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Abstract 
This study looks into the execution of arbitration awards in economically less-developed 
regions of the People’s Republic of China, aiming to update understanding of the execution 
status and problems hindering execution practices in the foregoing regions. Aside from 
reviewing secondary materials and published scholarly contributions, five methods, including 
collection of statistics from two intermediate courts and two arbitration commissions, survey 
by questionnaire, semi-structured interview, group interview and participant observation, 
were deployed to generate first-hand data in this study. Specifically, two provinces in China 
were chosen as the targets for study, while the interviewee pool consisted of eleven judges, 
thirteen lawyers, one senior official from an arbitration commission, two creditors and two 
professionals from different private debt collection agencies. Relying on the collected 
statistics and experience-based data, this study manages to depict the real-life execution of 
arbitral awards and general perceptions of commercial arbitration amid China’s legal 
community in the studied regions. Eight problems, namely, difficulty in asset tracking, 
inefficiency of judges, defaults of debtors, heavy burden of creditors, the influence of 
Chinese culture, flaws in China’s legislative framework, and poor quality of arbitral awards, 
are diagnosed as issues possibly constituting obstacles to execution. This study also unveils 
the role of the hitherto under-addressed private collection agencies in China’s current 
execution practices, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, through comparing their 
operations against those of the other two collection forces, namely, courts and lawyers. 
Moreover, this study exposes the impacts of China’s cultural heritage (i.e. ideologies 
concerning Li, De and He) and modern values (like worshipping money) on shaping Chinese 
parties’ legal awareness and execution-related behaviours. Finally, based on the outcomes of 
previous discussions, this study generates several suggestions on improving the general 
execution status in China respectively for the consideration of Chinese authorities and 
judicial force. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
1.1 Overview of the Thesis 
As an alternative dispute resolution (ADR), commercial arbitration is particularly appreciated 
for its transnational enforceability, compared with judgements.1 Yet, the shortage of empirical 
evidence portraying the real-life execution of arbitral awards (EAA) in the People’s Republic 
of China (hereinafter referred to as China or the PRC), particularly those economically less-
developed regions (ELDRs), throws doubt on the enforceability of arbitral awards in China, 
and further inflames concern about the development perspective of commercial arbitration in 
the country. To fill this gap and promote a better understanding of China’s current execution 
status, this thesis is produced upon the outcomes of an empirical study, which employed five 
research methods2 to collect execution statistics and experience-based data from Chinese 
courts, arbitration commissions, and practitioners in two ELDRs of China. Relying on first-
hand and secondary data from multiple sources, this thesis concludes that, notwithstanding 
scepticism about commercial arbitration amid the studied Chinese community, this ADR has 
achieved observable development in the two target regions, and the EAA in these regions 
appears to be a demanding, yet achievable, task. Seven issues, namely, difficulty in asset 
tracking, inefficiency of judicial collectors, identity and location of debtors, heavy burdens of 
creditors, the influence of cultural factors, China’s flawed legislative framework, and 
questionable quality of arbitral awards, are pinpointed in this thesis as key problems possibly 
thwarting the execution attempts of award creditors. This thesis also reveals the important role 
of the hitherto under-researched private collection forces in China’s current execution 
practices, through analytically comparing their operations against that of Chinese courts in 
seven aspects. Contextualising the outcomes of data analysis in China’s socio-cultural 
realities, the thesis proposes that four issues, including imbalance between developments of 
China’s economy and legal mechanism, immature development of professional collection 
agents (PCA), China’s complicated social conditions, and the impact of cultural beliefs, are 
less perceptible factors affecting the China-grounded EAA. Through expanding on how 
China’s cultural heritage and new values steer contemporary Chinese parties towards 
particular attitudes and behavioural patterns in the EAA, this thesis establishes the importance 
                                                          
1 M Utterback and others, 'Enforcing foreign arbitral awards in China – a review of the past twenty years' (Website of King & 
Wood Mallesons, 15 September 2016)<http://www.kwm.com/en/uk/knowledge/insights/enforcing-foreign-arbitral-awards-in-
china-20160915> accessed 1 May 2017 
2 For details of the research design, see Appendix A. Methodology. 
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of Chinese culture to future improvement of China’s execution practices. Finally, eight 
suggestions on improving China’s execution environment, highlighting the introduction of a 
multi-agent execution framework and the enhancement of cooperation between China’s 
judicial and scholarly circles, are raised by this thesis respectively for the consideration of 
Chinese authorities and judiciary.  It should be underscored that, due to the specifications of 
data resources and other practical restrictions3, the outcomes of this study are more applicable 
for the execution of domestic and foreign-related awards, than other types of awards. 
 
1.2 Context of Research  
Motivated by an awareness that the establishment of an arbitration-friendly environment can 
improve the confidence of foreign parties in conducting cross-border transactions with China, 
Chinese authorities have hitherto devoted considerable resources to advancing China’s 
arbitration-related regulatory framework and other supporting facilities.4 Commercial 
arbitration is now widely acknowledged as the most favourable alternative means of resolving 
disputes between foreign parties and their Chinese partners.5 However, despite such 
achievement, the ultimate enforceability of arbitral awards in China remains a debatable issue 
amongst legal scholars and business practitioners, where a sharp confrontation between 
Chinese and foreign opinions can be readily perceived.6  For instance, the incompetence of 
Chinese courts is frequently cited by the foreign community as an obstacle to the recognition 
and enforcement (R&E) of arbitral awards, whereas Chinese scholars apparently vouch for 
Chinese courts’ capacity to fulfil their duties, although acknowledging problems worth their 
further efforts.7  
                                                          
3 See 1.5 in Appendix A. Methodology. 
4 For instance, CIETAC, which stands for the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, is a major 
arbitration institution in China that has been constantly improving its arbitration practice and building a reputation for 
impartiality since its establishment in 1956. See YM Qin and others, 'Brief Description of CIETAC’s new Arbitration Rules 
(in Chinese)' (Website of Llinks Law Office, March 2012)< 
http://www.llinkslaw.com/uploadfile/publication/56_1422494907.pdf> accessed 1 January 2016. 
5 JA Cohen, 'Time to Fix China’s Arbitration' (Carnegieendowment.org, 18 April 2005) 
<http://carnegieendowment.org/pdf/2005-04-18/cohen_pub2.pdf> accessed 1 January 2016; W Zhu, 'Arbitration as the Best 
Option for the Settlement of China-African Trade and Investment Disputes' [2013] 57(1) Journal of African Law 149-163. 
6 Such dichotomy can be observed in almost all the existing literature. See E Reinstein, 'Finding a Happy Ending for Foreign 
Investors: The Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in the People's Republic of China' [2005] 16(1) Indiana International & 
Comparative Law Review 37-72, 51-52; F Brown and CA Rogers, 'The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational 
Disputes-A Survey of Trends in the People's Republic of China' [1997] 15 Berkeley Journal of International Law 329-351, 
341-343; A Chisling, 'The Problem is Enforcement' (Website of Canadian Lawyer, 3 September 
2012) <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/4307/The-problem-is-enforcement.html> accessed 26 August 2015; SB Shen 
and J Shen, 'Characteristics and Innovation of China’s Commercial Arbitration Mechanism(in Chinese)' [2010] 12 Fa Xue 
31-34.  
7 A Ye, 'Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Foreign Judgments in China' [2007] 74(3) Defense Counsel 
Journal 248-252; F D’souza, 'The Recognition and Enforcement of Commercial Arbitral Awards in the People’s Republic of 
China' [2006] 30(4) Fordham International Law Journal 1318-1359,1346-1348; FZ Yang, 'Recognition and Enforcement of 
Overseas Arbitral Awards in China: An Empirical Analysis (in Chinese)' [2009] 16(1) Journal of International Economic 
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Therein, one could detect four strikingly interesting facts, if closely observed. Initially, due to 
the scarcity of reliable data, both Chinese and foreign communities are compelled to base 
their arguments on hearsay evidence or a few reported cases.8 The absence of concrete 
empirical evidence nevertheless shakes the credibility of these arguments.9 Secondly, when 
talking about the enforceability of arbitral awards in China, the previous studies seemingly 
focus more on legal matters other than practical aspects. In reality, the enforcement of arbitral 
awards involves two consecutive stages: (1) the court-led stage for the R&E of arbitral awards, 
and (2) the execution stage. The literature indicates that the R&E of arbitral awards has 
remained a hot research topic for both Chinese and foreign scholars, and scholars are inclined 
to place more weights on discussing legal issues that affect this process, like flaws in China’s 
legislative framework.10 Comparatively, there is a paucity of empirical data or academic 
publications to describe the actual treatment received by arbitral awards at the post-R&E 
execution stage in China. Such evident lacuna constitutes a reasonable ground for prudent 
practitioners to entertain suspicion about the enforceability of arbitral awards within the Great 
Wall. Additionally, the problems accused of hindering enforcement of arbitral awards in 
China, like interference from local government or difficulty in locating assets of defaulting 
parties, are beyond the legal realm and associated with China’s practical peculiarities.11 Hence, 
it is research-worthy to explore real-life execution practices in China, to diagnose potential 
problems and propose solutions to ensure the materialisation of arbitral awards. Thirdly, 
discussions about two issues, respectively related to participation of China’s non-state 
collection forces and the role of China’s long-standing traditional culture in the EAA, have 
hitherto been missing from the majority of the literature about commercial arbitration in 
China. Understanding of China’s execution environment without addressing the performance 
of China’s PCAs, namely, lawyers and private collection agencies (PCAC), is palpably 
incomplete. Meanwhile, considering the role of culture in the formation of legal norms and 
practices, it is rational to analyse China’s execution status in its indigenous cultural context, 
so as to decipher the underlying values that direct Chinese execution practices. Fourthly, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Law 52-83; X He, ‘Debt Collection in the Less Developed Regions of China: An Empirical Study from a Basic-Level Court 
in Shaanxi Province’ [2011] 206 The China Quarterly 253-275. 
8 Reinstein(n6) 51-52 
9 ibid 
10 For instance, see D’souza (n7); SF Fu, 'Discussion about Nationality of International Arbitral Awards (in Chinese)' [2014] 
6 CUFE Law Review 252-263. 
11 For instance, see A Ye(n7); R Peerenboom, ‘Seeking Truth from facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards in the PRC’ in Drahozal (ed), Towards a Science of International Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research 
(Kluwer Law International, Hague 2005). 
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literature reveals that, compared with ELDRs, China’s tier-1 regions12 have apparently 
attracted great research attention, thanks to their comparatively advanced economic status, 
internationalised legal environment and developed arbitration practice.13 However, He 
explored that, because of the imbalanced development in economy and social infrastructure 
among different regions of China, legal advancements observed in China’s tier-1 cities were 
not shared by the rest of the country.14 It is not exaggerated to state that legal practices and the 
current status of EAA in China’s ELDRs have still remained underexplored.  
 
Therefore, an empirical investigation into China’s mechanism for the post-R&E EAA in the 
country’s ELDRs, which endeavours to unearth potential hindrances and devise 
corresponding solutions, will predictably carry considerable academic value. Deliberating 
over the contributions of the previous research and the unresolved issues, this study 
determines to take advantage of the author’s personal familiarity with Chinese culture and 
legal environment to depict and analyse the current situation of executing arbitral awards in 
China’s ELDRs from an insider’s angle.       
 
1.3 China’s Current Frameworks for the R&E and Execution of Arbitral Awards 
As mentioned above, China’s enforcement framework actually consists of two sub-
frameworks, which stipulate legislative and procedural settings respectively for the R&E 
process and execution.15 Herein, a sketch of how these two frameworks function is prepared 
to present background knowledge for later discussions. Theoretically speaking, the R&E 
process refers to a court-administered procedure for scrutinising the validity of arbitral awards 
and obtaining judicial approval for enforcement, which serves as a prerequisite for court-led 
compulsory execution against defaulting award debtors. However, execution in this thesis 
exclusively refers to the collection of valid arbitral awards against defaulting debtors either by 
creditors or collection agents (both judicial and private). 
 
                                                          
12 Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou are typical of tier-1 regions, featured by their comparatively advanced legal and 
economic status. See XM Luo and MQ Hu, 'The Complete List of 2016 Ranking of Chinese Cities: Ranking of 15 New Tier-
1 Cities (in Chinese)' (Mrcjcn.com, 26 August 2016) <http://www.mrcjcn.com/n/159771.html> accessed 8 September 2016 
13 This preference can be detected from the tendency of using the movements of CIETAC (headquarter in Beijing) to 
generalise the development of China’s arbitration practice in the literature, like Qin and others (n4). 
14 He (n7). 
15 K Fan, Arbitration in China: A Legal and Cultural Analysis (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2013) 9-28. 
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1.3.1 Framework for the R&E of arbitral awards 
As a signatory to multiple international conventions and treaties, China has formed and 
exercised its framework for the R&E of arbitral awards broadly in line with transnational 
standards, notwithstanding some conceptual discrepancies between Chinese and popular 
international practices.16  On a quick glance, two Chinese statutes (the 1995 Arbitration Law 
and the 2012 Civil Procedure Law17), conjoining with two central international treaties (i.e. 
New York Convention of 195818 and Washington Convention of 1965)19 and normative 
documents released by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) of China20, constitute the 
legislative framework directly governing the R&E of arbitral awards in mainland China.21 
Other Chinese regulations, like the 1999 Contract Law22, might affect the R&E of arbitral 
awards to varied degrees.  
 
Under this legislative framework, Chinese practice explicitly divides arbitral awards, upon the 
place where an award is rendered and the nationality of the arbitration body23, into four 
categories, including foreign24, foreign-related25, domestic26, and non-domestic awards.27 It is 
                                                          
16 ibid. 
17 Hereunder referred to as the 2012 CPL. 
18 China joined in the club of the 1958 N.Y.C. signatory countries with “reciprocity” and “commerciality” reservations, 
which meant that “China shall apply the Convention to arbitral awards made in the territory of other contracting states only 
on the basis of reciprocity” and only apply to disputes as to “commercial legal relationships of a contractual nature or non-
contractual nature”. See A Chen, ‘Is Enforcement of Arbitral Awards an Issue for Consideration and Improvement?—The 
Case of China’[2005], 2 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/40/36054525.pdf> accessed 20 March 2015. 
19 The application of these two treaties is officially recognised in Article 260 of the 2012 CPL. 
20 These normative documents, which work on giving detailed instructions to assist lower courts’ law implementation and 
tackling problems that could be caused by the loopholes or contestable provisions in the published statutes, enjoy exclusively 
binding effect on lower courts and, hence, pose significant influence on China’s legal practice. Yet, these normative 
documents are inferior to the pertinent statutes. As to the R&E, attention should be paid to Interpretation on Application of 
the 2012 CPL (Known as the 2015 Interpretation). See CL Chen, 'Status and Function of Chinese Judicial Interpretation (in 
Chinese)' [2003] 1 China Legal Science 24-32, 26; X Huang and others, 'Interpretation of the SPC on Application of the Civil 
Procedural Law of the PRC (in Chinese)' (Westlaw China, 13 February 2015) 
<http://www.westlawchina.com/NewsLetter/view.php?id=164> accessed 15 October 2016 
21 Fan(n15) 71-91 
22 For instance, the 1999 Contract Law contains no stipulation allowing Chinese firms to resort to foreign arbitration bodies 
to hear disputes of purely domestic nature. In the case Beijing Chaolai Xinsheng Sport Leisure Co. Ltd. Vs. Beijing Suowang 
Zhixin Investment Consultant Co. Ltd.(2014), two Chinese companies entrusted the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board to 
solve their disputes about a domestic contract. Finally, the SPC ruled to reject enforcement of this award for invalidity of the 
concerned arbitration agreement, which allowed two Chinese firms to “submit the dispute without foreign elements to 
offshore arbitration institutions”. See X Dong and others, 'International Commercial Dispute Resolution Newsletter (in 
Chinese & English)' (Website of An Jie Law Firm, December 2014) < http://en.anjielaw.com/downloadRepository/73c167c1-
083d-4eb0-8ce9-054bb7c2eb1c.pdf> accessed 15 October 2016. 
23 SF Fu (n10) 258; ZS Tang and others, Conflicts of Laws in the People’s Republic of China (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 
178-179 
24 Foreign award refers to those rendered outside the sovereign territory of China by institutional or ad hoc arbitrations.  
25 Foreign-related awards are those rendered by Chinese domestic arbitration commissions (like CIETAC and CMAC), and 
concerning disputes that stem from one of the following situations: (1) “one party or both parties are foreigner, stateless 
persons, foreign enterprises, or foreign organisations”; (2) “the legal fact of establishment, modification, or termination of the 
civil legal relationship between the parties occurred in a foreign country”; (3) “the object of the action is located in a foreign 
country”. See Article 522 of the 2015 Interpretation.  
26 Domestic awards embrace those issued by Chinese domestic arbitration commissions and just concerning Chinese parties. 
27 China’s existing legislations have hitherto given no statutory definition of non-domestic awards, but precedents indicated 
that China-related awards delivered by foreign arbitration institutions within the boundary of China were labelled as non-
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worth clarifying that, by virtue of mutual agreements28 signed by the mainland with Hong 
Kong and Macau respectively, awards from these two regions could receive similar treatment 
to the conventional awards in the mainland, whilst the R&E of Taiwanese arbitral awards is 
subject to a series of nominative documents issues by the SPC (i.e. Provisions on Recognition 
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards rendered by Taiwan).29  For foreign, foreign-related and 
domestic awards, Chinese courts traditionally maintain a “two-prong” approach in reviewing 
their R&E: foreign and foreign-related awards are only scrutinised for procedural 
irregularities30, whereas domestic awards seemingly encounter more strict and substantial 
censorship31, which examines both the merit of these awards and the regularity of the 
corresponding procedures.32 Meanwhile, Chinese courts have not reached a consensus on 
judicial treatments for non-domestic awards.33  Hence, nationality is a crucial factor to 
consider when discussing the R&E of arbitral awards in China.  
 
Procedurally speaking, a creditor is entitled to apply for the R&E of an award to a competent 
Chinese court34 within a two-year period.35 It is also worth mentioning that the trialling 
division for civil matters in a Chinese court handles the applications for the R&E of arbitral 
awards, whereas an application for enforcement can be directly heard by the court’s Judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
domestic awards. For the definitions of the foregoing four types of awards, see R Peerenboom, ‘The Evolving Regulatory 
Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the People’s Republic of China’[2000] 12(1) Asian-Pacific Law &Policy 
Journal 1-69, 11; SF Fu (n10) 258, 259-261; ZS Tang and others (n23) 178-179 
28 Referring to ‘Arrangements of the Supreme People's Court on the Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the 
Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’, Fa Shi [2000] 3, 
<http://www.szac.org/data/detail.aspx?MenuID=0103070102&id=297>, accessed 20 March 2015; ‘Arrangements of the 
Supreme People's Court on the Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the Macau Special 
Administrative Region (in Chinese)’, Fa Shi [2007] 17, available on website of CIETAC at <http://cn.cietac.org>. 
29 B Howes and H Chen, ‘Commercial Arbitration: China’ (gor.com 2013) <http://globalarbitrationreview.com/know-
how/topics/61/jurisdictions/27/china/> accessed 25 March 2015;  J Leyda, ‘A Uniform, Internationally Oriented Legal 
Framework for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan?’, 
[2007] 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 2, 345-361; YF Lin, 'Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards between Both Sides (of the Taiwan Strait, in Chinese)' (Official Website of Shijiazhuang Arbitration Commission, 8 
November 2015) <http://www.sjzzc.gov.cn/html/news/2015/1108/2302.html> accessed 6 October 2016 
30 Article 274, 282 and 283 of the 2012 CPL instruct courts to review these two kinds of awards upon criteria outlined in 
Article V of the New York Convention. 
31 Article 237 of the 2012 CPL states seven grounds for setting aside or refusing to enforce domestic awards, and allows 
judicial review over the authenticity and sufficiency of evidence, which observably differs from the British practice. 
32 LB Song and LM Peng, 'Annual Observation on Chinese Commercial Arbitration (in Chinese)' (Bjac.org.cn, 2013) 
<http://www.bjac.org.cn/attached/file/20150430/zhongcaiguancha.pdf> accessed 14 October 2016. 
33 Chinese courts ruled contradictorily in two cases, namely, Zublin International GmbH vs. Wuxi Woco-Tongyong Bubber 
Engineering Co. (2004) and DUFERCOS.A. vs. Ningbo Gong Yi Pin Export & Import Co. (2009), which both concerned 
R&E of ICC awards that were rendered in mainland China. See XW Zhao, 'Discussion on the Nationality of ICC Award (in 
Chinese)' [2005] 5 Journal of Political Science and Law 71-74; L Chen, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of China-seated 
Arbitral Awards rendered by ICC (in Chinese)’ [2010] Studies in Law and Business 6, 80-89, 80-81; XH Liu, 'Theory and 
Empirical Analysis of Non-domestic Arbitral awards (in Chinese)' [2013] 5 Law Science Magazine 77-87; W Gao, 
'Discussion on Nationality of Arbitral Awards-Analysis of Dual-standard in China's Legal Practice (in Chinese)' [2011] 41(5) 
Journal of Northwest University 153-157, 156 
34 According to Article 273 of the 2012 CPL, the power of enforcing arbitral awards rests on intermediate courts, where the 
defendant has the place of his habitual residence or the place where the related property is situated. 
35 Article 239 of the 2012 CPL. 
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Execution Bureau (JEB).36 Thanks to this legislative framework and the arbitration-friendly 
procedural setting of judicial review (i.e. the Pre-report system37), the R&E of arbitral awards, 
especially foreign and foreign-related ones, could witness the application of many 
transnational practices, typically in terms of interim measures and criteria for the R&E.38 In 
cases where the R&E applications are declined, creditors could obtain two remedies, namely, 
re-arbitrating or filling a lawsuit about the concerned dispute to a competent court, by virtue 
of Article 275 of the 2012 CPL. Otherwise, creditors could always seek the enforcement of 
their awards in other jurisdictions where defaulting parties have assets.39 
 
According to the literature, China’s current framework for the R&E of arbitral awards 
seemingly suffers from several problems. Firstly, the dual criteria for determining the 
nationality of arbitral awards deviate from international practices40, and trigger issues about 
definition and judicial treatment of non-domestic awards.41 Secondly, this legislative 
framework, which offers differentiated judicial treatments to awards in line with their 
nationalities, perceptibly disadvantages domestic awards42 and leaves non-domestics awards 
unattended. Thirdly, this framework still fails to incorporate some important transnational 
practices, typically like recognition of ad hoc arbitration, full respect of party autonomy and 
the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz.43 Fourthly, this framework denies a third party’s right 
                                                          
36 JEB has been incorporated into China’s judicial system since 2001, with an organisational framework both 
administratively and financially independent from trialling departments of Chinese courts. See T Jiang and XB Cheng, 
'Reform of Civil Enforcement Mechanism: Reflections on Problems and Future Development (in Chinese)' [2014] 3 People’s 
Judicature 104-108; SM Dong, 'Judicial Remedies for Arbitral Awards under the Principle of Finality (in Chinese)' (Website 
of China Academy of Arbitration Law, 18 December 2015) <http://www.arbitration.org.cn/academiccollection/1247.jhtml> 
accessed 14 October 2016 
37 By virtue of Notice on Issues about Handling Matters Associated with Foreign-related and Foreign Arbitration by 
People's Courts (1995) and Provisions on Fees and Period of Reviewing for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (1998) of the SPC, China has established an internal control system that centralises the power of denying the 
R&E of foreign and foreign-related awards to the SPC. Under this system, an intermediate court must obtain approval from 
its affiliated High People’s Court and the SPC before delivering its refusal to recognise or enforce the related award. See SM 
Dong (n36); H Li, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Court Intervention in the People’s Republic of China’ [2004] 
20 Arbitration International 167-178, 172 
38 Song and Peng (n32); Fan(n15) 9-28 
39 J Fei and R Hill, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC. in MJ Moser (ed), Dispute Resolution in China (Juris 
Publishing 2012) 157-236, 188-189 
40 The Western and some Asian countries, like the U.S.A, Germany and South Korea, use where seat of arbitration as the sole 
criterion to determine the nationality of arbitral award. See RT Qin, 'A Comparative Study on the Implementation System of 
the Arbitral Awards between the Chinese and German Legal System (in Chinese) ' [2010] 5 Nankai Journal (Philosophy, 
Literature and Social Science Edition) 107-115 
41 W Gao (n33) 156-157; SF Fu (n10) 259-261; C Mun, 'Enforcing Arbitral Awards in China' (Bird & Bird, 30 May 
2012) <https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2012/enforcing-arbitral-awards-in-china> accessed 20 March 2015; L 
Chen (n33) 80-81. 
42 YN Zhao, 'Discussion about the Dual-Trail System of judicial Review over Arbitration in China (in Chinese)' [2016] 23(8) 
Legal System and Society 31-32; Fan(n15) 32 
43 XY Yu and M Ye, 'Some Issues about Modifications to Arbitration Law (in Chinese)' (Website of Wuhan Arbitration 
Commission, 29 August 2014) < http://www.whac.org.cn/index.php/index-view-aid-916.html> accessed 14 October 2016; 
ZW Fei, 'Suggestions about Modification to China's Arbitration Law (in Chinese)' (Cncietac.org, 2007) 
<http://cn.cietac.org/magzine/99-9.shtml> accessed 14 October 2016; QH Zhou, ' Flourishing of the Principle of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz and Reflections on Chinese Kompetenz-Kompetenz System (in Chinese)' (Website of China Academy of 
Arbitration Law, 20 November 2015) <http://www.arbitration.org.cn/academiccollection/1227.jhtml> accessed 14 October 
2016. 
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to apply for the R&E of arbitral award.44 Besides, Lord suggested that China could further 
improve its procedural rules about the enforcement of arbitral awards in six aspects, 
respectively about timeframe for debtors to raise objections, arrangement of enforcement 
hearing, decision-making process of courts, operation of the entrustment mechanism, 
conditions for suspending or terminating an enforcement proceeding, timeframe for the R&E 
process, and further simplification of Chinese regulations.45  
 
Nonetheless, the aforementioned problems cannot completely obliterate the efficacy of 
China’s R&E framework. Through studying 111 replies of the SPC about the R&E of foreign 
and foreign-related awards from 1997 to 2014, this study detects that foreign and foreign-
related awards could enjoy friendly treatment by virtue of the NY Convention, and a 
preferential attitude towards arbitration is shared by Chinese courts.46 The procedural setting 
under China’s current R&E framework is also standardised and easy-to-follow, though still 
having some ambiguities about the judicial process and time limit.47 Additionally, the R&E of 
arbitral awards, which exclusively falls within the jurisdiction of Chinese courts, can be 
supervised or interfered by other Chinese judicial organs (i.e. People's Procuratorates48 and 
Commission for Discipline Inspection49), which could further ensure the judicial performance 
when reviewing arbitral awards.50 Moreover, the updated 2015 CIETAC Arbitration rules51 
and Shanghai’s revolutionary reforms in arbitration (2014)52 heralded the increasing 
                                                          
44 SM Dong(n36) 
45 SJ Lord, 'The Procedure for Enforcement of Foreign-related and Foreign Arbitral Awards in the People’s Republic of 
China: Is There a Need for Reform?' [2015] 11(1) Kluwer Law International 1-47 
46 Among the 111 cases, the SPC wholly or partially overturned decisions of the lower courts in 50 cases (36 cases for the 
R&E of foreign-related awards and 14 for foreign awards), whereas upholding the rest 61 decisions. In particular, over the 
period from 2009 to 2014, the replies of the SPC overturned 15 rulings of lower courts, respectively permitting the R&E for 
10 foreign-related awards and 5 foreign awards. Meanwhile, among the concerned 111 cases, 6 foreign-related awards 
escaped the fate of being set aside, and were requested to re-arbitrate. Two foreign-related awards were given partial 
annulment, and 3 foreign-related awards enjoyed partial enforcement. Merely one foreign award was ruled with partial 
enforcement. Those cases are collected from the Website at http://www.pkulaw.cn.  
47 SJ Lord(n45). 
48 People’s Procuratorates are in charge of prosecution, investigation and supervision over legal activities. They have 
independent rights to conduct investigation, issue arrest warrant, and supervise operations of courts and individual judges. 
See W Dan and F Huang, 'Comparison between the Chinese and Western Procuratorial Systems (in Chinese)' (China-
judge.com, 2000) <http://www.china-judge.com/fnsx2/fnsx1462.htm> accessed 20 October 2016. 
49 This China-exclusive disciplinary watchdog is established to supervise and punish members of the Communist Party at all 
levels, who violate the law or the Party’s regulations, via its sprawling branch network. Learnt from its website at 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/.  
50 Article 43 and 235 of the 2012 CPL. See X Huang and others, 'Modifications to the Civil Procedural Law (in Chinese)' 
(Junhe.com, 10 September 2012) <http://www.junhe.com/images/ourpublications/201351716413697005.pdf> accessed 15 
October 2016 
51 LB Song and others, '2015 Annual Observation on Chinese Commercial Arbitration (in Chinese)' (Sina Blog, 17 March 
2016) <http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6f3797170102w7uv.html> accessed 14 October 2016 
52 As one of China’s free-trade zones, Shanghai set up a court specifically for handling arbitration-related cases and 
promulgated its individual arbitration rules. Compared with the 1995 Arbitration Law, Shanghai FTZ Arbitration Rules, 
which came into the effect in May 2014, shares the arbitration-friendly spirit of the former, but adopts more transnational 
arbitration practice and particularly strives to offer more favourable provisions on party autonomy, authority of tribunal, 
interim measures, consolidation and joinder of third parties. See DJ Yuan, 'Exploration and Innovation of Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism in Shanghai Free-Trade Zone (in Chinese)' [2014] 9 Legal Science Monthly 28-34, 32; J Pandjaitan and J Tang, 
'Shanghai Free Trade Zone Implements Modern Arbitration Rules' (Kluwer Arbitration Blog 2014) 
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internationalisation of China’s arbitration mechanism, which would subsequently facilitate the 
R&E of arbitral awards.  
 
Hence, despite the aforementioned problems, China’s current mechanism for the R&E of 
arbitral awards is relatively advanced and reconcilable with international practices, which 
could at least furnish foreign and foreign-related awards with a sound guarantee for their 
R&E.53 The efficacy of this framework is principally conditioned by the comprehensiveness 
of Chinese legislations and the efficiency of China’s judiciary, considering the court-
administered nature of the R&E process.   
 
1.3.2 Framework for the Execution of arbitral awards 
Compared with the R&E process that chiefly works within the judicial sphere and enjoys rich 
sources of law, the EAA is entirely under the radar of China’s national statutes and subject to 
China’s socio-cultural peculiarities, thereby appearing to be isolated from international 
practices.54 The oft-cited issue of ‘difficulty in enforcement’ in Chinese literature55 and the 
SPC’s reports56 chiefly refers to problems emerging during the execution process. In the 
absence of a statute exclusively governing coercive execution, China’s current execution-
concerned legislative framework consists of two components, including the 2012 CPL and 
nominative documents released by the SPC57, while other Chinese substantive statutes that 
tackle property-related rights or commercial-natured matters (e.g. 2007 PRC Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law and 2007 PRC Property Rights Law) might be consulted on a case-by-case 
basis.58 Under this framework, arbitral awards, regardless of their nationality, are superficially 
subject to the same legal treatment and execution status as judgements or other legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/07/02/shanghai-free-trade-zone-implements-modern-arbitration-rules/> 
accessed 10 February 2015. 
53 WP Zhang, 'The Development of Reformation and Innovation of Chinese International Business Arbitration under the 
Frame of the WTO (in Chinese)' (China Legal Science, 2004) <http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showNews.asp?id=5756> accessed 
20 February 2016; AJ Farina, '”Talking Disputes Into Harmony" China Approaches International Commercial 
Arbitration' [1989] 4(1) American University International Law Review 137-171,153-154.  
54 Inferred from comments of Interviewee 6. 
55 For instance, see GY Wu, 'Difficulty in Enforcement Reflected by the Story of How a Seed Baron Became a Habitual 
Defaulter (in Chinese)' (Xinhua Net, 8 August 2016) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2016-08/08/c_135574141.htm> 
accessed 10 August 2016; Q Xue, 'Analysis of Causes and Solutions to Difficulty in Enforcement (in Chinese)' (Website of 
Jiangsu Court, 6 September 2016) <http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/xwzx2014/llyj/xslw/2016/09/06150354219.html> accessed 15 
October 2016. 
56 For instance, see its 2015 Work Report, available in Chinese at 
http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2015npc/n/2015/0312/c394473-26681821-2.html. 
57 YF Lin, 'Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in China: Judicial Practice from 1987 to 2007 (in 
Chinese)' (Website of South China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, 18 August 2014) 
<www.sccietac.org/download/files/periodical/20140818105146.doc> accessed 13 June 2016 
58 ZX Xu, 'The Supreme People's Court: Analysis of Practical Application of Execution-related Regulations in 100 Execution 
Cases (in Chinese) ' (Chinalawinfo.com, 4 February 2016) 
<http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleFullText.aspx?ArticleId=94909> accessed 15 October 2016 
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instruments with binding effects in China.59 This suggests that there is little value in 
evaluating the China-grounded EAA in accordance with the nationalities of awards.  
 
Pursuant to Part III of the 2012 CPL, Chinese courts are the sole force to compel defaulting 
debtors to honour arbitral awards. Creditors could legitimately resort to the intermediate court 
“at the place of domicile of” the debtor or “at the place where the property under enforcement 
is located”60 within two years61 to initiate court-led compulsory execution against defaulters 
in China. Once an application for execution is approved by a court’s JEB after undergoing an 
up-to-15-day preliminary review, judges are expected to complete their operations within six 
months.62 This six-month execution period might be extended upon approval of the higher-
ranking courts.63 To facilitate their execution operations, courts are empowered to utilise the 
following approaches at their discretion: (1) seizing, freezing, transferring, auctioning or 
selling the property of defaulting debtors (e.g. deposits, bonds, stocks, fund shares and other 
properties), and (2) withholding or withdrawing a portion of the debtors’ incomes.64  
Meanwhile, courts could issue search warrants to discover defaulters’ hidden assets65, and 
fine or detain debtors for resisting court-led execution.66 In a case where execution is 
terminated due to a debtor’s insolvency, the debtor shall maintain the burden of his/her 
obligations, whilst the creditor reserves the right to reinitiate execution at any time, whenever 
discovering any enforceable property of the debtor.67  Besides, creditors could hire lawyers or 
freelance PCACs to collect their awards. Noticeably, private debt collection is not recognised 
as a legitimate industry in China, so PCACs are compelled to stay incognito, most likely 
under the cover of a financial consultant company.68  
 
Theoretically speaking, this framework envisages problems in three aspects. Initially, the 
literature accused China’s legislative framework of being impractical, imprecise and 
inconsistent, since China’s execution practices were ruled by the fragmentary provisions in 
                                                          
59 Inferred from Chapter 19 and 26 of the 2012 CPL. 
60 Article 58 of the 1945 Arbitration Law and Article 273 of the 2012 CPL. 
61 This period starts counting down after the expiration of deadline for performance specified in an award. Article 239 of the 
CPL. 
62 Article 225 and 226 of the 2012 CPL. 
63 Article 226 of the 2012 CPL, and Provisions of the SPC on Some Time Limits for Enforcement Cases by People’s Courts 
(the 2006 Provisions), available in Chinese at http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-gengduo-16.html?page=10. 
64 Article 242, 243 and 244 of the 2012 CPL. 
65 Article 248 of the 2012 CPL. 
66 Article 241 of the 2012 CPL. 
67 Article 254 of the 2012 CPL and Article 519 of the 2015 Interpretation. 
68 X Xu, ‘State’s Attitude: Expression and Practice of Private Debt Collection and Private Remedy (in Chinese)’ [2004] 16(1) 
Zhong Wai Fa Xue 19-32. 
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the 2012 CPL and the SPC’s nominative instructions, while influenced by other statutes.69 For 
instance, Article 19 and 20 of 2007 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law state that 
implementation of interim measures, execution of an award and an on-going arbitration 
process shall be consequently terminated, if the concerned debtor’s application for bankruptcy 
is accepted by a competent court. These provisions could substantially disadvantage 
commercial arbitration, because they could give generous leeway for debtors to use the 
bankruptcy process to escape from honouring awards.70 Meanwhile, the standard execution 
procedure seems to permit prolonged operations and offer little remedies to the grievant 
creditors. Apart from weaknesses in the legislative framework, the EAA is also complicated 
by the involvement of multiple stakeholders (e.g. record-holding institutions)71 in locating and 
transforming the target assets.72 Particularly, policies and involvement of six governmental 
record-holding departments, namely, local Revenue Bureau, Audit Bureau, Vehicle 
Administrative Department of Traffic Management Bureau, Public Security Bureau, Housing 
Management Bureau and City Construction Bureau, request mindful observation, because 
their departmental regulations could pose unwelcomed impacts on execution.73 For instance, 
judges’ legitimate inquiries into debtors’ real estate properties might be declined by the 
Housing Management Bureau on the ground of vagueness or privacy protection, if they intent 
to launch name-based general searches without presenting detailed demographic information 
of the debtors and precise addresses of the properties.74  Meanwhile, the execution capacity of 
Chinese courts has long been questioned, merely considering complaints about difficulty in 
execution75 and inferred from statements of the SPC in Guidelines for Implementing the 
Decision that Uses Two or Three Years to Basically Solve Difficulty in Execution.76 Besides, 
the efficacy of China’s execution framework might be restrained by the country’s socio-
cultural conditions, so inferred from Chinese opinions about causes of difficulty in court-led 
execution77 and foreign arguments about obstacles to execution78.  
                                                          
69 Q Xue(n55); ZY Qu and WS Yang, 'Conflicts and Solutions of Insolvency and International Commercial Arbitration' 
[2014] 32(7) Hebei Law Science 177-184, 181 
70 Qu and Yang (n69) 181-183 
71 An exclusive list of those organizations that might be consulted in execution proceedings can be found in the notices issued 
by the SPC, like Notice on Release of Opinions on Establishing and Perfecting Joint Enforcement Mechanism [2010] Fa Fa 
15. 
72 CR Li, 'Brief Discussion on Causes and Countermeasures of Difficulties to Judicial Execution (in Chinese)'[2016] 9 Legal 
System and Society 193-194 
73 Deduced from the answers to Q16 or 17 in questionnaires. 
74 X Lu, 'Central Media Heavily Criticise the Tight Control over Searching Property through Individuals' Names (in Chinese)' 
(people.cn 2013) < http://finance.people.com.cn/stock/n/2013/0219/c67815-20527686.html> accessed 25 March 2015. 
75 For instance, see A Ye(n7); HD Li and HW Li, 'Study of Causes and Countermeasures of Difficulties to Civil Enforcement 
(in Chinese)' [2016] 31 Legal System and Society 197-198. 
76 This document was released on 11 May 2016 at http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-20752.html. 
77 For instance, see ZX Kou, 'Difficulty in Enforcement: Causes and Countermeasures (in Chinese)' [2002] 20(3) Hebei Law 
Science 148-150; YP Liu, 'Brief Discussion on Causes and Countermeasures of Difficulties to Civil Enforcement (in 
Chinese)' [2016] 6 Human Resource Management 254-255.  
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In short, compared with the more mutual and internationalised R&E framework, China’s 
execution mechanism seems to be problematic, and susceptible to both legal and practical 
matters. Yet, though ‘difficulty in execution’ is a widely-recognised problem amid the 
academic circle and Chinese authorities, little research resources79 have been devoted to 
assessing the practical efficiency of China’s execution mechanism and exploring the 
underlying problems that affect the real-life EAA. Such situation inspired this thesis to dive 
into an empirical study of this under-explored area.  
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study aims to explore the following questions: 
i. What is the current status of the EAA in China’s ELDRs? 
• What are gaps between legislative prescriptions and the practical EAA? 
• What are the problems emerging in the real-life EAA? 
• Why could these execution-unfriendly problems exist? 
ii. How do Chinese parties manage to win success under China’s current execution 
circumstance? 
• What approaches would Chinese creditors adopt for the materialisation of their 
entitlements? 
• How do China’s courts conduct their execution operations? 
• How do Chinese private collection forces pursue execution?  
• How do the operations of Chinese judicial and private collection forces differ from 
each other? What are the implications of these dissimilarities for further 
improvement of China’s execution framework? 
iii. What role does culture play in the EAA? 
• Why is it important to study China’s contemporary legal practices in its cultural 
context? 
• To what extent does China’s arbitration practice fit in with its culture? 
• To what extent could Chinese culture shape the China-grounded EAA? 
• What are implications of these discoveries? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
78 For instance, see Peerenboom(n11) 255; J Pien, 'Creditor Rights and Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitral 
Awards in China' [2007] 45(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 586-632, 598-599. 
79 Crucial literature about the China-grounded EAA for this study are detailed in S2.2 below.  
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1.5 Approaches80 
This study adopted an empirical approach to explore the EAA in China’s ELDRs, amid 
Chinese parties with diversified professional backgrounds and personal experiences in 
frontline execution practices. This arrangement was employed upon two considerations: (1) 
empirical legal study could empower researchers to collect first-hand data to answer questions 
that were otherwise unaddressed by the existing secondary information81; (2) it could shed 
greater light on legal phenomena through critically vetting “numerical or non-numerical” data 
from various sources.82 Conducting an empirical research among Chinese practitioners could, 
therefore, assist this study in generating a close-range observation of latest execution practices 
in the concerned regions, to spotlight issues worth further attention and reforms. In view of 
the foregoing theories, this study decided to follow the data-centred approach, which meant 
that it implemented the field investigation without pre-defined hypotheses and formed 
theories alongside the progression of the research. Specifically, four groups of informants 
from two selected regions83, including judges, lawyers, creditors, and PCACs, were invited to 
anonymously participate in this study, to benefit from their familiarity with the regional 
execution environment and cultures. Five methods, namely, collection of execution statistics 
from local courts and arbitration institutions, questionnaire survey, semi-structured interview, 
group interview and participant observation, were utilised for data collection to ensure the 
diversity of data sources. In total, this study collected 33 valid questionnaires from judges and 
lawyers, and interviewed 29 informants to obtain experience-based data about execution 
reality in the studied regions. Data from interviews and the questionnaire survey were 
processed along with statistics from different institutions and other secondary materials to 
portray the status quo of the EAA in the concerned regions from an insider’s perspective, 
focusing on the identification of existing obstacles to execution and depiction of Chinese 
practitioners’ perceptions towards the broad execution environment in China. This study also 
engaged in participant observation on the operations of a PCAC, to obtain first-hand 
knowledge about this hitherto under-researched profession in China. The outcomes of this 
participant observation allowed this study to enrich people’s understanding of China’s 
execution practices from a new angle, and produced materials for this study to conduct a 
comparative performance analysis among Chinese judicial and non-judicial collection agents 
to shed lights on future reform of the country’s execution mechanism. Finally, all collected 
                                                          
80 See Appendix A. Methodology for details of the research design. 
81 A Bradney, ‘Choosing Law, Choosing Families: Images of Law, Love and Authority in “Buffy the Vampire Slayer”’[2003] 
2 WebJCLI, citied in DC Watkins and M Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 55. 
82 LJ Epstein and AD Martin, An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research (OUP Oxford 2014) 3 
83 See Appendix A. Methodology for descriptions of these two regions. 
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data was analysed comprehensively to explore the elements that fuel the persistent presence of 
obstacles to the EAA in China, highlighting the impacts of less-addressed cultural factors. By 
adopting such arrangement, this study managed to shake off personal assumptions about 
China’s legal practices, which originated from previous knowledge and practice of the author, 
and generated productive outcomes upon multi-sourced data to answer the pre-defined 
research questions.   
 
1.6 Main Contents of the Thesis 
This thesis is structurally divided into eight chapters. Directly after this introductory chapter 
comes the portion reviewing the literature about the development of commercial arbitration 
practice and enforcement of arbitral awards in China, which were contributed by legal 
scholars and practitioners, at home or overseas. Through honouring the contributions of the 
literature, this review demonstrates the theoretic foundation buttressing this study and 
justifying the needs to explore the defined research questions. The third chapter presents a 
succinct background discussion on the key notions in Chinese cultural and legal traditions, 
which could in theory affect China’s contemporary legal and execution operations, due to 
their far-reaching impacts on Chinese people’s social behaviours and legal perceptions. Then, 
the fourth chapter reports, upon the collected statistics and data, the recent development of 
commercial arbitration and the status quo of the EAA in the studied regions. Discussions in 
this chapter forms a general impression of the execution environment in the target regions, 
highlighting the gaps between legislative prescriptions and the practical EAA. Chapter V 
focuses on ascertaining obstacles to execution largely pursuant to the experiences of 
interviewees and results of the questionnaire survey. Meanwhile, this chapter also depicts the 
approaches adopted by Chinese parties to pursue success in execution. Expanding the 
discussions about problems associated with collection agents in Chapter V, Chapter VI 
delivers a comparative analysis of China’s three mainstream collection agents, namely, courts, 
lawyers and PCACs, to display their respective fortes and weaknesses. This analysis generates 
supporting evidence for this study’s proposition about updating China’s current execution 
framework into a well-supervised multi-agent one. Afterwards, Chapter VII contextualises the 
findings of this study in the literature to unveil four deeply-embedded factors accountable for 
the existence of the identified obstacles to execution, respectively as to China’s social 
conditions, legal framework, development of collection agents, and the impact of cultural 
beliefs. The main objective of this chapter rests on raising an awareness of the less-perceptible 
impact of Chinese culture on the EAA. Finally, Chapter VIII summarises the results of the 
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previous discussions, and then furnishes China’s authorities and judicial force with some 
suggestions for further improving China’s execution environment to promote the EAA. 
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Chapter 2. Overview of Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration 
and Execution of Arbitral Awards in China 
The literature tells that commercial arbitration has already cemented its position as a 
favourable resolution for China-related business disputes, both domestic and transnational.84 
However, despite this positive recognition, doubts about the actual enforceability of arbitral 
awards in China has never stopped tormenting legal practitioners and scholars, largely due to 
the paucity of concrete statistics and empirical evidence about the practicalities of execution 
inside the Great Wall.85 Meanwhile, Fan claimed that, although apparently observing the same 
global protocols as its Western counterparts, Chinese arbitration practice indeed harboured 
distinctive characteristics, which could be attributed to China’s unique cultural background 
and traditions.86 Yet, there is hitherto no academic publication particularly elaborating the 
impact of Chinese culture on the country’s execution practice. Therefore, the actual 
enforceability of arbitral awards in China, together with the real-life China-grounded 
execution of arbitral awards (EAA) and the role of Chinese culture in execution, stand as 
three topics worth academic attention. This chapter aims to present an encapsulated account 
of the published scholarly viewpoints about China’s arbitration practice and execution status, 
to explain the gaps that this research intends to fill and to justify the design of this research. In 
the light of the literature, this chapter commences with a section showcasing the development 
of commercial arbitration in China, to verify the necessity for this study to empirically explore 
the defined research theme upon China’s real-life practices. Next, this chapter summarises the 
findings of two scholars, who respectively contributed illuminating insights into China’s 
execution operations, to depict the current range of scholarly views in relation to the 
execution status of arbitral awards in the country. Meanwhile, execution statistics, 
respectively released by the Supreme People’s Court of China (SPC) and Arbitration Research 
Institute (ARI) of China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC), are also consulted to generate a comparison with the foregoing findings of the 
outside observers. The third section presents Fan’s viewpoints about how Chinese culture 
affected the country’s arbitration practice. Afterwards, through analysing the merits and 
limitations of the previous research, this fourth section establishes where and in what respects 
                                                          
84 J Graeme, 'Bridging the Gap Between Western and Chinese Arbitration Systems: A Practical Introduction for Businesses' 
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Selection of Pitfalls (Maklu 2009) 9; Fan(n15) 1; G Pisacane and others, Arbitration in China: Rules & Perspectives 
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85 Discussed in Section 1.2. 
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the literature leaves questions about arbitration in China unaddressed and, hence, the necessity 
for this study to pursue the research questions itemised in Chapter I. Finally, this chapter gives 
a brief justification of the intended research design of this study.  
   
2.1 General Development of Commercial Arbitration in China  
Tracking its historic root, China’s contemporary arbitration practice was introduced in 1979 
as an ADR mechanism, chiefly to comfort foreign practitioners, who generally harbour a 
long-standing distrust of China’s Judiciary.87  To boost practitioners’ confidence in its 
arbitration mechanism, China chose to transplant globally accepted rules and practices into 
the formation of its arbitration institutions and legal framework, but with some reservations 
and adjustments.88 This makes commercial arbitration in China differ from both international 
practices and traditional Chinese extra-judicial dispute resolution, like mediation.89 China’s 
med-arb practice, where arbitrators simultaneously assume the role of mediators to encourage 
the disputing parties to mediate their disputes at any stage, could be the best example 
supporting the previous statements.90 
 
Ever since its early stage of development, arbitration in China has been receiving many 
criticisms, largely revolving around the efficacy of its legislative framework91, the 
appropriateness of its unique practices (e.g. the dual-track system for the R&E of arbitral 
award)92, the credibility of Chinese arbitration commissions93, the competence of Chinese 
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courts94, and the ultimate enforceability of arbitral awards.95 Such sceptical attitude amongst 
the academia and practitioners was attributed to operational matters that were unique to 
Chinese arbitration practice, like the absence of reliable information and reports of court 
decisions.96  Actually, the scarcity of reliable empirical evidence justifies why the literature 
chiefly concentrated their attention on legal matters about the R&E of arbitral awards and 
arbitration practice in China’s economically advanced regions (e.g. Shanghai), which enjoyed 
more publicity.  It also contributes to the status of Peerenboom’s empirical study97 into 
enforcement of arbitral awards in China, which conducted nearly two decades ago, as the 
more prominent reference for later studies till now.98  
 
Responding to the foregoing challenges, Chinese authorities have devoted observable efforts 
to reforming China’s arbitration practice in legislative, institutional, procedural and practical 
aspects since1980.99 This was particularly proved by the promulgation of China’s 1995 
Arbitration Law and the explosive nationwide growth of Chinese arbitration commissions100, 
as well as CIETAC’s constant efforts in upgrading its regulations.101  It is said that the 2015 
CIETAC Arbitration Rules, which absorbs the latest international arbitration practices, 
particularly in terms of party autonomy and intermit measures, exemplifies the reform 
orientation of China’s arbitration-related legislations.102  China’ Civil Procedure Law was also 
modified in a pro-arbitration manner.103 Compared with its processors, China’s 2012 CPL is 
particularly praised for offering more pre-arbitration interim measures, loosening the tight 
judicial supervision over the R&E of domestic awards, and empowering People’s 
Procuratorates to supervise court-led execution in civil cases.104 As to institutional reforms of 
arbitration commissions, the 2012 jurisdictional battle (the 2012 Battle) amid CIETAC and its 
two branches (in Shanghai and Shenzhen) bore testimony to the increased competitiveness of 
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local arbitration commissions and heralded the collapse of CIETAC’s domination in China’s 
international commercial arbitration business.105 Furthermore, China’s highest judicial organ, 
the SPC, promoted many approaches to create an arbitration-friendly environment.106 For 
instance, the Pre-report system, which confers the authority to deny the validity of foreign and 
foreign-related awards exclusively on the SPC, eliminates the risk that the R&E of these 
awards might be jeopardised by the lower-ranking courts’ abrupt exercise of their supervisory 
authority.107 Additionally, as a new-born free-trade zone108, Shanghai was permitted to 
establish a court specialised in handling arbitration-related cases upon its individual 
arbitration rules, which reportedly embodied “breakthroughs to the existing statutes or 
administrative regulations”.109 Besides, the SPC’s pro-arbitration attitude is seemingly shared 
by its subordinates, so inferred from Chinese courts’ cautious attitude towards application of 
public policy in the R&E of arbitral awards110 and judicial responses to the 2012 Battle, which 
firmly upheld the independence of local commissions and the legitimacy of awards issued by 
the latter.111  In view of China’s previous reforms and current practices, Fan commented that 
commercial arbitration in China fundamentally observed the prevailing transnational 
protocols, but formed its distinctive features that fit China’s cultural background, typically 
like the combination of mediation and arbitration.112 Her arguments sit well with those of 
Wang and other scholars.113 A growth of 20% in Chinese arbitration commission’s caseload 
(136,924 cases in total) in 2015 also lends support to the foregoing claims, proving that 
China’s arbitration practice has won its reputation as a feasible dispute resolution.114 
 
Nonetheless, a negative attitude towards the enforceability of arbitral awards in mainland 
China keeps prevailing among scholars and practitioners. Pien argued that the prospect of the 
China-grounded EAA was gloomy for foreign creditors, considering the likely occurrence of 
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many practical obstacles, like local protectionism and lack of professionalism among 
judges.115  Based on her findings in 2016, Xiao observed that, while acknowledging the 
efficiency of Chinese courts in the R&E of foreign arbitral awards, foreign creditors still 
harboured a negative opinion about their enforcement experiences in China.116 Xiao further 
claimed that, owing to the absence of concrete data and case reports, a perception overstating 
the difficulty in the China-grounded EAA was prevalently adopted by foreign practitioners, 
who had no personal experiences in Chinese legal practices or even little first-hand 
knowledge about the country.117 Hence, lack of reliable updates could be labelled as a factor 
fuelling the outside world’s enduring doubt about the enforceability of arbitral awards in 
mainland China. Hitherto, merely few empirical studies have been conducted to statistically 
depict the execution status of arbitral award in China, largely due to difficulty in data 
collection. This study just located three recent empirical studies118 about the R&E of foreign 
arbitral awards in mainland China, but failed to discover empirical research projects looking 
into the EAA in China, let alone its ELDRs, during the past five years. Consequently, this 
study discovered no empirical analysis of reasons causing hindrances to the China-grounded 
EAA from the recent literature. 
 
To sum up, commercial arbitration in China has, notwithstanding the existing problems, 
undergone a transformative development over the past four decades, which indicates the 
suitability of China’s socio-cultural environment for commercial arbitration to thrive and the 
pro-arbitration attitude of Chinese authorities. This makes it research-worthy to explore why 
the EAA could be difficult under such circumstance. Meanwhile, China’s unique arbitration 
practice and rapid legal changes suggest that understanding of its contemporary execution 
status should be built upon empirical evidence of real-life practices and subject to timely 
updates. Yet, the literature mainly focuses on exploring issues about the R&E of arbitral 
awards, while the few enforcement-concerned scholarly contributions failed to present 
detailed analysis or the latest information on China’s execution practice. Additionally, the 
literature offers no evidenced-based explanation about the roots of hindrances to the EAA. 
Furthermore, the literature and Chinese authorities place heavy weight on issues about the 
operations of Chinese courts, and the performance of Chinese private collection agents 
seemingly receives almost no attention. In view of the foregoing limitations in the literature, 
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this study determined to explore the latest status of the EAA in China to seek answers to these 
unattended issues.  
 
2.2 Overview of Available Research Outcomes about Execution of Arbitral Awards in 
China 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the majority of the literature concentrates on unearthing 
institutional or procedural problems associated with China’s arbitration regime, especially in 
terms of the hearing process and the R&E of awards.119 Relatively few scholars have focused 
on problems emerging at the final stage of arbitration, that is to say, the EAA.120 Within this 
minority group, the highly-cited and influential work of Peerenboom, on which much of the 
later literature is based, is particularly important. The following portion firstly summarises 
key findings of two studies respectively conducted by Peerenboom and He about Chinese 
execution practice in chronological sequence, followed by a brief of research results 
announced by Chinese authorities (i.e. the SPC and the ARI of CIETAC).  
 
2.2.1 Contributions of Peerenboom 
In 2001, Peerenboom undertook an empirical study into enforcement of 72 arbitral awards in 
mainland China.121 Based on his research outcomes, Peerenboom presented an array of 
arguments on the China-seated EAA, among which enforcement-related statistics and the 
obstacles he addressed were considered data with unprecedented commercial and academic 
values.122 Specifically, Peerenboom’s study looked into 72 China-grounded enforcement cases 
from 1991 to 1999, focusing on collection of qualitative data from interviews with lawyers 
and award creditors.123 Relying on the gathered data and case reports, Peerenboom 
statistically verified the achievability of award enforcement in China, with 52% success rate 
for foreign awards and 47% for CIETAC awards.124 Peerenboom’s research also notified 
creditors of a discomforting, yet somehow reassuring, fact that, though 100% collection of 
award was achieved in just 17% of the studied cases, 34% of claimants managed to obtain 
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50% to 75% of the awarded amount, while 40% of creditors received half of their 
entitlements.125 Peerenboom also underscored the higher likelihood of successful enforcement 
in China’s economically developed areas than that in other less-developed small cities.126 
Awards worth less than 20,000 dollars could enjoy a 85% chance to be materialised in China’s 
major cities, like Beijing and Shanghai, while merely having a 63% chance in less-developed 
small cities.127 Peerenboom also founded that the likelihood for enforcement shared an inverse 
relationship with the size of the awarded amounts, given the fact that awards worth between 
20,000 and 2 million dollars merely possessed a 60% chance of enforcement in China’s major 
cities and 38% in small areas.128 The abovementioned figures interestingly rested on a middle 
ground between those respectively published by Chinese official resources and the media. 
They were, not surprisingly, lower than the optimistic statistics (71% for foreign awards and 
77% for CIETAC ones) released by ARI, but were more cheerful than the gloomy data (25%) 
announced by the media.129   
 
As to reasons for non-enforcement, the insolvency of award debtor was identified as the chief 
culprit, causing non-enforcement in 43% of the studied cases.130 Peerenboom131 found that, 
contrary to common belief, local protectionism, which could contribute to hindrances in 
enforcement processes, was not a crucial obstacle, although he discovered some evidence 
indicating the benefits of involving party members.132 Peerenboom also rejected the 
proposition that corruption could exert decisive impact on the EAA, although admitting the 
unlikelihood to assess to the actual effect of corruption.133 Moreover, Peerenboom addressed 
other issues probably trigger difficulty in enforcement, namely, low professionalism of 
Chinese judicial staff and legal practitioners, defective legislative framework, institutional 
problems haunting China’s enforcement system, and imbalanced development of legal 
awareness among Chinese people.134      
 
Peerenboom’s study also became a central reference point for later researchers on difficulty in 
doing data-centric empirical research in China. Typically, three problems were exposed, 
respectively referring to the poor response rate of the judiciary, unavailability of legal 
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professionals and the reluctance of Chinese legal practitioners to join in foreigner-led 
research.135 Peerenboom presumed that the reluctant attitude of Chinese legal community was 
caused by China’s regulatory restrictions on foreigner-led research and a shared anxiety 
among Chinese legal practitioners to avoid imprudent actions that might damage their 
careers.136 An alternative explanation, distinct from Peerenboom’s claim, but consistent with 
that of Liang137, is that a sense of uncertainty about the trustworthiness of researchers is the 
key factor dragging the Chinese legal community from actively participating in research 
projects. Peerenboom’s experiences just vividly verified this statement, considering that 
Peerenboom finally obtained access to intended interviewees and necessary data with the 
endorsement of reputable referees.  
 
Despite its importance, the value of Peerenboom’s research in shedding light on current issues 
in Chinese arbitral practice is now limited by two factors. Firstly, this research is about 17 
years old by now, which naturally provokes doubts about the applicability of its outcomes in 
today’s China. During the past 17 years, a flurry of initiatives have been introduced to make 
Chinese legislative framework match up with international standards and the requirements of 
China’s economic growth. The evolving history of the PRC Civil Procedure Law and 
CIETAC rules in the past years is vivid evidence underpinning the foregoing statement. 
Specifically, the PRC Civil Procedure Law undertook two revisions respectively in 2007 and 
2012, and it now incorporates more arbitration-supporting provisions that are perceptibly 
aligned with international practices.138  The CIETAC has also modified its arbitration rules 
eight times since 1956, and the latest one which embraces many internationally accepted 
arbitration practices came into effect in 2015.139 Meanwhile, a series of institutional reforms 
have also been executed to respectively modify China’s judicial system and arbitration 
commissions. The most significant milestone is the separation of Chinese judicial trialling and 
enforcement divisions in 2008, which announced the establishment of China’s relatively 
independent judicial enforcement force (referring to the JEB) with enhanced statutory 
authority and enforcement capacity.140 Even remarkably, a pilot reform, which allegedly aims 
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to more aggressively transform China’s judicial execution force and boost its efficiency 
through introducing a division that is independent from the JEB to exclusively handle 
execution-related decision-making, further specialising the bailiff team to better assist judges 
in implementation of compulsory execution measures, and updating the mechanism for 
releasing execution-related information, has already been launched in Shanghai since the 
middle of 2016.141  Merely relying on these facts, it can be concluded that enforcement 
conditions in China are significantly different from that of 17 years ago. Therefore, it is 
desirable to add necessary updates to Peerenboom’s research outcomes. Secondly, as a foreign 
researcher, Peerenboom faced tremendous difficulty in accessing legal professionals and in 
grasping implicit dimensions of Chinese legal culture in operation. Such difficulties were 
anticipated by Nafziger and Ruan in their earlier publication concerning China’s dispute 
resolution in 1989.142  For instance, Peerenboom identified the flaws in China’s legislative 
mechanism for enforcement in civil and commercial cases, but failed to recognise that the 
unsatisfactory development of this mechanism was rooted in China’s legal tradition that 
prioritised the development of criminal codes over other branches of law, unlike what Fan 
suggested upon her familiarity with Chinese culture in her work about China’s arbitration 
practice.143 This study also disagrees with Peerenboom’s claim that pinpoints China’s current 
institutional arrangement, rather than its legal culture, as the key reason causing the low 
authority of Chinese courts.144 Consequently, Peerenboom’s study, despite its strengths, 
offered neither a portrayal of the latest frontline experiences in the China-grounded EAA nor 
an in-depth discussion about cultural factors causing obstacles to enforcement.   
Comparatively speaking, a Chinese researcher with first-hand experiences in dealing with 
Chinese judicial system and social reality is often better able to navigate China’s labyrinthine 
legal environment and, thus, stands a better chance of obtaining first-hand enforcement data 
from cautious legal professionals. Moreover, Chinese is a highly contextual language with 
rich situational connotations, thereby making interpretation of Chinese a demanding task even 
for native speakers. These considerations virtually challenge the credibility of Peerenboom’ 
study for its foreigner-led nature. Moreover, Fan upheld that, due to the narrow pool of 
interviewees, Peerenboom’s study might just concentrate on particular types of cases, thereby 
arguably lowering the representativeness of his findings.145    
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However, despite the identified problems, Peerenboom’s research generated illuminating 
empirical results about enforcement of arbitral awards in China, which provide an extremely 
strong and useful basis for this thesis, with regard to determination of research focuses, 
construction of research design, implementation of fieldwork and data analysis. 
 
2.2.2 Findings of Xin He  
As a legal scholar engaging in a longitudinal study of China’s legal developments, He 
produced several contributions exploring China’s evolving enforcement environment, in 
terms of court reform, enforcement of commercial judgements in China’s economically 
developed region and debt collection in China’s less developed hinterland regions.146 The 
following section focuses representatively on He’s empirical study on the debt-collection 
operations of a Shaanxi basic-level Court 147, because his study strives to depict judicial 
practices in China’s economically less-developed regions (ELDRs), which partially tallies 
with the underlying objectives of this research. Judicial performance in debt collection 
provides a useful reference point for execution of monetary awards, since these two kinds of 
operations are both subject to the same procedural framework and carried out by the JEB of 
Chinese courts, though at different levels.148 In his study, He randomly studied 100 debt 
collection cases, and managed to interview 60 creditors and 5 judges. Then, based on his 
familiarity with Chinese legal practices and the gathered data, He generated the following 
findings.     
 
Initially, He confirmed that, despite needing further enhancement, the efficiency of Chinese 
courts in debt collection was not significantly worse than the situation in other developed 
states.149 This was chiefly ascribed to the establishment of the independent enforcement 
division and a coordinating mechanism that allowed courts to reap improved assistances from 
other institutions in asset tracking and possession.150 Statistically, He discovered that 45% of 
the studied cases (27 out of 60) harvested a full execution and 78% of 60 creditors received 
partial recovery of their debts, while creditors in 13 cases came back empty-handed.151 In 
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30% of the studies cases, coercive execution proceedings were initiated, and 50% of them 
received some results.152 He was informed that judges would encounter greater difficulty in 
enforcing judgments for “minor tort and administrative cases” than those for commercial 
ones.153 Additionally, He identified four key obstacles to court-led debt collection, namely, 
“triangle debt, no enforceable assets, left-over disputes of the previous planned economy, 
shortage of funds for operation costs amid courts”.154 Pursuant to his findings, He argued that 
the long-standing perceptions of Chinese courts’ low enforcement capacity could be largely 
attributed to the scarcity of reliable enforcement statistics and problematic research 
methodologies.155 He also found that local protectionism was frequently sponsored by 
“personal connections”, rather than interest-incited movements of local governments.156 Local 
government's interference could emerge in certain cases, but less frequently.157 Echoing 
Peerenboom’s findings, He claimed that local protectionism, though outwardly standing as a 
ready reason adopted by nonlocal parties to justify their failures in lawsuit or enforcement, 
exerted a limited impact on courts’ operations.158 Meanwhile, He observed that guanxi-based 
connections could motivate courts to devote more efforts to ensuring the positive outcomes of 
enforcement, whereas judges were only willing to offer well-connected parties preferential 
treatment within lawful bounds, to avoid being accused of misconduct.159 
 
Apart from the foregoing findings, He detected some striking facts. A key implication of his 
research is that the situation in China’s economically advanced regions cannot be applied 
mechanically to generalise about other less developed areas, since regional economic status 
directly shapes the growth of local courts.160 Secondly, courts in economically backward 
regions skewed more heavily towards using mediation, instead of adjudication to settle 
disputes, possibly due to their relatively small caseloads and the SPC’s preferential attitude 
towards mediation.161 Thirdly, attitudes of judges would substantially determine the results of 
court-led mediation, especially in cases where time-consuming mediations were deliberately 
utilised by debtors as stalling tactics ‘to delay payment’.162 He found that the interviewed 
judges would oblige debtors, whose genuine intention for requesting mediation was not 
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substantiated by any compliance behaviours or indications of these, to swallow judicial 
propositions for settlement that were believed as best balancing interests of the involved 
parties.163 Yet, He also warned that mediation might compel creditors to accept compromised 
amounts of their entitlements, while it could not provide a 100% guarantee of success in 
enforcement.164 Besides, the situation in politically sensitive cases was different from ordinary 
ones, considering that judges would exercise extra caution when enforcing cases that involve 
local governmental organs, and were unlikely to use coercive measures to compel those 
organs to honour their obligations.165 
 
In brief, He’s findings agree with those of Peerenboom on nomination of debtor’s financial 
embarrassment as the key factor causing unsuccessful execution and the limited impact of 
local protectionism on execution. Yet, unlike Peerenboom, He rejected the claim that Chinese 
courts suffered from low execution capacity, even with the awareness of regional difference 
on legal advancement in China. Meanwhile, compared with Peerenboom, He seemingly 
enjoyed greater familiarity with China’s legal culture and judicial practices, which allowed his 
study to pinpoint implicit phenomena and unspoken messages embedded in the data. For 
instance, He spotlighted the tendency for Chinese judges and litigants to overstate their 
understanding of, and command over, practical situations.166 However, He failed to further 
explore the role of Chinese cultural beliefs in court-led execution and the successful 
experiences of litigants. Such failure makes this study of He unable to contribute concrete 
knowledge about the practicalities of execution in the Chinese cultural context, let alone 
expose the reasons motivating Chinese parties to conduct particular behaviours in execution. 
Meanwhile, the involvement of only one basic-level court means that one cannot, without 
further investigation, assume He’s study to be representative.  
 
2.2.3 Execution status reported by Chinese authorities and other institutions  
Aside from Peerenboom’s contribution, three other institutions and the SPC also delivered 
their reports on enforcement status of arbitral awards in China. Initially, ARI conducted two 
studies (respectively in 1994 and 1997) to produce concrete enforcement statistics, to ease the 
anxiety of investors and creditors.167 Relying on information collected from 43 Chinese 
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courts, ARI reported that enforcement rates for the CIETAC awards reached 80% and 77% in 
the concerned years respectively.168 Nonetheless, the credibility of ARI statistics was labelled 
as contestable, considering the limitation of single-source data collection and ARI’s kinship 
with the CIETAC, which was likely to introduce motivational bias in the production of its 
statistics.169 Other international legal associations or institutions, like Wolters Kluwer and 
Queen’s Mary University of London (QMUL), have also conducted investigations into 
enforcement of arbitral awards in China.170 A report delivered by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
and QMUL in 2008 stated that, on a global scale, the majority of arbitral awards (accounting 
for 75%) won successful enforcement, and 84% of creditors received over 75% of their 
entitlements.171 Debtors’ financial incapacity was identified as the key obstacle to 
enforcement in 70% of the studied cases, while corruption of judicial staff hampered the 
enforcement process in 10% of cases. This report claimed that China harboured an 
antagonistic attitude towards enforcement of foreign awards, notwithstanding that such 
hostility did not necessarily lead to failure in enforcement. Yet, the outcomes of this global-
scale survey, which narrated the general tendency for enforcement of arbitral awards 
worldwide, failed to produce statistics particularising the enforcement status in China. 
Besides, Xiao released her findings from an online research project via the platform of Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog, reporting that the enforcement status of foreign awards in China was better 
than perceptions of foreign practitioners.172 This study revealed that, upon their previous 
enforcement experiences, 72% of respondents acknowledged commercial arbitration as a 
favourable resolution for settling China-related disputes, but 84% of them tasted various 
challenges in enforcement.173 The identified problems were respectively associated with local 
enforcement procedure (63%), discriminative treatments by judicial staff (17%), enforcement 
expenditure (10%), an unfriendly attitude towards foreign awards (6%), and the lengthy 
enforcement period (4%).174 The majority of respondents (73%) materialised their awards 
within a year, while 65% of them recovered 76% to 100% of their awarded remedies, and 
73% received at least 50% of their entitlements.175 Despite these statistics, Xiao discovered 
that 87% of respondents pictured China as a place where the prospect of enforcing arbitral 
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awards was more depressive than that in other countries.176 This study then concluded that 
Chinese courts were capable of fulfilling their duties, notwithstanding problems in their 
enforcement practices and a prevalent negative opinion on the China-grounded materialisation 
of foreign awards. Nevertheless, Xiao’s study faces two restrictions. Firstly, this study 
conducted online is subject to difficulties in relation to verifying the identity of respondents 
and the authenticity of answers. No indications about the solutions for this study to deal with 
these difficulties are discovered in its final outcomes. Secondly, this study merely gathered 
foreign practitioners’ perceptions of enforcing arbitral awards in China, leaving Chinese 
parties’ insights into the theme unexplored. Apart from the foregoing limitations, the fruits of 
these previous research projects contain two gaps, respectively regarding failure to produce a 
description of the general execution status in China upon trustworthy multi-sourced data and 
the absence of native culture from analysis of Chinese practices.  
 
Taking advantage of its institutional position as the highest judicial body, the SPC organised 
an investigation into the R&E of foreign-related and foreign awards in 2007, receiving the 
participation of 17 higher courts at the provincial level.177 In total, this investigation examined 
610 cases that were decided by Chinese courts at various levels from 2002 to 2006. It reported 
that, during the concerned period, courts upheld 96.15％ of applications for enforcing foreign-
related awards, together with 78.38% of petitions for the R&E of foreign awards. Merely 
4.75% of applications (in 16 out of 337 cases) for setting aside awards were granted, and 
3.85% of applications for enforcement (4 out of 104 cases) were denied, while the courts 
declined 6.76% of applications for recognising and enforcing foreign awards (5 out of 74 
cases). Based on the foregoing statistics, this investigation concluded that China’s judicial 
force had succeeded in forming an arbitration-friendly attitude, and in improving judicial 
supervision over commercial arbitration. Unfortunately, unlike the study of Xiao that 
announced the outcomes of execution ranging from failure to 100% success, this investigation 
produced no detailed execution statistics. 
 
Alternatively, limited execution-concerned data can be abstracted from the annual work 
reports of the SPC. According to the 2017 work report of the SPC (the 2017 Report)178, 5.079 
million cases with a monetary amount of 1.5 trillion RMB (around 0.17 trillion pounds)179 
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were successfully closed by courts at various levels in 2016. These two execution figures 
respectively increased 33.1% and 54%, compared with those in 2015.180 Yet, there were still 
no figures illustrating amounts initially payable and finally collected via court-led execution. 
It is noticeable that the 2017 Report presents data verifying the efficacy of the SPC’s four pro-
execution attempts, namely, introducing a national e-platform to internally monitor operations 
of all courts and unify their execution operations, establishing a cross-departmental e-platform 
to facilitate judges’ hunting for defaulters and their hidden assets, organising online judicial 
auctions to liquidate assets, and promoting the infliction of punishments on defaulters. The 
2017 Report declared that, in 2016, Chinese courts totally organised 430,000 online judicial 
auctions and concluded deals of 270 billion RMB (around 30.68 billion pounds). They also 
blacklisted 6.89 million defaulting debtors181, and restricted 8.57 million defaulters from 
travelling luxuriously by flight or high-speed train. Meanwhile, 16,000 debtors were arrested 
for non-fulfilment of their obligations, whilst 2167 defaulters were given criminal sanctions, 
which also doubled the figure in 2015 (1145). These figures corroborated news reports that 
Chinese courts have started adopting harsh approaches to crack down execution-avoidance 
and have attained positive achievements in the battle against habitual defaulters.182 In contrast, 
the experiences of some practitioners and data released by the media tell a somewhat different 
story about the execution status in China. It was exposed that, from 2008 to 2012, less than 
30% judgments received voluntary fulfilment, whereas the rest all encountered various 
execution-avoidance behaviours, both violent and non-violent.183 News from online sources 
also indicated a low likelihood of voluntary execution, while both creditors and judges bitterly 
grumbled about the dreadful hardship they had to endure during the course of the China-
grounded execution.184 All these collected unofficial information suggest that the SPC’s 
statistics do not present a complete or accurate picture of the experiences tasted by creditors 
when seeking the EAA in China. 
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In brief, the above-listed previous studies have contributed useful information to the 
understanding of China’s enforcement practice. Yet, these studies fail to address three crucial 
topics, respectively as to collection of multi-sourced execution data, the portrayal of the 
execution status in China, and the role of Chinese culture in execution. 
 
2.3 Findings of Kun Fan about Impact of Chinese Culture on Commercial Arbitration 
Unlike the foregoing empirical studies, Fan’s work, titled Arbitration in China: A Legal and 
Cultural Analysis, chiefly focused on presenting a nuanced account of China’s commercial 
arbitration practice against its cultural background.185 Chapter IV in the book presents Fan’s 
findings about the status of the EAA upon utilisation of statistics and data from previous 
investigations, including those of Peerenboom.186 The value of Fan’s work for this 
dissertation rested on its analysis of the impact of traditional Chinese legal culture on the 
country’s modern arbitration practice. Starting with an analysis of China’s existing 
arbitration-related legislation and practices, Fan raised evidence for the close linkage between 
China’s traditional legal culture and contemporary arbitration practice. According to Fan, 
commercial arbitration in China revealed five distinct features, namely, a flawed legislative 
framework, inconsistent application of law, administrative affiliation to local governing 
authorities, low respect of party autonomy, and the popularity of med-arb practice.187 The 
formation of these characters was, according to Fan, attributable to China’s legal traditions, 
which valued distinct notions that departed from Western legal doctrines.188 Built upon a 
historical account of China’s legal traditions and development, Fan disclosed that, in 
contemporary China, law was still considered an instrument for maintaining social order, 
which consequently shaped Chinese authorities’ attitude towards promulgation of law and led 
to the application of the Biantong principle (变通, flexibility) in law enforcement.189 This 
justified the situation that China has devoted great efforts to upgrading its legislative 
framework to accommodate the legal requirements of its growth, but has not formed an 
integrated legal system yet.190 Fan then claimed that the procedure and underlying principles 
of China’s commercial arbitration were substantially influenced by traditional Chinese 
philosophies, especially like those associated with rituals, relational networks, harmony and 
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litigation avoidance.191 Chinese people’s preference for amicable dispute resolution with 
concrete formality over litigation was raised by Fan as evidence underpinning the foregoing 
claims.192 Fan also ascribed low respect of party autonomy in China’s arbitration practice to 
the Chinese tradition that prioritised collective interests over personal welfare.193  Pursuant to 
the previous findings, Fan concluded that, though having hitherto undergone a four-phase 
legal modernisation process and absorbed certain Western elements, Chinese legal culture still 
reflected its core tenets.194 In view of China’s previous legal developments, Fan suggested 
that a thoroughgoing reform of China’s legal environment could only be achieved upon 
conceptual transformation of Chinese legal culture.195 More discussions about Fan’s 
viewpoints will be presented in Chapter III, when exploring cultural elements that swayed the 
development of China’s arbitration practice. 
 
In short, Fan’s work reveals the necessity of analysing Chinese arbitration practice in its 
indigenous cultural context, which other studies, like that of Peerenboom, failed to do. This 
points to a significant gap in our current understanding, which this study seeks to fill by 
incorporating an analysis of the impact of Chinese cultural and legal traditions on the 
development of commercial arbitration in China. Yet, this study observed two limitations in 
Fan’s work. Firstly, Fan’s contributions are not produced upon multi-sourced first-hand data 
about the China-grounded enforcement of arbitral awards, which to some extent undermines 
the academic values of the claims embedded therein. Additionally, Fan’s work focuses on 
evaluating China’s arbitration practice, while giving limited attention to the EAA. Fan’s 
discussions about the role of culture in enforcement of arbitral awards stop at analysis of 
Chinese authorities’ attitude towards law enforcement and Chinese people’s perceptions of 
conflict settlement. To what extent Chinese cultural tenets could affect execution-related 
behaviours of Chinese people is the question remaining unresolved in Fan’ study. Building on 
Fan’s contributions, this study brings together an analysis of the cultural factors that could 
affect the China-grounded EAA, through empirically deciphering the real-life operations.         
 
2.4 Merits and Limitations of Previous Research  
As discussed above, previous research provided considerable insights into the development of 
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commercial arbitration in China, especially in terms of applicable research design and 
theoretic background. Specifically, apart from contributing desirable theoretical support, 
research experiences of Peerenboom and He point to the challenges of assembling empirical 
qualitative data from Chinese legal practitioners, as well as the necessity to diversify the 
interviewee pool and sources of information to enhance the credibility and representativeness 
of the final research findings. Meanwhile, their research designs underscore the importance of 
obtaining assistance from Chinese courts or reputable legal scholars to gaining access to 
crucial data or pertinent parties. Their achievements also substantiate the feasibility of 
adopting qualitative interview as the major approach for data collection. Comparatively, Fan’s 
book emphasises the importance of traditional Chinese values to understanding China’s 
contemporary legal operations and future reforms. It is worthy of highlighting that one 
conspicuous trait of publications contributed solely or partially by Chinese scholars is the 
emphasis on the impact of traditional Chinese culture on the country’s legal operations and 
dispute resolution.196 Comparably, Western scholars tend to remain silent on this aspect. 
Nevertheless, Chinese scholars and a small number of foreign experts have repeatedly 
highlighted the significance and far-reaching impact of Chinese culture, especially 
Confucianism, on Chinese legal practices and development.197 Bearing these scholarly 
opinions in mind, this study defined identification of cultural factors, which could sway the 
China-grounded EAA, as a focal question to pursue. 
 
When seen as a whole, the existing literature has three significant gaps. Firstly, they failed to 
profoundly answer one practical question which keeps whetting practitioners’ appetites: how 
Chinese creditors can manage to succeed in execution under China’s so-claimed flawed 
legislative framework and harsh enforcement conditions. Revealing the secrets how Chinese 
creditors successfully navigate the hurdles to enforcement will afford considerable insight into 
the practical working of China’s legal system against its cultural background. Secondly, the 
aforementioned studies all revolved around enforcement performance of China’s judicial 
force, whilst giving no or little account of the status or the experiences of other pertinent 
actors, like private collection agencies (PCACs) and lawyers. Descriptions about Chinese’ 
enforcement environment without mentioning the involvement of other partakers would 
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undoubtedly be incomplete and irrational. Thirdly, no studies have hitherto systematically 
explored and critically analysed the influence of Chinese culture on the EAA in China. This 
topic consequently arrested attention of this study, and obtains further exploration in the later 
discussions. Finally, China’s ELDRs have, thus far, received very little attention from the 
previous research, which inspired this study to explore the status of the EAA therein. 
 
In short, motivated by previous research and the foregoing unresolved issues, this study was 
designed to take advantage of personal familiarity with China’s culture and legal environment 
to depict and analyse the current situation of the EAA in China’s ELDRs, with a focus on 
identification of the existing obstacles to execution and their underlying causes.       
 
2.5 Justification of Research Design  
When designing this study, the author was enlightened by the literature to explore the research 
theme under China’s unique cultural condition, considering the crucial role of culture in the 
formation and interpretation of legal practices. According to theories of Trakman, legal 
operation in a particular region is essentially branded with indelible marks of its indigenous 
culture, and could by no means escape the influences of the pertinent culture, since the 
behaviours of participators in legal operation are decidedly subject to their corresponding 
cultural background and living environment, as well as their experience-based perceptions.198 
As to commercial arbitration, Trakman stated that, though being purportedly designed to 
become a cross-cultural ADR offering ‘expeditious, low cost, informal and speedy mercantile 
justice’199, development of commercial arbitration was inevitably exposed to the impacts of 
diverse local cultures during its global application, which requested a study of arbitration 
practice in a particular region to be conducted against the local cultural background.200 
Essentially, Trakman’s argument resonates well with claims of other scholars, advocating that 
comparative legal studies should always properly address the impacts of diverse regional 
cultures.201 This is particularly true when exploring legal practices in China, a country 
harbouring its own time-honoured legal culture that was widely divergent from the Western 
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ones.202 The foregoing theories jointly suggest that a proper reality-based interpretation of 
legal operations in China should be created upon a culturally contextualised analysis of 
empirical data from people acting in the frontline, so proved by the previous research 
projects.203 Therefore, this study determines to empirically investigate the EAA in China’s 
ELDRs that have been underexplored, with an aim to enrich understanding of the execution 
environment and practices in China with first-hand data.  
 
Talking about informants, this study determined to invite native practitioners with diversified 
professional backgrounds, including judges, lawyers, arbitrators, creditors and PCACs, to 
contribute their first-hand readings of execution practice in their home regions from different 
aspects, with an aim of generating sufficient evidence to present a multi-faceted portrayal of 
the EAA in the concerned regions.  By involving the selected informants, this study could 
benefit from their familiarity with particularly regional cultures and legal environments, to 
more precisely grasp the regional execution atmosphere in the studied areas and secure a 
strong position to pinpoint the problematic issues, explicitly or imperceptibly, affecting the 
EAA, as well as the underlying factors supporting these issues in China’s current socio-
cultural context. Moreover, this study utilised five methods for generating wanted data, 
namely, accessing execution-related statistics held by local courts and arbitration institutions, 
survey by questionnaire, semi-structured interview, group interview and participant 
observation on the operations of a PCAC, to increase the credibility and the productivity of 
data collection through diversifying sources of information. Finally, the data-centred approach 
was deployed in data collection and later analysis, so as to eliminate the impact of the author’s 
personal perceptions of China’s execution environment and enhance the accountability of the 
outcomes born by this study.      
 
Conclusion 
Dissecting the literature, one could obtain a general impression of the evolving trajectory of 
commercial arbitration in China and problems awaiting further action, as well as contributions 
of previous studies to the advancement of China’s arbitration practice. Yet, three research-
worthy issues, respectively regarding execution practice in China’s ELDRs, performance of 
China’s private collection forces and role of Chinese culture in execution, are found hitherto 
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underexplored by previous studies. Meanwhile, it is worthwhile to update execution statistics 
of arbitral awards, based on the contributions of Peerenboom and other studies.  Awareness of 
these underexplored issues motivated this study to conduct an empirical investigation into the 
EAA in two selected provinces of China among Chinese parties with varied professional 
backgrounds and practical experiences, to enrich understanding of the environment for 
executing arbitral awards in China’s ELDRs upon analysis of multi-sourced data. Bearing the 
defined research focuses in mind, this thesis proceeds to elaborate crucial concepts and 
customs in Chinese culture to depict the cultural context governing data collection and 
analysis of this study in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3. Sketch of Chinese Culture and Its Impact on Contemporary 
China  
Retracing the discussion in the previous chapter, the literature nominated culture as a 
substantially material factor orchestrating the formation of people’s legal perceptions and 
behaviours, as well as the execution of social practices and interpersonal interaction.204 
Hoecke and Warrington expounded that culture fundamentally determined “the concept of 
law, the role law in society and the way conflicts could and should be handled” in a particular 
community.205 Echoing the foregoing statements, Cotterrell entertained that legal practices 
were always characterised by their cultural roots, because the primordial mission of law, as an 
expression of accepted cultural traditions and values, was to safeguard culture within the 
realm permitted by the latter. 206  Putting it differently, the formation and implementation of 
law hinge on support from its cultural foundation, whose survival, in return, requests strong 
protection from law.207  Consequently, the kinship between law and culture determines that an 
analysis of legal environment and practice in a country should always be contextualised in the 
pertinent indigenous culture.208 This is particularly true for research into commercial 
arbitration, a transnational dispute resolution that has been compelled to accommodate 
modifications conditioned by different regional cultures during its global expansion.209 
Furthermore, inferred from Northrop’s findings210 about the pivotal role of native culture in 
legal transplants, propositions about reforming a country’s legal practices would not work 
their magic, unless these propositions could introduce transformations that could eradicate the 
cultural roots nurturing the target problems, but without offending the background culture. 
This then makes culture a must to address when investigating problematic legal matters. 
Hence, pursuant to the foregoing theories, Chinese culture is a topic that cannot be 
sidestepped in this study when pursuing the research questions about China’s so-believed 
problematic practice for executing arbitral awards.  
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As discussed in Section 1.3.2, the China-grounded execution of arbitral awards (EAA) 
appears to be a process subject to the country’s socio-cultural realities and the participation of 
multiple parties. During its over 5000-year development, China has fostered its unique culture 
with rich connotations and far-reaching influences, based on which Chinese legal 
philosophies were introduced and practiced.211 Fan claimed, echoing the opinions of other 
Chinese scholars, that traditional Chinese ideologies still maintained an enduring impact on 
contemporary Chinese people’s social behaviours and legal perceptions, as well as their 
attitude towards conflict resolution.212 Thus, it is necessary to explore both the Chinese 
general and legal ideologies that have been affecting China’s overall legal environment and, 
in particular, commercial arbitration practice, to facilitate discussions on whether and how 
these Chinese ideologies could shape contemporary Chinese parties’ execution-related 
behaviours and perceptions in later chapters. Through presenting a brief analysis of the 
Chinese general and legal culture, this chapter could not only answer the research question 
why it is important to study China’s contemporary legal practices in its cultural context, but 
could also portray a sketch of Chinese cultural notions underlined by the collected data, to 
promote a deeper understanding of analyses about their impact on China’s execution practice 
in the following chapters. 
 
Before diving into China’s legal customs, this chapter firstly encapsulates the cultural roots 
underpinning China’s legal operations, to facilitate later discussions about China’s legal 
environment and its localised characteristics. Therein, this thesis expounds on three kernels of 
traditional Chinese culture that stipulate social norms and personal behavioural codes for 
Chinese society. Next, China’s legal culture is succinctly portrayed from three aspects: (1) 
connotation and characteristics of the country’s legal tradition; (2) evolution of this culture; 
and (3) divergences between Chinese and Western legal cultures. The third section displays 
the impact of traditional Chinese tenets on the country’s modern legal and arbitration 
practices, to justify the necessity to address cultural elements when evaluating the EAA in 
contemporary China. 
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3.1 Essence of Traditional Chinese Culture 
According to Avruch, Culture is a complex that  
 
consisted of the derivatives of experiences, more or less organized, earned or created by 
the individuals of a population, including those images or encodements and their 
interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations, from contemporaries, or 
formed by individuals themselves.213  
 
The foregoing definition sits well with the starting point of Chinese scholars engaging in 
culture-related studies.214  Chinese scholars declared that traditional Chinese culture was 
essentially a collection of wisdoms gleaned from social practices and the life experiences of 
the Chinese nation over the past several thousand years to accommodate China’s exceptional 
historic, geographic, socio-economic and demographic conditions.215  Chinese scholars also 
argued that, although revolving around Confucian philosophies, traditional Chinese culture 
virtually embraced the juxtaposition of different schools of thoughts, typically like Fajia (法
家, Legalist), Taoism (道教) and Buddhism (佛教).216  In particular, the scholarly consensus 
is that China’s traditional legal doctrines were bred upon the joint contributions of 
Confucianism and Legalism.217 In simple terms, Confucianism at its early stage of 
development urged the ruling authorities to solely apply the moral norms to govern society, 
whereas Legalism advocated ruling people with publicly administered statutes and severe 
punishments.218 Later, Confucianism gradually absorbed some Legalist ideas, and introduced 
a mechanism for the maintenance of social order, which prioritised virtues as the core 
instrument of governance and used punishments as a supplementary tool, to satisfy the needs 
of the previous Chinese governing classes.219 This mechanism then enjoyed an enduring 
appreciation throughout the history of ancient Confucian-dominated China.220  
 
The literature suggested that traditional Chinese wisdoms revealed four distinctive priorities, 
which placed people’s social responsibilities over their freedom, obligations to their families 
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and communities over their entitlements, collective interests over personal ones, and 
maintenance of harmony over disputes.221  Strikingly, Huang, a Chinese American legal 
practitioner, believed that traditional Chinese culture was, if merely judging its family-
concerned philosophies and impact on commercial arbitration, featured as “being collectivist, 
hierarchical, harmony-oriented, controlling, and exclusive or tending to exclude.”222 The 
foregoing views about traditional Chinese culture essentially demonstrate the extensiveness 
and profoundness of this culture. They virtually buttressed an argument shared by Cheng and 
Huang, suggesting that analysis of particular China-concerned issues merely requests a review 
of the topic-related cultural ideologies, instead of an exclusive account of Chinese culture.223 
Hence, to better serve the research purposes of this study, the following section concisely 
explains three crucial traditional concepts that are deeply embedded in Chinese peoples’ 
mindset and, thereby, could wield far-reaching effects on China’s legal practices, namely, Li 
(礼), De (德) and He (和). By presenting the below discussion about these concepts, this 
study strives to direct academic attention to reasons behind Chinese parties’ behaviours in 
commercial arbitration and the EAA, as well as the underlying principles used for writing 
China’s version of arbitration practice.  
 
3.1.1 Connotation of Li (礼)  
As the very essence of China’s ancient civilisation, Li is unvaryingly recognised by Chinese 
scholars as the key concept of traditional Chinese culture, which has hitherto been shaping 
Chinese people’s social behaviour and moral perceptions.224 Although widely translated as 
rites, Li is actually an amorphous concept with extensive connotations, embracing three 
facets, namely, Lizhi (礼制, rites), Liyi (礼义, justifications for the stipulated ritual or legal 
rules) and Lijiao (礼教, education aiming to uniform people’s thoughts and behaviours in line 
with Liyi via multiple media).225 Judging from the foregoing sketch of Li, it could be detected 
that Li-centred ideologies were popularised nationwide among the ancient Chinese through a 
sophistically interwoven framework. This contributed to the far-reaching impact of these 
ideologies on shaping Chinese people’s behaviours and thoughts, as well as an enduring legal 
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tradition in China that promoted the joint utilisation of moral and legal norms to regulate 
people.226   
 
Realising the importance of Li in the ancient Chinese philosophic framework, Qu exposed 
that “Li was introduced as a tool to maintain social difference”227 to achieve an ordered and 
socially differentiated society, which was promoted by Confucianism upon a belief that 
people were born with distinct intelligent variances and, accordingly, should be categorised 
into different ranks pursuant to their social roles.228 Adhere to the Confucian concepts of role-
based social stratification, ancient Chinese society was administered with deep-rooted 
hierarchical awareness and a well-established social order.229 Traditionally, ancient Chinese 
citizens were classified into four categories, namely, scholars (士), farmers (农), artisans (工) 
and merchants (商).230 Scholars were granted with the highest social position by the 
governing authorities.231 This explains why Chinese people frequently place high emphasis on 
educational qualifications of their offspring and possess deep veneration for education 
professionals even now.232 Speaking from the author’s experiences, scholars are still enjoying 
high respect in contemporary China, which constitutes an advantage for them to win trust and 
preferential treatments from both private parties and authorities. Inheriting the Confucian 
beliefs of social stratification, Mencius preached that everything should be accomplished with 
close observation to certain norms or mores.233 Correspondingly, a series of rules, typically 
like San Gang Wu Chang (三纲五常)234, were introduced to regulate relationships between 
people with different social ranks or genders, which directly perpetuated the existence of 
China’s feudal authoritarian regime, heavy reliance on the guanxi235 network, and gender 
                                                          
226 XY Zeng (n215), 205. 
227 TZ Qu (n212) 273 
228 ibid, 270-325 
229 ibid. 
230 DC Bodde, Chinese Thought, Society, and Science: The intellectual and Social Background of Science and Technology in 
Pre-modern China (University of Hawaii Press 1991), cited in RS Kerr and others, Science and Civilisation in China: 
Volume 5, Chemistry and Chemical Technology, Part 12, Ceramic Technology (Cambridge University Press 2004) 18. 
231 TZ Qu (n212) 270-325. This is also proved by a well-known sentence taking from a Chinese poet, which stated that all 
other social professions were subordinate to scholars (万般皆下品，唯有读书高). In fact, the ancient Chinese philosophies 
nominated teacher as one of five figures [天地君亲师 (Heaven, Earth, Sovereign, Parent and Teacher)] that people should 
always honour.  See Xunzi (荀子), Discussion of Li (礼论篇) 
232 WX Xu, 'Respect for Teachers and Emphasis on Education are the Important Heritage of Chinese Civilization (in 
Chinese)' (People.cn, 8 December 2016)<http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1208/c49157-28934745.html> accessed 16 
January 2017 
233 Mencius, also known as Mengzi (孟子), was the most renowned Chinese Confucian philosopher after Confucius. This 
remark is from the chapter titled Li Lou (Part one) in his book Mengzi, and its Chinese version is “不以规矩，不能成方圆”. 
234 Three cardinal guides and five constant virtues were considered the spine of the Confucian ethical codes.  Three cardinal 
guides stipulate that emperor guides subordinates, father guides son, and husband guides wife. Five constant virtues embrace 
benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity. For detailed explanations, see Chapter IX (S5, p 583-586) in F Ji, 
Beijing University's Lessons for Chinese Cultural Studies (New World Press 2013). 
235 Guanxi is typical of the most prominent and time-honoured Chinese notions, which allegedly permeate every aspect of 
Chinese society. Guanxi is popularly identified as interpersonal relationship or relationship-based networking, which is 
 42 
 
inequality both at home and in social activities.236  Nowadays, the changed social conditions 
in China have annulled the outdated practices bred by Li-related notions, typically like those 
discriminative rules regulating family affairs based on San Gang (三纲).237 Yet, Wu Chang 
(五常) is considered the cream of China’s traditional culture, thereby still wining considerable 
appreciation in contemporary China.238 For instance, the ‘Eight-honour and Eight-shame’ 
claim raised by Jintao Hu (China’s former Chairman) shares the spirit of Wu Chang (五常), 
encouraging Chinese people to comply with moral norms and promptly make their 
contributions to the country.239 Meanwhile, contemporary Chinese people, though inculcated 
with the foregoing Confucian ideologies at varied degree, are generally admonished to 
observe the widely respected proprieties, and any behaviours offending propriety would be 
subject to public criticism or even severe punishments, which are tacitly approved by the 
Chinese community.240 Furthermore, Confucian notions of hierarchical stratification are 
blamed for breeding some problematic issues in today’s China, like the existence of the 
official-centred philosophy241, low-respect of the grassroots class, and overstressing of one’s 
social status.242 Based on his study, Fei claimed that the foregoing Li-centred notions jointly 
contributed to the formation of China’s folk culture, which emphasised blood ties and, 
thereby, was characterised as xenophobic and protective towards members within a 
relationship-based community.243 
 
In brief, the foregoing discussion demonstrated the significant position of Li (礼) in China’s 
traditional philosophic framework, mainly owing to its role in unifying peoples’ behaviours 
and facilitating realisation of the ruling authorities’ political agendas and pursuits. Despites 
the foregoing benefits, Li-related concepts could also lead to intricate ritual requirements and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
grounded on mutual trust and the principle of reciprocity, while it only becomes sustainable if with regular exchanges of 
favour or privileged treatments. Thus, the dynamic interaction between individuals constitutes the core connotation of guanxi. 
See XW Zhai, ‘Characteristics of Chinese Interpersonal Relationship-Nationalised Concept and Its Model (in Chinese)’ 
[1993] 4 Sociological Studies 74-83, 75-77; J McGregor, One Billion Customers: Lessons from the Front Lines of Doing 
Business in China (Free Press 2007) 125; J Guan, ‘Guanxi: The Key to Achieving Success in China’ (December 2011) Sino-
Platonic Paper 217. 
236 MY Gu, Cultural Foundations of Chinese Education (in Chinese, Shaanxi Education Publishing House 2004), 80-87 
237 MH Yang, 'The New Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues Modern Transformation of Traditional Chinese 
Thoughts of Filial Piety and Support (in Chinese)'[2013] 15(2) Journal of Jiangsu University (Social Science Edition) 18-22 
238 ibid; LF Liu and L Li, 'The Essence and Dross in the 'Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues (in 
Chinese)' [2014] 28(1) Journal of Hunan University (Social Sciences)129-133  
239 J Li, 'Jingtao Hu: Firmly Establish Socialist Concept of Honour (in Chinese)' (People.cn, 28 April 
2006) <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49169/49171/4337564.html> accessed 17 January 2017 
240 XY Zeng (n215) 198 
241 The core value of this ideology advocates defining the social rank of a person in accordance with his/her official position. 
In detailed terms, it claims that holding a high-level official position represents a person’s social influence and prestige, and 
only prodigious talents will be admitted into this elite group. Correspondingly, ordinary people are compelled to respect this 
group and obey their commands. See X Han, 'The Loss of Confucian Orthodoxy and the Rise of Guan Ben Wei——Based on 
the Thought of Chinese Traditional Politics and Culture (in Chinese)' [2013] 7 Frontiers 58-68, 60 
242 MY Gu (n236) 84-85 
243 XT Fei, Xiangtu Zhongguo (in Chinese) (Sanlian Bookstore, Beijing 1985),100-109  
 43 
 
the emergence of particular social phenomena, like the popularity of the guanxi network and 
the official-centred philosophy. As revealed above, the traditional Li-concerned values are 
likely to exert persistent influence on contemporary Chinese society. This then underpins the 
claim of Fan that Li is a crucial concept to be considered in China-concerned socio-legal 
studies.244 Pursuant to findings of Fan, commercial arbitration in China, which is essentially 
an extra-judicial multi-party resolution for handling disputes of commercial nature, is 
substantially affected by Li-centred concepts that shape behavioural patterns and attitudes of 
Chinese parties when dealing with particular events.245 It is reasonable to deduce, based on 
the literature, that these Li-centred ideologies could also exert impact on the China-grounded 
EAA through moulding Chinese parties’ behaviours and perceptions. Yet, to what extent Li-
centred ideologies could sway China’s execution practice remains a pending question for this 
study to explore.246    
 
3.1.2 Meaning of De (德)  
Compared with Li (Rites), De (德) is a concept less-addressed by foreign scholars, but oft-
cited in Chinese academic publications as a prominent pillar of traditional Chinese culture, 
which embraces notions for personal integrity and self-cultivation in the Chinese context.247 
Thus, through interpreting China’s traditional De-concerned ideologies, one could have a 
clear idea about the benchmarks utilised by Chinese people to evaluate their own or others’ 
social performances.  
 
Theoretically, this term is deemed to be “a collection of civilisation, principles, values and 
morality norms, which were created during the development of a country, society and 
individual”.248 In a broad sense, this term harbours extensive connotations, regarding beliefs, 
morality, administration, and state policies.249 Meanwhile, it could narrowly refer to personal 
qualification. Driven by a people-oriented spirit, the traditional Chinese culture laid particular 
weight on individuals’ self-cultivation and moral education.250  The ideal personality in 
Chinese context is Junzi (君子), who is conventionally supposed to demonstrate superior 
                                                          
244 Fan(n15) 181-185. 
245 ibid, 171. 
246 Discussed in Section 7.4.1 below. 
247 JH Gan and XQ Li, 'A Brief Discussion on Traditional Chinese Legal Culture Dominated by De and Li' [2008] 108(2) 
Journal of the Party School of CPC of Changchun Municipal Committee 92-94 
248 M Xin, 'Enlarge the Moral Brilliance Embedded in China’s Traditional Culture' (Guangming Theory, 18 September 2014) 
<http://theory.gmw.cn/2014-09/18/content_13275195.htm> accessed 23 June 2016 
249 JH Gan and XQ Li (n247) 92 
250 M Xin (n248) 
 44 
 
integrity, intelligence, modesty, ability to self-support and benevolence.251 Da Xue (大学)252 
preached that Chinese men were expected to firstly enhance personal qualification, then 
properly manage their families, and finally participate in the country’s administration and 
establish their social achievements.253 This theoretically means that De-related notions hearten 
Chinese people to fulfil their social responsibilities that are defined in line with their social 
positions.254 For instance, scholars are expected by Confucianism to carry out four demanding 
missions, namely, introducing sound ideologies about society and nature, guiding people to 
lead a better life, inheriting and developing the contributions of the previous masters, and 
creating a sustainable peaceful world for the following generations.255 To achieve these goals, 
Confucius advised that individuals should enhance their personal qualification by modestly 
learning from others, periodically conducting deep soul-searching on their behaviours, 
consciously resisting undue temptations, and constantly revealing high-level integrity and 
friendliness in social activities.256 Other Chinese classics also urged people to become 
industrious and prudent social practitioners with high integrity.257 It should be noticed that, 
opposed to Junzi, Confucian philosophies depicted a negative and despicable character known 
as Xiaoren (小人), who was featured by low morality and a fondness for pursuing personal 
interests.258 Therefore, De-related philosophies traditionally educate Chinese people to lead a 
low-profile and moderate life with less desires and conflicts, so as to avoid being labelled as 
Xiaoren. This directly perpetuates the enduring litigation-avoidance inclination in the Chinese 
community.       
 
On the surface, the foregoing notions are seemingly inspiring and beneficial, since they jointly 
promote the constant self-learning and target-driven personal improvement. However, this 
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study upholds that De-related notions might be responsible for the following problems. Firstly, 
these notions request Chinese people to consciously suppress their feelings and withdraw 
from challenging authorities.259 This explains why the Chinese are considered holding a ‘high 
tolerance of uncertainty’260 and generally being submissive to authority.261  Secondly, the 
absence of specific guideline for applying De-related notions could lead to misapprehension 
of these notions. For instance, these notions underpin the utilisation of moderate approaches 
to handle issues, so as to obtain wanted results without consuming huge risks or stirring up 
conflicts with others.262 Yet, this preference for moderate approaches might be misinterpreted 
as total avoidance of taking proactive actions or applying tough measures to achieve results, 
even if the situation requires so.263 This preference, to a great extent, leads to the modest and 
conservative personality of the Chinese.264 Also, De-related notions stipulate a set of high 
criteria for self-cultivation, but give no hands-on guidance for achieving these criteria. This 
evidently increases the difficulties for individuals to apply these notions, which then explains 
the lack of enthusiasm amid the contemporary Chinese to follow these notions in their daily 
life.265 Moreover, De-related philosophies encourage an individual to evaluate and adjust his 
behaviours based on others’ comments, in order to win social recognition.266 This makes 
Chinese people become awfully sensitive to others’ opinions and consciously observe 
formulaic behavioural codes on public occasions. Fei further explained that Chinese people, 
who had been, and would still be, living in a folk society that was featured by intense 
interdependence amongst group members, were more willing to surrender their personal 
perceptions and principles to the shared insights of their communities, especially when 
completing their social duties, so as to please their communities and cement high-status 
footholds therein.267 Fei’s claim resonates with the inference derived from findings of Shi 
about deficiencies in the national character of the Chinese, suggesting that China’s traditional 
beliefs convince its people  to promptly avoid making mistakes that no one else in his/her 
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neighbourhood would otherwise commit, regardless of how trivial his/her mistakes could 
be.268 However, Fei warned that, once an immoral or unlawful conduct won an acceptance 
within a clique, such conduct would then become highly infectious among the members of 
this clique, who were expected to observe the same set of moral norms and behavioural codes, 
whilst groups associated with this source clique might also be affected through intergroup 
communication. 269 Predictably, washing off the impact of such infectious behaviours would 
be a challenging task even for authorities. Thus, it is no exaggeration to announce that De-
centred philosophies defined the basic characteristics of the Chinese nation, as being 
submissive, introverted and attached to their individual cliques.270      
 
In short, De-related notions, which uphold high-standard self-discipline and self-cultivation, 
mould the collective personality of Chinese society and stipulate social expectations for 
Chinese individuals. The traditional behavioural codes promoted by these notions generally 
revolve around modesty, forgiveness and confrontation-avoidance. Theoretically, any 
dishonest behaviours or misconduct, including execution avoidance, virtually run counter to 
the spirit of De-related notions and, thereby, the presence of such behaviours could be used 
for assessing the actual impact of these notions. According to the SPC’s work reports271, a 
large amount of Chinese debtors were found purposely avoiding their obligations. This then 
motivates this study to explore two questions: whether De-related notions are still able to 
affect behaviours of contemporary Chinese population and what role they could play in 
China’s modern execution practice.272    
 
3.1.3 Meaning of He (和)  
Being a crucial concept in China’s traditional ideological framework, He (和) is generally 
explained as a notion preaching the establishment of a politically stable and amicable society 
through the adoption of benevolent and moderate approaches.273 Putting differently, this term 
heartens an individual to emphasise self-cultivation, and use mild, rather than aggressive or 
abrupt, means to manage his/her relationships and confrontations with other members in 
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his/her community.274 Hence, the notion of He substantially determined Chinese people’s 
choice for dispute resolution and, correspondingly, formed the Chinese-style commercial 
arbitration practice.275  Yet, this study would like to argue that the notion of He should be 
given a richer connotation than the foregoing definition, when pursuing the defined research 
theme, so as to better decipher Chinese people’s execution-related behaviours and 
perceptions.  
 
To achieve harmony, Confucian philosophies persuaded people to adopt the Junzi-style 
behavioural pattern, which highlighted avoidance of disputes and gentle attitude towards 
others.276 These philosophies partially contributed to Chinese people’s strong preference of 
less-confrontational extra-judicial dispute resolutions (e.g. mediation) over litigation to settle 
conflicts.277 But, Confucian philosophies also enlightened that people should firmly fight for, 
instead of easily giving up, their beliefs and legitimate entitlements.278 This means that, under 
the impact of these remarks, the apparently modest Chinese people would not hesitate over 
voicing their claims, but only if it is absolutely necessary. Additionally, this Chinese-style 
harmony should not be achieved upon suppression of different voices from marginal groups 
or ideologies, but rather upon the compatible coexistence of multiple values and tribes.279 
According to Confucian wisdom, a Junzi (君子) is expected to show magnanimity to different 
or rival opinions, and seek for coexistence of these divergences with reservation of his own 
ideas.280  Zhang argued that China’s current diplomatic strategies and policies were testimony 
to the appreciation of He-centred beliefs. Furthermore, China’s traditional ideologies also 
heartened its people to informedly apply their learned theories in real life. For example, 
Yangming Wang (王阳明) 281 avowedly preached that an intelligent individual should tactfully 
tackle real-life issues upon his/her pre-acquired theoretical knowledge and sufficient 
awareness of the ever-changing social realities, in order to avoid unnecessary risks and 
achieve the maximum outcomes with least inputs.282  Heeding such claims, He-centred 
notions encourage people to adopt a discreet handling of practical problems with strategies 
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adapting flexibly to the changing situation. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that Chinese 
people would not present proactive or even aggressive reactions to matters that could be 
considered flagrant provocations to their bottom line.283 
 
However, it should be noticed that, despite underplaying the importance of personal rights and 
freedom, Chinese culture conventionally accentuates the significance of public opinion on the 
governing authorities to the maintenance of politic and social stability.284 Shangshu (尚书) 
stated that “The common people stand as the cornerstone of a country, and their preferences 
determine the stability of the country” (民惟邦本，本固邦宁).285 Echoing this remark, 
Mencius proposed that “The common people should always come first and the country 
second, both prior to the emperor (民为贵, 社稷次之, 君为轻)”. 286 The Daoist philosopher, 
Laozi (老子) also reminded China’s ancient ruling bodies to manage the country with great 
caution, so as to achieve their political agenda without damaging public confidence.287 Those 
remarks jointly urged Chinese authorities to pay keen attention to public opinion and always 
maintain a positive political image. The foregoing notions arguably received keen observation 
of China’s ancient governors, regardless of their different ruling periods.288 The modern 
Chinese governments and judicial force seemingly also adopt these notions in their operations 
for achieving social stability and harmony, loosely proved by the utilisation of ceasing public 
rage as a reason for sanctioning capital punishment in criminal cases.289  
 
Hence, it could be inferred that He-related notions could still exert impact on the decisions of 
China’s contemporary governing authorities and the grassroots. This further indicates that 
preference for amicable dispute resolution will preserve its existence in Chinese society, and 
public opinion will be continuously treated as a weighty element to consider in decision-
making of China’s authorities. As stated previously in Section 2.3, Fan detected that the 
development of commercial arbitration in China was subject to the impact of He-related 
notions, typically evidenced by the formation of Chinese-style med-arb practice and 
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application of the Biantong principle.290 Yet, there is no explanation about what kind of role 
He-related notions would play in the EAA. This gap then constitutes a target for this study to 
further investigate.291  
       
To sum up, traditional Chinese culture is a complicate collection of Confucianism and diverse 
schools of traditional philosophies, which have jointly posed persistent influence on the whole 
Chinese nation with more or less untarnished connotations. Particularly, three crucial notions 
in traditional Chinese culture, including Li, De and He, could exert both positive and 
detrimental effects on Chinese peoples’ thoughts and social behaviours. Merely considering 
an appeal raised by Chinese scholars for selectively inheriting traditional Chinese ideologies 
and watchfully preserving China’s unique cultural characteristics292, legal practices in China, 
including the EAA, are likely to continuously operate in a cultural context with distinctive 
Chinese features. Bearing the previous discussion in mind, the next section depicts China’s 
legal culture, explaining its connotation, evolution and characteristics that makes it differ 
from the Western one.  
   
3.2 Compact Overview of China’s Legal Culture 
According to the literature, legal culture is such a complicate term that its universally agreed 
definition has still been in short supply hitherto.293 However, Friedman defined legal culture 
as a reflection of peoples’ “customs, opinions, ways of doing things and thinking” about the 
legal system, all of which were inexorably subject to the influence of the corresponding 
culture.294 Sharing the spirit of Friedman’s remarks, Zhang held that traditional Chinese legal 
culture was the fruits of Chinese people’s practical experiences, which demonstrated Chinese 
peoples’ intelligence and creativity.295 According to his arguments, ancient Chinese law came 
into being chiefly to serve the purpose of restraining and punishing deceitful deeds of the 
common people.  It is a general consensus that traditional Chinese philosophies, especially 
those Confucian ones, were deeply embedded in China’s legal culture, which equipped the 
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latter with unique characteristics that distinctively differed from its Western counterparts.296 
Qiu also claimed that, owing to its constant development in the past several thousand years, 
Chinese legal culture had formed its profound framework, which was sharing ideological 
kinship with China’s modern legal fabric and continuously influencing legal awareness of 
modern Chinese society.297 The foregoing statement received a strong endorsement from Fan, 
who believed that the core tenets of traditional Chinese legal culture were still keenly 
observed in China’s contemporary legal operations, despite the outcomes of the country’s 
century–old legal modernisation.298 Therefore, it is seemingly appropriate to assess Chinese 
legal doctrines in its broad cultural context and without mechanically applying Western 
criteria. Starting with an introduction to the connotations and characteristics of China’s 
traditional legal culture, the following section then briefly describes the evolution of China’s 
legal customs and explains the essence of its presiding socialist rule of law. Afterwards, this 
section itemises the discrepancies between Chinese and Western legal practices in three 
aspects, namely, ultimate missions, core values and enforcement forces.    
 
3.2.1 Connotation and characteristics of China’s traditional legal culture 
Traditional Chinese legal culture virtually consists of two key components, namely, Li (礼) 
and Fa (法).299 As explored above, Li (礼) is a crucial umbrella term with rich connotations. 
Herein, Li merely refers to its narrowed definition as rites, including widely accepted moral 
codes and customary practices that literately governed every facets of Chinese people’s daily 
life.300 In comparison, Fa (法) also possesses its broad and narrowed definitions. Zeng 
claimed that Fa (法) broadly embraced all established rules, including moral disciplines and 
customary laws, while it could also be solely used as a synonym of Lv (律), referring to 
criminal legislations and decrees promulgated by the governing bodies.301 It is worth 
accentuating that ancient China derived its law from three sources, namely, legislations from 
the governing bodies, clan rules (or inter-family protocols), and customary taboos.302 In other 
words, morality codes were a recognised external source for China’s ancient law.303 
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Moreover, Chinese legal education was traditionally carried out through three channels, 
namely, governmental publication, law enforcement operations and formal school-based 
education.304 Comparatively speaking, due to Chinese people’s long-standing submissiveness 
to authority, attitudes of the governing bodies towards legal system and practices would 
substantially mould the prevailing conceptions of the Chinese population. All these facts 
actually confirmed the close combination of Li and Fa in traditional Chinese legal practice.305 
Moreover, Zhang argued that the core of China’s traditional legal philosophies was using 
severe punishments to deter the common people from committing behaviours that could 
violate the interests of others or the state.306 Yet, a Han Dynasty philosopher, Dong Zhongshu 
(董仲舒) urged the governing authorities to achieve social stability and safeguard their 
dominance through conducting so-called ‘benevolent governance’, under which the 
authorities were expected to observe Confucian moral codes and chiefly resort to morality-
centred education that promoted De-related notions, rather than severe penalties, to regulate 
their people.307  Ma also summarised that the essence of traditional Chinese legal culture 
rested on its intention to promote cautious utilisation of criminal sanctions, tolerance for 
concealing each other’s transgressions amongst relatives, harmonious neighbour relations and 
mutual collaboration against external threats.308 Therefore, China’s traditional legal culture is 
believed as upholding two critical propositions, namely, (1) combining Li and Fa (礼法结合), 
and (2) prioritising morality-centred education over infliction of punishment in regulating the 
society (德主刑辅).309 
 
Comparatively, Zhang’s work presented an elaborate account, unveiling twelve features of 
traditional Chinese legal culture.310  Firstly, Zhang raised the comprehensive development of 
the ancient Chinese legal departments as evidence for China’s legal traditions that appreciated 
logical thinking and a practice-oriented legislative attitude. Secondly, the emphasis on using 
moral codes and education, rather than sanctions, to restrain people’s actions is a distinct and 
time-honoured legal custom in China.311 Zhang sustained that the incorporation of moral 
codes could help law obtain higher respect and better implementation amid the common 
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people. Thirdly, ceasing legal disputes amongst individuals and preventing public disturbance 
to safeguard social stability and equilibrium always remained the top priority on political 
agendas of all Chinese governing authorities, both previous and present-day.312 Using Fa as a 
tool for the Chinese governors to shackle their subordinates to wanted behaviours comes as 
the fourth cultural characteristics of traditional Chinese legal operations.313 On this point, 
Chinese scholars reached an agreement that the effectiveness of the Chinese legal practices 
was substantially subject to the legal awareness of the corresponding emperors, which 
undesirably enlarged the uncertainty of legal justice.314 Then, traditional Chinese legal culture 
highly stressed the protection over China’s blood-tied human relations pursuant to the Li-
related concepts.315 Sixthly, proper fulfilment of legal promises was deemed as the source of 
authority for traditional Chinese legal framework, thereby being invested with keen attention 
from the authorities.316 Next, traditional Chinese legal culture was inclined to regulate 
officials’ performances with elaborate procedures and stipulations.317 Eighthly, traditional 
Chinese legal culture encouraged the authorities to promptly adjust law and their legal 
practices to adapt to the changes in social conditions.318 Ninthly, the traditional Chinese legal 
forces adopted the notion of He, and promoted conciliation as the most favourable way to 
reduce litigation and solve disputes.319 It is worth highlighting that two primary approaches 
were conventionally utilised for diffusing the Chinese-style philosophy of litigation 
avoidance, including directives from the presiding highest administrative authority (e.g. 
emperors) and grassroots education (via distribution of folk songs, proverbs or popular 
readings).320 Additionally, Chinese legal culture traditionally encouraged law enforcement 
forces to simultaneously observe legal rules and customs, which regulated interpersonal 
relationship, in their operations.321 This literally suggests that the Chinese legal forces are 
traditionally given the permission to exercise law at their discretion. The eleventh 
characteristic of traditional Chinese legal culture concerns its emphasis on imposing strict 
sanctions in the light of legislative stipulations.322 Finally, traditional Chinese legal culture put 
store on the maintenance of amicable relationship between nature and human beings. 323   
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Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that, during the over-thousand-year feudal period, 
regional law enforcement operations in China were carried out by local administrative organs 
as a part of their responsibilities. Though being abolished by later reforms, such practice has 
nevertheless contributed to a public perception of Chinese judiciary, which considered this 
judicial force to be subordinate to the administrative organs, amid Chinese people even till 
now.324 
 
Focusing more specifically on development of arbitration practice, Fan underlined three key 
features of Chinese legal culture, including “emphasis on rituals, relational network, and 
harmony and conflict avoidance”.325 According to Fan, these three notions essentially shaped 
core tenets, legislative framework and procedural organisation of China’s commercial 
arbitration.326 It is worth highlighting that Fan’s work contributed an attention-arresting 
discussion about implementation of law with emphasis on rituals. Resonant with the 
foregoing claims of Zhang, Fan expounded that, by virtue of Li-centred concepts, Chinese 
legal culture traditionally urged law enforcement bodies to execute written legislations in a 
manner that simultaneously observed “natural rules, national laws and human sentiments”, so 
as to compensate for the inflexibility of the statutory framework and better accommodate 
volatile legal problems in individual cases.327 This ideological inclination then bred the notion 
of Biantong (变通)328 and further sponsored the popularity of this notion in China’s 
contemporary legal practices.329 Hence, the notion of Biantong, which presumably enjoys 
wide application in China’s arbitration practice, is worth deliberation when exploring 
execution-related issues in later discussions. Meanwhile, Fan argued that the development of 
Chinese commercial arbitration was essentially rooted in China’s long-standing preference for 
amicable dispute resolution.330 This proves the impact of He-related concepts on China’s 
contemporary arbitration practice.  
 
In short, traditional Chinese legal culture has formed its signature traits during its long 
development history, which has branded China’ contemporary arbitration practice with 
identifiable marks. Specifically, emphasis on rituals, relationship-based network and harmony, 
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together with the application of the Biantong notion, are considered culture-conditioned 
features of China’s arbitration practice, which distinguish it from the Western version. 
Comparatively speaking, the literature detects the roles played by He and Li-related notions in 
the formation of China’s legal customs and ideologies, while claiming the importance of 
using De-related notions to educate the people to the maintenance of social order. Echoing 
with these findings, Fan identified how notions of He and Li contributed to the development 
of China’s contemporary commercial arbitration. Nonetheless, Fan’s work offers no 
indication on what role traditional De-related notions played therein, as well as how these 
traditional ideologies could affect China’s modern execution practice. 
 
3.2.2 Evolution of China’s legal culture in the modern era   
Fan claimed that China’s traditional culture was by no means immutable from challenges and 
ideological transformations.331  Though there is no agreed time for the starting of China’s 
modern era, it is generally accepted that the Westernisation campaign, which happened in the 
late Qing Dynasty, initiated China’s legal modernisation process.332  Ever since then, China 
has been incorporating Western ideologies and practices into its legal framework, like those 
associated with constitutional rights and commercial arbitration.333 Zhang argued that this 
Westernisation campaign brought about eight transformations to China’s traditional legal 
culture: 
• Learning from the Western practices to modify the existing law in line with the 
changing social conditions;  
• Fighting against the three cardinal guides and related social norms; 
• Conducting Westernised modification to China’s existing legal system upon 
adherence to traditional Chinese philosophies and customs, like those Confucian 
ones;   
• Abolishing the absolute monarch and transiting to more democratic political regimes, 
like constitutional monarch and republic; 
• Moving from rule by man to rule of law; 
• Changing the legislative emphasis from fulfilment of obligations to protection of 
entitlements;  
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• Separating the judiciary from the administrative organs; 
• Modifying the traditional criminal-law-centred legislative orientation and permitting 
promulgation of various departments of law.334 
 
In view of the previous legal reforms undergone by China since the late Qing dynasty, Wang 
claimed that contemporary Chinese legal culture was formed upon three sources, namely, 
China’s legal traditions, Marxist notions and incorporated Western practices.335 Wang also 
believed that China’ modern legal framework adopted the civil law version, but with the 
incorporation of common law practices, particularly as to development of commercial law and 
the limited acceptance of case law.336 Consequently, China cannot be classified as either a 
common or civil law country, but a country with a hybrid legal system.337   
 
Meanwhile, traditional Chinese culture has allegedly suffered an ebbing control over modern 
Chinese society and, even worse, was intimidated by the new-born hybrid cultures since 1979, 
owing to the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and the invasion of Western life tenets, 
which have been constantly flooding into China as an outcome of its opening-up.338 
Behaviours of Chinese young generation, especially those born after the 1990s, who appear to 
lead their lives with distinctively different values in comparison with the earlier generations, 
are raised as typical evidence underpinning the foregoing claim.339   
 
Pursuant to the official statements released by China’s presiding leadership, the country is 
now in the progress of establishing socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics.340 
Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Comprehensively 
Promoting the Rule of Law341 detailed objectives of this progress as follows: 
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Under the leadership of the CPC (Communist Party of China), adhere to the socialist 
system with Chinese characteristics; implement the theory of socialist rule of law with 
Chinese characteristics; form a well-structured legislative framework, a highly efficient 
mechanism, an airtight supervision system and a powerful guarantee system for 
implementing rule of law; construct a sound intra-Party regulatory system; persist in 
concurrent promotion of law-based ruling, governance and administration; insist in the 
integrated construction of a rule of law country, government and society; achieve 
scientific legislation, strict law enforcement, impartial judiciary and law abidance of the 
entire population; and facilitate the modernisation of the governance system and 
capacity of the country.342  
 
Inferred from the foregoing contents, it is proposed that China’s socialist rule of law is 
expected to reveal four key features: (1) adhering to the leadership of the CPC, (2) protecting 
people’s welfare and entitlement, (3) preserving Chinese traditions, and (4) establishing a 
legal framework with Chinese characteristics.343 Specifically, Xi Jinping stated that China’s 
legal reforms should be conducted in accordance with China’s social realities and learn from, 
instead of directly copying, other country’s practices.344   
 
Comprehensively entertaining the foregoing claims, it could be concluded that, though 
absorbing Western practices and Marxist legal notions, modern Chinese legal culture has 
discarded some out-dated practices and modernised its connotations, but still cherishes and 
will continue to preserve China’s traditional customs, which are considered the cream of 
Chinese civilisation.  This then underscores the necessity to explore dissimilarities between 
Western and Chinese legal cultures, and analyse the impact of China’s traditional notions on 
its contemporary legal and arbitration practice in the following sections.  
 
3.2.3 Discrepancies between Western and Chinese legal cultures 
Due to their different origins and history of development, Chinese and Western societies have 
generated legal cultures that are characteristically unlike from each other.345 In his work titled 
Comparative Study of Chinese and Western Legal Cultures, Zhang itemised eight divergences 
between these two cultures, respectively in terms of origin, objectives, cultural attributes, 
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relationship with morality, logical framework, components, basic spirit, and core values.346  
Merely considering their impact on legal practice, traditional Chinese legal culture differs 
from its Western counterpart in three key dimensions, namely, ultimate missions, core values 
and enforcement forces. Starting with ultimate missions, the Western legal practices are 
essentially designated to defend individuals’ legitimate rights and freedom, which naturally 
tags these two items as the central concept in the Western legal sphere.347 Correspondingly, 
the Western world are praised for their achievements in developing well-structured protective 
mechanisms for individual interests and free trade.348 In comparison, the key mission of 
China’s traditional legal practices was to safeguard the sovereignty of the feudal governing 
class and collective interests of the pertinent community through firmly upholding the 
Confucianism-based ethic codes.349 Even now, ensuring political stability and the welfare of 
the whole society is still defined as a top-priority mission of law enforcement in modern 
China, compared with the Western legal practice.350 This somehow explains why China is 
deemed as adopting rule by law, instead of the Western-version rule of law.351 Consequently, 
the previous reforms of China’s legislative mechanism seemed to invest more attention in 
upgrading the framework of criminal sanctions. Meanwhile, individual interests and rights are 
still understated in the Chinese legal context, while a sophisticatedly interwoven legal 
framework for commercial affairs has still been absent hitherto in China, merely considering 
the country’s current flawed legislations for arbitration and enforcement in civil or 
commercial cases.352 For instance, unlike in the UK where commercial issues are dealt under 
the joint force of the published statutes and constantly updated case law, China’s current 
statute-centred legislative framework seems to be inefficient in accommodating the newly 
emerging business problems. Secondly, these two cultures virtually cherished contrastingly 
different legal values. Specifically, the Western culture heavily relies on law to educate and 
restrain individuals’ behaviours, whereas the Chinese one welcomes the joint application of 
morality and law, and places the moral codes prior to legal rules.353 Additionally, the Western 
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culture stressed the realisation of justice, while Chinese one promoted harmony and litigation 
avoidance.354 Moreover, Chinese legal culture educated law enforcement forces to bow to the 
management of administrative authorities and serve the political agenda of the latter, while 
legal forces under the Western context enjoyed high-level independence and solely engaged in 
the implementation of law.355 Thirdly, the two cultures relied on different forces to exercise 
law. China’s traditional legal operations were chiefly shared by four bodies, namely, the 
emperor, specific legal departments, regional administrative organs and inter-clan 
committees.356 Even in today’s China where implementation of law is chiefly burdened upon 
its judiciary, some administrative organs are still entitled to exercise their own regulations or 
interfere in the operations of law enforcement departments.357 This practice deviates from the 
Western legal operations, where independent law enforcement departments would exclusively 
bear all the responsibilities.358 Moreover, attention should be paid to the claims of Wang, 
saying that  
 
Chinese people’s obedience to law is their compliance to authority….. People are willing 
to follow respectful leaders, thereby accepting the regulation of law….. Therefore, it is 
not hard to understand why, in today when people reveal increasingly obvious awareness 
of personal rights, they feel it is acceptable for the government to retain gigantic public 
authority.359  
 
Wang also stated that, according to Chinese people’s perception, justice was actually a result 
of legal operations administered by law enforcement officials with high integrity, rather than 
the implementation of particular statutes.360 This can be verified by Chinese society’s 
entrenched appreciation for “rule of honest and upright official”.361 Hence, performance of 
law enforcement agents holds a decisive role in determining Chinese people’s perceptions of 
and confidence in China’s legal system. In contrast, Western society gives privilege to the 
authority of law, rather than authoritative bodies or law enforcement agents.362 To sum up, the 
unique features of Chinese legal tradition determine that China’s legal practices should not be 
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assessed according to Western standards and doctrines.363 This then justifies the need for this 
study to evaluate the China-grounded EAA and present research outcomes in China’s socio-
cultural context.   
 
3.3 Impact of Cultural Ideologies on China’s Contemporary Legal and Arbitration 
Practices  
The previous discussion indicates that traditional Chinese ideologies and legal beliefs have 
been, over the past several thousand years, passed down from generation to generation, 
cutting across time and regime changes.364 Research revealed that, despite having undergone 
ideological integration among dissimilar ancient Chinese philosophies and temporary 
politically-purposed adjustments at different historic stages, the essence of traditional Chinese 
culture has broadly remained untarnished and exerted profound influence on modern China 
and its culturally-connected neighbours.365 The imperceptible presence of Chinese culture can 
be found from the small facets in people’s daily life and interpersonal communication to 
aspects that could determine the fate of China, like the country’s development guidelines and 
diplomatic policies.366 The ‘Chinese Dream’ raised by Xi Jinping (China’s presiding 
Chairman), which centred on harmony and development with Chinese characteristics, could 
be considered bearing testimony to the impact of traditional Chinese culture on the country’s 
developmental orientation.367 Accordingly, a conclusion could be produced that Chinese 
people have been literally immersed in a constant exposure to traditional values. This 
somewhat substantiates the unlikelihood of unreservedly removing the negative impacts of 
traditional Chinese beliefs. Meanwhile, despite the discrepancies between behaviours and 
values of different generations, the whole Chinese society seemingly still cherishes some 
essential cultural concepts, like the appreciation of harmony and conflict-avoidance.368 
Traditional notions are also found still possessing a strong existence in China’s economically 
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less-developed regions (ELDRs), typically like the rural areas.369 Even noticeably, given 
attempts of China’s top authority to revive traditional values, it is unlikely that traditional 
Chinese culture would lose its touch with modern China in the near future.370 Consequently, it 
could be said that Chinese culture has been and, predictably, will be reigning over Chinese 
society, even under the increasing influence of Western ideologies. This makes it worthwhile 
to review how China’s legal traditions have been hitherto affecting the country in 
contemporary time, focusing on clarification of the tradition-conditioned characteristics of 
China’s legal and arbitration practices.    
 
3.3.1 Impact of traditional ideologies on China’s contemporary legal practice 
The literature has already discerned the enduring impact of traditional Chinese legal 
philosophies on China’s modern practices in three facets, including legislative orientation, 
attitude of law enforcement forces and legal awareness of individuals.371 Naturally, these 
ideologies would also shape China’s commercial arbitration, which allows quasi-
judicial tribunals to share the mission of dispute settlement with Chinese courts upon the 
empowerment of the parties concerned.  
 
Initially, China’s legal tradition has shaped its legislative orientation as mission-driven and 
somewhat discriminative, but open to the transnational practices upon preservation of Chinese 
characteristics. As mentioned previously, the maintenance of social stability and sovereignty 
serves as the key mission of China’s legal practice. Consequently, it could be observed that 
Chinese authorities inherited the traditional criminal-law-centred approach and continuously 
devoted their major efforts to ensuring the efficiency of China’s criminal law, merely 
considering the frequent updating and modifications of this law.372 Thus far, China’s criminal 
law has witnessed nine versions of amendment, with the latest one coming into effect on 29 
August 2015.373 In contrast, even though China has, since 1979, promulgated a series of 
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commercial laws to handle newly emerging business issues, like private property rights374, the 
country reveals a slower pace in updating its enacted commercial statutes, like its 1995 
Arbitration Law.375 Given China’s rapidly evolving social and economic conditions over the 
past several decades, it is doubtful to what extent China’s 22-year-old Arbitration Law could 
sufficiently satisfy the needs of settling business disputes and materialising awards nowadays. 
Additionally, Xue spotlighted the flaws in China’s existing regulations about the protection of 
women’s rights, respectively in terms of employment and personal safety.376 Xue argued that 
China’s current legislative mechanism failed to provide a sound guarantee to ensure women’s 
equal opportunity in social practices, let alone feasible measures to protect women’s well-
being and rights, like countermeasures against domestic violence. This legislative weakness is 
linked to the subtle gender-biased recruitment policy prevailing in the contemporary China.377 
Equally, this study feels that China’s regulations for protecting migrant workers’ interests, 
although contributing greatly to improvement of this group’s welfare and social status, could 
be considered demonstrating a stratification-based attitude that treats the latter as a marginal 
group with low social position. Meanwhile, the absence of legislation governing the operation 
of China’s private debt collection industry and the restricted powers of Chinese lawyers under 
China’s current legislative framework indicate that Chinese authorities seemingly underplay 
the supplementary role that non-state actors could play in facilitating or even advancing the 
country’s legal operations. Furthermore, transnational legal notions, which are incompatible 
with Chinese culture, might encounter hardship when being incorporated into China’s legal 
framework. This is typically proved by the fact that the 1995 Arbitration Law upholds many 
international arbitration practices, but denies ad hoc arbitration, which does not meet the 
requirement for formality in China’s cultural context that advocates institution-administered 
standardised operations.378 Therefore, though beneficial for constructing a feasible legislative 
framework to safeguard the country’s political stability and governance, China’s current 
tradition-influenced legislative orientation is not ideal for the country to sufficiently support 
its rapid economic expansion and further promote development of commercial arbitration. 
 
Secondly, attitudes of China’s law enforcement forces seemingly still follow the traditional 
pattern, considering their preference towards ADR, prudence in imposing punishments on 
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defaulting debtors, endeavour to simultaneously observe customs, legal principles and human 
sentiments, and sensitivity to public opinion. Staring with Chinese courts’ preference for 
using conciliation in court-led execution proceedings, the 2017 Report379 stated that Chinese 
courts closed 5.321million cases through conciliation, accounting for 23.1% of their total 
caseload (23.03 million). These figures bear testimony to Chinese judiciary’s traditional 
inclination towards solving disputes in a less confrontational manner and reducing litigation 
through utilisation of ADR, compared with their counterparts in some Western hyper-
litigation countries, like the USA.380 Such friendly attitude of Chinese courts towards ADR is 
obviously beneficial for further growth of commercial arbitration in China. Additionally, the 
SPC’s annual work reports repeatedly mentioned its goals of safeguarding the country’s 
political stability and contributing to the establishment of a harmonious society. These 
remarks loosely spotlighted that the key tasks of modern Chinese courts and their appreciation 
of He-related concepts still remain unchanged. The impact of confrontation-avoidance 
tradition on China’s law enforcement forces could be further verified by the fact that Chinese 
courts publically exposed 6.89 million defaulters in 2016, but merely 16,000 defaulting 
debtors were give judicial detention and 2167 debtors received criminal sanctions.381 Thus, it 
could be announced that China’s legal traditions have contributed greatly in shaping Chinese 
courts into cautious law enforcement agents that appreciate amicable dispute resolutions and 
soft punitive approaches over litigation and severe punishments in commercial and civil cases. 
Meanwhile, the key tasks of Chinese courts and their subordination to China’s administrative 
organ loosely verifies the survival of the traditional Chinese notion that law just serves as an 
instrument for governance, which is under the administration of law enforcement forces set up 
by the central government.382 In view of the foregoing situations, it is understandable that 
creditors might have a weak faith that Chinese courts will become tough fighters for the 
materialisation of individual interests. Furthermore, Wang found Chinese courts still sticking 
to a traditionally-appreciated proposition about concurrent consideration of customs, legal 
principles and human sentiments in law enforcement operations.383  Wang presented a case, 
where the statute of limitations had already expired and the creditor was, due to ignorance of 
law, unable to adduce legislatively-acceptable evidence of continuous debt recovery attempt, 
apart from railway tickets. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of evidence, the court adopted 
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railway tickets as evidence proving the interruption of the statutory limitation and supported 
the creditor’s claim for debt recovery. Wang believed that the doctrine behind the court’s 
ruling was a simple traditional value saying that ‘repayment of a debt is perfectly self-
justified’. If merely considering the situation in the foregoing case, Chinese courts’ tradition-
observing attitude seemingly could provide better protection to Chinese people, who are in 
general still lacking sufficient legal awareness. Yet, such practice could substantially 
undermine the authority of the published statutes and give judges worrying leeway to exercise 
law at their discretion, thereby introducing unnecessary uncertainty in China’s legal 
operations.384 Besides, under a traditional notion that public opinion serves as the cornerstone 
of social stability and a government’s political success, Chinese courts’ performance is found 
susceptible to public opinion, which is hitherto suffering from inefficient management in its 
distribution and, thereby, might become arbitrary or biased under intentional solicitation.385 It 
could be detected that overstatement of public opinion could make Chinese judges struggle 
between strict observance of legal rules and respect of not-necessarily-rational public insights, 
when performing their duties.386  This situation is undoubtedly disadvantageous for the 
materialisation of arbitral awards that are in favour of out-of-towners and, thereby, might 
provoke negative feelings within the local community. Thus, the abovementioned culture-
conditioned characteristics of Chinese courts are not all favourable for the development of 
commercial arbitration and EAA. Especially, Chinese courts’ reluctance to exercise severe 
punishments on defaulters and their sensitivity to public opinion could weaken the deterrent 
effect of court-led coercive execution and embolden the debtors to engage in habitual default.   
 
Finally, China’s legal traditions also moulded Chinese people’s law-abiding awareness and 
perception of judicial authority. The litigation-avoiding notion is still found popular among 
Chinese people, which could be substantiated by the popularity of commercial arbitration and 
mediation in China.387 Then, the traditional ideologies that virtually prioritise moral codes 
over legal rules in educating and governing the common people are blamed for having been 
deceptively misguided Chinese people to use moral codes to evaluate judicial fairness.388 
Naturally, Chinese people would be easily upset by the law-abiding judges’ decisions, if the 
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latter superficially conflict with moral beliefs of the former. Meanwhile, China’s judiciary is 
considered subordinate to the state administrative authority, partially due to a public 
perception stemming from the fact that China’s judicial operations over the feudal period 
were conducted by the local administrative bodies as a part of their duties.389 Consequently, 
such division on the standards of judicial fairness between Chinese courts and the common 
people, together with the public perception of Chinese courts’ inferiority to other government 
administrative bodies at the corresponding bureaucratic ranks, markedly weaken Chinese 
people’s confidence in courts as competent dispute solvers.390 This claim is underpinned by 
the fact that Chinese people would resort to quasi-judicial authorities or government 
departments for disciplinary and grievance, like Xinfang Ju (信访局, Bureau for Complaint 
Letters and Calls), to express their grievances and seek for reliefs in a manner that might 
follow their scripts, but might not necessarily be law-approved.391 The literature has detected 
a worrying phenomenon known as ‘Trust in Complain Reporting, But Not in Law’ (信访不信
法), in which Chinese parties, who considered themselves victims of unfair judicial 
treatments, would refer their cases (e.g. those statute-barred for the expired limitation period) 
to Xinfang Ju especially at national and provincial levels, in the belief that these 
administrative bodies are more resourceful problem solvers than courts.392 Arguably, the 
dispute resolution approach relying on quasi-judicial authorities or government departments 
could not only erode the authority of Chinese courts, but also challenge public perceptions of 
judicial fairness and preference for rule of law.393 Herein, this study spotlighted a research-
worthy question whether arbitrators, who are requested to settle the disputes within the realm 
approved by the pertinent arbitration rules and national law, would envisage the same plight in 
their practice. Besides, Chinese people’s traditional attachment to rule of honest and upright 
officials is found problematic for promoting China’s legal advancement, since it overplays the 
significance of individual officials’ integrity and competence to the realisation of legal 
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justice.394 Influenced by this attachment, Chinese people generally hold high expectations on 
Chinese law enforcement staff. Correspondingly, they could be easily frustrated by judges’ 
poor performance in individual cases, and even project such poor performance to the whole 
judicial force.395 Hence, the lingering impact of legal traditions could serve as a plausible 
excuse explaining the generally weak legal awareness of contemporary Chinese people and 
their collective perceptions of an ideal judiciary, which would exert certain influence on 
shaping China’s legal operations and environment on the whole. 
 
3.3.2. Impact of traditional ideologies on China’s contemporary arbitration practice     
As presented in Chapter II, China’s commercial arbitration practice is recognised as observing 
the transitional principles, typically like those promoted by the NY Convention and the 
UNICITRAL Model law, so proved by China’s arbitration rules and the comments of 
practitioners. Yet, this does not mean that commercial arbitration in China can just be immune 
from the influence of traditional Chinese culture. In fact, the literature discovered that, aside 
from the abovementioned Chinese legal traditions, commercial arbitration in China was found 
revealing the characteristics forged by the following ideologies.    
 
Huang argued that traditional Chinese family-concerned philosophies substantially fashioned 
China’s commercial arbitration practice into operations with five distinguishable 
characteristics as below.396 Initially, Huang stated that China’s commercial arbitration shares 
the “collectivist” cultural feature with the traditional Chinese family, proved by its non-
recognition of ad hoc arbitration. If interpreted in a Chinese sense, ad hoc arbitration could be 
considered a form of unsupervised privately-directed event that demonstrates a high emphasis 
of individual interest and autonomy. Huang implied that the spirit of ad hoc arbitration self-
evidently went against the Chinese proposition that collective interest should always surpass 
individual ones. This clarifies why contemporary China has hitherto incorporated many 
transnational doctrines in its commercial arbitration practice, but is still displaying a reluctant 
attitude towards approval of ad hoc arbitration. Next, Huang believed that the institutional 
structure of China’s arbitration commissions, judicial force and arbitral tribunals, together 
with the denial of a tribunal’s jurisdiction over validity of arbitration agreement and 
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arbitrability of the concerned matters, were testimony to the hierarchic nature of China’s 
arbitration practice. Thirdly, Huang pinpointed China’s “harmony-oriented” culture as the 
reason supporting the officially approved incorporation of conciliation in China’s commercial 
arbitration process, evinced by China’s existing arbitration-concerned regulations.397 Then, 
Huang contested that the controlling spirit of Chinese culture induced the exclusive utilisation 
of institutional arbitration, extensive supervision of arbitration commissions over tribunals, 
and the understatement of party autonomy, which conflicted with the fundamental principles 
of global arbitration practice. Stipulations in the1995 Arbitration Law, which confer 
jurisdiction over validity of arbitration agreement on arbitration commission rather than 
tribunal, substantiate Huang’s claims. In contrast, Fan held the enduring impact of the notion 
about public control and collective interest as the reason fuelling China’s preference for 
institutional arbitration.398 Yet, this study prefers to ascribe the popularity of institutional 
arbitration to Chinese people’s deep-seated authority-abiding sense, which educates them to 
place more trust in institutions than individual arbitrators. Finally, Huang argued that China’s 
hesitation to permit inland operations of foreign arbitration bodies and legal practitioners was 
irrefutable evidence proofing the exclusivity of its arbitration culture. She also labelled the 
exclusivity of Chinese culture as the reason encouraging local protectionism. Upon her 
findings, Huang claimed that traditional Chinese philosophies actually exerted detrimental 
impact on China’s arbitration practice, which undesirably undermined the credibility of 
arbitration and suppressed the involved parties’ entitlements to orchestrate their arbitration 
proceedings.     
 
Through also addressing culture, Fan presented a different version of Chinese commercial 
arbitration’s five characteristics, namely, rigid legislative framework with loopholes, 
uncertainty in law enforcement, administrative control from internal and external authorities 
over arbitration proceedings, understatement of party autonomy, and the incorporation of 
mediation in arbitration process.399 Specifically, Fan ascribed China’s flawed legislative 
framework, administrative interferences over arbitration process and low appreciation of party 
autonomy to the lingering effects of traditional Chinese Li-centred ideologies that underscored 
formality, collective welfares and administrative control.400 Additionally, Fan pinpointed the 
application of the Biantong principle401 as a crucial reason causing high-level legal 
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uncertainty and low public confidence in China’s law enforcement, because this principle 
literally permitted law enforcement forces to implement written stipulations with flexibilities 
that were believed as sitting well with practical conditions and human sentiments.402  
Resonating with the viewpoints of Huang, Fan further proposed that China’s traditional 
culture, which championed avoidance of litigation and harmony, have been fuelling the 
nation’s peculiar fondness for extra-judicial dispute resolution, especially mediation or 
conciliation.403 Based on her findings, Fan concluded that traditional Chinese ideologies were 
imposing perceptible impact on the development of commercial arbitration in China and, 
therefore, a transformation of fundamental Chinese legal tenets stood as the key to a 
revolutionary reform of the country’s arbitration practice.404    
 
Besides, the literature seems to harbour different views about China’s efforts in incorporating 
Westernised tenets into its arbitration practice. Some scholars praised CIETAC for its 
capability of applying Western legal doctrines to solve disputes in an Eastern cultural 
context.405 Huang, however, proposed a further radical modification of China’s arbitration 
framework, though recognising the constant changes in Chinese practices. Meanwhile, aside 
from being transformed by transitional standards, Chinese legal culture was reported to exert 
inverse influences on the transformation of international arbitration operations, typically 
proved by the increasingly popularity of med-arb practice on a global scale.406 
 
In brief, traditional Chinese culture, which still orchestrates Chinese people’s perceptions of 
social practices and behavioural pattern, could exert enduring influence on China’s 
contemporary legal operations and arbitration practice through shaping the nature and basic 
tenets of the latter two. Hence, when assessing China’s execution environment for arbitral 
awards, this study needs to take Chinese culture and social realities into consideration, to 
enhance the credibility and informativeness of the final outcomes.      
 
Conclusion  
In the light of the literature, this chapter succinctly overviews some traditional Chinese 
ideologies that are deemed to have been choreographing China’s legal and arbitration 
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practices till now. The discussions in this chapter not only depict the broad cultural 
background that might shape the current China-grounded EAA, but also reveals the cultural 
context in which this study was conducted to answer the research questions about the role of 
Chinese culture in the country’s contemporary execution practice.  
 
The previous discussions reveal that Chinese society is still living under the sovereignty of 
China’s entrenched traditional ideologies, which literally permeates every aspect of this 
society and edits the life of all its members. This justifies the necessity for this study to 
explore the current status of the EAA in China’s ELDRs, upon consideration of how and to 
what extent cultural philosophies could affect Chinese parties’ perceptions and behaviours. 
Through a concise analysis, this study notices that three key concepts in traditional Chinese 
culture, including Li, De and He, could exercise persistent influence, both negative and 
positive, on Chinese people’s social awareness and behavioural pattern, thereby substantially 
swaying the developmental orientation of China’s contemporary legal practice and moulding 
Chinese people’s legal awareness. Comparatively speaking, tenets related to Li and He are 
found tacitly orchestrating the operations of modern Chinese society and social 
communications among its members, proved by the enduring presence of China’s distinctive 
cultural phenomena, like guanxi and the preference for amicable ADR. Yet, the rampancy of 
dishonest activities in modern China, like execution-avoidance, casts doubts on the influence 
of De-centred notions, which were originally introduced to promote decent behaviours among 
Chinese individuals. Moreover, under the influences of these concepts, China has formed its 
own legal culture with many unique characteristics, three of which are considered steering the 
development of arbitration practice in China, namely, emphasis on harmony and litigation 
avoidance, combination of Li (ritual) and Fa (law) reflected by the application of the Biantong 
principle, and appreciation of the guanxi-based network. Accordingly, Chinese arbitration 
practice reveals a strong preference for institutional operation, suppression of party autonomy, 
deployment of less confrontational resolutions, and flexibility in the implementation of law.  
 
Overall, the literature revealed that Chinese cultural and legal traditions could pose lingering 
impact on China’s modern arbitration practice and legal environment. This then raises a 
plausible hypothesis that these cultural elements might also affect the China-grounded EAA, 
since the latter would inevitably involve various Chinese stakeholders and, thereby, could be 
exposed to the underlying ideological principles observed by these parties and China’s social-
cultural realties. Yet, this study perceives the absence of literature unearthing the impact of 
Chinese general and legal culture on China’s execution practice. Such finding inspires this 
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study to analyse the role of traditional Chinese ideologies in the formation of China’s current 
execution environment in the later analysis, so as to fill up this gap. Applying the foregoing 
discussions about Chinese culture, the next chapter expands on the findings of this study 
about the status quo of the EAA in the concerned regions.   
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Chapter 4. Execution of Arbitral Awards in Practice: Status Quo  
Having reviewed the literature on commercial arbitration practice and the cultural 
environment for legal operations in China, this study acknowledged the development of 
China’s commercial arbitration and the enduring influences of traditional Chinese culture on 
the country’s modern legal practices, while also detecting the shortage of empirical findings 
about the current execution status of arbitral awards in China’s economically less-developed 
regions (ELDRs) and the impacts of Chinese culture on the country’s execution practice. 
Echoing this research need, this chapter works on answering the research question about the 
general execution status in the two studied regions (hereunder referred to as Target 1 and 2)407, 
highlighting gaps between legislative prescription and the practical execution of arbitral 
awards (EAA), upon triangulation of data from four main sources, namely, contribution of 
previous research or official reports, statistics from four institutions, questionnaire survey, and 
interviews. Relying on the outcomes of data analysis, this chapter depicts a broad picture of 
the EAA in the concerned regions from three aspects, namely, the recent development of 
commercial arbitration, perceptions of commercial arbitration amid the Chinese legal 
community, and the practical status of the EAA. Additionally, this chapter strive to, through 
interpreting data about the development of commercial arbitration, extract evidence 
displaying the role played by Chinese culture therein, to support later analysis about this 
culture’s impact on the EAA. Structurally, a description of the up-to-date development of 
commercial arbitration in the studied regions opens this chapter, aiming to analyse the 
compatibility of commercial arbitration and China’s current socio-cultural environment. Then, 
this chapter moves forwards to examine perceptions of commercial arbitration respectively 
held by Chinese judiciary and legal practitioners, spotlighting issues that contributed to these 
perceptions. Finally, this chapter reports on the execution status in the studied regions to 
portray the prospect of the EAA in practice. Upon completing the following discussion, this 
thesis is enabled to convey a statistics-based understanding of the recent environment and 
reality for the EAA in China’s ELDRs, to prepare for an investigation into the standing 
obstacles to the EAA in the following chapter. 
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4.1 Current Development of Commercial Arbitration 
Data contributed by two arbitration commissions and interviewees verified that commercial 
arbitration has obtained considerable developments and recognition in the target regions of 
China.   
 
Firstly, statistics revealed that local commissions under discussion have received quite 
remarkable growth over the past decade, in terms of caseload and institutional advancement. 
As a senior arbitrator and administrative office of a local commission in Target 1, Interviewee 
2 stated that his commission was established in 1999, and started with a caseload of less than 
20 per year and less than a dozen arbitrators. Then, the period from 2009 to the September of 
2014 witnessed a dramatic growth of this commission. Statistically, the commission handled 
2303 cases during this period, while around 90% of these cases were closed with an award. A 
turning point in its annual caseload occurred in 2011 with an increase of approximately 70%, 
and then remained at the similar level (around 600 cases per year) over the subsequent years. 
Interviewee 2 accredited the foregoing increase in caseload to institutional reform of his 
arbitration commission and to an arbitrator team with improved qualifications. Interviewee 5 
and 7408 witnessed the historical development and achievements of this commission hitherto. 
For the studied commission in Target 2, it has processed less than 2700 cases with a total 
value of 3 billion RMB (about 341 million pounds) by the end of 2013, while its most 
significant growth happened over the past decade.409 In response to their augmented caseloads, 
both of the abovementioned commissions rallied a large group of resident arbitrators, which 
consisted of scholars, lawyers and practitioners with multi-disciplinary backgrounds, like 
fiscal management and business administration.410 In view of the qualifications of his 
arbitrator teams, Interviewee 2 revealed a strong confidence that his team was ready to handle 
more high-profile international cases. A similar inclination can be sensed from the wording in 
the annual report of the studied arbitration commission in Target 2.  
 
Secondly, an acquaintance with commercial arbitration amongst legal practitioners could be 
deduced from responses to the questionnaire survey and comments of the interviewees. In 
total, 20 respondents to the questionnaire survey411 and 22 interviewees412, including 13 
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411 Answers to Q6 of the Questionnaire. 
412 Three arbitrators (Interviewee 2, 4 and 7) were not embodied herein for their self-evident familiarity with commercial 
arbitration.  
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lawyers and 29 judges, admitted their knowledge about arbitration. It should be elaborated 
that 28 respondents413 recognised arbitration as an extra-judicial approach to settle 
commercial disputes, and 11 responding judges nominated the cost-efficient and time-saving 
nature of commercial arbitration as the reason buttressing such recognition.414 Yet, this study 
would like to reserve a cautious attitude towards the profoundness of their understanding of 
arbitration, considering that the EAA merely occupied a small portion of these practitioners’ 
workload and, accordingly, limited chances would be available for them to practice their 
knowledge. Learning from answers to Q12 of the questionnaire, merely 9 judges (out of 33 
respondents) have ever undertaken execution of commercial arbitral awards, whereas none of 
33 respondents experienced execution of foreign awards. Speaking as a senior judge in Target 
1, Interviewee 10 stated that “Execution (of arbitral award) is associated with the local 
economy. Many local courts actually have no experiences in handling cases (about the EAA)”. 
Interviewee 19, a senior judge of an intermediate court in Target 2, also reported that “The 
EAA merely accounted for about 20% (of the previous annual caseload of his unit). Very few 
foreign-related cases were received, and domestic cases constituted the majority.” The 
foregoing claims were further proved by the fact that applications for the EAA in 2013 merely 
occupied around one third of the total caseload of the studied court in Target 1. Interviewee 
19 specified that his court had just received 20 applications for the R&E of arbitral awards 
since 2011. In contrast, another intermediate court in Target 2 reported that 58% of its 
execution cases in 2013 concerned arbitral awards, involving a total value of about 15 million 
RMB (almost 1.7 million pounds). This is possibly because, compared with the first two 
courts, the third court is located in a city with more active commercial transactions. 
Meanwhile, Interviewee 4 spoked, as an arbitrator and legal scholar in Target 1, that not all 
judges in China were equipped with proper knowledge and practices about handing 
arbitration-related cases. Such scepticism about Chinese courts’ competence might be caused 
by two factors: (1) lack of communication between China’s judiciary and academic circles, so 
claimed by Interviewee 21 upon his lawyering experiences; (2) reflection of the low public 
perception about judiciary authority bred by China’s legal tradition415. Furthermore, 
interviewed creditors (Interviewee 8 and 25), together with two PCAs (Interviewee 9 and 29), 
confessed their unfamiliarity with commercial arbitration. Interviewee 11, 13 and 21, who 
were lawyers respectively from Target 1 and 2, also described a weak awareness of arbitration 
among their clients. Comparatively, labour arbitration, which has been literally adopted as a 
                                                          
413 This includes 2 lawyers and 26 judges. 
414 Answers to Q7 and 7.1 of the Questionnaire. 
415 Discussed in Section 3.3.1. 
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must-do procedure prior to trial416, apparently enjoys higher recognition amongst interviewees. 
As a creditor with experiences in executing judgments in Target 1, Interviewee 8 “has never 
engaged in commercial arbitration, but knows about labour arbitration”. Interviewee 25 also 
mentioned his knowledge about labour arbitration, as it concerned employment relationships. 
Thus, the foregoing data denotes that, in China’s ELDRs, the acquaintance of Chinese 
businesspersons with commercial arbitration remain insufficient, while legal practitioners 
generally have limited chances to practice their knowledge of commercial arbitration.            
 
Moreover, this study noticed that the current development of commercial arbitration in China 
was witnessing an uneven growth nationwide. An opinion that commercial arbitration 
harvested more appreciation in economically or legally advanced regions, like Beijing, was 
indicated by eight interviewees.417 This statement can be further verified by comparing the 
caseloads and variety of disputes handled by CIETAC and the two studied local arbitration 
commissions. Pursuant to data available on CIETAC’s official website, foreign and foreign-
related arbitrations are mainly hosted by CIETAC and the arbitration commissions in China’s 
tier 1 cities, like Beijing or Shanghai.418 Meanwhile, these cases normally involve large 
amounts of money or high-value objects. Taking the year of 2013 as an example, CIETAC 
heard 1256 cases, involving a total disputed amount of 24.4 billion RMB (about 2.77 billion 
pounds). Its Beijing branch, in particular, undertook 1058 cases, and its Shanghai brand came 
second in caseload, handling 159 cases.419 In total, these two branches assumed about 96.9% 
of CIETAC’s caseload in 2013. Meanwhile, 322 cases of CIETAC’s Beijing branch and 43 
cases of its Shanghai branch were foreign-related in nature, which respectively accounted for 
30.4% and 27% of the corresponding branches’ caseloads. In contrast, for arbitration 
commissions sitting in the two studied regions, they have hitherto mainly dealt with domestic 
cases, and seldom heard home-seated arbitrations that involved foreign companies from 
limited regions. Statistically, annual caseload of the arbitration commission in Target 1 was 
roughly two-fifth of that of CIETAC (1256) in 2013, and the amounts of monetary value that 
it processed merely counted as around 10% of that handled by CIETAC. The commission in 
Target 2 heard around 200 cases with a value of 0.1 billion RMB (about 11.4 million pounds) 
on an annual basis. Additionally, the arbitration commission in Target 1 disclosed that merely 
10% of its cases concerned parties largely from China's Asian neighbours (e.g. Singapore) 
                                                          
416 Chapter 10 of the 1995 Labour Law. 
417 Interviewee 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12 and 24.  
418 The following statistics were available at http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=24.  
419 There is no official explanation about this unbalanced caseload among CIETAC’s branches in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. Presumably, this could be largely attributed to Beijing’s prominent position as China’s political and economic 
centre. 
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and few Canadian companies. Another commission’s annual report gave no details of its 
foreign clients, but the nationality and geographic distribution of its arbitrators denoted that 
this commission previously had contacts with clients merely from the nearby neighbourhood. 
Such discrepancies in caseload can also be observed among the branches of CIETAC. In 2013, 
CIETAC’s Sub-Commissions in Shenzhen, Tianjin and Chongqing jointly assume roughly 
3.1% of CIEATC’s caseload, and ten cases were foreign-related.420 Deliberating over the 
foregoing statistics and other background information, this study deduces that the 
abovementioned discrepancies might be produced by the following two reasons. China’s tier-
1 regions, which are generally advanced in economy and legal practices, apparently have 
more opportunities to be involved in international transactions and, therefore, foster a 
relatively stronger preference towards the utilisation of arbitration for dispute settlement. By 
contrast, the rest of China largely remains as underexploited areas for foreign firms421, which 
to some extent depresses the expansion of local commercial arbitration practice. Additionally, 
the comparatively-advanced legal atmosphere and a pool of qualified arbitrators in tier-1 
regions give parties more confidence in commercial arbitration than the over-loaded Chinese 
judicial system.422 But, this situation is unlikely to apply equally to China’s ELDRs.423 
Consequently, these two factors jointly engendered the imbalanced development of 
commercial arbitration in China.    
 
In brief, commercial arbitration is found enjoying a quick expansion with growing caseload in 
the studied regions. Nevertheless, the legal communities in these regions harbour dissimilar 
opinions towards local courts’ competence in handling arbitration-related cases. Meanwhile, 
the nationwide development of commercial arbitration appears to be imbalanced between 
China’s economically developed and less-developed regions. Notwithstanding these problems, 
the current growth of commercial arbitration in the studied regions indicates that this ADR is 
suitable to grow under China’s cultural and legal traditions. This virtually denies the 
possibility that difficulty in the EAA are accredited to the collision between modern 
commercial arbitration practice and China’s socio-cultural environment. Such finding urges 
this study to further explore perceptions of commercial arbitration in Chinese society and the 
reason why the EAA is believed to be difficult under this apparently pro-arbitration 
circumstance.   
 
                                                          
420 See n418. 
421 Learned from the backgrounds of the two studied regions, see Section1.2 in Appendix A. Methodology.  
422 Deduced from comments of interviewees named in n417. 
423 Inferred from findings of He, Discussed in Section 2.2.2. 
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4.2 Perceptions of Commercial Arbitration 
Contrary to the opinion that nominated commercial arbitration as the favourable resolution for 
China-concerned disputes, this study observed that the interviewed Chinese legal practitioners 
preferred litigation over arbitration for settling commercial disputes. Data demonstrated that, 
despite the scepticism about the competence of Chinese courts, 21 out of 29 interviewees, 
embracing judges and lawyers, selected litigation as their most favourite option for dispute 
settlement.424 Being a lawyer with over two decades of practicing experience in Target 2, 
Interviewee 21 openly expressed his apathy to arbitration, and advised his clients to ignore the 
arbitration clause and directly resort to litigation for disputes settlement. Interviewee 21’s 
arbitration-avoidance attitude was likely caused by his concern over ‘incorporation of court in 
execution’, ‘lack of knowledge about commercial arbitration among parties to disputes’, and 
‘unsecured qualifications of arbitrators’. His recommendation was advocated by other five 
lawyers425 respectively from Target 1 and 2. Nevertheless, Interviewee 11 raised a slightly 
different proposition, recommending that parties should first strive to solve their controversy 
“through friendly negotiation. If that does not work out, they could then consider initiating 
litigation”. In contrast, two arbitrators, Interviewee 2 and 7, appraised commercial arbitration 
as a time-saving and economic approach for resolving commercial disputes. Their remarks 
were endorsed by Interviewee 5 with his experiences in legal and business operations as a 
lawyer. However, the questionnaire survey generated paradoxical information. It was reported 
that 28 out of 33 respondents (26 judges and 2 lawyers) believed that commercial arbitration 
could become an effective ADR, leaving 5 judges with an opposite stance. 10 responding 
judges and 2 lawyers recognised that arbitral awards carried the equivalent binding effect as 
judgements, and 16 judges accepted the binding effect of arbitral awards upon judicial 
recognition, whilst arbitral awards just had limited effect for 4 judges. Only one judge chose 
the option that, unless voluntarily honoured by parties to dispute, arbitral awards carried no 
binding effect. Indicated from his answer, the same judge believed litigation to be a better 
way to solve commercial disputes than arbitration, and held no clear idea about the future 
development of commercial arbitration in China. The foregoing data suggests that, 
notwithstanding the dissenting opinions, the majority of the respondents acknowledge the 
merits of arbitration and the enforceability of arbitral awards. Nonetheless, 16 judges and 1 
lawyer would recommend parties to settle their controversy via litigation, whereas 7 judges 
and 1 lawyer voted for arbitration. Besides, 2 judges preferred conciliation, and 6 judges were 
                                                          
424 Interviewee 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27 and 28. 
425 Interviewee 1, 12, 13, 22 and 23. 
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inclined to offer parties two or three dispute resolutions (i.e. arbitration, litigation and 
conciliation). Thus, the previous analysis indicates that, despite the popular recognition for the 
merits of arbitration in settling commercial disputes, a prevailing preference for litigation 
amongst legal practitioners in the two studied regions could be announced.   
 
Through deciphering comments of interviewees, the abovementioned preference for litigation 
is apparently rooted in distrust of Chinese arbitration commissions. It seemed to be generally 
accepted among interviewees that, compared with arbitration commissions, courts could offer 
better-trained staff, stronger guarantee in execution and more legislative remedies. Quoting 
from Interviewee 1, “Qualifications of judges are better than arbitrators, owing to their 
practice and training”. Interviewee 23 also claimed that, compared with litigation, 
 
Commercial arbitration has no advantages in practice, which differs from that in the 
textbook. In domestic cases, litigation is more favourable than arbitration, since it offers 
at least two opportunities for judicial remedies. In international cases, arbitration has an 
advantage, for its strength in cross-national execution. In cases involving the 
government, litigation is more independent, while arbitration is restricted by multiple 
factors. … Judges are more professional and have more experiences of trialling cases 
(than arbitrators). 
 
According to interviewees, local arbitration commissions were marked by the following 
shortcomings. Initially, practitioners cast serious doubt on the qualification of arbitrators. 
Speaking from an arbitrator’s angle, Interviewee 2 shared that 23% of arbitrators in his 
institution were respectful professors with outstanding credentials, and experienced lawyers 
accounted for 38%. The rest of his team included practitioners from various professional 
fields, like retired judges and governmental officials. Interviewee 2 was apparently quite 
proud of the current composition of his team, evidenced by his ambitions to assume more 
international cases. Unfortunately, the confidence of Interviewee 2 in the competence of 
Chinese arbitrators ostensibly failed to permeate through the interviewed group. Ten 
interviewees, embracing two arbitrators and eight lawyers426, conveyed a shared concern 
about the patchy quality of arbitrators, whereas Interviewee 5 was the only lawyer offering a 
positive comment on this aspect. Commenting as a lawyer and legal scholar in Target 1, 
Interviewee 26 appreciated the involvement of respectful scholars in arbitration practice, but 
stated that the presiding selection framework of arbitrators was so “loosely organised” that it 
was unable to precisely filter out disqualified candidates. In the eyes of Interviewee 26, 
“Qualification and experiences of some arbitrators are not fully competent to handle 
                                                          
426 Interviewee 4 and 7 are arbitrators, while Interviewee 1, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23 and 26 are lawyers. 
 77 
 
arbitration cases. This inevitably affects the quality and impartiality of arbitration.” 
Interviewee 7, acting as an arbitrator and legal scholar in Target 1, claimed that the current 
selection framework for arbitrators overstressed years of practice, which then raised a concern 
about the credibility of this framework in scientifically picking up competent arbitrators. 
Accordingly, Interviewee 7 believed that no guarantee that all acting arbitrators were 
equipped with a satisfactory level of professionalism could be safely placed. Interviewee 4, 
who simultaneously performed as an arbitrator and legal scholar in Target 1, expressed his 
scepticism about the authority of the Expert Board, which preserved the power to adjust the 
contents of awards. Their doubts somehow endorsed two interviewed judges’ criticisms about 
poor quality of awards.427           
 
Next, impartiality of arbitrators was also challenged by interviewees, owing to the absence of 
sound supervision on arbitrators’ behaviours. According to Interviewee 22 and 23 (both 
lawyers in Target 2), it was not a rare phenomenon that arbitrators serving in the local 
arbitration commissions usually had “close relationship with one or both parties to 
controversy”. Such close relationship between an arbitrator and a party or, more likely, its 
representatives could be formed upon some indirect and less perceptible connections, like the 
previous customer-solicitor relationship, teacher-student or schoolmate relationship, and 
membership of the same bar association.428 They claimed that the foregoing situation could 
“place the fairness of arbitrators under suspicion, but might not necessarily constitute a 
ground for removal of arbitrators.” According to Article 34 of the1995 Arbitration Law, an 
arbitrator could be removed if,  
 
(1) Being a close relative of a party or a party's representative;  
(2) Having personal interests in the case;  
(3) Possessing some connections with a party or a party's representative, which could 
possibly jeopardise the impartiality of the arbitration;  
(4) Meeting a party or his representative in private, or accepting an invitation for dinner 
or gifts from a party or his representative.    
 
Speaking from his lawyering experiences, Interviewee 22 observed that an arbitrator and the 
representative of a party happened to be members of the same bar association might not 
necessarily be accepted as a solid ground for removal of the arbitrator.  Nonetheless, such 
association might, by itself, be sufficient to make the concerned party entitled to some 
privileges in China, a hitherto guanxi-based society. Just as Interviewee 22 stated, members of 
                                                          
427 Interviewee 19 and 20. 
428 Interviewee 22 and 23. 
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the same bar association “run into each other frequently and, thereby, have to spare others’ 
feelings and look after each other.” In this sense, the impartiality of an arbitrator, who 
happens to share the membership of a bar association with a party’s representative, might 
constitute a factor disadvantaging another party or parties to arbitration. Interviewee 4, 22 and 
23 also reflected that, apart from influences of their local connections and internal 
administrative interferences, arbitrators were discouraged by low payments to actively fulfil 
their duties. Based on his personal experiences, Interviewee 4 complained that the arbitration 
commission that he served for would use merely one third of its service fees to compensate 
arbitrators’ contribution, with a fix ceiling price and distribution formula. He further 
mentioned that, under the distribution formula, arbitrators in the same tribunal would be 
subject to differentiated payments exclusively in accordance with their roles. This meant that, 
in a three-member tribunal, the presiding arbitrator would receive a higher payment than the 
rest two arbitrators. Interviewee 4 entertained that such practice not only caused the brain 
drain of local arbitration commissions, but also could make arbitrators susceptible to 
temptation of illegitimate interests. Even worse, a well-organised grievance framework for 
disciplining arbitrators’ behaviours has been missing hitherto, according to Interviewee 7 
when acknowledging flaws in the current internal supervision framework of arbitration 
commissions. Theoretically, arbitrators’ performances were subject to inspection of the 
arbitration commission and higher authorities, like Local Legal Affair Office.429 Nevertheless, 
Interviewee 7 observed that, up until the time of the interview, wrongdoings of arbitrators 
were solely processed in-house in a less consistent and reliable manner. He presumed that 
inspection conducted by an independent third-party might serve the purpose of discipline 
better. Hence, an insufficient regulatory framework, together with impacts of local 
connections and poor incomes, just throw the creditability of local arbitrators into question.     
 
Thirdly, rationality of the current organisational framework of arbitration commissions was 
also debatable from the perspective of interviewees. Reviewing his experiences as an 
arbitrator in Target 1, Interviewee 7 exposed that local arbitration commission stood as a 
quasi-judicial institution with a corresponding administrative rank, and was subject to the 
direct management of local government. Working in the same region as an arbitrator, 
Interviewee 4 remarked that the presiding leadership of local commissions followed the same 
formula: headed by officials from the Legal Affairs Office at the same administrative level, 
                                                          
429 No author, 'Establish a First-class Arbitration Institution Through Conducting Creative Reforms with High Standards and 
Efficacy (in Chinese)' (newsifeng.com, 1 September 2015) <http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150901/44561280_0.shtml> accessed 
11 February 2017 
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and composed by lawyers, scholars and experts with recognisable reputation in their 
specialised fields. Interviewee 7 trusted that such composition of leadership was beneficial for 
coordinating inter-department management under the local administrative framework and, 
accordingly, promoting the R&E and EAA. However, he spotlighted that such organisational 
framework diluted the autonomy of individual arbitrators, and moulded the strong 
administrative nature of arbitration proceedings held by local commissions, since this 
organisational framework essentially placed the power to finalise an award in the hands of 
arbitration commission, rather than arbitrator. Interviewee 7 explained that, once an 
arbitration tribunal generated its decision, the award would be reviewed and signed by a 
delegated administrative official, usually the Deputy Director of the commission, before being 
officially released to the parties to dispute. Interviewee 4 further exposed the possibility of re-
editing arbitral awards by the Expert Board of the commission. Yet, Interviewee 7 rebutted 
that adjustment or edition to the decisions of arbitration tribunals merely happened in very 
few cases. Pursuant to the 2013 Annual Report of the studied commission in Target 2, the 
foregoing work procedure could strengthen in-house supervisions on performance of 
individual tribunals and provide ultimate guarantee for the overall quality of awards. Contrary 
to this official opinion, Interviewee 4 raised a challenge about the dependability of the 
foregoing second-time review. Echoing the remarks of Interviewee 4, Interviewee 7 also 
contended that such review could be tagged as unnecessary meddling in arbitration, and 
reform or termination of such review process could be considered. Moreover, Interviewee 4 
also argued that the current organisational structure of Chinese arbitration commission was 
just a hotbed breeding scepticism about administrative interferences in commercial arbitration. 
This is possibly because that the presence of local governmental officials in the leadership of 
arbitration commissions creates an undeniable kinship between local administrative 
authorities and arbitration commissions, which allows the formers to monitor or even control 
the operations of the latter.430 Hence, the foregoing discussion denotes that the presiding 
organisational framework of local arbitration commissions perpetuates a lingering concern 
over the independence and impartiality of arbitration commissions and, consequently, 
discounts the legal merits of arbitral awards to a perceptible degree. Yet, if contextualising 
this issue in Chinese culture, the foregoing operations of Chinese arbitration commissions 
actually reflect China’s Li-based customs that underscore formality and supervision from the 
higher authorities, as well as De-centred notions that encourage cautious conducts to avoid 
mistakes.431  
                                                          
430 See n93 and the article cited in n429. 
431 Discussed in Section 3.1. 
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In view of the abovementioned institutional issues, the interviewed legal community appeared 
to be even more disturbed by the finality of arbitration. Article 9 of the 1995 Arbitration Law 
stipulates that parties to disputes are not allowed to resubmit their disputes to the same 
arbitration tribunal or a court for settlement after an arbitral award has been issued. In other 
words, compared with litigation, parties to arbitration do not have a second chance to 
challenge the final decisions of the tribunal to the same or higher authorities. The study 
upholds that, in the presence of concerns over the competence and impartiality of Chinese 
arbitration commissions, the legislatively granted finality of arbitral awards, though matching 
the international practices, nevertheless defies Chinese people’s culture-conditioned 
preference for moderate approaches with a certain level of security under the influence of De-
related notions.432 Interpreting from comments of interviewed lawyers, their clients were 
worrying about that going for arbitration would compel them to place their fates in the hands 
of a third party with questionable qualifications and, thereby, damage their chances to appeal 
or enjoy judicial relief.433 In that sense, the finality of awards is actually a curse, rather than a 
blessing, to the involved parties. Consequently, Chinese legal practitioners are inclined to 
recommend litigation as the most favourite way to settle commercial disputes, so verified by 
answers of 21 respondents434 and comments of 21 interviewees. This inclination resonates 
with some judges’ perceptions of the development prospect of commercial arbitration. 7 
judges responded in their questionnaires that arbitration merely had limited development 
space in China, because it followed the latest international legal practices, but defied Chinese 
legal tradition. Meanwhile, 4 judges answered that they were unclear about the development 
of arbitration owing to the absence of statistic evidence. Therefore, the above discussion 
implies that commercial arbitration has not been widely accepted as an ADR in China’s 
ELDRs, possibly for some of its practices are irreconcilable with traditional Chinese beliefs 
under the current circumstance. 
 
Nevertheless, this study detected that the abovementioned problems could not totally remove 
the ground for commercial arbitration to further expand in China. Actually, seven interviewed 
judges435 expressed their supports for further developing commercial arbitration or other ADR 
means, with a view to lessen the overloaded burdens of courts. Meanwhile, 20 judges and 2 
lawyers (out of 33 respondents) expressed in the questionnaire survey that commercial 
                                                          
432 Discussed in Section 3.1.2. 
433 Interviewee 1, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23 and 26. 
434 According to Q10 in the questionnaire, 17 respondents only recommended litigation as the favourite way to solve 
commercial disputes, while 4 judges chose litigation together with arbitration or/and conciliation.  
435 Interviewee 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 20. 
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arbitration had a broad space to develop in China, because the increased legal demands of 
China’s rapidly growing commercial operations justified the indispensability of ADR.436 
Commenting from a cultural perspective, their positive support for commercial arbitration 
could be considered a reflection of China’s entrenched legal custom for amicable dispute 
resolution based on He-related notions.437   
 
To sum up, the previous analysis spotlights a litigation-preferred attitude and distrust of 
arbitration among the interviewed Chinese legal practitioners. Specifically, perceptions of 
commercial arbitration can be affected by some inherent deficiencies of local arbitration 
commissions, including patchy qualification of arbitrators, dependence on local administrative 
authorities, and absence of an efficient supervision framework. These deficiencies undermine 
the credibility of arbitral awards, and further trigger concerns over the enforceability of 
arbitral awards and development prospect of commercial arbitration in China.  However, this 
study finds that the current intra-institutional management of arbitration commission is 
ideologically grounded upon China’s notions related to Li and De. Meanwhile, under China’s 
current circumstance where the competence and impartiality of arbitration commissions are 
still under challenge, the finality of commercial arbitration makes this ADR seemingly 
unfavourable for Chinese society, which culturally prefers moderate approaches with remedial 
measures. Yet, this study observes a supportive attitude among the studied judges towards the 
future growth of Chinese commercial arbitration, which could be explained by China’s He-
based tradition that favours amicable dispute resolution.  
 
4.3 Execution Status of Arbitral Awards in the Target Regions 
As to the EAA, it was repeatedly emphasised by the interviewed judges, arbitrators and 
lawyers that arbitral awards received similar or even friendlier treatment than judicial rulings 
in civil or commercial cases.438 A senior judge of an intermediate court in Target 1, 
Interviewee 6 exposed that “Awards are enforced as other instruments conferring entitlements, 
like judgements. Their execution is subject to the same procedural rules, practical status and 
problems.” Speaking as an arbitrator in Target 1, Interviewee 2 stated that “There is no 
difference between the execution of judgement and arbitral award. No discrimination against 
arbitral award is observed.” Interviewee 16, a senior judge in Target 2, also claimed that 
                                                          
436 Answers to Q9 in the questionnaire. 
437 Discussed in Section 3.1.3. 
438 Interviewee 2, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16 and 19. Interviewee 2 and 7 are arbitrators, while Interviewee 12 and 13 are lawyers. 
Interviewee 6, 14, 16 and 19 are judges. 
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“Arbitration and judgement face the same situation in execution.” Noticeably, Interviewee 10 
raised an opposite voice that “The enforceability of arbitral award is lower than that of 
judgment. Some judges might be particular (when reviewing arbitral award), and distrust 
arbitral award.” Despite this opposite voice, it is safe to announce that judiciary organs in the 
target regions broadly held a friendly attitude towards arbitration, while analysis of the status 
and problems about execution of civil judgements could provide vital references to illustrate 
the execution environment of arbitral awards. Meanwhile, the interviewed judges raised no 
evidence that nationality of arbitral awards could affect their execution. Therefore, this study 
did not consider nationality of arbitral awards when analysing their execution status.         
 
Although no direct comparison between execution of judgments in civil or commercial cases 
and arbitral awards was available, arbitral awards apparently boasted a high rate of execution. 
According to the statistics of the local arbitration commission in Target 1, the recorded 
voluntary EAA counted for roughly 40% of its total caseload.439 Less than 0.2 % awards were 
denied execution by local courts over a five-year period. The 2013 Annual Report of 
arbitration commission in Target 2 also announced that less than 1% of its cases encountered 
judicial rejections. As to the compulsory EAA, roughly one third of the applications 
submitted to the studied court in Target 1 were for enforcing arbitral awards with a total 
amount of less than 0.5 billion RMB (about 56.8 million pounds) in 2013. As mirrored by the 
paper records, the execution period of arbitral award varies from 15 days to three months, 
with six months or longer in rare cases. Statistically, roughly 23% of awards were enforced 
within a month, 63% within three months, and 86% within six months. Besides, the 
percentage of the amounts actually enforced was slightly higher than 60% of the total amount 
to be enforced. The studied court in Target 2 stated that about 58% of applications it received 
in 2013 were for the EAA, which were worthy of almost 15 million RMB (almost 1.7 million 
pounds). 96% of those cases were successfully closed, with the full recovery of the total 
amount to be enforced. The shortest execution period was one month, while no data indicated 
the length of the longest process and specific percentages of execution periods. Interviewee 
19 also briefed that  
 
The EAA accounted for about 20% (of the total caseload), 50-60 cases per year. … 
Though the execution phases differed in individual cases, all of their cases were 
enforced within a period of six months and with a recovery of 85% of the total amount 
payable.    
 
                                                          
439 Because parties to arbitration are not required to register their voluntary execution in China, the commission obtained this 
figure through its follow-up investigation.   
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Comparatively speaking, the previous statistics depicted an improved picture for the EAA 
than the discoveries of Peerenboom in 2000, particularly in terms of higher success rate in 
execution. Yet, there is an observable discrepancy in percentage of the finally collected 
amount between the studied regions (60% and 85%-96%).  Given the similar economic 
situation in the studied regions, this discrepancy is likely due to the difference in size of 
amounts involved (around 0.5 billion RMB and 15 million RMB440). 
 
Then, moving onto the outcomes of the questionnaire survey, this study revealed that the 
average annual workload of 15 responding judges stayed at around 30 cases, while eight 
judges assumed over 60 cases per year and a first-year judge merely handled 2 cases by the 
time of questionnaire survey.441 One judge reported an annual workload of 200 cases.442 In 
comparison, two responding lawyers merely undertook 2-3 cases per year. As to the type of 
the most common dispute involving in execution cases, 32 respondents443 voted for debt-
related disputes. Meanwhile, 4 judges selected cases about business controversies, whereas 9 
judges ticked other types of civil disputes and 3 votes were for labour-related disputes.444 
Hence, collection of overdue debts appears to be the most common task for judges. When 
asking about the probability to achieve successful execution, 23 responding judges believed 
the odds to be 50% or higher, whereas 2 junior judges and 6 senior ones, reported a possibility 
of 40% or less to 20%. The highest success rate (90%) was reported by a young judge, who 
had five-year experiences and an annual workload of 60 cases by the time of this 
questionnaire survey. One lawyer claimed a 70% chance to win execution and another stated a 
100% success rate. On average, this data indicates that the EAA in the studied regions would 
stand a roughly 50% chance to success. 
 
For the length of execution period, the shortest one took 15 days, while one judge reported the 
longest period of 36 months.  Specifically, 24 out of 31 responding judges completed their 
execution cases within a month or less, and 8 of them managed to close cases within 6 months. 
The longest execution period for 13 judges was within 12 months, while 6 judges experienced 
execution proceedings lasting over 12 months, and 2 judges were uncertain about the longest 
period of execution. For two lawyers, the shortest period of execution was respectively 3 or 6 
months, whereas the longest one lasted for 18 or 30 months. If deliberating over this data 
                                                          
440 Equal to about 56.8 and 1.7 million pounds. 
441 Answers to Q11. 
442 Considering that the senior position of this judge requested him to supervise the operations of other judges in his 
department, this study presumed that this number might indicate the caseload assigned to his supervision. 
443 This include 30 judges and 2 lawyers. 
444 Answers to Q13. 
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together with the execution statistics of the two studied courts, it can be announced that the 
six-month time limit is a feasible period for judges to complete their execution tasks, whereas 
exceptions could not be totally ruled out. When being asked about the percentages of amount 
that were finally collected in their cases, one out of 10 responding judges445 reported a 
percentage of 76% to 99%, and 2 judges claimed 51% to 75%, whereas one judge merely had 
26% to 50%.446 Interestingly, 6 judges were unsure about the exact figure. In comparison, one 
lawyer claimed a rate of 76% to 99%, and the other stated 51% to 75% on this topic. 
Essentially, messages conveyed by these figures are in line with the comments of 
interviewees447 on execution: few execution cases would end up with a total failure, while the 
majority of cases would succeed, but possibly with partial execution at varied percentages. 
These messages also sit well with findings of Peerenboom and He448, saying that 100% 
execution merely emerged in a relatively small amount cases, but the majority of cases would 
stand a good chance to win a partial execution in China. 
 
Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to remarks of Interviewee 26 that, considering 
the uniqueness of individual cases and regional social realities, it was impossible to precisely 
define the level of difficulty in execution “merely upon reading statistics in courts’ annual 
reports or feedback of parties to controversy”. Consequently, the aforementioned seemingly 
pretty figures should be only used as references when calculating risks in execution and 
designing execution strategies, for two considerations. Firstly, success of execution is 
essentially determined by the solvency of debtors and the specific execution status of 
individual cases, so repeatedly reminded by 17 interviewees.449 This claim echoes the findings 
of Peerenboom and He, both of whom placed the insolvency of debtors as the key reason 
causing unsuccessful execution.450 Digging deeper into the execution records of the 
intermediate court in Target 1, one could discover that 25 cases, which underwent an over six-
month execution period, involved either a large amount of receivables or multiple awards 
against a single debtor. But, this does not indicate that cases with similar conditions will 
always meet the same destiny. In fact, 15 cases of the foregoing court, with a total amount of 
over 0.15 billion RMB (around 17 million pounds), were respectively closed within 3 months, 
thanks to the good economic status of debtors and the efforts of judges. Next, status of 
execution could be shaped by local economic and social conditions. The above-listed 
                                                          
445 Those judges all came from Target 2, and were requested to complete the second version of questionnaire for judge.  
446 Answers to Q16 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges and questionnaire for lawyer. 
447 Interviewee 1, 14, 16, 19, 20, and 24. 
448 Peerenboom(n11) 264-265; He(n7) 260. 
449 Interviewee 1, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28 and 29. 
450 Peerenboom(n11) 254; He(n7) 260. 
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execution statistics were respectively presented by two intermediate courts and two arbitration 
commissions, which were all seated in cities that enjoyed relatively better economic 
conditions in the two target regions. In contrast, the outcomes of questionnaire survey were 
collected from five less-developed cities, compared with the locations of these two courts. 
Critically analysing these two sets of statistics, one could spot some dissimilarities. Briefly 
speaking, this study detected that the EAA witnessed higher rates of success and collected 
amounts, as well as shorter process, in economically advanced cities. This corroborates the 
brighter prospect of the EAA in the economically advanced cities than in the others, so 
diagnosed by Peerenboom.451 Hence, agreeing with the insights of He into China’s 
imbalanced legal development452, this study holds that those dissimilarities essentially marks 
the foregoing statistics as questionable indicators for situations in other underdeveloped cities, 
let alone rural areas or counties. Recalling their execution experiences in other counties, 
Interviewee 8 and 24 alluded briefly to greater difficulty in execution, which were arguably 
attributed to “impacts of local economic conditions” and “guanxi networks”. Their 
experiences moderately ratify the findings of Lv453 about the complexity of social conditions 
in China’s small counties and influences of local ‘untouchable’ groups. Commenting as a 
senior judge in Target 1, Interviewee 10 also claimed that “It is difficult to calculate an 
average or the exact figure of execution rate (for all cities)”. Comprehensively considering the 
previous discussions, it could be established that local economic status and the specific 
conditions of individual cases are two crucial considerations defining the outcomes of the 
EAA, regardless of the location of execution.    
 
In short, statistics suggest that the EAA could, on average, stand a 50% chance of success in 
the studied regions, but might be subject to regional discrepancies. Meanwhile, judges are 
found capable to complete execution in the majority of cases within the six-month period, 
notwithstanding their varied caseloads. However, partial collection of creditors’ entitlements 
appears to the most likely outcomes of the EAA. These facts sustain the discoveries of He, 
which acknowledged execution competence of courts in China’s ELDRs.454 Besides, local 
economic status and specific conditions of individual cases are labelled as two crucial 
elements to address when anticipating likelihood in execution, whereas there is no evidence 
                                                          
451 Peerenboom(n11) 275-276 
452 He(n7) 257-258 
453 DW Lv, 'Underworld Jianghu in China's Small Counties (in Chinese)' (sina.com.cn, 22 May 2015) 
<http://history.sina.com.cn/his/zl/2015-05-22/1703120424.shtml> accessed 7 July 2016 
454 He(n7) 270. 
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proving that the practices and outcomes of the EAA would be differentiated upon nationality 
of arbitral awards. 
 
Conclusion 
The previous analysis reveals that commercial arbitration in the studied regions has reaped 
certain achievements, respectively in terms of its social awareness and institutional 
advancement of arbitration commissions. This proves the suitability of China’s socio-cultural 
environment to accommodate this transnational ADR. However, the foregoing achievement 
has not yet overcome an innate scepticism towards China’s arbitration practice, and the future 
development of this ADR might be restricted by competition between arbitration 
commissions and the litigation-centred attitude of Chinese practitioners. Fundamentally, 
Chinese society’s distrust of local arbitration commissions originates from concerns over 
three problems, namely, qualification and impartiality of arbitrators, attachment of arbitration 
commissions to governmental authorities and lack of a sound regulatory framework. Despite 
the foregoing scepticism, judges in the two studied regions apparently endorse the further 
development of commercial arbitration into a credible ADR. As to the execution status, this 
study detects that judges in the studied regions are competent to, irrespective of their heavy 
workload, complete their execution operations within the legislatively permitted six-month 
period, and achieve partially or total materialisation of creditors’ entitlements. Moreover, 
arbitral awards seemingly receive equal treatments as judgements without nationality-based 
differentiation in court-led execution. Besides, this study observes the impact of Chinese 
culture on operations of Chinese arbitration commissions, public perceptions of China’s 
judiciary and arbitration practice, and the developmental orientation of arbitration in China. 
Particularly, the fact that arbitration has not yet been accepted as the first option for solving 
commercial disputes by Chinese parties, who are rather well-known for their conventional 
appreciation for ADR over litigation, evinces the decisive role of Chinese culture in defining 
the survival and operations of China’s legal activities. Based on the previous discussion, this 
study develops a claim that, despite the supportive attitude for the development of Chinese 
arbitration practice and apparently good execution rates in the studied regions, the EAA 
would be subject to the impact of Chinese culture. Particularly, Chinese practitioners’ 
suspicion towards the competence of arbitration commissions could not only supresses 
Chinese parties’ inclination to use arbitration for dispute settlement, but might also 
imperceptibly condition judges’ attitude when pursuing the EAA. However, to what extent 
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Chinese culture could be held responsible for difficulty in the EAA is a question needing 
further exploration. Bearing this question and the current status of the EAA in mind, the next 
chapter focuses on ascertaining obstacles to the EAA in the studied ELDRs.   
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Chapter 5. Execution of Arbitral Awards in Practice: Problems 
Upon the previous analysis of the execution status of arbitral awards in China’s economically 
less-developed regions (ELDRs), this chapter digs deeper into the collected data to diagnose 
problems that could constitute obstacles to the execution of arbitral awards (EAA). Apart 
from answering the question about problems in China’s execution practice, this chapter also 
attempts to display the approaches that Chinese creditors would use to seek materialisation of 
their entitlements. Starting with a brief comparison between the subject-related findings of the 
literature and this study, this chapter then elaborates on issues found to be problematic for the 
EAA. Finally, this chapter presents some implications valuable for proceeding further, 
particularly in terms of factors swaying the execution results, role of collection agents and 
Chinese parties’ approaches to obtain success in execution. 
 
As stated in Section 2.2 of Chapter II, Peerenboom identified five reasons plausibly hindering 
the EAA, namely, insolvency of debtor, low qualification of Chinese judicial and legal 
practitioners, defective legislative framework, institutional problems haunting China’s 
enforcement system, and imbalanced development of legal awareness among Chinese 
people.455 He nailed four key obstacles to court-led debt collection, respectively related to the 
complicated nature of debt, insolvency of debtor, problems left behind by China’s economic 
transition, and financial embarrassment of local courts.456 Meanwhile, Peerenboom and He 
both labelled local protectionism as a less detrimental factor to the EAA.457 In comparison, 
the SPC apparently harbours different opinions on factors triggering difficulty in execution. It 
reported four manifestations of obstacles to execution, respectively associated with 
identification of debtors, asset tracking, selection of competent collection agents, and 
liquidation of target assets.458 Jiang itemised five execution-dodging strategies deployed by 
debtors, namely, altering legal identity or concealing business operation to create artificial 
disappearance of the debtor, channelling assets or corporate capitals through intricate 
corporate network to obstruct asset investigation, applying for liquidation to avoid immediate 
execution, cooperating with a third party to conduct fraudulent conveyances to camouflage 
                                                          
455 Peerenboom (n11), 254-255 
456 He (n7), 260, 264. 
457 Peerenboom (n11) 255, and He (n7) 262 
458 Party Leadership Group of the SPC, ‘Report on Solutions to Difficulty in Enforcement Encountered by People’s Courts 
(in Chinese)’(people.rednet.cn 1999) <http://people.rednet.cn/PeopleShow.asp?ID=348431> accessed 31 March 2015. 
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assets, and seeking protection or exemption from local authorities.459 Besides, instigating 
stakeholders or using personal connections to levy pressure on local government and then to 
compel courts to terminate execution is also deemed to be an effective execution-avoidance 
approach, since Chinese courts are subject to the governance of local authorities, both 
financially and administratively.460 Arguably, the previous execution-related problems are 
attributed to multiple reasons, chiefly including insolvency of the debtor, a weak sense of 
integrity prevailing in Chinese society, the inefficient legislative framework, and a judicial 
attitude erroneously emphasising trialling and underestimating execution.461 
 
Referring back to this study, data stemming from the survey and interviews revealed many 
obstacles to execution. The outcomes of the questionnaire survey exhibited that 31 
respondents, except two judges, believed that difficulty in execution could not be solved in a 
short space of time.462 Specifically, the responding judges revealed that execution could be 
hampered by disappearance of and asset concealment by debtor (31 votes), insolvency of 
debtor (29 votes), interference of local government (8 votes), resistance or passive delay in 
execution by financial institutions (10 votes), resistance or passive delay in execution by 
Housing or Urban Construction Departments (6 votes), and other problems (1 vote).463 Two 
responding lawyers agreed that four issues, namely, execution-avoidance behaviours of debtor, 
insolvency of debtor, over-long execution period, and local courts’ different execution 
procedures and practice, could lead to difficulty in execution. Comparatively, the remarks of 
29 interviewees presented a more detailed account of the five execution-hostile problems 
acknowledged by Peerenboom.464 Meanwhile, these remarks also revealed the impacts of 
other issues, respectively associated with Chinese culture, corruption and local protectionism, 
and quality of arbitral awards, on the EAA. On the surface, the foregoing data declared that 
difficulty in asset tracking was crowned as the No.1 obstacle to execution, while debtor’s 
financial status was the key factor determining the final destiny of an execution case. 
Nevertheless, the influence of other factors, like inefficiency of collection agents, on the EAA 
should not be understated. In fact, interviewees’ experiences attest that execution is a delicate 
operation involving multiple stakeholders and complicate practical issues.465 Inferred from 
                                                          
459 QY Jiang, Court Delay and Law Enforcement in China: Civil Process and Economic Perspective (Deutscher 
Universitatsverlag, Wiesbaden 2006), 203-209. 
460 H Xu (n183). 
461 DL Xue, ‘Analysis of Problems in Current Enforcement of Civil Judgments (in Chinese)’(Findlaw.cn 2008) 
<http://china.findlaw.cn/lawyers/article/d7064.html> accessed 31 March 2015.  
462 Answers to Q19 in No.1 Questionnaire, and Q 20 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges and questionnaire for lawyer.  
463 Answers to Q18 in No.1 Questionnaire, and Q 19 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges and questionnaire for lawyer. 
464 Peerenboom(n11) 255, 282-309 
465 Particularly addressed by Interviewee 6, 10, 24 and 27. 
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their experiences, unpleasant surprises stemming from any ostensibly insignificant matters 
might cheaply dismiss a case with an apparently optimist prospect. For instance, less-
satisfactorily translated documents would not certainly cause a failure to execute, but could 
lead to a brief delay during the preliminary review process of a competent court.466 In a worst-
case scenario, a debtor might take the opportunity to hide his/her assets and, consequently, the 
execution process might be terminated due to ‘sudden bankruptcy’ of the debtor. Therefore, 
this study endorses that, when unveiling obstacles to the EAA, attention should be paid to all 
identified problems, rather than merely to those oft-cited in the literature. Following this 
belief, the below section presents a full list of execution-hostile issues divulged by this study.         
 
5.1 Difficulty in Asset Discovery and Possession 
Echoing the findings of Peerenboom467, difficulty in asset discovery and possession was 
nominated by all interviewees of this study as the key factor contributing to the current 
gloomy prospect of enforcing awards or judgments in civil and commercial cases. Though 
lack of concrete evidence, this problem presumably poses an equal challenge to litigation and 
arbitration. This is because the EAA would “be processed as normal execution cases (by 
Chinese courts)”468, while 25 of 29 interviewees469 remarked that the key to successful 
execution in China rested on identifying enforceable assets. Hence, asset discovery and 
possession could virtually mould the fate of an arbitral award in its China-grounded execution, 
regardless of its nationality. Yet, asset discovery still remains a Herculean mission in China, 
where a powerful nationwide publicly-accessible asset-tracking platform is still absent. It is 
worth expanding that the newly-introduced judge-exclusive asset-tracking network, which is 
expected to empower judges to obtain a debtor’s financial status from related institutions 
(typically like banks) within an hour, is still undergoing its trailing process.470 Though 
acknowledging the strengths of this exclusive channel in reinforcing judges’ abilities in asset 
discovery and possession, this study holds a cautious reservation about the effect of this e-
platform in relieving difficulty in asset tracking, upon a supposition that this e-platform might 
work magic in tracking debtors’ compulsorily registered or institutionally-managed assets, but 
it might be impotent to detect or stop asset concealment by prepared debtors, like hiding their 
                                                          
466 Learnt from remarks of Interviewee 10. 
467 Peerenboom(n11) 292-294. 
468 Interviewee 10. 
469 Apart from Interviewee 4, 7, 15 and 18. 
470 P Lin, 'The Controlling and Tracking System will Have Nationwide Coverage in Tracking Enforceable Assets (in 
Chinese )' (Thepaper.cn, 30 September 2016) <http://www.thepaper.cn/baidu.jsp?contid=1536771> accessed 15 October 
2016; Y Xie, 'Courts Further Limited the Spaces for Habitual Defaulters (in Chinese)' (js.ifeng.com, 28 January 2016) < 
http://js.ifeng.com/a/20160128/4244739_0.shtml> accessed 15 October 2016 
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assets under the names of third parties. Additionally, the collected data indicates that the 
effect of this e-platform might be undermined by uncooperative behaviours of record-holding 
institutions. According to the outcomes of the questionnaire survey, multiple institutions, 
including local government, Industrial & Commercial Office, Inland Revenue Department, 
banks and other financial institutions, Public Security Bureau, Housing and Urban 
Construction Department, media and so on, might be consulted for information about debtors 
in execution proceedings.471 This study was informed that resistance from these institutions 
could constitute a challenge to execution.472 These findings from the questionnaire survey 
resonated with opinions of the interviewed judges and lawyers.473 Interviewees, especially 
lawyers474, complained about limited access to records of debtors’ assets and reluctance to 
collaboration by record-holding institutions. The Housing Department was the very example 
giving by the interviewed lawyers475 to underpin the foregoing statement. Speaking as a 
senior judge in Target 1, Interviewee 6 called for the establishment of “a nationwide e-
platforms for inquiring individuals’ information held by banks, Housing Departments, 
Vehicle Management Department, Customs, Marriage Registration Offices and so on, ” so as 
to let debtors “have no space to hide or conceal their assets”. However, until a powerful well-
interwoven nationwide asset-tracking platform is available, difficulty in asset discovery is 
likely to continuously haunt Chinese judges and creditors.           
 
A further discouraging fact is that successful location of debtors’ assets does not necessarily 
guarantee the final possession of the concerned assets. Remarks from Interviewee 6, upon his 
judicial practice, raised an awareness of difficulty in liquidating assets, particularly in terms of 
“identifying ownership and transferring title and related rights of property”. In one of his case, 
a real estate property was unenforceable on the ground that ownerships of the house and the 
land respectively belonged to two individuals. Interviewee 6 also mentioned that, due to the 
historical problems left over by China’s previous public ownership, some properties were 
registered under the name of the state or a collective group. For such properties, combing their 
problematical ownership was tantamount to an impossible task, which then created an 
insurmountable obstacle to execution. The interviewed judges and lawyers476 also raised the 
issue of ‘the only asset’, referring to the situation where “Debtors merely possess one property 
for long-term residence”.  Interviewee 6 and 19, serving as senior judges separately in Target 
                                                          
471 Answers to Q16 in No.1 Questionnaire, and Q 17 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges and questionnaire for lawyer. 
472 Answers to Q18 in No.1 Questionnaire, and Q 19 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges and questionnaire for lawyer.  
473 Interviewee 1, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and, 26  
474 Interviewee 1, 5, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 26. 
475 Interviewee 11, 22 and 23 
476 Interviewee 6, 12, 13, 19, 22 and 23. 
 92 
 
1 and 2, expressed their concerns about how to ensure the debtor’s daily life needs after 
execution, since there was hitherto no stipulation addressing this problem. Surrendering to a 
fear that debtors might suffer great difficulty in maintaining their daily life after execution, the 
interviewed judges revealed a shared hesitation to pursue the collection of ‘the only asset’. 
This study entertains that such hesitation of Chinese judges could be rooted in China’s legal 
custom that advocates simultaneous observation of customs, legal principles and human 
sentiments when conducting legal operations, so as to achieve the intended objectives without 
triggering public disturbance.477 Reviewing their previous lawyering practice, Interviewee 22 
and 23 acknowledged the existence of the aforementioned hesitation, which convinced them 
that courts in different regions harboured dissimilar understandings towards the directives of 
the SPC and, accordingly, their practices in ‘the only asset’ cases were inconsistent. This 
discrepancy in courts’ practices corroborates a claim that the aforesaid legal custom could 
lead to uncertainty in China’s legal operation.478 However, this issue about the only asset 
might be settled by virtue of Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
concerning the Handling of Enforcement Opposition and Reconsideration Cases by People's 
Courts (2015 Provisions).479 It is reported that local courts have started taking proactive 
actions in the execution against the only asset.480 Yet, until more cases are reported, it is still 
too early to claim that all courts would take the same proactive attitude towards the execution 
against the only asset, especially considering that the 2015 Provisions still offer no sound 
insurance to preclude debtors, who are unhappy with arrangement of their post-execution life, 
from pestering judges to intervene or even hijack the compulsory execution process.481 
Moreover, liquidation of certain types of assets in China needs to undergo particular 
procedures, which might cause extra costs or risks for creditors. Speaking as a lawyer, 
Interviewee 23 mentioned that the Chinese law forbade parties to directly repay their debts 
with fix assets. He further explained that “Tangible assets, like real estate properties, can only 
be used for direct repayment of debts, if such assets have been publicly auctioned for at least 
one time, but failed to be sold out because of no bids”.  Additionally, transferring the title of 
                                                          
477 Discussed in Section 3.2.1. 
478 C Cheng and K Jia (n384).  
479 This document, released as Fa Shi [2015] No. 10, came into effect on 5 May 2015. According to Article 20 of this 
document, the only asset could be enforced upon four conditions: (1) if another residential property was found under the 
possess of an individual who has the duty to support the debtor; (2) if the debtor is found transferring other assets to avoid 
execution after the concerned award comes into effect; (3) if the creditor provides the debtor with a place to live or money to 
cover a rental for 5 to 8 years according to the average amount of rental on the local market; (4) if the debtor was given three 
months to arrange a new residence after the concerned award comes into effect. 
480 No author, 'Six Classic Cases Released by Xiamen: The First Compulsory Enforcement Case Against "the Only Asset" in 
the Province (in Chinese)' (Sina.com.cn, 15 January 2016) <http://xm.house.sina.com.cn/news/2016-01-
15/10386093591973586081944.shtml> accessed 2 December 2016 
481 Longan law firm, 'Discussion about Enforcement Against "the Only Asset"(in Chinese)' (Official Website of Longan Law 
Firm, 23 May 2016) <http://www.longanlaw.com/kpi/3391.jhtml> accessed 2 December 2016 
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real estate properties might provoke disputes about possible payment of hefty tax and other 
administrative fees requested by the Housing Department, so declared by Interviewee 10. 
Hence, the abovementioned practical and procedural issues associated with asset liquidation 
would create attention-worthy challenges to the EAA that request large amounts of monetary 
values or transfer of properties. This could be further inferred that difficulty in asset discovery 
and possession only constitute an obstacle to execution under China’s current circumstance, 
and this situation could be improved along with the upgrading of China’s supporting systems 
for execution. 
 
It is worth clarifying that the foregoing arguments are grounded upon one assumption that 
debtors indeed have enforceable assets, but deliberately reject to honour awards or 
judgements. Joined by 31 respondents482 in the questionnaire survey, the interviewed judges 
and lawyers483 mentioned that it was not rare that execution proceedings had to be terminated, 
because debtors just had no enforceable assets. Interviewee 1 believed that the destiny of 
execution was essentially determined by debtor’s solvency. Based on his lawyering practice, 
Interviewee 1 claimed that “Execution against large corporations with physical assets stand a 
better chance to win, for they have stronger financial strengths to fulfil possible liabilities”. 
Sharing a similar viewpoint, Interviewee 24, a lawyer in Target 1, would also recommend his 
clients “to avoid cooperating with parties having an unhealthy financial status” and adopt 
precautionary measures to mitigate business risks. Speaking as a senior judge in Target 1, 
Interviewee 10 also commented that, in cases against individuals, “like those associated with 
compensations to injuries from traffic accident, debtors are frequently found unable to pay the 
awarded compensations”. Therefore, the foregoing data suggests a strong possibility that the 
EAA might be dismissed simply because of insolvency of debtors. Nevertheless, Interviewee 
10 claimed that such failure should be categorised as business risks and be handled by upfront 
risk management. This statement won endorsement from another judge484 and two lawyers.485 
Interestingly, Interviewee 9 and 29, who are both engaged in the private collection business, 
seemingly would not give ready credence to the insolvency of debtors. Interviewee 9 
maintained that “The economic status of a debtor should not be evaluated upon superficial 
evidence, and thorough investigations should be conducted before jumping to any conclusion”. 
Meanwhile, he would not give up on collecting a debt, even if the insolvency of the debtor 
were confirmed. Interviewee 29 expressed similar opinions, saying that “(Chinese) 
                                                          
482 Include 29 judges and 2 lawyers. 
483 Interviewee 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27 and 28. 
484 Interviewee 14. 
485 Interviewee 5 and 21. 
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businesspeople always have back-up plans and, merely in very few cases, they will end up 
with total bankruptcy and become penniless. Generally, debtors are able to at least make 
partial payments or repay in instalments.” Interviewee 29 also disclosed that it was not rare 
that “Some superficially dead-broke debtors are later found leading a secret luxury life”. As a 
consequence, he would not trust superficial evidence proving debtor’s insolvency, and would 
also not rest until obtaining satisfactory results. Retracing the previous discussion of Chinese 
culture, it could be established that beliefs of Interviewee 9 and 29 actually share an 
ideological root in China’s traditional values, which praise frugality and encourage people to 
save money for rainy days. Therefore, this study skews towards reading the same message as 
Interviewee 9 and 29, suggesting that bankruptcy of debtors should not be treated as a readily 
acceptable ground for termination of execution, unless there is solid evidence proving the 
authenticity of debtors’ insolvent status. Noticeably, the abovementioned behaviours of 
debtors and private collection agents (PCA) enshrine China’s De-related notions, which 
encourage people to adopt prudent actions to mitigate risks and form their own opinions on 
specific issues upon careful analysis.486  
    
In short, debtor’s solvency is nominated as a decisive factor determining the final outcomes of 
the EAA. Due to the absence of an easily assessable nationwide platform for asset discovery 
and issues about asset liquidation, difficulty in tracking and possessing assets stands as a 
formidable challenge to the EAA. This situation upholds a claim that reforms to solve 
difficulty in execution must start from the specific realities of China.487 It could also be used 
to justify the claim raised by the CPC about constructing the Socialist rule of law with 
Chinese characteristics. Besides, Chinese courts’ attitude towards execution of the single asset 
exposes their observance of China’s legal traditions, which could cause inconsistency in 
operations of local courts.  Meanwhile, PCAs’ perceptions towards debtors’ insolvent status 
reflect the impact of De-related notions on Chinese parties’ thinking and behavioural patterns.  
 
5.2 Issues Associated with Award Debtor  
That precisely verifying debtor-related information is of great importance to execution is an 
idea shared by all interviewees. 33 respondents to the questionnaire survey named 
disappearance of debtors or their assets as a challenge to execution, which just endorsed the 
                                                          
486 Discussed in Section 3.1.2. 
487 Interviewee 6, 13, 26, and 27. 
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previous perception of the interviewees.488 Meanwhile, 7 respondents489 labelled this issue as 
the most oft-encountered obstacle.490 Hence, the foregoing data jointly establishes the 
significance of productively acquiring information of debtors for the successful EAA. 
Specifically, experiences of PCAs491 underscored that two crucial issues respectively about 
identification and whereabouts of actual debtors should be solved prior to or, at very least, 
immediately after initiating the execution process.  
 
Learning from the participant observation, this study registers that an execution process of 
award should always start with ascertaining the identity of award debtor. Two tasks should be 
accomplished at this stage, namely, unequivocally identifying the target debtor and verifying 
his/her financial solvency. This could be a nightmare for creditors who are alien with the 
‘mind-bendingly complex ownership structure’ in China492 or social conditions of the region 
where assets sit.493 Practices of PCAs and observations of this study suggest that local private 
investigators or specialists could be invited to provide intellectual support or, even short-cuts 
to access more precise information in a cost- and time-efficient manner.494 Such services 
might request hefty payment and, accordingly, become unbearable for financially 
embarrassed creditors, so confessed by Interviewee 9 as an insider in private collection 
business. This statement is corroborated by the fact that Interviewee 25 (a private creditor) 
refused to use PCA for recovering overdue debts, because it would be “expensive and unsafe”. 
Commenting from his lawyering practice, Interviewee 5 agreed with Interviewee 9 on a claim 
that a feasible practice for ascertaining identity of a debtor would be acquiring all obtainable 
information about the debtor at the very beginning of business communications and promptly 
keep tracking any changes in relation to the identities of involved stakeholders all the way 
through. This practice is utilised by the observed private collection agency (PCAC) as a 
standard precautionary measure for safeguarding its money-lending transactions. Yet, 
interviewees’ comments495 implied that not all creditors were able to offer useful materials 
about defaulting debtors by the time when court-led or private-agent-spearheaded execution 
                                                          
488 Answers to Q18 in No.1 Questionnaire, and Q 19 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges and questionnaire for lawyer. 
489 Include 6 judges and 1 lawyer. 
490 Answers to Q 19.1 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges and questionnaire for lawyer. 
491 Interviewee 9 and 29. 
492 J McDuling, ‘The Mind-bendingly Complex Ownership Structure Behind Chinese Internet IPOs’ (Quartz Media, 10 
December 2013) <http://qz.com/155535/the-mind-bendingly-complex-ownership-structure-behind-chinese-internet-
ipos/>accessed 28 December 2013. For further description of corporate structure in China, see XC Jia in ‘Complex 
Organizational Structure and Chinese Firm Value’ (2010) Wharton Research Scholars Journal 69, 
<http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/69/> accessed 28 December 2013.  
493 Information Learnt from a meeting with two private collectors during the participant observation. 
494 This proposition reflects the similar ideas advocated by foreign legal practitioners. See B Knoetzl and P Marsch, 
‘Challenges of Asset Tracing/Recovery’ (who’swholegal.com, October 2012) 
<http://whoswholegal.com/news/features/article/30067/challenges-asset-tracingrecovery/> accessed 2 January 2016. 
495 Interviewee 9, 10, 24 and 29. 
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commenced.  In rare cases, creditors might even have no clear idea about their debtors or the 
objects under disputes, so learnt from the participant observation and comments of 
interviewees. For instance, in a case shared by Interviewee 10, the applicant was unable to 
present a precise description of the land with disputable ownership, which partially compelled 
the concerned court to terminate the execution process. Therefore, identification of actual 
debtors and their assets is a crucial factor swaying the EAA, and failure to productively 
accomplish this task might delay execution proceeding or even presage failure.         
 
Next, hardship in tracking debtor’s movement and exact location is another alarming 
challenge for the EAA. Pursuant to his lawyering experiences, Interviewee 21 mentioned that 
even “China’s police force, which manages the civil registration system and possesses the 
most latest demographic records of individuals, cannot track people’s movement in real time”. 
This statement was upheld by experiences of Interviewee 8 and 9 respectively as a creditor 
and a PCA. This is chiefly owing to the key shortcomings of China’s previous resident 
identification framework, which failed to record biometric details of civilians and therefore 
offered a rich field for ID forgery to thrive. Under the protection of that flawed ID framework, 
individuals could freely eradicate their footprints with fake ID and play hide-and-seek with 
the authorities. Although China’s public security department has started tightening up its ID 
management and cracking down on ID forgery, it will possibly take a decade to totally wash 
off the effects of existing fake IDs, considering the 10-year expiration dates of the previous 
ID.496 Apart from creating difficulties for authorities to locate people’s movement, the 
existence of fake ID also leads to obstacles to discover and confirm a debtor’s assets. This 
argument is indirectly proved by directive notices and regulations successively released by the 
People’s Bank of China, specifically concerning verification of bank account details and 
holder’s information.497 A further discouraging fact is that, even with a proper ID 
management framework and an established e-platform for financially tracking people’s 
movement, searching for a particular individual amid over 1.37 billion Chinese people498 is 
still like looking for a needle in a haystack.   
 
In brief, precisely identifying an debtor, together with pinpointing his/her location and assets, 
were identified as challenging tasks for the EAA in China’s current social context, 
                                                          
496 China launched the 2rd version of ID in 2004 shortly after the PRC Resident Identification Law started kicking off.  
However, by virtue of the 2012 amendment of the foregoing law, some people are now still using their original IDs, which 
were issues before 1 January 2012 and without their biometric details. 
497 Related documents were respectively released in 2000, 2001 and 2012. 
498 No author, 'China’s Population Reaches 137 Billion, Over-60 Age Group Expands' (Global Times, 20 April 2016) 
<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/979372.shtml> accessed 18 December 2016 
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particularly due to two reasons, namely, poor administration of debtor’s information and 
particularities associated with China’s huge population. Again, the existence of these 
problems, which are essentially attributed to China’s current social realities, proves evidence 
for supporting a modern Chinese claim that legal reforms should be conducted in accordance 
with the country’s socio-cultural realities to construct a functional legal mechanism with 
Chinese characteristics.499     
 
5.3 Heavy Burden on Award Creditor 
Deduced from interviewees’ statements500, creditors are conventionally considered passive 
participants in the EAA. Yet, creditors are expected to undertake proactive actions, 
particularly in terms of tracking debtors and cooperating with collection agents, to steer the 
course of execution, so proved by the experiences of interviewee 8 and 25, who represent 
creditors engaging in self-reliant execution. 
 
i. Creditors are expected to conduct due diligence activities to collect supportive evidence, 
and adopt risk-avoidance measures.    
Reviewing his lawyering practice in Target 1, Interviewee 1 addressed the necessity of 
carefully choosing business partners, and expressed a preference for those with a sound 
reputation and healthy financial status. This proposition, which was manifestly endorsed by 
Interviewee 25 as an experienced businessperson, underscores the significance of pre-
transaction due diligence investigation. Three interviewed lawyers and a judge501 held a 
consensus that, when a creditor resorts to courts for compulsory execution of his/her 
entitlements, his/her plea actually indicated the nullity of his/her pre-transaction due diligence. 
Commenting upon his execution-related practices as a lawyer, Interviewee 24 recommended 
that a creditor should obtain concrete information of the debtor through due diligence 
investigation, which would then allow him/her to place sufficient precautions to mitigate risks 
of later litigation or default. Interviewee 5 also claimed, as a lawyer, that “Parties should 
properly conduct risk-avoidance precautions in transactions, and the upfront due diligence 
investigation is of great importance”. Meanwhile, Interviewee 25 underlined the importance 
of mitigating losses by timely terminating costly operations. In fact, he would sacrifice 
leftover debts in affordably small amounts to escape costly debt collection operations. 
                                                          
499 JP Xi (n340) 
500 Interviewee 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 27. 
501 Interviewee 1, 10, 21 and 24. 
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Experiences of Interviewee 9 and 29 as PCAs, together with the findings of the participant 
observation, further denote that possession of a thorough knowledge about debtors could 
provide an advantageous start to the EAA. Interviewee 9 would conduct a comprehensive 
investigation prior to undertaking a collection case, while the company of Interviewee 29 used 
criteria, which “are even stricter than those for choosing public servants”, to scrutinise 
backgrounds of its clients before approving their requests for loans. No wonder that both 
Interviewee 9 and 29 revealed little worry about defaulting behaviours of debtors. The 
observed PCAC was also inclined to pay weighty attention to conduct upfront background 
checks and verify their clients’ latest status, to ensure its profitability. Moreover, though being 
a creditor with limited resources, Interviewee 8 successfully completed a self-reliant 
collection of a disputable debt, which was previously turned down by the local court for 
coercive execution, thanks to his thorough knowledge of the debtor’s social background. The 
foregoing data jointly suggests that, under China’s current execution environment, creditors 
are supposed to conduct productive due diligence activities to increase their chance for the 
successful EAA.      
 
Unfortunately, experiences of interviewees502 and the observed PCAC indicate that the 
majority of creditors appear to harbour no precise knowledge about the latest status of their 
debtors, which might then increase difficulty in execution, prolong the execution proceeding 
and, correspondingly, dilute the likelihood of success. This statement resonated with the 
perceptions of Interviewee 12, saying that  
 
Parties (creditors) generally have no awareness of tracking and recording the financial 
status of the other parties (debtors), thereby being unable to provide useful asset-related 
information. If waiting idly for a court to conduct investigation, the process will 
consume too much time, and may alert the other parties (debtors) and allow them to take 
the opportunity to transfer their assets. 
 
Being a senior judge in Target 1, Interviewee 10 went further, accusing creditors of 
irresponsibly blaming courts for unsuccessful execution, when they were actually informed 
about the unenforceability of the cases at the very beginning of application and failed to carry 
out proper risk management. This claim partially echoed the views of Interviewee 5, who 
observed in his lawyering practice that some creditors “submitted their applications (for 
coercive execution) with a clear knowledge about unenforceability of their cases, but were 
compelled by the procedural requirements to do so”. Interviewee 10 bluntly pointed out that 
                                                          
502 Interviewee 8, 9, 24, 25 and 29. 
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“Cases, where the court-led execution is unable to be completed, are attributed to the early 
mistakes committed by the parties (creditors).”   
 
In short, the preceding discussion indicates that creditors in the Chinese context are expected 
to bear the burden of proactively facilitating court-administered or agent-led execution 
operations. Particularly, creditor’s negligence to data collection about debtor’s financial status 
and to risk-avoidance management are commonly accepted by the Chinese legal community 
as crucial reasons causing unsuccessful execution.       
 
ii. Creditors are expected to work effectively with judges or private collection agent.    
This study observes that Chinese creditors are apparently lacking confidence in cooperating 
with either judicial or PCAs for the following reasons. Firstly, the long-standing doubt about 
the credibility and impartiality of Chinese judiciary naturally drifts creditors and judicial 
enforcers away from each other, so reflected by the comments of Interviewee 8 and 25. Being 
private creditors, Interviewee 8 and 25 both specified that they would use court-led execution 
as “the last resort” to collect their debts or awarded rights, because this process was 
considered “expensive and time-consuming”. However, the interviewed judges503 and 
lawyers504 subscribed to an idea that courts should not be accused alone for the unsatisfactory 
outcomes of execution, while creditors should not be exempted from the liability for failure of 
court-led execution. Deduced from comments of three interviewed judges505, creditors were 
inclined to blame judges for not taking aggressive attempts in pursuing the execution of their 
entitlements, but forgave themselves for making poor or risky decisions in the first place. Yet, 
Interviewee 10 and 28 argued, upon their experiences as senior judges, that creditors were the 
very ones dragging themselves into the tough coercive execution process. More importantly, 
Interviewee 1 and 11 (two lawyers in Target 1) advocated that creditors should proactively 
bear the burden to present evidence of debtor’s whereabouts and assets to assist judges in 
execution, considering that creditors were supposed to be the ones most familiar with the 
debtors’ status and credibility. Herein, the view expressed by interviewees506 about how 
creditors are supposed to work with judges is worth highlighting. Experiences of Interviewee 
8 as a creditor indicated that, to promote the execution process, creditors should heedfully 
observe their own behaviours when approaching to judges, and treat judges in a polite and 
decent manner. Judging from a lawyer’s perspective, Interviewee 21 and 24 resisted the idea 
                                                          
503 Interviewee 10, 14 and 28. 
504 Interviewee 11, 13, 26 and 27. 
505 Interviewee 10, 14 and 28. 
506 Interviewee 8 and 21. 
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that creditors should take any risky or extreme attempts to influence judges’ performance. 
Interview 8 shared anecdotal evidence about how individual used extreme approaches, like 
committing suicide in judges’ office, to pressurise judges into taking actions. He deemed such 
approaches to be “unworthwhile”. The idea of treating judges with decent behaviours was 
also enshrined in the findings of Peerenboom.507 As to the impact of media on execution, 
Interviewee 23, a lawyer in Target 2, shared a case where a creditor successfully compelled 
the competent court to accelerate its execution process with the help of media. Nevertheless, 
reviewing his lawyering practice in Target 1, Interviewee 13 maintained that “Mass media or 
social media platforms, strictly speaking, offer little helps (in execution)”. This belief was 
consonant with observations of Peerenboom, claiming that the lobbying effect of media was 
not effectual in all cases without exception.508 In the light of his 25-year experiences in the 
Chinese legal practices, Interviewee 21 exhorted creditors to win the battle of execution only 
with “legitimate approaches”, rather than “underhand tricks”.  
 
Then, for PCACs, four interviewees509, including two private creditors, seemingly considered 
them a gang of lawless troublemakers, and eight interviewees510 manifestly disapproved the 
involvement of PCACs in execution. Quoting from Interviewee 8, “The services of private 
collection company will not be easily used, because it is too troublesome and these people are 
not someone to be trifled with.” This disapproving attitude was sustained by Interviewee 25. 
Consequently, it is little wonder that Interviewee 8 would only turn to PCACs for help, if his 
self-reliant execution is failed. Nonetheless, acting as PCAs in different regions, Interviewee 9 
and 29 both declared that the outcomes of their operations depended upon the commitment of 
creditors, especially in the financial aspect.  
 
Hence, the foregoing analysis reveals a share consensus amid the Chinese legal practitioners 
and creditors that creditors who were unable to efficiently cooperate with judges or PCAs 
should share the responsibility for unsuccessful execution. Though appearing to be 
unreasonable, the foregoing practices actually reflect the spirit of China’s De-related notions, 
which encourage introspection and self-criticism when tackling failure or problems.511 
Obedience of the interviewed creditors to such practices also corroborates this claim, and 
further proves modern Chinese society’s submissiveness to authority under the impact of Li-
                                                          
507 Peerenboom(n11) 306-307. 
508 ibid. 
509 Interviewee 8, 25, 26, and 27. 
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related notions.512 Meanwhile, the fact that execution tactics, like using mass media to levy 
pressure on court-led execution and hiring a PCA, was not always appreciated by the Chinese 
practitioners, echoes a De-based proposition that problems should be handled with flexible 
approaches pursuant to the reality.513     
 
In brief, this study detects that, under the current circumstance, creditors would assume a 
heavy burden in the China-grounded EAA, and there is an inclination to blame the victimised 
creditors for unsuccessful execution. This study also observes the evidence verifying the 
impact of China’s cultural and legal traditions on perceptions towards execution held by 
Chinese creditors and legal community. Meanwhile, the foregoing analysis loosely denotes 
that law in the Chinese context is still considered a tool more for regulating individuals’ 
behaviours, rather than protecting their entitlements.  
 
5.4 Inefficiency of Collection Agents 
Acting on behalf of creditors, collection agents, who perform the field execution activities, 
understandably play a crucial role in realisation of the EAA. This study notices that, aside 
from courts, PCACs and lawyers can also be employed by creditors to materialise awards on 
the latter’s behalf. Deducing from caseload and statements of interviewees514, lawyers are 
inclined to avoid execution cases. This inclination explains why interviewees’ comments were 
chiefly centred on the execution performances of judges and PCACs.   
 
5.4.1 Chinese Courts  
Pursuant to the collected statistics, judges remain the principal force undertaking execution in 
civil and commercial cases, which makes this execution force face more challenges about 
their efficiency and professionalism. The demographic statistics of respondents to the 
questionnaire survey proved that 26 out of 31 responding judges possessed a Bachelor’s or 
Master’s degree in Law.515 Meanwhile, it is reported that 15 out of 31 judges had chances to 
attend on-the-job training.516 Besides, according to the 2017 Report, “Courts at various levels 
trained 493,000 judges”, while the SPC introduced various methods to enhance the 
                                                          
512 Discussed in Section 3.1.1. 
513 Discussed in Section 3.1.2. 
514 Interviewee 1, 11, 12, 13, 21, 24 and 27. 
515 Answers to Q5 of the questionnaire. 
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professionalism of local courts, especially those in Xinjiang and Tibet.517 Resonant with the 
foregoing data, Interviewee 21 and 26, speaking as legal scholars respectively in Target 1 and 
2, both recognised that, thanks to China’s previous legal reform and the contribution of 
China’s top authorities, the overall quality of Chinese judicial personnel witnessed an 
observable improvement. Hence, this study agrees with the findings of He518 on the point that 
the execution capacity of Chinese judicial force is not as poor as otherwise believed by the 
public.  
 
Nevertheless, 19 interviewees519, including judges, lawyers, arbitrators, and creditors, still 
nursed a grievance against this execution force. Specifically, heavy workload, low income and 
lack of funds were named by judges as factors undermining the efficiency of court-led 
execution.520 According to the records of the studied court in Target 1, its Judicial Execution 
Bureau (JEB) averagely received over 50 cases per month, which meant that each judge 
would simultaneously work on 2 or 4 cases. Meanwhile, judges were under great pressure to 
close a case possibly within 3 months or even far less, notwithstanding the legislatively 
permitted six-month period plus a possibility of extension.521 Interviewee 3 indicated that 
judges in the grassroots courts undertook even heavier workloads. Based on his judicial 
practices in a basic People’s court, Interviewee 3 argued that heavy workload, poor benefits 
and little vacation were the reasons causing brain drain in the grassroots courts and a severity 
shortage of staff in JEBs. This claim won the support from Interviewee 14, as a senior judge 
of an intermediate court in Target 2. Linking this claim to the previous discussion, it can be 
concluded that problems possibly upsetting courts in their execution operations encompass 
resistance by debtors, hardship of asset discovery, shortage of manpower, limited budgets, 
and overloaded work schedule. In view of all these problems and the abovementioned 
execution statistics in Section 4.3, judges should be commended for their achievements. Yet, 
court-led execution was still labelled as time-consuming and low efficient by the interviewed 
lawyers and creditors.522 Commenting from a creditor’s perspective, Interviewee 8 and 25 
emphasised that they preferred to self-reliantly enforce their rights, and only when other 
options did not work out would they resort to courts for compulsory execution. Particularly, 
experiences of interviewees and observations of this study spotlight the following crucial 
issues about courts’ execution.    
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i. Lengthy Operation Period   
Comments of eight interviewees523 reflected that Chinese courts had an established notorious 
reputation for slow action, which could be attributed to the following two major reasons. 
Initially, Chinese courts have been undertaking heavy workload with limited manual forces524 
and resources, which would inevitably lead to slow speed in case processing and lengthy 
operation phase.525 Secondly, merely considering the normative documents released by the 
SPC526, Chinese courts are chained to stipulated procedures and other bureaucratic protocols, 
which is the natural requirement of China’s entrenched culture that underscores formality.527 
Learning from Interviewee 10 and 16, courts’ apparently predictable operations were 
systematically programmed into four phases, including case admission, internal review and 
case assignment, field execution, and final review. Judges were required to undergo all the 
steps and honour the corresponding protocols in their field operations.528 Remarks of 
Interviewee 23, upon his lawyering practice in Target 2, indicated that these requirements, 
which were designed to productively discipline courts’ operation, virtually constituted 
cumbersome shackles that disabled courts from taking swift actions and offered debtors rich 
opportunities to conduct execution-avoidance behaviours. Interviewee 23 exposed that, 
“During the period for judges to complete the procedure of sealing a (debtor’s) bank account, 
which takes10 to 30 minutes, the party (debtor) can transfer millions away.” Hence, this study 
holds that heavy workload and China’s bureaucratic culture jointly mould the lengthy nature 
of China’s court-led execution process, which then constitutes a problematic issues restricting 
the execution capacity of Chinese courts.  
 
Facing the inevitability of a lengthy operation in court-led execution cases, interviewees529 
suggested that the below issues about execution phases were, at least for now, worth 
particular attention. Upon his lawyering experiences in Target 2, Interviewee 23 highlighted 
that “The 2012 Civil Procedure Law (CPL) fails to present well-defined procedure and time 
limits to instruct courts’ execution. … Local JEBs employ different practices and attitudes (in 
execution)”. This denotes that judges are given generous leeway to edit the field execution 
operations at their discretion. According to the internal rules of the two studied courts, each 
phase of the four-step execution process should ideally take no longer than 3 working days 
                                                          
523 ibid. 
524 For instance, execution judges accounted for approximately 3% of the total personnel of the studied courts in Target 2. 
525 Deuced from statistics in Section 4.3. 
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and could be extended to 7 days upon approval under exceptional circumstances (e.g. natural 
disasters), apart from the six-month period for field execution. However, comments of 
Interviewee 10, as a senior judge in Target 1, exposed that applications of the foregoing 
stipulations in practice might be restricted by factors that were beyond the reach of courts. 
Specifically, he explained that the foregoing 3-day internal administrative process could be 
prolonged into 10 or 15 days, due to poor preparation of application documents. He also 
accentuated that  
 
The majority of the time was spent on field execution, especially on asset discovery. It 
was hard to define the period (needed for execution). … If the case involved executing 
against assets locating in other places (outside the jurisdiction of the competent court), 
the case would involve multiple parties and the execution might be prolonged. 
 
Allegedly, pulling some strings can be an acceptable approach to accelerate the process, so 
insinuated by the interviewed creditors’ repeated emphasis on the involvement of influential 
contacts in execution.530 Even though, it would still take, at the most optimistic estimation, a 
day to complete all the paperwork and procedural requirements of court-led execution. Yet, as 
observed by Interviewee 23 in his previous lawyering practice, well-connected debtors in this 
IT era could effortlessly launch complex financial operations and make their assets vanish 
within minutes, simply by a few clicks of the mouse. Noticeably, courts are legislatively 
obliged to notify debtors about the existence of application for coercive execution, before 
entering into the field execution.531 Therefore, it could be established that the current textbook 
operation of courts literally leaves a large window of time for debtors to act on tip-offs and 
take countermeasures to impede execution proceedings. Additionally, drowning in a six-
month execution process is in fact a least favourable scenario for applicants. Experiences of 
the observed PCAC in this study have unveiled an inverse correlation between length of 
execution period and likelihood of success. Putting it differently, the longer an execution 
process lasts, the less likely debtors’ assets can be traced and awards can be honoured. Thus, 
it is found that China’s court-led execution is currently subject to different practices of local 
courts in the absence of clear statutory stipulations. This situation somewhat proves the 
application of the Biantong Principle532 in China’s modern legal practice.533 
 
In brief, this study concludes that China’s current court-led execution, which is featured by its 
lengthiness and regionally discrepant practices, is unfavourable for the EAA, since it might 
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force creditors to bear costly expenses and unnecessary perils. This study also maintains that 
this problem could be attributed to the mutual effects of China’s formality-cherishing 
bureaucratic culture and the Biantong principle that permits Chinese courts to form their 
dissimilar practices upon local conditions at their discretion.  
   
ii. Flawed Work Procedure 
Apart from their lengthy operation, Chinese courts were also bombarded by criticisms from 
interviewees about their imperfect work procedure.  
 
Initially, interviewees raised their concerns over the transfer of the executed properties. 
Interviewee 22 and 23 pointed out that the 2012 CPL failed to lucidly instruct courts on how 
and when to pay applicants, thereby leaving courts to act on their individual procedural 
provisions. Speaking as a senior judge with a higher-ranking position, Interviewee 10 asserted 
that a local court in Target 1 was expected to transfer the payment to the provided account of 
an applicant “within 3-7 working days”. However, experiences of five lawyers indicated that 
the foregoing stipulations were not meticulously honoured by local courts.534 Interviewee 12 
and 21 warned that creditors might not be compensated forthwith after the official completion 
of court-led execution processes. Interviewee 27 further elaborated that “The collected 
moneys or properties will first be placed in the custody of courts, and then be transferred to 
the creditor. …There is no uniform time limit for the period of this fund transferring.” These 
claims were in line with perceptions of Interviewee 22 and 23, who revealed that payments 
might be held back for various reasons, like misconduct of judges motivated by personal 
interests. Nonetheless, the aforementioned concern has been handled by Article 6 and 10 of 
the SPC’s Provisions on the Administration of the Executed Money and Properties (2017), 
which respectively allow debtors to make direct payments to creditors and request courts to 
deliver the executed properties to creditors within 30 days upon receipt.535 Besides, when 
seeking execution of awards in non-RMB currencies, Zhang warned creditors of potential 
issues in relation to currency conversion, like timing and floating exchange rates, due to lack 
of legislative guidance.536 Such issues were not observed in this study, because the chosen 
regions both had little experiences in enforcing foreign-currency-based awards or judgments. 
Meanwhile, the SPC has issued a new interpretation to tackle issues about currency 
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conversion.537 Hence, the interviewees’ concerns over the transfer of the executed properties 
have been attended to by the SPC’s new initiatives. 
 
Next, eight interviewees538 and one judge responding to the questionnaire survey539 upheld 
that the current framework supervising judges’ execution performance had been, and was still, 
suffering from severe defects. Inferred from the 2017 Report540, field judges’ performances 
are simultaneously subject to the supervision of their serving courts and higher authorities. 
This putatively denotes that applicants can resort to various administrative or judicial 
institutions to oversee their execution cases. However, comments of interviewees suggest that 
the efficacy of such internal supervision is debatable for two major reasons. Firstly, setting 
manifest criteria to measure judges’ enthusiasm at work is a demanding task, especially in the 
absence of legislative stipulations, so inferred from remarks of Interviewee 10 as a senior 
judge in Target 1. According to Interviewee 10, judges’ performances were traditionally 
measured against quantifiable scales, like number of cases closed and complaints submitted. 
Meanwhile, the concerned statistics were gathered respectively on monthly, quarterly and 
annual intervals, based on which the final verdicts on judges’ performance would be produced. 
Being a senior judge with a higher-ranking position, Interviewee 10 exposed the questionable 
authenticity of such statistics, because “Some lower courts might falsify statistics to beautify 
their achievements”. Relying on the foregoing remarks, it could be deduced that such statistics 
are of limited value for applicants who are unable to closely follow judges’ daily operations, 
since they offer little insights into judges’ genuine commitments in individual cases. Also, 
Interviewee 1 and 12 both complained, from a lawyer’s angle, about the absence of concrete 
criteria for benchmarking judges’ performance and clinically spotlighting their slackness. This 
somewhat explains why disgruntled applicants were found encountering difficulty in raising 
evidence to underpin their complaints, or filing their complaints on “circumstantial evidence 
or pure speculation” by Interviewee 11 in his lawyering practice. Presumably, the absence of 
solid evidence would give generous leeway for the related authorities to dismiss such 
complaints. This presumption is endorsed by the statement of Interviewee 24, saying that “A 
complaint seldom receives results, because of difficulty in raising evidence”. Interviewee 10 
and 28 further corroborated this statement from a judge’s stance. Secondly, comments of one 
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interviewed judge541 and two lawyers542 implied that, even with the presence of sufficient 
evidence, a complaint would still need to undergo lengthy bureaucratic procedures to reap the 
wanted response. Three issues depressing the efficacy of the complaint procedure, namely, 
“difficulty in evidence collection, low rate of success and considerable time input”, were 
particularly identified by Interviewee 10 and 11. Finally, Interviewee 22 and 23 commented 
upon their lawyering experiences in Target 2 that, even if their complaints were sustained by 
the authorities, aggrieved applicants might not receive wanted reliefs, since “No stipulations 
in China’s existing legislations manifestly define the legal consequences of judges’ slackness 
in execution and available remedies”. In a case shared by Interviewee 23, the judge disputably 
compelled the shareholders of the defaulting company to honour the judgement with their 
personal assets. Interviewee 23 submitted a complaint against such approach on behalf of his 
client, but it apparently inflicted no punishment on the concerned judge. In contrast, another 
intermediate court in the same region was named by Interviewee 22 and 23 as a model, which 
enacted strict internal provisions on the execution performance of judges. Experiences of 22 
and 23 virtually reveal that it is up to individual courts to determine on their own terms about 
how to discipline misconduct of field judges and compensate complainers. Besides, it is worth 
highlighting that judges are legislatively requested to voluntarily withdraw from cases 
involving personal interests.543 Nonetheless, this apparently does not incapacitate judges from 
participating in the foregoing cases during their off-duty hours or exerting influences on their 
fellow companions to sway execution proceedings, so deduced from remarks of Interviewee 
28. Such off-duty services are seemingly accessible upon two principal conditions: (1) 
creditors enjoy strong connections with the concerned judges; (2) judges are willing to act for 
legally acceptable objectives and stay free from any career-killing risks.544 However, it is 
unclear whether and how courts would supervise the foregoing off-duty conducts of judicial 
staff. This might then ignite concern over the impartiality of court-led execution. Therefore, 
the abovementioned data spotlights the necessity to introduce a reformed supervisory 
framework or complaint settlement channel to regulate judges’ performance to enhance the 
efficiency of court-led execution.  
 
Thirdly, lack of coordination among courts could also create obstacles to the EAA, so 
exemplified by the experiences of two lawyers545 and one creditor.546 In his lawyering 
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practice, Interviewee 23 spotted that China’s current execution practice followed a ‘first-come, 
first-served’ principle. This means that courts might actually need to vie with each other in the 
execution against the same debtor or property.547 In a case shared by Interviewee 22 and 23, 
the court, which accepted their application for execution, was forced to terminate its 
proceeding at the stage of preliminary review, because another court had got one step ahead 
and initiated its actions against the same property, which was, at that very moment, preserved 
by interim measures of the former court. Additionally, Interviewee 8 sensed resistance from 
the local court when seeking the execution of a judgment outside his home turf as an 
individual creditor. Hence, interviewees’ remarks indicate that, due to lack of coordinated 
cooperation between local courts, the EAA could be disrupted by a collision between 
operations of different courts, which particularly constitutes a snag in transregional execution.     
 
Therefore, the existing procedure of China’s court-led execution is criticised for inconvenient 
payment methods, flawed supervision over judges’ performance, and ineffective inter-court 
coordination. This study believes that the existence of these problems could be attributed to 
the impact of the official-centred ideology548 that essentially places officials in a superior 
position and prioritises the security of their authorities over the fulfilment of their 
responsibilities. Authorities harbouring these ideologies are identifiable for their inconsiderate 
work procedure and condescending attitude, which could be perceived in the foregoing court-
led operation. Yet, the SPC’s recent initiatives reflects its determination to solve these 
problems with further proactive reforms. 
 
iii. Unsatisfactory Level of Professionalism amongst Judges  
Low qualification of Chinese judicial staff and legal practitioners was named by Peerenboom 
as a crucial obstacle to the EAA.549 As stated previously, the collected data shows that the 
overall quality of the Chinese judicial team have received considerable improvement, 
benefitting from China’s recent legal reforms. Meanwhile, based on the available execution 
statistics, this study agrees with the findings of He on the claim that, despite still suffering 
from observable weaknesses, Chinese courts are competent to carry out their execution 
operations.550  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
546 Interviewee 8. 
547 This claim can also be deduced from Official Reply of the SPC on Issues concerning the Disposition of Seized Property by 
the First Seizing Court and the Enforcement Court for a Priority Claim, available at 
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=21937&lib=law. 
548 See n241. 
549 Peerenboom(n11) 255 
550 He(n7) 270. 
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Yet, a sceptical attitude towards qualifications of Chinese judges is seemingly ensconced in 
the studied Chinese community. In particular, outcomes of interview and the questionnaire 
survey jointly pinpoint the shortage of training on execution-related knowledge and skills 
among judges as an issue worth attention. Inferred from the comments of the interviewed 
judges551, they are all familiar with legal practices and local social-cultural environment, 
thereby being competent in handling civil disputes with regional characteristics. The results of 
the questionnaire survey also showed that respondents popularly agreed that an efficient 
judicial enforcer should possess rich legal knowledge (33 votes), together with financial 
knowledge (26 votes), negotiation skills (30 votes) and understanding of business operation 
(16 votes).552  And, three responding judges proposed that judicial enforcers should also have 
ability to resist interference, experience in social practices and a reputation for probity.  26 out 
of 33 respondents believed that the current on-the-job training for judges covered the wanted 
knowledge and skills for execution.553 Serving as senior judges, Interviewee 3, 6 and 16 all 
stressed the importance of further enhancing judges’ practical skills to success of execution. 
The foregoing data jointly verifies China’s commitment to upgrade the professionalism of its 
judiciary force. 
 
However, speaking from his experiences as an arbitrator and lawyer, Interviewee 4 argued 
that most of the judges apparently still possessed a rather limited knowledge of commercial 
arbitration. Specifically, Interviewee 4 observed two inclinations of judicial attitudes towards 
arbitration-related cases, namely, conservatively following the precedents of the SPC or 
arbitrarily deciding the case at judges’ discretion, in his previous practice. He believed that 
the existence of the foregoing two inclinations just exposed some judges’ poor knowledge 
about commercial arbitration. Though sounding harsh, his arguments partially tallied with the 
findings of the questionnaire survey. Statistically, the questionnaire survey showed that 18 out 
of 31 responding judges had theoretical knowledge about arbitration, while merely 9 judges 
actually engaged in the execution of commercial arbitral awards, and none of them had ever 
handled the execution of foreign arbitral awards. This means that judges in China’s ELDRs 
have limited chances to obtain hands-on experiences of the EAA. Such lack of experience 
supports the scepticism towards the execution competence of Chinese courts. Meanwhile, as 
to training for judges, the questionnaire survey reported that, though all judges were provided 
with access to on-the-job training, merely 15 of them were able to attend.554 Three out of 4 
                                                          
551 Interviewee 3, 6, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 28. 
552 Answers to Q20 in No.1 Questionnaire, and Q 21 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges. 
553 Answers to Q21 in No.1 Questionnaire and Q 22 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges. 
554 Answers to Q22 in No.1 Questionnaire and Q 23 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges. 
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responding judges, who assumed 100 or 200 cases on an annual basis, were absented from 
training, presumably owing to their heavy workload. Reviewing his judicial practice, 
Interviewee 3 also complained about the shortage of opportunities for judges in basic courts to 
attend training, while Interviewee 15 and 17, who were both junior judges, expressed the 
similar concern. Meanwhile, the current judicial trainings chiefly focused on trial-centred 
legal knowledge, whereas very few on the execution-related subjects were organised, so 
inferred from statements of Interviewee 3. Interviewee 16 also commented that “The current 
execution-related training is unable to match the requirements of reality. Knowledge required 
by judges should include the latest legal knowledge and execution approaches (e.g. audio 
visual technique and IT operations)”. Interviewee 15 and 17 spoke on behalf of junior judges, 
calling for on-the-job training or supervision of senior judges to help newcomers quickly 
adapt to their jobs. These remarks exposes the insufficient coverage of the current on-the-job 
training for judges, which comparatively overlooks the required execution knowledge and 
skills. Furthermore, the efficiency of such training is also questioned for the absence of 
systematic assessments. 30 of 31 judges responding to the questionnaire survey were 
convinced that on-the-job training would be beneficial for improving their execution 
performance.555 Yet, the interviewed judges raised no evidence that the outcomes of their 
training would be assessed against any defined criteria to evaluate the efficiency of such 
training. Also, their performance in training apparently placed no impact on the annual 
evaluation of their work-related performance or career advancement. This then throws the 
actual efficacy of the foregoing training into question. Therefore, although having acquired 
considerable improvement, Chinese courts in the studied regions are still envisaging 
challenges to their knowledge and competence in the EAA, considering their limited 
experiences in this aspect and judicial training of questionable quality. Meanwhile, the 
foregoing scepticism somewhat reflects the Chinese population’s culture-conditioned 
conservative nature and low public confidence in China’s judiciary.556     
 
Apart from the foregoing complaints, this study also learned complaints about the 
bureaucratic and standoffish attitude of judges. Such workstyle might be beneficial for judges 
to process their caseload with the least interferences of personal emotions and to supposedly 
improve their impartiality and efficiency. However, it portrays Chinese judges as indifferent 
and unapproachable bureaucrats in Chinese people’s mind, and creates a significant gap 
between judges and the common people, so reflected by the comments of Interviewee 8. 
                                                          
555 Answers to Q23 in No.1 Questionnaire and Q24 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges. 
556 Discussed in Section 3.3.1. 
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Being a creditor, Interviewee 8 considered Chinese courts to be places with tough 
accessibility and unfriendly staff. During a brief observation of the visitors to a Higher 
People’s court, this study found that these people were generally submissive to the authority 
of judicial staff on the spot, but raised fierce complaints about the court’s rigid and 
inconsiderate procedures. This study holds that these complaints virtually expose the 
influence of the official-centred notion557 on China’s judiciary staff. Learning from its 
instructions, the SPC, as China’s highest judicial authority, has realised the negative impact of 
the aforementioned bureaucratic image on public confidence in courts, and initiated its 
attempts to transform judicial workstyle.558 Yet, the collected data suggests that it might take 
a long process to wash off the bureaucratic image of courts in the mind-set of Chinese people. 
In short, the previous analysis establishes that Chinese courts’ current workstyle could 
provoke unnecessary tension between courts and the populace, which could consequently 
tarnish the public image of courts and affect public approval for court-led execution.  
  
However, this study would like to propose that the previous criticisms on the performance of 
judicial enforcers actually signifies Chinese society’s traditionally high expectation on this 
public force, under the impact of Li-based notions that educate Chinese people to entrust their 
welfare to public authorities.559 This belief is loosely endorsed by the fact that five disgruntled 
lawyers560 used heavy workload and procedural restrictions as excuses to exonerate judges 
from their unsatisfactory performances, and individual creditors561 still reserved court-led 
execution as their last hope to cling on. 
    
All in all, this study discovers that operations of judicial enforcers are suffering from three 
main shortcomings, respectively relating to their standard protocols, operating procedure and 
professionalism of judicial personnel. These problems have kept eroding public confidence in 
Chinese courts. However, this study would name the official-centred notion and Chinese 
society’s engrained scepticism towards China’s judiciary as the two ideological grounds for 
breeding the foregoing problems.  
  
                                                          
557 See n241. 
558 See Several Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Ardently Implementing Justice for the People, Greatly 
Strengthening Judicial Justice and Continuously Enhancing Judicial Credibility, Fa Fa [2013] No.9, available in Chinese at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2013/10/id/147063.shtml. 
559 Discussed in 3.1.1. 
560 Interviewee 11, 12, 21, 23, and 26.  
561 Interviewee 8 and 25. 
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5.4.2 Private collection agencies  
Compared with judicial enforcers, the majority of interviewees revealed a noticeable 
disapproving attitude towards PCACs. Specifically, 8 interviewees562 openly opposed the 
employment of PCACs, chiefly for the reason that such agencies did not possess legally 
recognised identities and their operations might wander off the legal path. As creditors with 
modest execution budgets, Interviewee 8 and 25 were unwilling to seek assistance from 
private collection companies, chiefly for financial consideration and fear of high risks. In a 
case shared by Interviewee 8, the creditor was compelled to swallow the full liabilities for the 
unlawful operations of the hired PCAC, who disappeared after its unlawful behaviours were 
exposed by the local authority. Intriguingly, Interviewee 9 and 29, both engaging in private 
collection business, also shared anecdotal evidence exposing the likelihood that deceitful 
agencies might take illegal possession of the collected moneys and vanish without trace. The 
previous remarks corroborated a warning from Interviewee 27 grounded upon his lawyering 
practice in Target 1, voicing that the involvement of PCACs might “provoke legal disputes or 
lead to a total loss of the enforced money”. Hence, comments of interviewees indicate that 
high risks, expensive costs and uncontrolled operations are the labels pasted firmly on PCACs. 
In contrast, Interviewee 23 recognised the strengths of PCACs, pursuant to his lawyering 
practice in Target 2. Quoting from Interviewee 23, PCAs “indeed possess unique strength and 
approaches in finding money and locating people”. Meanwhile, Interviewee 12 and 13 
advised that creditors should tactically deploy this group in line with the specific conditions of 
their cases. Interviewee 12 stated that, between court and PCACs, “The competent one shall 
be hired”. In brief terms, the foregoing data disclosed that the involvement of PCACs in 
execution is not widely accepted among Chinese legal practitioners, and stands as a backup 
strategy for prudent creditors due to budget and risk considerations. This practice fits with 
China’s De-related notions, that encourage Chinese people to take a moderate stance and 
skews heavily towards superficially low-risk movements.563 Also, interviewees’ 
recommendation for employing PCACs upon the conditions of specific case denotes the 
application of the Biantong principle in China’s legal practices. Moreover, through comparing 
the foregoing comments on Chinese courts and PCACs, this study senses that the interviewed 
Chinese community seemingly shares a preconceived distrust of non-state forces, which 
                                                          
562 Interviewee 1, 3, 5, 11, 21, 26, 27 and 28. 
563 Discussed in 3.1.2. 
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might be partially rooted in China’s Li-related notions that are inclined to give more 
credibility to state forces than private ones.564 
 
Nevertheless, the outcomes of the participant observation somehow partially refuted the 
foregoing negative impression on PCACs. The observed PCAC managed to achieve success 
in all execution-concerned cases during the period of the participant observation and, 
apparently, attained quite positive feedback from its clients. In a case, the observed agency 
successfully located a debtor who had been artificially disappearing for 5 years, and closed 
the case within three weeks. Admittedly, the performance of the agency in that case 
substantiates its efficiency in tracking individuals and their assets on its home turf.  
Meanwhile, no substantial evidence was obtained to establish the PCAC’s involvement in 
illegal activities, although its operations seemed to include some activities of a questionable 
nature. For instance, the agency amassed massive amounts of information about the missing 
debtor and the community around him in the previous case. This indeed triggers an immediate 
concern over the violation of individual privacy. But, there was no a shred of concrete 
evidence suggesting illegal possession of the information in question. In contrast, the 
participant observation gathered rich evidence showing the close association between the 
PCAC and its grassroots connections, from which the agency obtained extensive access to 
various information. Reviewing their operations in the private collection business, 
Interviewee 9 and 29 also reported high rates of success in debt collection and other cases. 
Moreover, learning from the participant observation and comments of the foregoing two 
interviewees, PCACs are followers of client-centred operation strategies, proved by the fact 
that they could offer customised service packages and negotiable commission fees. Besides, 
the participant observation divulged that some problems faced by judicial enforcers were 
equally applicable for the operation of PCACs, like difficulty in asset tracking and resistance 
to execution by debtors, whereas PCACs also envisaged some unique issues, including 
inspections by law enforcement authorities and competition from other agencies. Yet, 
experiences of Interviewee 29 proved that the presence of well-interwoven local connections 
could offer PCACs extra leverage in their operations. Herein, three points about the foregoing 
findings should be further explained. Firstly, the participant observation merely covered a 
period of less than three months, and was conducted upon random notifications of the agency. 
Thus, it would be irrational to conclude the superiority of PCACs in execution over judges, 
just based on the foregoing data. Secondly, the author was deliberately shielded from the core 
                                                          
564 Discussed in 3.1.1. 
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field operations of the agency, thereby being unable to present concrete evidence about the 
legitimacy of the agency’s field operations. This by no means suggests the lawfulness or 
acceptability of all operations of the agency. Thirdly, a detailed analysis of PCACs’ operation 
will be presented in the next chapter. Hence, the abovementioned data jointly depicts that the 
operation of PCACs appears to be swift, productive and generously rewarded, but resource-
consuming, loosely organised and risky. More importantly, the outcomes of the participant 
observation suggest a strong feasibility of incorporating PCACs into China’s officially-
recognised execution force. 
 
To sum up, the previous analysis proves that courts and PCACs both suffer from certain 
shortcomings, whilst demonstrating considerable strengths in execution. Comparatively 
speaking, Chinese courts offer low-cost and legally less-risky, yet low efficient and time-
consuming, services, whereas PCACs are characterised by their efficient and productive, but 
expensive and sometimes dicey, operations. Additionally, workstyle of judges appears to be 
bureaucratic and aloof, while PCACs generally possess intimate relationships with their 
clients and the grassroots communities living on their home turfs. Besides, this study 
perceives how China’s cultural ideologies, typically like the official-centred ideology and the 
Biantong principle, could mould public perceptions of collection agents.   
 
5.5 Ideological Factors Perpetuating the Execution-unfriendly Atmosphere  
Interestingly, all interviewees addressed, either explicitly or impliedly, the influence of 
ideological factors on people’s attitudes towards debt-avoidance behaviours. Interviewee 26 
argued that negative ideologies could exercise long-lasting impact on execution. This 
argument won a sweeping popularity among interviewees.565 Thus far, Chinese government 
has adopted some measures566 to promote healthy social values and philosophies, but 
apparently received little rewards, so reflected by the concerns of interviewees.567 Specifically, 
eight ideological factors spotlighted by interviewees, including guanxi, the official-centred 
philosophy, the ‘Play Smart and Stay Safe’ philosophy, awareness of social class and 
discrimination against women, weak legal awareness of Chinese people, negative opinions on 
                                                          
565 Interviewee 4, 8, 9, 10, 25, 27, 28, and 29. 
566 For details of these measures, see 6th Five-year Plan (2011-2015) on Conducting Legal Publication and Education Among 
the Citizens by Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee and Department of Justice, available in Chinese at 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2011/content_1918911.htm 
567 Interviewee 4, 8, 9, 10, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29. 
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execution and China’s judiciary, and the notion of ‘worshipping money’, are grouped under 
their cultural roots for analysis.  
 
5.5.1 Factors based on China’s cultural traditions  
In the comments of interviewees, the most-named ideological factor affecting execution is 
guanxi568, which is essentially a derivative of China’s Li-based notions that advocate to 
regulate Chinese society through observing various norms for the management of 
interpersonal relationship.569 Interviewee 8 repeatedly emphasised the importance of using 
personal connections to the success of execution upon his self-reliant collection experiences. 
He was convinced that “Somehow having authority and guanxi will do (good for execution)”. 
Interviewee 9 and 29, both PCAs, admitted that their businesses were essentially established 
upon their guanxi-networks. Upon his lawyering experiences in Target 1, Interviewee 27 also 
underlined the value of an extensive guanxi-based network to a lawyer’s career success in 
relatively underdeveloped cities, together with the difficulties of handling complicated 
interpersonal relationship in his practice. The success of Interviewee 21 and 26, both as 
lawyers and legal scholars, further proved that lawyers with extensive connections would 
stand a better chance to win others’ respect and claim victory in their practice. These facts 
jointly prove Chinese people’s belief in the influence and importance of guanxi, which was in 
harmony with the findings of Peerenboom.570    
 
The official-centred philosophy is, in the eyes of interviewees, another attention-arresting 
ideological element, whose presence could be deduced from three facets. As stated previously 
in Chapter III, this philosophy is rooted in Li-related notions, and centres on the superiority of 
the authorities over the common community.571 Initially, premises and workstyle of courts572, 
together with an eagerness to protect their authority and image573, denote the high self-
consciousness and self-esteem of China’s judicial force. Also, courts were condemned by 
interviewees574 for their indifferent and condescending attitude in their operations. This study 
advocates that such condescending feelings are likely grounded upon the official-centred 
philosophy, and fuelled by judges’ pride in their occupations and Chinese society’s 
                                                          
568 See n235. 
569 Discussed in Section 3.1.1. 
570 Peerenboom(n11) 255 
571 See n241.  
572 Observed by the author during the fieldwork. 
573 Stemming from the comments of two judges, Interviewee 10 and 14. 
574 Interviewee 8, 9 and 11. 
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perceptions of law enforcement forces as state authorities. Next, the interviewed lawyers575 
and individuals576, who were presumably subject to the long-term influence of the official-
centred philosophy, subconsciously revealed a submissive attitude towards courts and other 
authorities. While complaining about poor performance of courts, the interviewed lawyers577 
still leaned heavily towards resorting to courts for coercive execution, because courts were 
more trustworthy than PCACs. Thirdly, the focus of China’s legal reform also indicates the 
impact of the official-centred philosophy. Inferred from the comments of the interviewed 
judges578, the focus of China’s legal reforms are hitherto chiefly concentrated on improving 
China’s judicial system, with minor changes to other related aspects, like the development of 
law associations. For example, Chinese courts are now equipped with increasingly powerful 
resources and authority to track assets and defaulting debtors579, whereas Chinese lawyers do 
not enjoy the same privilege, let alone PCACs, who still have no legally recognised identity. 
Moreover, the abovementioned negative attitude amid interviewees towards the involvement 
of PCACs in execution and lawyers’ reluctance to assume execution cases580 jointly indicated 
that the participation of PCACs or lawyers in execution were not so appreciated by law 
enforcement forces. Essentially, this suggests that, although the SPC has been striving to seek 
assistance from other top-level governmental agencies to curb difficulty in execution581, 
courts at all levels seemingly have little intention to promote their collaboration with non-
governmental forces, particularly like lawyers and freelance professionals, in their execution 
operations. Profoundly considering the foregoing statements, it could be established that the 
official-centred philosophy indeed exerts certain influence on shaping operational and 
thinking patterns of Chinese courts and other stakeholders.        
 
Detected from the remarks of all interviewees, the influence of China’s De-related notions 
could be proved by the presence of the ‘Play Smart and Stay Safe’ philosophy (明哲保身), 
which enshrines a De-based preference for moderate approaches, and warns people to 
cautiously observe their social behaviours and avoid involvement in any situations that may 
peril their personal interests or safety.582 For instance, Interviewee 4 and 7 respectively 
                                                          
575 Interviewee 11, 12, 21, 23, and 26. 
576 Interviewee 8, 9, 25 and 29. 
577 Interviewee 1, 5, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 and 27. 
578 Interviewee 6, 10, 14, 16, 19 and 20. 
579 P Lin (n470) 
580 Discussed in 5.4.2. 
581 WJ Li, '44 Departments Signed a Memo to Jointly Punish Defaulting Debtors (in Chinese)' (China News, 21 January 2016) 
<http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2016/01-21/7726810.shtml> accessed 28 December 2016 
582 ZC Gu, ‘Play Smart and Stay Safe’ is Virtually Equal to Committing Crimes (in Chinese)’ (sina.com.cn, 
2007)<http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_488cae3301000bzw.html> accessed 22 August 2016; SY Jin, ‘Is Principle of ‘Play 
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pointed out, pursuant to their experiences as arbitrators, that some arbitrators were eager to 
avoid confrontations in their work, which then made them vulnerable to public opinion and 
the attitudes of media. During his judicial practice in Target 1, Interviewee 10 observed that 
some judges also adopted the same practice to reduce risky confrontations and ensure their 
job security. Meanwhile, judges’ hesitation in inflicting severe punishment on obstinate 
debtors583 and handling the ‘single asset’ problem584 also bears testimony to the impact of the 
‘Play Smart and Stay Safe’ philosophy on China’s legal practices. Yet, this study harbours an 
optimistic deduction that judges, who are die-hard followers of this philosophy, are 
predictably unlikely to commit misconduct in exchange for cheap rewards, with or without 
tight supervisions. Thus, the ‘Play Smart and Stay Safe’ philosophy could actually bring 
about both positive and negative impacts on execution.  
 
Besides, execution in civil or commercial cases could also be swayed by two apparently 
unrelated ideological issues, namely, awareness of social class and discrimination against 
women, so deduced from the self-reliant execution experiences of Interviewee 8 as a female 
creditor with limited resources. Specifically, Interviewee 8 deemed execution to be “a tough 
task for people without background or guanxi”, and perceived the discrimination against 
women prevailing in Chinese society, which disadvantaged female creditors’ execution 
attempts. Fundamentally, these two issues can both trace their roots back to China’s Li-related 
notions.585 
 
5.5.2 Factor associated with China’s legal customs 
In his research, Peerenboom named the imbalanced development of legal awareness among 
Chinese people as a factor contributing to difficulty in execution.586 This study proposes that 
China’s legal tradition, which underpinned the combination of Li (ritual) and Fa (law) in 
regulating Chinese society, should bear the responsibility for this problem.587 Resonant with 
the findings of Peerenboom, this study also detects that weak legal awareness amid Chinese 
people could impose serious challenges for persuading the voluntary EAA. Inferred from the 
remarks of Interviewee 8 and 25, Chinese creditors have an increasingly strong desire to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Smart and Stay Safe’ the baseline of morality for Chinese People? (in Chinese) ’ (People.com.cn, 2012) 
<http://blog.people.com.cn/article/1340062545543.html> accessed 22 August 2016. 
583 Also observed by Peerenboom(n11)295-296. 
584 Discussed in Section 5.4.1. 
585 Discussed in Section 3.1.1. 
586 Peerenboom(n11) 308-309. 
587 Discussed in Section 3.3.1. 
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protect their legitimate interests, but are inclined to achieve their goals by using personal 
influences rather than legal remedies. Meanwhile, Interviewee 4, who simultaneously acted as 
a lawyer and arbitrator, commented that basic legal concepts, like procedural justice, have not 
yet established their popularity among Chinese people. Reviewing his judicial experiences, 
Interviewee 28 also stated that, due to weak legal awareness, Chinese parties were likely to 
complain about rulings against their interests, though such rulings were issued under due 
process and pursuant to the applicable law. Hence, weak legal awareness of Chinese people 
should be accepted as a crucial ideological cause of China’s current undesirable execution 
status.  
 
Furthermore, this study acknowledges how pre-perceived negative attitude towards China’s 
judiciary, which could be attributed to China’s legal custom that used to define law 
enforcement as a secondary mission of the administrative organ, could sway the opinions of 
interviewees’ on court-led execution. Starting with the interviewed creditors588, their 
execution attempts seemed to be skewed by some long-standing negative opinions on 
execution and China’s judiciary, which either originated from unpleasant personal 
experiences or negative case reports. For instance, as creditors with limited resources, both 
Interviewee 8 and 25 were declined to use courts or PCACs as their first choice for execution, 
due to their negative impressions on the latter two. Interviewee 25 further conveyed a belief 
that lending money was an easy task, while recovering the money lent was a nightmare. 
Echoing the belief of Interviewee 25, Interviewee 29 claimed, from the angle of a PCA, that a 
creditor was believed as always staying in an inferior position, when pursuing collection of 
overdue debts against a defaulting debtor. Consequently, the two interviewed creditors589 
conveyed a negative attitude towards the prospect of execution. Besides, although the 
collected execution statistics and the outcomes of the questionnaire survey jointly prove the 
improved competence of Chinese judges, court-led execution is still considered low-efficient 
and time-consuming by Chinese non-judicial practitioners.590 Thus, upon consideration of the 
foregoing discussion and limited experiences of the studied two courts in the EAA591, the pre-
perceived distrust of Chinese courts’ execution capacity could constitute a challenge for 
materialisation of arbitral awards in China’s ELDRs. 
 
                                                          
588 Interviewee 8 and 25. 
589 ibid. 
590 Discussed in Section 5.4.1. 
591 See statistics in Section 4.3 and discussions in Section 5.4.1. 
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5.5.3 Modern ideologies  
This study also pinpoints evidence demonstrating the impact of modern ideologies on China’s 
legal practice. Specifically, ‘worshipping money’, which stood as a new value sweeping 
contemporary Chinese society, was blamed by Interviewee 26 for encouraging great 
reverence for money and tolerance of  debt-avoidance behaviours. Based on his lawyering 
practice and academic research in Target 1, Interviewee 26 criticised that, incited by this 
twisted moral value, “Some people even feel honourable about (their) habitual debt-avoidance 
behaviours”. Speaking as a creditor with nationwide business experiences, Interviewee 25 
also mentioned that “Deferral of a debt has already become a common phenomenon in China”. 
Interviewee 21 and 24 also observed evidence supporting the claims of Interviewee 26 in their 
lawyering practice. Interviewee 26 further spotlighted that, giving China’s current economic 
and social status, the influence of this contagious philosophy was unlikely to be erased 
overnight. Yet, the approaches utilised by courts to punish habitual debtors (i.e. publishing the 
demographic details of the blacklisted debtors and restricting their luxury consumption) 592 
could be considered attempts to offset Chinese people’s tolerance of default behaviours. This 
implies that Chinese judicial force are trying to use solutions accommodating China’s socio-
cultural realities to solve the problems plaguing its current execution operations. Therefore, 
the impacts of modern ideologies should not be ignored when assessing the EAA in China’s 
ELDRs.  
 
In brief, the collected data verifies the lingering impact of eight ideological factors on the 
EAA. Noticeably, apart from modern ideologies (i.e. worshipping money), all other seven 
factors could be attributed to either China’s cultural or legal traditions. Such finding 
persuades this study to label Chinese culture and legal customs as underlying elements 
affecting China’s modern execution practice for further analysis. 
 
5.6 Corruption and Local Protectionism 
When being asked about whether corruption and local protectionism have ever affected their 
execution attempts, interviewees593 offered two distinctly different answers. One opinion was 
that they had never troubled by issues of corruption and local protectionism, while another 
                                                          
592 See the 2017 Report, n178. 
593 Interviewee 1, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 21, 22, 23, and 26. 
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opinion claimed that corruption and local protection were indeed influential on the process of 
execution, but it was very difficult to collect concrete evidence to verify their existence.   
 
5.6.1 Local protectionism 
Local protectionism still remains as an oft-cited obstacle in the literature drafted by Western 
or Chinese scholars.594 It refers to a situation that Chinese local courts are inclined to, 
voluntarily or forcedly, protect local interests by impeding execution of any awards against 
local parties.595 Kong claimed that the formation of local protectionism was due to the joint 
impact of China’s Li- and De-related notions.596 Specifically, Kong explained that Li-related 
ideologies educated Chinese people to defend the interests of those with intimate connections 
or relationships, while De-based notions advocated high tolerance of wrongdoings and 
encouraged local governors to establish their political careers by protecting and maximising 
local interests.597 Considering that local protectionism is characterised by protection of local 
interests even at the absence of proper justification, Kong deemed its compatibility with 
China’s traditional culture to be the reason perpetuating the enduring existence of local 
protectionism.598  
 
Among all interviewees, Interviewee 8 was the only one suggesting that local protectionism 
was detrimental to the enforcement of judgments. In his case against a major local corporation, 
Interviewee 8 was convinced that the local court acted in favour of the corporation and used 
various reasons to help the corporation avoid liabilities, although the evidence and law were 
both on his side. Interviewee 8 bluntly marked this case as a typical example of local 
protectionism. Additionally, 8 judges and 2 lawyers (out of 33 participants) responding to the 
questionnaire survey named government interference as a reason causing difficulty in 
execution.599  
 
In contrast, Interviewee 14, a senior judge in Target 2, claimed that it was unlikely that local 
governments would step in and interrupt the progress of civil or commercial cases, because 
the associated political price would be too much for local governments to bear. His statement 
                                                          
594 For instance, see works of Peerenboom (n11) and He (n7). 
595 Peerenboom(n11) 269; RJ Huang, 'Discussion on Local Protectionism in Law Enforcement (in Chinese)' [2003] 11 
Guangxi Social Sciences 100-102 
596 DE Kong, 'Analysis of Reasons for Formation of Local Protectionism in Law Enforcement (in Chinese)' [2007] 27(2) Sun 
Yatsen University Forum 179-182 
597 ibid, 181-182. 
598 ibid, 182. 
599 Answers to Q18 in No.1 Questionnaire, and Q 19 in No.2 Questionnaire for judges and questionnaire for lawyer. 
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was upheld by Interviewee 21 in the light of his lawyering practice in the same region. 
Interviewee 21 further detailed that  
 
About the issue of local protectionism, I got no direct evidence, but can sense the 
existence of interference from third parties. … In civil and commercial cases, 
interference is mostly caused by personal actions of governmental officials, but does not 
represent the will of the government.  
 
As a lawyer in Target 1, Interviewee 24 also shared a similar opinion, saying that protective 
interferences, which were ostensibly posed by local governments in civil cases, were actually 
misconduct of officials motivated by their personal interests, and it was difficult to raise 
concrete evidence against such interference. The foregoing remarks sat well with the findings 
of Peerenboom600 and He601, which claimed that local protectionism emerging in execution 
cases was likely to be caused by disguised personal involvement of local officials. 
 
Moreover, Interviewee 22 and 23, both lawyers in Target 2, believed that local authorities 
might interfere in high-profile cases602 that affected local economic or political stability. In 
the case they shared, the local government ordered the court to postpone the trial, until it came 
up with proper solutions to a dispute involving a large number of investors and a weighty real 
estate project. Speaking as a senior judge, Interviewee 10 sustained the claims of Interviewee 
22 and 23. The example given by Interviewee 10 was about the execution of a judgement that 
could lead to the bankruptcy of a local major taxpayer. In this case, considering that the 
bankruptcy of such a big firm would contribute to a series of social consequences, like laying-
off of employees, the local government took over control and led through the process. Herein, 
before jumping to blame the local governments for their interruption, attention should be paid 
to the remarks of Interviewee 22 and 23. They argued that letting local governments rein on 
high-profile cases would actually be beneficial for execution, since a local government, as the 
highest administrative organ in the corresponding region, would naturally stand the best 
position to “coordinate local authorities to ensure execution”. According to the lawyering 
experiences of Interviewee 11,  
 
Civil and commercial cases generally concern disputes between individuals and 
companies, thereby seldom encountering interference from local governments. 
                                                          
600  Peerenboom(n11) 271, 276-277; also see R Peerenboom, Economic Development and the Development of the Legal 
Profession in China. in MYK Woo and ME Gallagher (eds), Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary 
China (Cambridge University Press 2011) 114-138, 121 
601 He(n7) 261 
602 According to them, such projects include the so-called image projects and vanity projects, as well as projects affecting the 
welfare of the local communities. 
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Presumably, it (local protectionism) may occur in cases about projects that are organised 
by local governments for attracting investment.    
 
The foregoing comments suggest that, for most of award creditors, their cases are most likely 
to fall outside the category of high-profile ones and, therefore, are unlikely to become the 
victims of local protectionism. Even under the rare circumstances where interference from 
local governments does emerge, such interference could be “mitigated or eliminated by the 
attention from higher authorities", so reflected by Interviewee 21. Therefore, it would be safe 
to announce that there is no concrete evidence proving the presence or detrimental impact of 
local protectionism on execution of business-related awards or judgements. Such finding 
virtually places this study in line with the claim of Peerenboom603 that local protectionism 
might exert limited, rather than decisive, negative impacts on the EAA.    
 
5.6.2 Corruption 
Yang exposed that Chinese people harboured a paradoxical feeling towards corruption, saying 
that they despised corrupted officials for their wrongdoings, but simultaneously envied the 
latter their positions and illicit gains.604 Yang further explained that corruption was bred by 
China’s guanxi-based social framework, notions of hierarchical privilege, and its previous 
‘rule by man’ tradition.605 His claims won support from Jin and Zhao.606 The foregoing claims 
imply that, as long as China still remains a guanxi-based society with a lingering awareness of 
social stratification and flawed supervision over officials’ performance, corruption can never 
be effectively erased.  
 
Referring to the outcomes of this study, Interviewee 6 and 10, both senior judges in Target 2, 
admitted the existence of corrupted judges, and blamed the latter for ruining the efforts and 
reputation of the entire judicial force. As lawyers respectively from Target 1 and 2, 
Interviewee 1, 21 and 26 also admitted their knowledge of judges’ misconduct, but had never 
encountered such situation in their practice. This is possibly owing to their respectful 
positions in the corresponding local academic and legal fields, which allow them to possess 
extensive local connections and shield them from the attack of corrupted judges. In 
comparison, Interviewee 11, 12, 22 and 23, who were all young lawyers, reported their 
                                                          
603 Peerenboom(n11)271 
604 J Yang, 'Analysis of Cultural Root of Corruption (in Chinese)' [2014] 4 Exploration and Free Views 94-96, 95.  
605 ibid, 95-96. 
606 AH Jin and LZ Zhao, 'Discussion on Political Cultural Root of Corruption (in Chinese)' [2010] 2 People's Tribune 42-43. 
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experiences of encountering misconduct of corrupted judges, who hint at gifts or money in 
exchange for accelerated actions or other favours. For instance, Interviewee 11 stated that he 
had previously seen judges requesting unjustified rewards in execution cases. However, they 
also mentioned that, thanks to China’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign, judges were acting 
with extra cautions to avoid accusation of corruption or misconduct. The 2017 Report 
declared that the court conducted investigations into the poor performances of 769 leader 
judges and punished 13 of its own personnel for their misconduct, while courts at all 
administrative levels inflicted penalties on 656 judges in total, and 86 of these judges were 
turn over for external investigation and trial.607 These statistics reportedly manifests ‘zero 
tolerance’ of the SPC to judicial corruption.608 Quoting directly form Interviewee 11, ‘gift-
sending is now a demanding or even impossible task in China’. Five other interviewed 
lawyers609 also observed the reduction of judicial corruption in their practice, due to the effect 
of China’s recent anti-corruption campaign. The foregoing data jointly denotes an ebbing 
influence of corruption on China’s legal practices. Hence, as to the impact of corruption on 
the EAA, this study observes that, compared with the findings of Peerenboom610, judicial 
corruption has been perceivably reduced by China’s ongoing anti-corruption campaigns and, 
correspondingly, its impact on execution has been weakened.        
 
However, it is worth highlighting that interviewees’ opinions about the impact of corruption 
and local protectionism on execution might be conditioned by their dissimilar background and 
social status. If interpreting interviewees’ statement against their identity and personal profile, 
it can be concluded that people holding higher social positions or stronger local connections, 
like Interviewee 21 and 26, evidently have no experiences of being troubled by corruption or 
local protectionism. For younger lawyers or junior judges, like Interviewee 22 and 23 who 
have comparatively inferior social status or weak connections, their execution attempts are 
more likely to fall victim of invisible interference possibly posed by corrupted officials. This 
tentatively proves that the impact of corruption and local protectionism could be affected by 
the background and personal connections of the concerned collection agents. 
 
To sum up, this study detects that local protectionism is, in most cases, just misconduct of 
officials in disguise. Unless in cases involving ‘performance-related projects’, it is unlikely 
that local governments or the CPC would directly meddle in the EAA. Also, personal 
                                                          
607 Cited in n178. 
608 The 2016 Report, cited in n180. 
609 Interviewee 12, 13, 21, 22, and 23. 
610 Peerenboom (n11)303-305. 
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influences of lawyer and judges might stand as a shield mitigating or blocking interferences 
from local powerful parties in execution.  Furthermore, the influence of corruption on 
execution has been observably lessened, thanks to China’s anti-corruption movement. Yet, it 
is also noticed that these two items both enjoy their roots in China’s traditional culture, 
thereby being impossible to totally eliminate them without transforming the related ideologies.  
 
5.7 Perceptions of Flaws in China’s Current Legislative Framework for Execution 
As stated in the introduction, China has already established a workable legislative framework 
for the EAA. However, in line with the finding of Peerenboom611, 3 interviewed judges and 4 
lawyers612 contemplated, upon their practice, that this system was typically suffering from 
four problems, respectively in terms of the absence of an independent execution law, time 
limit, distribution of collected values, and implementation of punishment for resistance to 
execution. Yet, based on data analysis, this study observes that these problematic issues 
identified by interviewees seemingly do not apply to all the cases. 
 
5.7.1 Lack of a well-drafted execution law 
Commenting as senior judges, Interviewee 6, 10 and 19 advocated the promulgation of an 
independent statute for execution, to standardise court-led execution proceeding nationwide 
and fill up the loopholes in the existing legislative framework. Currently, court-led execution 
is jointly regulated by the 2012 CPL, the directives of the SPC and the internal regulations of 
courts with proper jurisdiction. Interviewee 10’s comments denoted that the co-existence of 
multiple directives not only confused judges about how to perform, but also contributed to the 
regionally differentiated execution practices that increased difficulties of creditors in seeking 
cross-boundary or cross-regional execution. His claim was supported by the lawyering 
experiences of Interviewee 22 and 23 as to execution against the single asset and methods 
used by courts to pay creditors. Additionally, the existing legislations “fail to precisely define 
the categories of enforceable assets” and “division of liabilities”, so highlighted by 
Interviewee 6. Interviewee 10 also detailed that the current execution-related legislations 
embodied many ambiguities that could cause conflicts with other statutes at the same 
legislative rank or departmental regulations.  Particularly, Interviewee 10 mentioned that  
                                                          
611 Peerenboom(n11) 287-292 
612 This group includes 2 judges and 2 lawyer from Target 1, together with 1 judge and 2 lawyer from Target 2. 
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Courts and the Housing Departments quarrel about the enforceability of public housing 
reserve funds and issues about mortgage. Courts also fight with the State Revenue 
Bureau about taxes related to the auction of assets or generated during the process of 
asset transfer.    
 
Agreeing with the claims of Interviewee 10, Interviewee 19 expounded that, “Unlike trialling, 
execution actually embraces many practical and procedural issues,” thereby requesting a 
uniform law to coordinate the cooperation of all concerned stakeholders. Interviewee 6 upheld 
a similar proposition. On this point, Interviewee 10 exhorted that an independent law should 
be enacted, upon outcomes of systematic legal research, to settle inconsistences amongst the 
existing regulations. Nevertheless, this study is inclined to oppose this proposition out of 
concern that, although the enactment of a new law could bring certain benefits to China’s 
execution practice, it would also shackle courts to extra restrictions, which might further 
decelerate their operations.            
 
5.7.2 Problematic time limit  
One interviewed lawyer613 and 2 judges614 raised complaints about statutory time limits. Their 
perceptions partially echo the discoveries of Peerenboom about Chinese courts’ tendency to 
ignore the stipulate time limits in their operations.615 Firstly, Interviewee 5, a lawyer in Target 
1, mentioned that the current difficulty in execution was, to some extent, attributed to the tight 
time limit for submitting an application for execution. Under the 2012 CPL, creditors are 
allowed to file a petition for execution within two years.616 Interviewee 5 claimed that 
creditors (in some cases) had clear knowledge of debtors’ insolvency, but still submitted their 
applications for compulsory execution, in order to exercise their legitimate rights within the 
permitted time limit. Interviewee 5 also spotlighted that creditors with a thin legal knowledge 
might have problems with calculation of the time limit, which could lead to the automatic 
termination of their rights to coercive execution. Yet, the foregoing claim did not receive 
support from the interviewed creditors617, who raised no concern about the time limit.   
 
As a senior judge of an intermediate court in Target 2, Interviewee 19 was unhappy with the 
stipulated time limits on judicial operations. He claimed that “It is impossible (for courts) to 
                                                          
613 Interviewee 5 
614 Interviewee 6 and 19, respectively from Target 1 and 2. 
615 Peerenboom(n11) 288-289. 
616 See n61. 
617 Interviewee 8 and 25. 
 126 
 
make a decision on an objection to execution within 15 days618, because such decision-
making process might involve time-consuming investigation, like affirmation of facts and 
liabilities of spouses”. However, considering that his unit reported a 100% rate of completing 
the execution process within the six-month period, the stipulated time limits for court-led 
execution might be inconvenient for judges, but apparently impose little threats to execution.  
 
In brief, considering the current execution-hostile atmosphere in China and hardship in 
discovering debtors’ assets, the current stipulations of time limits is perceived as unfavourable 
for creditors to exercise their legitimate rights and inconvenient for judges to effectively fulfil 
their duties. However, given the collected execution statistics and the comments of 
interviewees, this issue is unlikely to constitute a threat to all cases.   
 
5.7.3 Distribution of the collected monetary values 
Reviewing their lawyering practice, Interviewee 22 and 23 disclosed that, in court-led 
execution, the collected values might be subject to four types of payments, namely, 
“receivables of creditors, administrative fines, judicial fines and execution fees”. 
Comparatively, they considered that execution fees were too little to warrant serious attention, 
unlike the other three types of major payments. They further expounded that administrative 
and judicial fines, which were placed at judges’ discretion particularly in non-local execution 
cases, usually “appear in large amounts”, and might be grounded upon “far-fetch reasons, like 
resistance to execution by debtor”. According to the previous version of China’s Civil 
Procedure Law, courts should “firstly compensate receivables of creditors, successively 
followed by payments for administrative and judicial fines”, so shared by Interviewee 23.  
Unfortunately, Interviewee 22 and 23 spotlighted the dearth of stipulations about distribution 
of the enforced values in the 2012 CPL.  Interviewee 10 also expressed his concern about this 
problem, saying that, with the removal of the foregoing stipulations, it was little wonder that 
some courts defined their own versions of the payment plan. When undertaking a cross-
regional execution case, Interviewee 22 and 23 observed that a local court totally reversed the 
abovementioned sequence of distribution: judicial fines were paid prior to payments to 
administrative fines and the receivables of creditors. This then led to a result that the 
monetary values, which were sourced from auctioning the debtor’s assets, could not fully 
                                                          
618 Article 9 of the 2006 Provisions, cited in n63. 
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cover the receivables of all creditors. Unfortunately, the SPC’s new Provisions619 give no 
clear answer to this issue. Thus, the absence of clear stipulations about distribution of the 
collected values is found undesirable for protecting creditors’ legitimate interests.  
 
5.7.4 Implementation of punishments for resistance to execution  
The 2012 CPL620 and the Criminal Law621 empower judges to place fines or even 
imprisonment on debtors, who are financially capable of honouring awards or judgements, but 
deliberately avoid their liabilities. Back to the time of interview in 2014, Interviewee 6 and 10 
both expressed their concerns over the infliction of punishments for deliberate refusal of 
execution from a judge’s angle. Interviewee 6 explained that such infliction was subject to 
“evidence collection and coordination with other law enforcement departments”. He felt that 
it would be difficult for field judges to collect sufficient evidence and build solid cases against 
debtors, because the required evidence “is instantaneous in nature and hard to trace”, like 
debtor’s violent confrontation with judges or paper trace of intentional concealment of assets. 
Realising local courts’ hesitation in applying the foregoing punishments, the SPC has started 
pushing them to take more aggressive actions to promote execution and punish audacious 
debtors for their reckless defaulting behaviours in 2015.622 Echoing the SPC’s initiative, local 
courts reported a series of flagged cases, where debtors were all punished seriously for their 
avoidance behaviours.623 While applauding such aggressive actions, this study would like to 
underscore that solid evidence appeared as a key phrase in all those published cases. It 
suggests that only with solid evidence would courts apply punishments to compel defaulting 
debtors to honour awards. Additionally, Interviewee 6 addressed the importance of productive 
assistance from other law enforcement departments to the infliction of punishments in 
execution cases, because “Courts have no statutory powers to conduct investigation, but just 
possess authority to inquire”. He further detailed that, to build a case against a defaulting 
debtor, a court needed assistances from the Public Security Bureau and People’s Procuratorate, 
who had power to conduct investigation and approve an arrest. Therefore, solid evidence and 
cooperation of other law enforcement departments are pinpointed as two crucial factors 
constraining courts from extensively using the available punishments to intimidate debtors 
and promote execution.   
                                                          
619 Cited in n535. 
620 Chapter 21 of the 2012 CPL. 
621 Article 313 of the Criminal Law. 
622 The 2016 Report, cited in n180. 
623 Details of those cases could be found on the website of the Supreme People’s Court at <http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-
xiangqing-15043.html>.  
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 In short, the earlier discussion spotlights the flaws in China’s current legislative framework 
for the EAA, respectively in terms of lack of an execution statute, problematic time limits, 
distribution of the collected values, and infliction of punishments on uncooperative debtors. 
These flaws could affect the EAA to varied degrees and, therefore, call for prompt reforms. 
Herein, this study discovers an interesting phenomenon that the interviewees shared a critical 
attitude when commenting on the effectiveness of China’s execution framework, and gave 
little mention of improvements having been made. This could be interpreted as a reflection of 
Chinese society’s low confidence in China’s modern legal development.     
 
5.8 Low Credibility of Arbitral Awards 
Unsatisfactory quality of awards and non-executability of awarded remedies were named by 2 
arbitrators and 2 judges, upon their observations, as two less addressed elements that could 
hinder or even deny the EAA. However, the two studied arbitration commissions respectively 
reported that less than 0.2% and 1% of their awards failed to pass the judicial review for 
execution. These figures suggest that the foregoing two elements have not hitherto imposed a 
serious challenge to the EAA in the studied regions. Yet, it is still worthy to give a brief 
account of complaints about these two issues for future improvement of China’s EAA.  
 
5.8.1 Unsatisfactory quality of arbitral awards     
The interviewed judges624 and arbitrators625 perceived that unsatisfactory quality of arbitral 
awards could be attributed to three reasons. Discrepancy in language utilisation between 
judges and arbitrations emerges as the first factor causing grievances. According to the 2013 
Annual Report of the arbitration commission in Target 2, arbitrators were coached for drafting 
awards in line with the standard formality and language requirements of Chinese government 
documents. In contrast, the interviewed judges626 seemingly appreciated a different version of 
wording and legal terminologies. As a senior judge in Target 2, Interviewee 20 stated that 
“The contents of arbitral awards differ from those of judgements in language utilisation. … 
The problems include ambiguity, inaccuracy, colloquial language, and lack of formal legal 
terminologies”. His statement was endorsed by interview 19. Interviewee 20 was particularly 
upset about wording used by arbitrators when stating “the calculation of interests and payment 
                                                          
624 Interviewee 10 and 20. 
625 Interviewee 4 and 7. 
626 Interviewee 19 and 20. 
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methods”. These remarks suggest that judges would use the language requirements for 
judgements as benchmarks to assess the quality of arbitral awards, which requires arbitrators 
to proactively adopt the language used by judges in award drafting. Unfortunately, 
Interviewee 20 did not offer specific examples to support his statements. However, the 
forgoing remarks resonated with the claims of Zhang, who blamed problematic language 
usage, including ambiguous wording, misuse of punctuation marks, imprecise descriptions of 
numbers, grammatical mistakes and wrongly written characters, for damaging the quality of 
arbitral award.627 Based on the previous statements, the discrepancy between language utilised 
by arbitrators and judges could be labelled as a factor affecting the quality and enforceability 
of arbitral award in China. Meanwhile, it should be stressed that language utilisation might 
equally be a critical matter in the execution of foreign awards, which involved a large amount 
of translated documents. Supposedly, no judges would be pleased by poorly translated 
documents with baffling wording. Inferred from the previous execution statistics and the 
comments of Interviewee 20, it is unlikely that judges would deny the EAA solely on the 
ground of language irregularity. Yet, it is a reasonable deduction that the uneasiness stemmed 
from improper language utilisation of arbitrators might become a possible reason justifying 
judges’ slackness in the EAA.    
 
Secondly, the interviewed judges628 expressed that an arbitral award might be discredited by 
execution courts, because of conflicts between legal principles respectively employed by 
arbitrators and judges when reviewing the related case. Reviewing his experiences as a senior 
judge in Target 2, Interviewee 20 argued that  
 
Arbitrators are mainly chosen from lawyers. Their decisions-making doctrines and 
application of law are inconsistent with those of judges. Their perceptions of legal issues 
and doctrines are totally opposite (to those of judges). Many rulings (of arbitrators), we 
(judges) believe, even contradict the general legal knowledge. 
 
Interviewee 20 supported his statement with a case, in which judges ruled that the statutory 
time limit was expired, whereas the arbitral tribunal felt otherwise. His colleague, Interviewee 
19, stated that, although being inclined to honour the decisions of arbitrators, judges indeed 
felt uncomfortable with such conflicts and reserved their doubts about the quality of arbitral 
awards. Interviewee 10 also mentioned, as a senior judge in Target 1, that “Some judges 
might exert strict censorship on arbitral awards, possibly owing to distrust of arbitrators’ 
                                                          
627 RB Zhang, 'A Brief Discussion on Drafting of Arbitral Award (in Chinese)' (hdzc.net, 27 January 2015) 
<http://www.hdzc.net/html/yc/review/2015_01/27/242134159.html> accessed 18 November 2016 
628 Interviewee 10 and 20. 
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judgement”. Such distrust was further fuelled by a concern about the uneven level of 
professionalism amongst arbitrators.629      
 
Finally, the quality of arbitral awards was also questioned for various interference that could 
appear during the award issuing process, so deduced from the remarks of two interviewed 
arbitrators.630 Interviewee 4 exposed that an award was subject to the review of administrative 
officials for approval or even, a modification by the Expert Board. This practice reflects the 
spirit of China’s Li-based notions that accentuate formality and control of superiors over their 
subordinate.631 Apart from accepting administrative supervision and expert instructions, an 
arbitrator might also be swayed by public opinion, so believed by Interviewee 4 and 7. 
Interviewee 7 elaborated that, suffering from the same stress of maintaining social stability as 
judges, arbitrators could be hijacked by public opinion, and surrender themselves to a desire 
to avoid critical mistakes or conflicts. Such sensitivity to public opinion reflects China’s He-
related ideologies, which request arbitrators to amicably solve the disputes without triggering 
social uneasiness.632 Resonating with the foregoing statement, Interviewee 4 exposed that 
arbitrators who were eager to evade problems and protect personal careers would submit 
seemingly thorny cases to the Expert Board for final decisions, rather than delivering their 
own rulings. Admittedly, the existence of the foregoing interference indisputably discounts 
the impartiality and trustworthiness of arbitral awards.       
 
In short, language inaccuracy in arbitral awards, discrepancies between decision-making 
rationales of arbitrators and judges, and outside interference are identified as factors eroding 
the quality of arbitral awards and, consequently, hampering their execution. Aside from these 
problems, this study discovers that judges’ criticism about the quality of arbitral awards and 
their distrust of arbitrators’ decision-making competence actually display a superior attitude, 
which indicates the subtle impact of the official-centred ideology633 on the interviewed judges. 
Moreover, arbitrators’ willingness to accommodate public opinion on their cases proves the 
power of China’s traditional culture. 
 
                                                          
629 Such concern was respectively expressed by Interviewee 1, 3, 7, 21 and 26. 
630 Interviewee 4 and 7. 
631 Discussed in Section3.1.1. 
632 Discussed in Section 3.1.3. 
633 See n241. 
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5.8.2 Non-executability of awarded remedies     
Two interviewed judges634 disclosed that an award could be labelled as “unable to be 
executed”, due to ambiguity in its main contents or its incompatibility with other legislations. 
Sharing his knowledge as an arbitrator, Interviewee 4 exemplified the hardship in producing 
practically executable remedies with a case, in which arbitrators were unable to reach an 
agreement on awarded remedies, because of the involvement of multiple parties and the 
disputable definition of the concerned object.635 In that case, Interviewee 4 declined to issue 
an award based on the ambiguous facts, for a fear that the award might face an unable-to-be-
executed fate. A similar situation was addressed by Interviewee 10 from a judge’s perspective, 
when explaining how “the divorce of court’s trialling and execution divisions” could sponsor 
the generation of practically non-executable judgments. He shared a case, in which the 
trialling judges upheld the return of an illegally possessed land to its legitimate owner, but did 
not conduct field investigation and specify the physical location of the land with precise 
parameters in the ruling. When the case later entered into the coercive execution process, the 
applicant was unable to provide detailed descriptions of the land. Consequently, the execution 
process came into a dead end. Moreover, Interviewee 19 and 20, both senior judges in Target 
2, stated that embedment of contents, which were in conflict with governmental policies or 
regulations, constituted a sound ground for courts to decline the EAA. Interviewee 19 
presented a case where the rulings of arbitrators were considered non-executable, on the 
ground that the required time period for action in the award was 15 days, while governmental 
policies demanded at least 30 days to complete the concerned action. Consequently, this 
award was unable to be executed, unless a major correction to the contents of its ruling was 
conducted.      
 
In brief, two issues associated with the credibility of awards, namely, poorly-drafted award 
and unfeasible remedies, could constitute workable excuses for judges to dismiss an execution 
application. This then justifies the necessity for Chinese arbitration commissions to further 
enhance the professionalism of arbitrators and ensure the quality of awards. Nevertheless, the 
collected execution statistics suggest that these issues do not have a widespread existence. 
                                                          
634 Interviewee 10 and 20. 
635 This case concerned disputable ownership of a real estate property, which was intended to become a comprehensive 
shopping mall. The whole building was sold in small unites and a large number of investors purchased their portions under 
several types of structured ownership. However, the original purchase agreement merely stated the size of the purchased unit, 
while failing to prescribe a specific method of measurement. Later, investors were in dispute with the project developer and 
the property management company over the distribution of their units. A collective arbitration was launched. Unfortunately, 
Interviewee 4 just mentioned his decisions about the case, but did not share the final outcome of the arbitration.  
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Endorsed by other judges’ comments, Interviewee 19 assured that judges would do their best 
to “ensure the EAA”. 
 
Conclusion  
Based on the collected data, this chapter spotlights problems possibly hampering the EAA in 
eight dimensions, while discovering the execution approaches favoured by Chinese parties, 
and the impact of China’s cultural ideologies on the country’s modern execution practice. In 
brief terms, when seeking execution, parties could encounter problems caused by difficulty in 
asset tracking, defaults of debtors, heavy burden on creditors, and inefficiency of collection 
agents to varied extents. Meanwhile, the influence of China’s deep-rooted traditional and 
modern ideologies, like ‘worshipping money’, should be registered as a new member of the 
‘Hindering Execution’ club, because these ideologies are found posing subtle impact on 
China’s execution and legal practices. In contrast, issues, including corruption and poor 
qualification of Chinese judges, apparently have ebbing influences on execution, chiefly 
owing to the reforms of China’s legal framework and ongoing anti-corruption campaign. Also, 
local protectionism might be downgraded or removed from the list of obstacles to execution, 
considering the absence of obvious evidence proving its detrimental effects on the EAA. 
Moreover, flaws in China’s current legislative framework for execution and poor quality of 
arbitral awards are named by some interviewees as possible reasons hindering the EAA, 
despite their infrequent occurrence.  
 
Learning from the interviewed creditors, the thesis perceives that Chinese creditors prefer 
using the following approaches to seek successful materialisation of their entitlements. 
Initially, they would present active performance in execution, like shouldering the burden of 
tracking assets or debtors and maintaining constant communication with collection agents. 
Secondly, Chinese creditors would start with self-reliant execution operations, and then resort 
to PCACs for assistance, whilst applying for court-led execution would be their last option. 
Thirdly, Chinese creditors would observe the corresponding social-cultural background to 
ensure the feasibility of their movements. A comprehensive analysis of Chinese parties’ 
experiences reveals that, though the amount of the monetary value involved in a particular 
case does have a say on the level of potential difficulty in execution, the results of the EAA 
are essentially susceptible to five factors, including debtors’ financial solvency and 
willingness to meet their obligations, involvement of creditors, efficiency of collection agents, 
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and cooperation of other influential stakeholders (e.g. record-holding institutions). The key to 
success in the China-grounded EAA ultimately rests on timely discovery, seizure and 
liquidation of a debtor’s enforceable assets. Nonetheless, deployment of different collection 
agents could, to certain extent, sway the progress and outcomes of an execution case. 
Execution capacity of PCACs is, particularly, verified by creditors’ paradoxical attitude that 
they complain about the risks associated with operations of PCACs, but are willing to choose 
PCACs over courts for pursuing execution. This then justifies the need of comparatively 
analysing performance of different collection agents to further explore their strengths and 
weaknesses in later discussion. After all, precedent experiences of interviewees affirm that the 
EAA in China is not a monodrama of Chinese courts, but a process calling for contributions 
of multiples stakeholders, especially creditors. 
 
Furthermore, during the analysis of problematic issues affecting execution, this study 
observes how China’s general and legal culture exerts influence on Chinese parties’ 
execution-related operations and perceptions. Particularly, this study repeatedly observes 
evidence proving the impact of China’s notions relating to Li, De and He, like the official-
centred ideology and guanxi. Such findings inspire this study to conduct further analysis, to 
demonstrate how China’ cultural ideologies could mould its modern execution practice. 
 
Acknowledging the foregoing empirical portrayal of problems affecting execution, the next 
chapter works on conducting a comparative analysis of China’s three collection agents.  
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Chapter 6. Execution of Arbitral Awards in Practice: Performances of 
Collection Agents 
According to the previous chapter, a creditor could seek execution of an award against a 
defaulting debtor through self-reliant or agent-led execution in China’s current context. 
Speaking as an adviser for collecting debts in China, Tony Au argued that self-reliant 
execution was ostensibly not a practical or affordable option for outsiders unfamiliar with 
China’s business environment and practicalities of execution, whilst execution undertaken by 
a well-resourced agent, either foreign or Chinese, would be more productive.636 His 
proposition is underpinned by the analyses in the previous chapters, which have successively 
portrayed the execution of arbitral awards (EAA) in China’s economically less-developed 
regions (ELDRs) from three dimensions, including the current status, practices and 
problematic issues therein. Pursuant to these analyses, this study acknowledges the important 
role that a credible collection agent could assume in the EAA. Consequently, when evaluating 
the actual situation of the EAA in China, performance of collection agents should constitute a 
crucial facet worth elaboration. In this study, collection agent refers to a third party acting on 
behalf of creditor in execution. Two types of collection agents, including court and lawyer, are 
legally available under the 2012 Civil Procedure Law (CPL)637, while private collection 
agencies (PCAC), who are still awaiting legal recognition, are active participants in debt-
collection practice and can be hired for the EAA.638 The collected execution statistics reported 
the observably higher execution success rate of PCACs (85%-100%), in comparison with that 
of courts (40%-60%).639 This provoked this study to explore PCACs’ secrets of success 
through dissecting and analysing their operations against those of courts and lawyers. Ideally, 
a cross-evaluation of different collection agents’ execution capacity, which focuses on 
disclosing their respective strengths and weaknesses, could not only shed some lights on the 
future amelioration of Chinese courts’ execution operations and promote cross-agent 
cooperation, but could also instructively guide home-ground or off-turf execution attempts of 
creditors against dishonest debtors.  
 
                                                          
636 No author, 'Meeting the Chinese Debt collections challenge' (World Finance, 26 October 2011) 
<http://www.worldfinance.com/inward-investment/asia-and-australasia/meeting-the-chinese-debt-collections-challenge> 
accessed 26 October 2016. 
637 Article 58 (which nominated lawyers as candidates for litigation representative to exercise within the scope of delegated 
authority) and 273 of the 2012 CPL. 
638 See detailed discussions in Section 5.4. 
639 ibid. 
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Yet, the performance of private collection agents (PCA), including lawyers and PCACs), has 
hitherto failed to occupy the attention of the previous studies on China’s execution practice, 
like those of Peerenboom and He, possibly due to their court-centred research scopes.640 
Delivering a comparative analysis of collection agents’ execution operations could allow this 
study to fill up this missing piece about China’s execution environment and bring updates 
about institutional developments of Chinese collection agents, thereby enriching practitioners’ 
understanding of China’s execution status. Specifically, this analysis answers the questions 
about execution operations of China’s judicial and PCAs, highlighting dissimilarities in their 
operations and implications derived therefrom, to establish the possibility for China 
improving its execution status through the introduction of a multi-agent execution system.  
 
Structurally, this chapter critically juxtaposes operations of the aforementioned agents from 
seven dimensions, including legal status, case admission, operating framework, methods of 
information collection, involvement of creditors, behavioural codes, and potential perils, 
chiefly upon the comments of interviewees and findings from the participant observation. 
Each section in this chapter starts with portraying Chinese courts’ operations, followed by 
comparatively examining the performances of the other two agents and ended with a summary 
that reiterates the strengths and weaknesses of these three agents in the corresponding aspects.  
 
6.1 Legal Status  
Essentially, the concerned three collection agents are granted utterly unlike legal identities 
under China’s current execution-concerned legislations. This subsequently determines their 
execution capacity and employability for the EAA.    
 
Authorised by the 2012 CPL, Chinese courts can initiate coercive execution against defaulting 
debtors upon receipt of valid applications from legitimate creditors.641 To facilitate their 
execution operations, courts are statutorily empowered to inquire from record-holding 
institutions or individuals about debtors’ financial status, issue various interim measures 
spontaneously or upon request of creditors, and inflict penalties on debtors who wilfully 
obstruct court-administered execution actions.642 For arbitral awards, courts also preserve the 
                                                          
640 Discussed in Section 2.2. 
641 Chapter 19, 20 and 21 of the 2012 CPL. 
642 ibid. 
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authority to rule on their validity and enforceability.643 Nevertheless, this statutory authority 
cannot be enjoyed without costs. In fact, courts have to follow the stipulated procedural 
requirements when exercising their powers, or they might face severe punishments, so 
deduced from the work reports of the SPC.644 Hence, courts are, in principle, competent law-
abiding agents that possess proper statutory authority to execute arbitral awards, but have to 
always honour the standard procedures and rules. 
 
Meanwhile, lawyers are also possible candidates for creditors to entrust with the EAA, for 
their obvious advantages in legal knowledge and local practices.645 The interviewed lawyers 
disclosed that they were, in reality, reluctant to assume execution cases due to their restricted 
authority in asset tracking and other complications in execution, like the requirement of large 
time input.646 Moreover, their comments indicated that lawyer-led execution operations 
requested the involvement of local courts and, thereby, were susceptible to the inefficiency of 
courts and the related procedural restrictions. Yet, lawyers with extensive connections and 
prestigious status were found encountering fewer problems, like corruption or slackness of 
judges, in their practice, which consequently contributed to their higher confidence in 
successful execution.647 Therefore, though sharing the same law-abiding nature, Chinese 
lawyers could be considered less active, but possibly more resourceful, agents for the EAA, 
than courts.   
 
In contrast, Chinese PCACs operate in the absence of a legally approved status. 
Retrospectively speaking, Chinese authorities have manifested their opposition against the 
legitimatisation of the private collection business through the release of two multi-department 
normative notices respectively in 1995 and 2000.648 Aiming to reduce violent crimes linked to 
debt collection, both of these notices forbade the establishment of private debt collection 
companies in any form and private debt collection activities that used violent or illicit 
approaches to harass debtors.649 Later in 2006, China introduced a new profession known as 
commercial debt collector, attempting to regulate the private collection business through a 
                                                          
643 Article 237 and 274 of the 2012 CPL. 
644 See Section 2.2.3. 
645 Inferred from the background of the interviewed lawyers. 
646 Interviewee 1, 11, 12, 13, 21, 24 and 27. 
647 Inferred from experiences of Interviewee 21 and 26. 
648 Notice on Prohibition of Establishing Debt Collection Company by Ministry of Public Security and State Administration 
for Industry and Commerce, released on 28 November 1995; Notice on Prohibition of Debt Collection Firms and Curbing 
Illegal Debt Collection Activities by State Economic and Trade Commission, Ministry of Public Security and State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, released on 15 June 2000. 
649 XL Chen, 'Demystifying Professional Debt Collector: Miscellaneous Approaches, Service Fees Possibly Reaching 50% 
(in Chinese)' (news.ifeng.com, 14 July 2016) <http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160714/49352070_0.shtml> accessed 23 December 
2016. 
 137 
 
national certification system.650 But, commercial debt collectors are still not allowed to 
establish a firm to run the private collection business.651 Learning from online sources, 108 
individuals has hitherto been officially certified to be commercial debt collectors, whilst the 
majority of firms currently engaging in private collection business still do not possess a 
certified qualification of commercial debt collector and usually operate under the name of 
offering financial consulting or investigation services.652 This statement is endorsed by the 
operating status of the observed PCAC and the background of the two interviewees653 from 
PCACs in this study. Hence, not a single legitimately registered Chinese company is hitherto 
permitted to engage in the debt collection business, and the so-claimed professional debt 
collection firms all operate in an off-the-book manner. However, the embarrassing legal status 
of the private debt collection business in China seemingly does not preclude some Chinese 
firms or individuals from actively undertaking debt collection tasks, merely considering the 
experiences of Interviewees 9 and 29. This is possibly due to increasingly urgent demands of 
creditors for collecting overdue debts against obstinate debtors and hefty monetary rewards 
involved therein.654 Furthermore, operating in an off-the-book manner seems to grant PCACs 
unique strengths in tracking assets and debtors, as well as great flexibility in choosing suitable 
or, more often, not-so-lawful approaches to compel debtors to meet their obligations.655 Thus, 
compared with the operations of courts and lawyers, the involvement of PCACs in the EAA 
might lead to higher legal risks and expenditure, but might generate more productive results in 
discovery of assets or debtors. One point should be highlighted herein. Foreign collection 
agencies are theoretically permitted to directly pursue the execution of overdue debts against 
Chinese debtors, without undergoing any litigation process.656 However, this situation only 
applies to the EAA, if the collection of an award is considered the payment of an overdue debt 
under Chinese law. This means that an arbitral award still needs to win approval for 
recognition and execution from a competent Chinese court, prior to being collected by a 
foreign agency.   
 
                                                          
650 LL Xiang and AL Liao, 'Commercial Debt Collector Becomes a New Profession, But Unable to Register A Company (in 
Chinese)' (news.xinhua.com, 17 April 2006) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2006-04/17/content_4433815.htm> 
accessed 23 December 2016 
651 ibid. 
652 T Zhang, 'Private Debt Collection Guru-Han Bing (in Chinese)' (MaxLaw.cn, 26 July 2016) 
<http://www.wxqkjfls.com/art/view.asp?id=856516057745> accessed 23 December 2016; Beijing Debt Lawyer, 'Is Debt 
Collection Company Legal, What Risks Could Be Caused by Entrusting Debt Collection Company to Collect Debt (in 
Chinese)' (fabao365.com, unknown) <http://www.fabao365.com/zhaiwu/120726/> accessed 23 December 2016 
653 Interviewee 9 and 29. 
654 XL Chen (n649) 
655 This statement is partially inferred from comments of Interviewee 12, 22 and 23, while partially from the article of XL 
Chen (n649). Also see Y Lan, 'How China’s Debt Collectors Go To Work' (Global Times, 20 June 2016) 
<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/989412.shtml> accessed 23 December 2016 
656 No author (n636) 
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To sum up, courts and lawyers are collection agents with legislatively recognised identities, 
whereas the former enjoys richer statutory authority and the latter might benefit greatly from 
extensive local connections in their execution operations. Both of them are restricted by the 
procedural necessities when undertaking execution cases. Conversely, PCACs are generally 
embarrassed by their unlawful identity, but compensated with higher service fees and greater 
leeway in their field operations. Nonetheless, the employability of PCACs in the EAA is 
undermined by the likely occurrence of high perils and costs in their unregulated operations.  
 
6.2 Case Admission 
The collected data by this study reveals that, due to their varied legal identities and ultimate 
objectives, courts and the other two PCAs adopt two sets of characteristically different 
policies for case admission, namely, all-welcomed and cherry-picking policies. This to a 
certain extent explains why courts and the other two agents reported different odds of success 
in execution. Meanwhile, in terms of the EAA, case admission is theoretically a watershed 
splitting the workloads of courts and the other two agents, since courts are the only authority 
to handle requests for rejection of execution and exert preservative measures. In other words, 
Chinese courts are, in theory, the more favourable collection agents for arbitral awards, 
because they have statutory powers to solve disputes over the enforceability of arbitral awards 
and exert lawful approaches to compel debtors to honour their obligations. Nevertheless, 
arbitral awards involving large monetary remedies could meet the admission requirements of 
PCAs and, accordingly, might spur the latter to contribute more proactive execution 
performances than courts. Therefore, the EAA requests a proper deliberation over criteria for 
case admission of different collection agents, so as to determine the suitable agent to wrestle 
against defaulters.  
 
6.2.1 Courts 
Fundamentally, courts are defined as members of China’s national law enforcement force, 
who operate on state support and exert judicial authorities to safeguard social order and 
stability.657 This then determines that the ultimate objective of courts rests on serving as the 
defender of justice, rather than pursuing economic benefits. Consequently, courts 
                                                          
657 S Tiezzi, 'Xi Jinping’s Vision for China’s Courts' (The Diplomat, 9 January 2014)<http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/xi-
jinpings-vision-for-chinas-courts/> accessed 28 August 2016 
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conventionally endorse an ‘open door’ policy when accepting applications for execution.658 
According to the working procedure of the two studied courts, applications for coercive 
execution will be firstly scrutinised by specialised administrative bodies of the Judicial 
Execution Bureau (JEB) and, then assigned to field judges. An execution case can safely pass 
the preliminary scrutiny for case admission and make its way into the next execution phase, 
once the following items are produced: validated documents in the recognised form of 
presentation, qualified applicant(s), a valid application, identifiable default of debtor(s), 
practically enforceable instrument(s), and the established jurisdiction of the court.659 Even 
better, the SPC released its Opinions on Promoting the Reform of the Registration System for 
Case Docket by the People's Courts660 in 2015. According to Article III (4) of this normative 
document, courts should only apply the foregoing uniform criteria to scrutinise applications 
for execution. The 2017 Report claimed that 95% of cases received immediate admission by 
courts in 2016, and new approaches, like self-service or online admission, have been on 
trial.661 The foregoing data literally suggests that the case admission process of Chinese courts 
has been further standardised nationwide, and creditors would no longer worry about ‘local 
practices’ when applying for court-led execution.  
 
Deliberating over the foregoing discussion, the caseload of courts is, in essence, not 
comparable with those of other two private collection forces. In other words, courts are 
requested to undertake all scrutiny-completed cases, notwithstanding the likelihood of 
successful execution. This certainly brings good news to creditors, but virtually increases the 
difficulty for courts to claim victory in the battle against obstinate debtors. Echoing 
discoveries of He662, this study found that the two interviewed creditors663 treated court-led 
execution as their last forlorn attempt, only if all the other alternatives were exhausted. These 
remarks indirectly sustain an argument raised by the interviewed judges and some lawyers664, 
holding that many creditors consciously use coercive execution as their last attempt and file 
their applications with clear knowledge about the slim likelihood of success in their cases. 
Pursuant to the judicial experiences of Interviewee 10, if those cases really receive an 
upsetting denouement at the end of the day, courts will face bitter criticisms or complaints 
made by the disgruntled applicants, regardless of judges’ efforts in execution. In that sense, 
                                                          
658 Chapter 20 of the 2012 CPL. 
659 ibid. 
660 This document, known as Fa Fa (2015) No. 6, came into effect on 1 May 2015, and is available in Chinese at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-04/15/c_1114977537.htm 
661 Cited in n178. 
662 See discussion in 2.2.2. 
663 Interviewee 8 and 25. 
664 Interviewee 1, 5, 10, 24, and 28. 
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courts are literally scapegoats taking the blame for creditors’ previous poor business decisions 
or negligence, so believed by Interviewee 10 and 14, both senior judges. This situation also 
partially explains why courts have been constantly haunted by the rather low rate (roughly 40-
60%) of execution in civil and commercial matters, compared with the impressive 
achievements of PCACs (close to 100%).665  
 
After all, the current ‘all-welcomed’ policy of courts in case admission is favourable for 
promoting the cross-boundary or cross-province EAA in China, whereas it also increases  the 
workload of courts and places them in an inferior position to compete against PCAs for 
creditors’ confidence in court-led execution.  
 
6.2.2 Private collection agencies and lawyers 
Compared with Chinese courts, lawyers and PCACs proffer commercial services upon the 
individualised demands of their clients at negotiable fees.666 In contradiction of their ‘all-case-
welcomed’ slogan, PCACs and lawyers are generally evangelists of the cherry-picking policy, 
chiefly motivated by a hot pursuit of personal interests. It is worth mentioning that personal 
interests herein include both financial and non-financial ones, like business reputation and 
local influence.    
 
As stated in Section 6.1, the private debt collection business has not been legally recognised 
in China, so there is no legislation having been enacted to regulate the operations of PCACs. 
Learning from the participant observation, the studied PCAC chiefly operates upon the 
contractual conditions mutually agreed by a creditor and the agency, as well as common 
industrial practices. Remarks of Interviewee 29 indicated that his company also adopted a 
similar approach. Through interpreting the collected data, this study proposes that PCAs are 
most likely to accept cases upon a comprehensive consideration of the following three factors 
to maximise their entitled rewards. According to Interviewee 9 and 29, PCACs would initially 
deliberate on the odds of successful execution, based on the documents and other background 
information submitted by creditors. Most cases could easily meet this first criterion, provided 
that the legitimate awards or documents are presented. However, agencies might also consider 
other locally- or individually-conditioned factors. Interviewee 9 expressed his reluctance to 
undertake cases in association with three groups of legally protected individuals: ethnic 
                                                          
665 See statistics in Section 4.3. 
666 Learnt from the outcomes of interviews and the participant observation. 
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minorities (protected by China’s ethnic policies and their ethnically tight-knit communities), 
disabled persons (labelled as a disadvantaged group and granted preferential protection), and 
villagers (most likely underpinned by large-size neighbourhoods that are united by kinship or 
place of residence). Deducing from remarks of Interviewee 9 and 24667, these three groups 
could create considerable difficulties or even lead to unsuccessful execution. They also 
indicated that, even for local law enforcement or administrative authorities, the 
aforementioned groups were considered hard-to-please or recalcitrant communities. An 
interesting fact is that the first two groups of protected individuals could be employed by 
creditors to force the debtors or stakeholders into surrender, so mirrored by the experiences of 
Interviewee 24 and 29. In contrast, Interviewee 29 outwardly revealed no problems with 
undertaking cases against the foregoing protected groups, thanks to his prestige and well-
connected network on his turf. But, he conveyed his grievance against serving outsiders from 
certain regions, which were mainly economically disadvantaged areas compared to his home 
turf, for a concern over the latter’s capacity to pay the service fee. Nonetheless, there is no 
evidence suggesting that the foregoing individualised factors would equally affect the final 
decisions of PCACs in all contexts. This then denotes the localisation of PCACs’ operations.  
 
Secondly, the experiences of Interviewee 9 indicate that, once a positive prospect of execution 
is established, PCACs will estimate input costs, including both capital and human resources. 
For Interviewee 9, collection cases, which pressurised him into exhausting extensive personal 
connections to obtain a ‘green pass’ or conducting costly field operations, were exclusively 
tagged as unprofitable. Such case would certainly be dismissed by PCACs, who literally live 
for meaty rewards. Apparently, the length of the needed execution period is not a factor 
plaguing PCACs, when calculating whether a case is worthwhile.668 This is possibly because, 
unlike courts, PCACs can work on adaptable or, even, customisable timetables, upon a 
guarantee of sufficient funds.    
 
Thirdly, PCACs consider the size and collectability of the anticipatory rewards, so disclosed 
by Interviewee 9 and 29 upon their debt collection practice. Reflected by the outcomes of the 
participant observation, PCACs might charge 30%-50% of the collectable amounts, with full 
coverage of operating expenditures by creditors (e.g. travel expenses). Interviewee 9 stated 
                                                          
667 Interviewee 24 is simultaneously serving as an independent lawyer and a legal consultant of a local corporation. In a case, 
he alleged that his company was extorted by an influential creditor, who hired a group of ethnic minority people to pressurise 
his company into accepting groundless requirements of the latter. Fortunately, his company defeated such attempt, with the 
assistance of the local authorities.  
668 Inferred from the experiences of Interviewee 9 and 29. 
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that the performance of his team was essentially shaped by the amount of the payments they 
received, while Interviewee 29 also implied that the outcome of execution largely hinged on 
his clients’ ungrudging financial commitment. Consequently, it appears that PCACs’ 
willingness to undertake a case can be substantially influenced by monetary incentives. Yet, 
under rare circumstances, agencies might wake from the spell of monetary interests and 
decline to handle a case. Interviewee 29 shared a case, in which a client approached his team 
to collect an overdue debt. At the first look, the case was an easy task, which was readily 
equipped with legitimate documents, an evidently identified debtor and enforceable assets. 
However, Interviewee 29 rejected to take on the case. It was because the case merely 
concerned a tiny part of a large group debt against the same debtor. Had he resolved this case, 
he would have actually helped other creditors with cheaply harvesting their victories and, 
thereby, would have lost a large group of potential clients. This certainly did not fit his best 
interests and, accordingly, the case was dismissed. Hence, not every case can win the favour 
of PCACs, but those with foreseeably huge rewards and a strong likelihood of success will be 
assumed. The previous discussion, which examines the factors driving individual agencies’ 
decisions in undertaking cases, virtually confirms that careful calculation is needed when 
inviting PCACs to execute arbitral awards. 
 
As to lawyers, it should be firstly clarified that, unlike their Western counterparts, the Chinese 
legal community is still undergoing its specialisation process, which allows Chinese lawyers 
to encounter little restrictions in case admission, so reflected by the experiences of the 
interviewed lawyers and published articles.669 Specifically, the interviewed younger 
lawyers670 are inclined to focus their practice on a particular field, whereas senior ones671, 
generally having practiced for over a decade, would assume cases of diverse natures, ranging 
from criminal and administrative disputes to commercial ones. The outcomes of this study 
gathered no comments from interviewees that explicitly depicted criteria of case admission 
prevailing in this profession. Nonetheless, an inkling of how lawyers would assess an 
execution case could be abstracted from a perceivable unwillingness to undertake execution 
cases amongst the interviewed lawyers. Interviewee 27 expounded that his unwillingness was 
                                                          
669 KJ Dong and others, 'The Third Chinese Legal Reform: Reform of China's Legal Service Industry (in 
Chinese)' (China.com.cn, 21 April 
2008)<http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/data/zgfz2008/content_14988899_2.htm> accessed 25 January 2016; YW Chen, 
'Thoughts on the Specialisation Development of Law Firms in the Central and Western Regions (in Chinese)' (Website of All 
China Lawyers Association, 10 March 2014) <http://www.acla.org.cn/html/lvsuoguanli/20140310/15490.html> accessed 27 
December 2016; S Leng and Others, 'Analysis of Chinese Overseas Legal Service Industry (in Chinese)' [2017] 5 & 6 
Chinese Lawyer 73-76; 65-67 
670 Interviewee 11, 22, 23 and 27. 
671 Interviewee 1, 5, 12, 13, 21, 24 and 26. 
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mainly caused by three reasons: complexity and uncertainty of execution, expensive time 
costs and a grim outlook. He preferred to sign up for lawsuits than to be enmeshed in 
execution. His statements resonate with the inclination of 6 (out of 11) interviewed lawyers.672 
However, privileged social position or access to resources can entitle lawyers to offer services 
in a wider range of cases. Specifically, Interviewee 22 and 23 from a law firm, which 
reportedly enjoyed extensive local resources and nationwide connections, revealed no obvious 
hesitation in pursuing execution locally or nationwide. Additionally, benefiting from their 
prestigious positions in local academic and legal communities, Interviewee 21 and 26 
apparently witnessed little interference and hardship in their legal practice. Interviewee 1 also 
ascribed his success to his personal connections and the local influences of his clients. Yet, 
such privileged treatment is seemingly available only to a small-membership society. Hence, 
it would be reasonable to infer that an overwhelming majority of lawyers adhere to the same 
cherry-picking policy as PCACs, and prefer to undertake cases that enjoy promising prospects 
and favourable returns, while begetting less troubles or backlash. But, lawyers’ general 
reluctance to assume execution tasks virtually precludes them from undertaking active 
operations in the EAA. 
 
In summary, courts appear to be convenient and affordable collection agents, who offer reliefs 
to all legitimate creditors and, consequently, encounter a greater likelihood of failing to 
accomplish their execution tasks. In contrast, PCACs and lawyers are hired guns, who prefer 
participating in well-rewarding cases and superficially enjoy a high rate of success. Yet, the 
unparalleled caseloads of these three agents deny the possibility to use performance statistics 
as the sole criterion to compare their collection capacity against each other.  
  
6.3 Operating Framework 
In accordance with their professional characteristics and statutory status, courts and PCAs 
adopt their respective managerial mechanisms.673 Apart from revealing distinguishable 
discrepancies in their daily operation management, these agents utilise different methods to 
recruit and supervise their employees, in line with the compositions of their personnel and 
professional protocols.674 Through comparatively analysing these agents’ field operations, this 
study realised that the operating framework of an agent could substantially determine the 
                                                          
672 Interviewee 11, 12, 13, 21, 24 and 26. 
673 Inferred from the outcomes of interviews and participant observation. 
674 ibid. 
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length of the execution period, the intricacy of procedural requirements and the efficiency of 
the pertinent agent. The following section shows how these agents’ respective institutional 
frameworks could affect their collection practices.  
 
6.3.1 Courts     
The organisational structure and work procedures of the studied courts suggest that China’s 
judiciary adopts a multi-layered management mechanism characterised by formality and 
solemnity. 675 To serve the research theme, this study merely looked into the pyramidally 
organised internal management system of China’s intermediate courts.676 Using the court 
where Interviewee 6 serves as an example, the Chief Judge supervises the overall operations 
of the court under the assistances of a board of senior judges, and two senior judges are 
delegated to respectively manage the trialling and execution divisions, while specific tasks in 
each division are further assigned to middle-level judges, who are followed by junior judges 
and supporting staff.677 The merit of this pyramid structure chiefly rests on its simplicity and 
efficacy in guaranteeing the execution of commands from the top authorities.678  
 
Nonetheless, this multi-layered structure is far from perfect, so indicated by remarks of two 
interviewed judges.679 Firstly, it could bring about lack of internal coordination between 
functional divisions of a court. Chewing over remarks of Interviewee 6 and 10, the divorce 
between operations of trialling and execution divisions in a court provokes disruptive inter-
divisional competition or even tension. These two senior judges also exposed the silent 
prevalence of an ingrained prejudice that judges serving in the trialling department were 
superior to those in the execution. Interviewee 10 further indicated that frictions between 
trialling and execution divisions could fuel bureaucratic delays and evasion of responsibilities. 
This loosely explains why courts were bombarded by complaints that were commonly 
associated with Chinese administrative organs, like requesting unnecessary red tape and 
                                                          
675 HZ Xia, 'How China's Legal Mechanism is Structured (in Chinese)' (Website of the National People's Congress of the 
People's Republic of China, 19 February 2013) <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/sjb/2013-02/19/content_1755111.htm> accessed 
2 September 2016 
676 DP Liu and W Jiao, 'Discussion about Reform of Court's Internal Management Mechanism (in Chinese) ' [1999] 5 
Shangdong Justice 42-45 
677 Based on the background knowledge of this court obtained during the fieldwork. 
678 Z Liu, 'Structure, Position, Rank and Competition for Positions-Deep Structure of Court's Internal Framework (in 
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kicking parties around departments.680 Additionally, Interviewee 10 blamed the inefficient 
communication between trialling and execution judges for the generation of unenforceable 
awards. Thus, the current organisational layout of courts is not so execution-friendly. 
Meanwhile, such organisational framework requests heavy administrative duties and manual 
forces, which can substantially contribute to courts’ costly and low-effective operations. For 
instance, the studied court in Target 2 owned around 150 staff, but merely 5 of them worked 
as field judges with an annual caseload of around 50 or higher cases. Apart from expenses on 
administrative and HR managements, Chinese courts might also be burdened with hefty costs 
of real estate and maintenance. In his study of a grassroots court in Shaanxi, He found that the 
court carried “a 7.8 million RMB (around 0.9 million pounds) bill arising from the 
construction of its new office building”.681 Pursuant to personal observation of the author, the 
four courts visited in this study are generally seated on august premises that benefit from both 
convenient traffic connections and well-equipped infrastructure. In the light of remarks 
gathered randomly from visitors of a court in Target 1, physical premises and distinct logo of 
courts indeed created indelible marks in the public mind, bolstering an assurance that courts 
were state-endorsed legitimate institutions for dispute settlement. Nonetheless, courts’ 
outwardly expensive premises also provoked this study to question about how they could 
funds themselves upon limited fiscal budgets. Unfortunately, this study received no 
information about these courts’ liabilities for their premises. Hypothetically, courts would 
require considerable resources to manage their premises and operations. Speaking from his 
lawyering experiences, Interviewee 26 commented that Chinese courts were still under 
control of local administrative authorities in terms of economy and personnel. But, the current 
fiscal budgets of courts, particularly those in ELDRs, are unlikely to fully cover their funding 
requirements, so denoted by the findings of He.682 Being a senior judge of an intermediate 
court in Target 2, Interviewee 14 also complained that, “In view of various expenses, it is 
tough to run the court because the fiscal budget is not sufficient.” Interviewee 26 implied that 
this economic stress might persuade courts to maintain a rapport with local authorities or even 
surrender to the instructions of the latter in exchange for fiscal support. Such finding 
corroborates with the claims of Peerenboom, saying that courts’ over-dependence on local 
authorities severely undermines public confidence in the impartiality and efficacy of China’s 
judicial operations.683    
                                                          
680 J Xiang, 'Seriously Implement "Three Strictness Three Realisations", Establish A Loyal, Clean and Reliable Image of 
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Echoing their emphasis on formality and solemnity, Chinese courts also construct a rule-
bound framework to regulate and reward judges’ performances, so revealed by the interview 
experiences of this study. Primarily, during the field investigation, this study found that judges 
were required to honour the nationwide uniform work schedules, with little variances between 
the trialling and execution divisions. Specifically, judges are expected to work five days per 
week on a nine-to-five routine, with an allowance of theoretically unlimited overtime. In 
practice, this fixed timetable does not grant applicants a generous time allowance to approach 
judges, unlike it apparently suggests. Firstly, the collected execution statistics indicated that 
judges were usually overloaded and some judges even had to handle 200 cases on an annual 
basis, which essentially made it impossible for them to allocate equal time and commitment to 
each single case, let alone meet or update all applicants in person. It is reported that judges 
working in the grassroots courts would be consumed by even heavier caseloads.684 Secondly, 
aside from heavy caseloads, judges’ working hours are further gnawed away by various job-
related or unrelated tasks, so agreed by the observations of this study and published 
opinions.685 When waiting for the arranged interviews, the author was informed that judges 
were entitled to a lunch break for two or up to three hours during their working days. This 
then shortened their daily office time to around six hours. Then, these six hours are literally 
dismembered into fragmentary chunks to fulfil various tasks. For frontline judges, the 
majority of their office hours are devoted to desk duties and field operations.686 Enlightened 
by personal observations on the two studied intermediate courts, this study witnessed a 
mountain of paperwork that a judge needed to complete to respectively meet the procedural 
requirements of their departments and other stakeholders in an execution case.687 Typically, 
the submission of progression reports and various applications is a standard proportion of 
judges’ desk duties.688 It is reported that judges’ current paperwork burden is undesirably 
extensive, because most of their submitted documents request a time-consuming preparation 
process, but possibly receive little appreciation in return.689 Apart from desk duties and field 
operations, judges are also requested to attend training and meetings for various purposes, like 
administrative matters.690 Although providing certain benefits in internal administration and 
                                                          
684 CY Ren and ZY Huang, 'Shortage of Judges, Worry of Courts: The Situation is Changing (in Chinese)' (Infzm.com, 17 
April 2015) <http://www.infzm.com/content/108892> accessed 26 December 2016 
685 FG Gao, 'Account From Execution Judge: Process of An Execution Case (in Chinese)' (Legal Blog, 14 May 2016) 
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687 For a list of required documents, see Measures for People's Courts to Arrange Execution Documents into Archives 
(Provisional) released by the Supreme People’s Court on 18 May 2006.  
688 ibid. 
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690 This finding came from the observation of this study during the interviewing period. Also see Y Chen, 'Behind the Tide of 
Judges' Resignation: Rich Dream Cannot Defeat the Hash Reality (in Chinese)' (news.sina.com.cn, 24 July 2016) 
<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2016-07-24/doc-ifxuhukz0907342.shtml> accessed 27 December 2016.  
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enhancement of judges’ professional qualifications, these aforementioned events severely 
encroached on the effective office hours of judges. All these foregoing factors negatively 
affect the efficacy of judges. Moreover, although granted with autonomy in their fieldwork, 
judges need to frequently seek upfront approvals from their superiors for their proposed 
actions.691 In other words, field judges merely have very limited authority to make decisions 
at their discretion. This situation is unfavourable in execution cases, where immediate actions 
are frequently demanded to stop the defaulting debtors’ ill-intended attempts or other 
stakeholders’ behaviours that might tip off the debtors. For instance, Interviewee 23 stated 
upon his lawyering experiences that, when seizing a debtor’s account or deposit, judges were 
expected to “take immediate action on the spot” to prevent clerks of banks from alerting the 
debtor. Meanwhile, such approval process would presumably request certain deliverables and, 
thereby, increase the paperwork burden of judges. Moreover, in view of their workload, the 
interviewed judges692 protested about their low salaries and little paid time off. Their 
complaints resonate with those in the published articles.693 According to the execution 
statistics of the studied court in Target 1, judges normally undertook 3 or up to 5 cases at the 
same time. This caseload, together with the shortened working hours and tedious formalities, 
obviously requires judges to devote considerable commitment. However, Interviewee 3 and 
14 believed that their commitment was not appropriately rewarded. Lack of paid vacations to 
engage in wanted training or family events was a key factor inflaming the disgruntled feelings 
of Interviewee 3. Interviewee 14 particularly complained that their current benefit package 
could barely match up with the ever-increasing living expenses, let alone repayment of their 
house mortgage. As a consequence, heavy workload, comparatively low income and tight 
controls of the rule-bound framework jointly whittle away at judges’ enthusiasm for their 
work.694 Besides, these factors could lead to brain drain of China’s judicial force.695 Allegedly, 
China has been losing around 1000 judges per year, accounting for roughly 0.5% of the total 
judicial force (200,000) by the year of 2015.696 Since most of these resigned judges used to be 
the backbone of their units, their resignation is deemed to be a heavy loss for Chinese 
judiciary.697 Being a senior judge, Interviewee 14 also expressed his concern about losing 
talented young judges to well-paid institutions, like financial management companies. 
                                                          
691 This is deduced from the experiences of FG Gao (n685), and further supported by experiences of the author during the 
process of data collection from courts. Besides, the fact that Instruction Request Report is listed as a required document to be 
put into execution archives by Measures for People's Courts to Arrange Execution Documents into Archives (Provisional) 
can also be evidence verifying this claim. 
692 Interviewee 3, 14 and 28. 
693 CY Ren and ZY Huang (n684); Y Chen (n690). 
694 Y Chen (n690). 
695 CY Ren and ZY Huang (n684). 
696 Y Chen (n690). 
697 ibid.  
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Therefore, it appears that the current personnel management of courts is somehow inadequate 
in ensuring field judges’ performance in execution cases.   
 
In brief, courts’ current operating framework moulds court-led execution into a bureaucratic 
proceeding, which is suitable for handling heavy caseloads at affordable costs, but 
characterised by a cumbersome institution, slow progress, and rule-bound operations. 
Restricted by their protocols and other unfavourable issues, judges appear to be a cheap and 
law-abiding workforce, which suffers from heavy workload, poor efficiency and low morale.  
 
6.3.2 Private collection agencies and lawyers 
Contrary to courts’ standardised operations, PCACs operate in an elastic or floating manner, 
partially owing to their legally unpropitious business environment. Learning from the 
participant observation, the concerned agency adopted a single-layered organisational 
structure, with streamlined management and employees. Under this structure, the company’s 
operation was roughly divided into three functional sections, namely, in-house administration, 
external communication and field operations. Sharing the assistance of a bookkeeper, three 
managers were respectively in charge of these sections. Procedurally, a case was firstly 
scrutinised by a manager to verify the authenticity of the submitted documents, and a 
preliminary calculation of success was produced for further consideration of the other two 
managers. Then, another manager in charge of liaison with the agency’s outside connections 
assessed the difficulties that might be involved in untying bureaucratic knots and red tapes. 
Finally, three managers jointly finalised their decisions about the case. Once a case was 
admitted, the manager running field operations could always count on all-out supports from 
the other two. Rewards harvested from their operations were split proportionally among 
managers. The remarks of Interviewee 9 resonated with the findings of the participant 
observation, suggesting that this three-person management team cooperated seamlessly in 
their operations. During the whole decision-making process and later operation, each of the 
managers would individually complete his own tasks and promptly assist the operations of the 
others, without hesitation or circumvention of responsibilities. Excepting these three 
permanent positions, other employees were temporarily recruited and managed in a project-
based manner. Such HR management strategies seemingly allow the agency to enjoy 
sufficient labour supply with less employee expenses. Additionally, the agency hid its head 
office in privately owned premises with basic decoration and office facilitates. This study was 
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informed that this location could provide the agency with wanted privacy and a formal office 
environment at cheap costs. Admittedly, these operation strategies excel at cost reduction and 
protection of confidentiality. But, this study deems that managing a disparate group of 
employees without a complicate administrative structure is a strategy only feasible for 
institutions with small workloads and staff requirements. While tightly controlling its 
overheads, the agency seemingly devoted itself to continuously exploring new business 
opportunities and resources to safeguard its financial capacity. The participant observation 
revealed that, excluding debt collection, the agency also engaged itself in various financially 
well-rewarding activities, like private lending and problem-solving services. Thanks to its 
sufficient financial resources, the agency managed to maintain its extensive guanxi network, 
and was enabled to conduct name-based man-hunting within its home province. Thus, it can 
be said that the foregoing strategies seemingly help the agency construct an efficient and cost-
saving operating mechanism, given its almost 100% success in debt collection. However, due 
to PCACs’ unrecognised legal status and secretive operations, no state authorities are 
delegated to specifically supervise their practice.698 The absence of official supervision and 
the elastic operating framework of PCACs jointly gave dishonest agencies some leeway to 
double-cross creditors and abscond with the collected funds, so proved by the knowledge of 
Interviewee 9 and 29 (both PCAs). The experiences of Interviewee 8 as a private creditor 
suggested that victimised creditors could, theoretically, file their complaints against dishonest 
agencies with the State Public Security Departments. But, the lawyering experiences of 
Interviewee 11 argued that, unless concrete evidence of illegitimate conduct was presented, 
such complaints were unlikely to obtain proper attention of the competent authorities. 
Consequently, the current operating framework of PCACs virtually increases the risks 
entailed in their collection practice, simply considering the likelihood that creditors might lose 
all their entitlements without proper remedies.     
 
Some ink needs to be spilt on elaborating the personnel management of PCACs, considering 
the complex backgrounds of their employees. As mentioned above, the observed agency hired 
its crew from the local community in a case-based manner, which literally shaped its 
personnel into a hotchpotch of people with diverse background experiences. The participant 
observation spotlighted the thin academic and legal qualifications of this agency’s employees, 
loosely proved by the misspelled words in their handwritten notes, utilisation of coarse 
languages, and certain suspicious behaviours. This finding implies possible challenges in 
                                                          
698 Discussed in Section 6.1.  
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managing this disparate group. Yet, this study was also impressed by its employees’ rich 
knowledge of the grassroots community and their local influence at varied levels. Echoing the 
composition of its personnel, the observed agency adopted the flexitime scheme, encouraging 
its staff to work on their own schedules and placing little procedural restrictions on their field 
operations. According to its employees, the agency merely insisted on note-taking in a 
designed form and prompt updates of the work status in oral form. Its project-based crews just 
needed to report to their team leaders, and evidently enjoyed full autonomy throughout the 
whole field execution process. Moreover, no manifest corporate stipulations about their 
employees’ attendance and behaviour were perceived by this study. Instead, members of this 
agency were found seemingly adhering to and acting on some unspoken codes that received 
tacit consent within their circle. For instance, it is tacitly accepted that debt collection is an 
all-male business, where females can merely undertake supporting roles, like bookkeeping. 
Also, the so-called rules and morality of Jianghu are kept on a pedestal, particularly 
evidenced by veneration of this agency’s employees for heroic figures or the previous 
achievements of their leadership. This study observed that this agency apparently used the 
personal charm of its leaders and monetary rewards, in lieu of impersonal rules, to regulate its 
employees. This management strategy apparently works well in promoting the performance of 
this agency, proved by its employees’ perceivable gusto and strong sense of teamwork in their 
field operations. In an off-turf debtor-chasing case, this agency’s mission team managed to 
identify and locate an intentionally disappearing debtor, which had been an unaccomplished 
task for a group of creditors for almost five years, within a week. Particularly, the team 
processed a large amount of fragmentary information, and worked out clues about the location 
and secret connections of the debtor within roughly 12 hours. This study witnessed that 
unpicking useful clues from a myriad of information was indeed a tedious task, requesting a 
committed workforce that shone at deductive reasoning or dared to speculate, but not 
necessarily with forensic or legal knowledge. The similar situation can be deduced from the 
comments of Interviewee 9 and 29, both sophisticates with rich experiences in debt collection 
and strong interpersonal skills. Interviewee 9 was admired by his subordinates and clients for 
his previous deeds and local influence, which conferred him with extra powers to persuade 
people and peddle his propositions. Quoting from Interviewee 9, he had little worry about 
handling defiant debtors, and all his receivables were successfully recovered at the end of the 
transactions. In a case about settlement of family inheritance, Interviewee 9 used his personal 
influences and negotiation skills to steamroller the warring heirs into submission to his 
propositions. Speaking from personal experiences of the author, such outcomes are unlikely to 
be achieved merely upon mastery of legal knowledge or exertion of statutory authorities. 
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Therein, the deterrent effect of Interviewee 9 as a respected local figure was the key to 
success. The remarks of Interviewee 29 also reflected his personal influence in his community 
and confidence in positive completion of his cases. Hence, the foregoing data reveals that the 
leader-centred management framework empowers PCACs to keep their employees on a tight 
rein, but without strangling their initiative. Nevertheless, this framework is over-reliant on the 
performance of particular leading individuals, which then raises concern over the objectivity 
and trustworthiness of PCACs’ decision-making and operations. According to Interviewee 26 
and 27 (both lawyers from Target 1), the complicated composition of PCACs’ employees and 
their disordered management defined this force as unfavourable agents to be entrusted with 
collection missions. Therefore, the current operating framework of PCACs could allow them 
to, compared with courts, present a higher efficiency and encounter less responsibility-shifting 
problems in their execution operations, but could simultaneously enlarge the risks of creditors 
being deceived by dishonest agencies. This then defines PCACs as dynamic agents, who offer 
high-priced, customised services, but with a questionable guarantee of the final outcome.    
 
Then, referring to lawyers, these legal practitioners essentially operate in the way that is 
similar to their Western counterparts.699 Noticeably, the utmost discrepancy between these two 
lawyer communities rests on the fact that the British-style division of responsibilities between 
solicitor and barrister does not exist in the Chinese context.700 Basically, Chinese lawyers are 
generally equipped with adequate legal qualifications, practical experiences and various-sized 
local connections, while they normally act in line with the protocols of the local bar 
associations.701 Meanwhile, their practice is simultaneously subject to the routine 
management of their law firms and complaint-based surveillance of the Legal Affair Bureaus 
at a municipal level.702 Compared with PCACs and courts, the operating style of lawyers 
reveals the following features. Firstly, sufficient legal expertise and duel supervision educate 
Chinese lawyers to cautiously practice under the Chinese legal framework and avoid 
committing visible legal mistakes, typically proved by the persistence of Interviewee 21 
(lawyer from Target 2) in using only legitimate tactics to win legal battles. Next, Interviewee 
27 (lawyer from Target 1) claimed that intimacy with the local community and authorities 
could help Chinese lawyers smooth their paths to success. Additionally, unlike courts, lawyers 
                                                          
699 J Wang, '30 Years After Reestablishment of the Lawyer System (in Chinese)' (Sina.com.cn, 30 October 2008) 
<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-10-30/143016557203.shtml> accessed 29 December 2016. 
700 F Ge, 'Enlightenments of the British Lawyer System (in Chinese)' (Infzm.com, 28 June 2016) 
<http://www.infzm.com/content/117893> accessed 29 December 2016. 
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702 GM Liu, 'How the Americans Manage Their Lawyer (in Chinese)' (China Value, 2 April 2011) 
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seemingly operate without bureaucratic fetters imposed by internal management and outside 
supervision, and they are granted full autonomy in handling their cases, given the fact that this 
study received no complaints from lawyers about their oversight authorities and procedural 
restrictions on their operations. Besides, lawyers’ services are negotiated and awarded on a 
case-by-case basis, which then guarantees their entitlement to flexible work schedules and 
generous payments, so observed by this study during the fieldwork. Therefore, considering 
their familiarity with China’s legal environment and local realities, lawyers are well-informed 
agents, who offer credible professional services at negotiable prices with flexible agenda and 
sound warranty.   
 
Therefore, compared with state-hired judges, PCACs and lawyers work in a freelance manner, 
whereas their personnel management approaches are poles apart, possibly owing to the varied 
backgrounds of their employees and peculiarities of their operating environments. 
Particularly, this study witnessed that the operating framework of PCACs, which tolerated 
great flexibility in procedural necessities and personnel management, enables them to pursue 
collection cases with little restrictions, despite the accompanying risks faced by creditors. In 
general, the operating frameworks of lawyers and PCACs appear to be more result-oriented 
and less bureaucratic, than that of courts. 
 
In short, Chinese courts are managed in a manner, which is rigid in nature, but feasible to 
provide standardised practice to manage their heavy caseloads. This makes court-led 
operations endure unavoidable formalities and result in prolonged proceedings. Additionally, 
though imposing systematic supervision over judges’ duty-related performance, the presiding 
personnel management framework of courts could circumscribe the discretion of judges and 
suppress their enthusiasm for the work, thereby undermining their efficiency. In contrast, 
PCACs and lawyers operate on case-based schemes and with less red tape. Owing to the 
peculiarities of PCACs’ personnel composition and operating environment, their internal 
management appears to be looser, but more effective in promoting work efficiency and 
morale of their employees, than those of lawyers and courts. However, this study holds that 
PCACs’ operating framework is of little value for courts, who are expected to handle heavy 
caseloads with a credibility guarantee, whereas their HR strategies could be consulted for 
reforming courts’ personnel management. 
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6.4 Methods of Information Collection 
Pursuant to the collected data, all three agencies, regardless of their superiority in legislative 
status or social connections, endured hardship in locating the whereabouts and assets of 
debtors. Yet, this study noticed that courts and the two PCAs espoused different approaches to 
acquire wanted information, which contributed to striking contrasts in focuses and purview of 
data collection among these three agents. Considering that the materialisation of awards 
fundamentally rests on identification of debtor and enforceable assets, these three agents’ 
information collection methods would inevitably affect their execution capacities. 
 
6.4.1 Courts 
Legislatively speaking, courts enjoy three sources of information to explore a debtor’s latest 
status, namely, clues submitted by creditors, self-disclosure by debtors, and information 
gathered by a court-led inquiry.703 In a case of coercive execution, self-disclosure by 
defaulting debtors is a source presumably with the lowest credibility.704 Therein, courts might 
need to only count on the other two sources. Theoretically, creditors should be the most 
economic and reliable channel for courts to gather clues about debtors and their assets.705 In 
reality, very few applicants can meet this expectation, which then imposes the burden of 
information collection entirely on the overloaded courts.706 In the worst scenario, courts had 
to line up for the extensive blind inquiry administered by higher authorities on a periodic 
basis.707 Interviewee 10 and 14, both senior judges, mentioned that tracking defaulters and 
their assets was the very task consuming the majority of judges’ time and efforts. Interviewee 
10 further stated that, despite the six-month allowance for execution, no court could 
conclusively estimate the period needed for tracking assets or defaulters, let alone place a 
guarantee that such proceeding would certainly reap a satisfactory ending. Thus, the 
inefficiency of creditors in offering clues about debtors’ latest status was deemed to be 
swelling the execution-related costs and encumbering court-led execution.708 Additionally, 
courts could exert their statutory powers and deploy old-school methods to track down 
defaulting debtors or their assets. As an experienced execution judge, Interviewee 6 named 
two oft-used sources of information, namely, public registration records and history of 
                                                          
703 Article 241 and 242 of the 2012 CPL. 
704 Inferred from Article 9 of the SPC’s Provisions on Issues concerning Property Investigation during Enforcement in Civil 
Procedures, Fa Shi [2017] No.8, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=23148&lib=law 
705 Interviewee 1 (lawyer in Target 1). 
706 Interviewee 12(lawyer in Target 1). 
707 Interviewee 11(lawyer in Target 1). 
708 See Section 5.3. 
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debtors’ financial transactions and expenditure. His statements echo the answers given by 
judges in the questionnaire survey about institutions possibly involved in execution. 
Particularly, Interviewee 6 emphasised that, unlike the Public Security Bureau, courts merely 
had rights to enquire, but not to investigate. These remarks indicate that courts have to wrestle 
with various institutions709 for permits to access needed information.  
 
Till now, Chinese top authorities have implemented a series of measures to mitigate difficulty 
in information collection faced by judges and speed up court-led execution process. For 
instance, a nationwide asset-tracking e-platform was introduced in 2014, to facilitate court-
administered investigation into the financial records of defaulters.710  This system is reported 
to not only allow judges to track various types of properties (e.g. bank deposits and stocks) of 
defaulting debtors within an hour, but could also record performances of judges and 
institutions involved.711 In 2016, the SPC and other 43 authorities jointly released a memo 
about measures to punish defaulting debtors, with an aim to spur debtors into voluntary 
fulfilment of their obligations.712 Besides, the SPC released a normative document to compel 
record-holding institutions to proactively assist court-led property investigations in this 
July.713 On the surface, these initiatives carry certain deterrent effects against defaulting 
debtors. Nonetheless, this study would like to assume a cautious attitude towards the 
efficiency of such top-down initiatives on achieving their intended objectives, for three 
reasons. Initially, complex social conditions in different parts of China incline local 
authorities to discount the execution of regulations or initiatives released by their superiors, to 
balance intricate interests of miscellaneous stakeholders and maintain the social stability in 
line with the realities of their governing regions.714 Consequently, to what extent the foregoing 
initiatives could be evenly honoured in practice across the country remains a pending 
question. Secondly, courts’ inquiry into confidential information held by institutions, like 
banking details, would be considered intrusion into the sacred turf of the latter and, therefore, 
trigger territorial battles. Herein, the currently low authority of Chinese court715 raises concern 
over the institutional stakeholders’ willingness to give up their territorial privileges and 
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<http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2015/12/id/1773327.shtml> accessed 31 December 2016 
 155 
 
surrender to the inquiries of courts. Such concern is further buttressed by the news reporting 
the resistant behaviours of record-holding institutions.716 Hence, it is now still too early to 
announce that the foregoing initiatives could help courts easily crush the stonewalling efforts 
of passively resisting institutions, and always obtain wanted data or materialise execution 
measures (e.g. seizing a debtor’s assets). Furthermore, judges are extremely cautious about 
operating within their jurisdictions, and strive to avoid potential conflicts or accusations, so 
mirrored by the emphasis of the interviewed judges on legal training and complaints about 
legislative restrictions.717 It is unlikely that Chinese judges with a cautious attitude and high 
self-esteem would jeopardise their careers and commit infringements merely in exchange for 
scraps of information, no matter how valuable such information could be for successful 
execution. This is subtly proved by the opinion of Interviewee 23 (lawyer from Target 2) that 
PCAs seemingly have a stronger capacity to locate assets and debtors than courts. Meanwhile, 
the previous discussion revealed that, despite their heavy workloads, courts were embarrassed 
by their shoestring budgets.718 This indicates that digging up data, which is deliberately buried 
under paperwork or requests time-consuming analysis, still remains an unaffordable task for 
courts.  
 
Interestingly, Interviewee 6 remarked that courts only concerned the authenticity of 
information provided by applicants, but gave little stress on the legitimacy of source from 
which such information was derived. Unless there is substantial evidence proving otherwise, 
all information presented by applicants would be assumed as coming from lawful sources. His 
insights were endorsed by Interviewee 10, claiming that information provided by applicants 
should be merely categorised as “supportive clues” and, thereby, “fall beyond the scrutiny of 
China’s Evidence Law”. This study holds that these remarks are not intended to incite 
creditors to attain debtors’ information at any costs, but rather convey a judicial attitude that 
encourages creditors to play an active role in legitimately facilitating court-led execution. 
Interviewee 10 accentuated that the wrongdoings of applicants in information collection “are 
punishable under statutes or other provisional administrative regulations”.  
 
Noticeably, according to the SPC’s new provisions, courts are permitted to offer rewards for 
clues about debtors’ whereabouts and assets.719 Chinese courts have started implementing 
                                                          
716 For instance, see J Tan and XQ Zou, 'A Public Accumulation Funds Office in Dalian is Fined 300,000 RMB by Court for 
Resisting Court-led Execution by Requesting Judges to Queue for Its Service (in Chinese)' (The Paper, 16 August 2017) 
<http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1764567> accessed 10 September 2017 
717 Interviewee 3, 6, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20. 
718 See Section 6.3.1. 
719 See n704, Article 21. 
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these provisions.720 Yet, more cases are needed to establish the effectiveness of this 
information collection technique. Meanwhile, this study observes that such approach is 
unaffordable for creditors with limited resources, since rewards are only set up upon creditors’ 
requests and financial contributions.721  
 
In brief, Chinese courts enjoy increasingly advanced information-gathering approaches and 
resources to locate debtors and assets, but the efficiency of court-led investigations is 
susceptible to the cooperation of other institutions and the commitment of judges.  
 
6.4.2 Private collection agencies and lawyers 
As indicated by interviewees, lawyers and PCACs generally have very limited powers to 
inquiry into public records, which impel them to cling to non-official sources of 
information.722 Yet, the participant observation denoted that this disadvantageous situation 
apparently did not incapacitate them from dredging up deeply hidden stories or assets.  
 
Starting with practices of lawyers, interviewees723 vehemently complained that lawyers’ data 
collection capacity was paralysed by their restricted powers and complex red tape to access 
public records. Interviewee 11 explained that, in the absence of useful clues, lawyers would 
be denied access to certain public records, like property registration, which could only be 
checked with precise details of the related ownership. His complaints were sustained by 
Interviewee 23, who expounded that the Housing Department only allowed lawyers to access 
its records if “the precise address (embracing flat number) and owner’s name (strictly in 
consistent with that appeared on the ownership certificate) of the corresponding property” 
were presented. Those restrictions severely undermine lawyers’ ability and enthusiasm to 
conduct asset tracking singlehandedly, proved a shared reluctance among the interviewed 
lawyers to undertake executions cases.724 Interviewee 21 and 24 implied the feasibility for 
lawyers to obtain information from personal connections, which demanded a considerable 
amount of resources and time, and therefore was permitted only upon approval of clients. But, 
Interviewee 21 also insisted that, despite the difficulty in asset tracking, creditors should 
strictly comply with related regulations and reject illegal investigation. This seemingly denies 
                                                          
720 TZ Li, 'Court Offered a Reward of 230000 RMB for Locating Debtors (in Chinese)' (Beijing Youth Daily, 25 July 2017) 
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the possibility that lawyers would aggressively invade individual’s private life during their 
data collection. In contrast, Interviewee 11, 22 and 23 preferred resorting to courts for 
unreachable information. Thus, it could be summarised that lawyers are also inclined to rely 
heavily on public records in execution-related data collection, while extensive background 
investigation is affordable only upon the endorsement of clients. 
 
Comparatively speaking, PCACs encountered an even more awkward situation in data 
collection than lawyers, chiefly owing to their unlawful identity. Unlike lawyers, PCACs have 
no authority to directly inquire about public records under the institutional supervisions, 
which only leaves unofficial channels as their sole source of information.725 Pursuant to his 
experiences in debt collection, Interviewee 9 shared four oft-adopted approaches for data 
collection, including (1) using personal connections to poach financial records from record-
holding institutions, (2) probing for clues amid the debtor’s relatives and friends, (3) tracking 
phone records through local telecommunication service providers, and (4) obtaining tips from 
the creditor. Apparently, slips of the tongue, which are produced by the relatives or associates 
of debtors, ostensibly stand as PCACs’ most favourite source for exhuming clandestine 
secrets or clues. For instance, Interviewee 9 verified his client’s financial status and credibility 
in a money-lending case, upon information derived from a conversation with his clients’ 
neighbour. Meanwhile, the participation observation revealed that strong guanxi-based bonds 
with local communities furnish influential PCACs with remarkable information collection 
ability on their turfs. This study witnessed that, relying on its local contacts and diverse 
sources of information, the observed agency managed to collect a multitude of information 
about a defaulter, who had been successfully fabricating his disappearance for five years, 
within two days.726 Those information ranged from pictures and various records to comments 
of people around the target individual, in both electronic and paper forms. The agency’s 
bumper harvest of data validated that well-connected agencies could sneakily access 
individuals’ social life without alerting the concerned stakeholders. Hence, it can be 
announced that the data-gathering activities of PCACs seemingly escape troublesome 
formalities and generate rich, customised answers to specific prying questions, which could 
better accommodate their goals of execution. Nonetheless, PCACs’ extensive investigation 
might bring about legal disputes, particularly in terms of privacy and business secrets. It 
seems that the observed agency would enlist all people around a suspicious target in its 
preliminary dragnet search, until fewer strong-linked objects were sifted out. This study 
                                                          
725 Based on the outcomes of the participant observation. 
726 The case is mentioned in Section 6.3.2. 
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regrettably failed to unveil the channel for the observed agency to obtain recent photos and ID 
documents of its targets. Accordingly, no evidence was established to discredit the legitimacy 
of these private information, let alone accuse this agency for invading others’ privacy. Apart 
from the diversity of data collected and sources of information, this agency also presented a 
strong performance in data analysis. In the previous case about a debtor having been 
disappearing for almost five years, the agency discovered plausible leads about the debtor’s 
secret mistress and hideout from studying a few group photos and history of phone 
communications. The whole deduction process was actually initiated by a conjecture of its 
employees that the debtor might have special relationships with a seemingly unrelated lady in 
a group photo. Although being beneficial for private investigations, such unsubstantiated 
guesswork should be prohibited in the fact-based inquiries by court or lawyers.727      
 
In short, courts are generally old-school players with increasingly high-tech approaches for 
information collection and a keen sense of trouble avoidance, while PCACs are apparently 
willing to take audacious or aggressive attempts to attain wanted data, even at the costs of 
minor infringements of legal or moral principles. Comparatively, courts present better 
performance in obtaining public records of individuals’ financial status, whereas PCACs’ 
superficially reign supreme in exploring personal secrets or plausible clues from isolated 
incidences or fragmentary evidence. For lawyers, they could either enjoy the advancement of 
courts’ information gathering resources, or conduct non-official investigations to reap 
execution-related information, but with little likelihood of breaking the law. This study 
believes that PCACs’ data collection practice, which relies chiefly on grassroots support, 
could offer useful references for courts when seeking execution against locally well-resourced 
defaulters. 
 
6.5 Involvement of Creditors 
The participant observation found that the studied PCAC constructed its business reputation 
upon positive feedback from its previous clients, which suggests the significance of creditors’ 
experience for moulding public perceptions of a particular collection agent. This claim is 
further supported by the enduring scepticism towards Chinese courts’ execution 
competence.728 Comparatively speaking, lawyers and PCACs both offer customer-tailored 
services and, thereby, permit the extensive participation of creditors in their collection 
                                                          
727 Article 63 of the 2012 CPL lists seven legally acceptable fact-based evidence, and guesswork is not included.  
728 See Section 2.1. 
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operations, whereas courts apparently treat applicants for compulsory execution with a totally 
opposite attitude that they are seemingly inclined to isolate these applicants from their 
operations, so inferred from the comments of interviewees.729 The below section successively 
examines the involvement of creditors in these three agents’ operations, to identify 
problematic issues embedded therein. 
 
6.5.1 Courts 
The observations of this study and remarks of the interviewed lawyers730 concurred that courts 
were inclined to work on their own terms, and generally reluctant to actively involve or 
constantly notify applicants about their progress. The foregoing data also indicated that no 
judges could be easily accessed, even with a confirmed appointment. Interviewee 11 
elaborated that heavy workload, difficulty in execution and other possible factors (e.g. 
personal interests) jointly made judges unable to place steadfast attention solely on the 
progression of a single case. His opinions were strongly supported by Interviewee 12, 13, 22 
and 23. He731 also noticed the complaints amongst the studied parties about the unfriendly 
manner of judges in ELDRs. Moreover, the 2015 Work Report of the SPC acknowledged that 
the manner of some judges in dealing with applicants was problematic.732 Reviewing the 
foregoing statements, this study proposes that a sense of superiority held by judges could be a 
crucial reason motivating them to keep deliberate distance from applicants to maintain their 
authority. Such practice impedes applicants from gaining timely updates on their execution 
cases, which might constitute an element that induce distraught applicants to take backdoor 
channels to learn about information relevant to their concerns.733 Moreover, creditors are 
given no chance to participate in the judiciary decision-making process under the 2012 
CPL.734 Superficially, the foregoing operation style appears aloof, and possibly opens the door 
to the rampancy of guanxi-grounded bribery or interference. Meanwhile, this isolated 
workstyle could easily make creditors question the efficiency of non-transparent court-led 
operations, which explains why creditors were found inclined to put the blame for 
unsuccessful execution on courts.735 However, speaking from the previous serving 
experiences in China’s Public Security system, such applicant-excluded operation possesses 
                                                          
729 Interviewee 8, 11, 12, 13, 22 and 23. 
730 Interviewee 11, 12, 13, 22 and 23. 
731 He (n7) 269. 
732 Cited in n56. 
733 Inferred from the experiences of Interviewee 8 as a creditor. 
734 Part III. 
735 Reflected by the collected data of this study and discoveries of He (n7, 273). 
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certain merits. In particular, it allows judges to save themselves from drowning in time-
consuming elucidations about trivial matters or justification for their movements to legally 
illiterate applicants. Besides, isolating applicants from court-led execution could protect field 
judges from being hijacked by whims of anxious creditors, thereby enabling judges to make 
plausible decisions at their discretion. Consequently, the reduction of applicants’ involvement 
can avert further deceleration of the long-drawn-out court processes.      
 
Viewing the foregoing conventional workstyle of courts, interviewees736 recommended 
applicants, who were unwilling to be left in the dark, to initiate and maintain constant contacts 
with judges to check on the progress of their cases. Nonetheless, they pointed out that 
pestering judges with trivial inquiries or lengthy leisure conversations fell outside the 
category of recommended actions. Concise and purpose-driven communication on a periodic 
basis (e.g. weekly) was named by Interviewee 8 as an efficient approach for creditors to 
refresh the busy judges’ attentions and speed the execution proceedings. This study upholds 
that periodic contacts with judges can also constitute evidence proving creditors’ continuous 
commitment to materialisation of their legitimate interests, which could be used to support 
their complaints against inactive judges. Meanwhile, courts have started working closer with 
lawyers and applicants, typically proved by the SPC’s efforts in updating its online 
services.737 Interviewee 22 and 23, two lawyers from Target 2, also observed such tendency in 
a case, where the court dynamically informed them about the progress of execution, emerging 
problems and the proposed solutions. Yet, other interviewees gave no mention of such 
practice, suggesting that it has not been widely adopted in the studied regions. Accordingly, 
this study concludes that creditors are still lack of means to timely track judges’ field 
operations. 
 
To sum up, court-led execution process generally reveals a creditor-excluded feature, which 
could enable judges to operate with less interference and delay, but could also upset creditors, 
and provoke complaints about lack of transparency in court-led operations and the 
commitment of judges. Spontaneous participation in a watchful manner could be initiated by 
creditors in court-led execution, but there is no chance for creditors to exert any decision-
making power.   
  
                                                          
736 Interviewee 8, 11, 12, 22 and 23. 
737 See Decision of the Supreme People's Court on Amending the Several Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on 
Issuing the Information on the List of Dishonest Judgment Debtors, Fa Shi [2017] No.7, available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=23163&lib=law 
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6.5.2 Private collection agencies and lawyers 
In contrast to courts, lawyers and PCACs were found keeping close contact with their clients 
throughout the execution process.738 The study also unveiled four benefits of such practice, 
namely, timely supplement of funds or resources, attainment of recognition and support from 
clients, protection of PCA’s interests, and word-of-mouth advertisement from satisfied 
clients.739 For instance, in the previous debtor-tracking case740, the observed agent needed to 
cross-examine fingerprints and handwritings to verify the identity of an individual suspected 
of being the right target. This agency managed to collect the foregoing items from its clients 
within less than an hour, while securing access to other background evidence upon further 
request. In other two cases741, this agency clinched the deals in rather difficult situations, 
thank to direct personal-level communication with clients and the interpersonal skills of its 
staff. Particularly, in the case about a couple’s disputes,742 this agency actually discussed 
operation strategies with its client on the spot, and stage-managed the performance of the 
latter throughout the whole negotiation process. Nevertheless, this study noticed that such 
direct and frequent client-agency communication was effectuated upon three conditions: 
limited caseload, sufficient time budget, and mutual trust. Moreover, Interviewee 9 and 29 
both implied the importance of client involvement to reinforcement of their business 
reputation and influence. The observed PCAC also attributed its reputation to positive 
feedback from its former customers. Thus, it is acknowledged that active involvement of 
creditors can help PCACs build their business images and broaden their social connection. 
Yet, the presence of creditors cannot guarantee the legitimacy of PCACs’ operations, since 
creditors have no chance to engage in the decision-making process of PCACs, so learned from 
the participant observation. This justifies why, even though welcoming creditors to oversee 
and participate in their operations, PCACs were still considered untrustworthy agents by the 
interviewed creditors743 and lawyers.744    
 
Compared with other two agents, this study received no comments from the interviewed 
creditors about lawyers’ execution performance.745 However, through interpreting the 
comments and background information of the interviewed lawyers, this study found that, 
                                                          
738 Revealed by the participant observation. 
739 ibid. 
740 Mentioned in 6.3.2. 
741 One case was about settling disputes between a couple, and another about distribution of legacy among three siblings.    
742 See n741. 
743 Interviewee 8 and 25. 
744 Interviewee 1, 3, 5, 11, 21, 26, 27 and 28. 
745 Interviewee 8 and 25. 
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despite their hesitation to undertake execution cases, these lawyers’ caseloads and career 
achievements seemingly verified customer satisfaction of their services. The experiences of 
five interviewees746 concurred that lawyers would keep their customers closely updated about 
their cases, but just on a need-to-know basis. Interviewee 24 explained, upon his legal practice 
in Target 1, that he would manifestly inform his clients about the likelihood of execution and 
potential problems, before taking on the cases. His practices were in line with those of 
Interviewee 13, who would recommend clients to prevent further losses by relinquishing 
execution attempts that would anticipatorily arrive at a fruitless end. Nonetheless, Interviewee 
24 also admitted that he would withhold certain case-related information from clients, but 
only to serve the purpose of reducing confusion and avoiding unnecessary delays. Giving the 
generally insufficient legal background of Chinese clients and harsh execution environment, 
participation of creditors upon a need-to-be basis appears to be a desirable option for lawyers 
to promote the execution processes on their schedules. It should be highlighted that, compared 
with courts and PCACs, lawyers would let creditors to take a leading role in finalising 
strategies or even the fate of their execution cases.747 Thus, creditors could enjoy the highest 
level of decision-making power when working with lawyers in execution cases.    
 
In short, courts are found operating in a conventional and applicant-isolated manner, while 
PCACs and lawyers tend to permit the involvement of creditors in their operations. However, 
creditors could exercise little control over court-administered and PCAC-led execution, but 
could play a decisive role in lawyer-led execution. This determines that, by deploying 
different agents to seek the EAA, creditors would taste varied levels of information 
accessibility and decision-making authority. Generally, interviewees held strong negative 
opinions about execution capacities of courts and PCACs, but raised no challenge to lawyers’ 
performance. Yet, the scepticism towards the credibility of PCACs did not preclude creditors 
from employing PCACs as collection agents, considering the caseload of the observed PCAC. 
This indicates, apart from high performance operations, productive client-agent 
communication could be a crucial reason help an agent win creditors’ trust.  
 
6.6 Behavioural Codes 
The participant observation indicated that, due to differences in institutional status and 
ultimate operating objectives, courts and two PCAs treasured divergent behavioural codes in 
                                                          
746 Interviewee 13, 21, 22, 23 and 24. 
747 Inferred from the experiences of Interviewee 1 and 24. 
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their operations. Such finding then makes the behavioural codes of collection agents a 
worthwhile topic to pursue, so as to explore their possible impact on collection approaches of 
different agents.     
 
6.6.1 Courts 
Apparently, Chinese courts act on two key principles. The primary protocol of courts is 
operating strictly within the confines of the law by all appearances, so spelt by the 2012 CPL 
and normative documents of the SPC. This resonates with their institutional status as a crucial 
part of China’s law enforcement force. Learning from the collected data, interviewees were 
more concerned about low efficiency of courts, rather than corruption or other improper 
behaviours of judges.748 This loosely proves that, notwithstanding its shortcomings, court-led 
execution is considered carrying a recognised guarantee of legitimacy among Chinese 
practitioners. Yet, this study also acknowledges that the abovementioned protocol could not 
totally prevent judges from engaging in dishonest actions, particularly those for satisfying the 
requests of guanxi-bonded parties.749 Secondly, the comments of interviewees indicated that 
courts skewed heavily towards conservative approaches to maintain social stability and avoid 
conflicts.750 For instance, when performing their duties, judges would take precautions to 
circumvent disputes or confrontation that might foment unrest or large-scale public 
dissatisfaction within their jurisdictions.751 This opens the possibility that court-led execution 
could be influenced or hijacked by public opinion.752 Meanwhile, mediation is popularly 
utilised in court-led operations to promote execution by generating outcomes that are 
reportedly affordable for both parties.753 Furthermore, judges are predisposed towards 
calculated evasion of extreme or contestable execution approaches, like taking an 
uncompromising stance on possession of debtor’s ‘only asset’.754 Judges’ hesitancy about 
imposing punishment on recalcitrant debtors is also living evidence of their conservative 
attitude.755 This study deems that the second judicial protocol follows China’s legal traditions 
that prioritise the maintenance of social stability over other concerns and stress the necessity 
to accommodate public opinion, while it also honours China’s De-based notions that promote 
                                                          
748 Interviewee 1, 8, 12, 13, 22, 23, 25, 27 and 29. 
749 Based on discussions in Section 5.5.1. 
750 Interviewee 6, 19, 22 and 23. 
751 Discussed in Section 5.4.1. 
752 Discussed in Section 5.5.1. 
753Z Zhang, 'Effects of Mediation During the Compulsory Execution on Promoting Judicial Harmony (in Chinese)' 
(Chinacourt.org, 21 July 2011) <http://pjzy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=457> accessed 30 December 2016; He (n7) 
419-456. 
754 Interviewee 6, 19, 22 and 23. 
755 Interviewee 27. 
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utilisation of moderate approaches to handle issues.756  
 
Hence, the foregoing two behavioural codes persuade courts to exert their mandatory powers 
within legally recognised borders, while suppressing their competence to flexibly respond to 
debtors’ multifarious strategies for execution avoidance. These codes also make courts 
vulnerable to public opinion imparted by social media and, accordingly, leave leeway for the 
involved parties to sway courts’ decisions by stirring up public uproar. Fundamentally, the 
previous findings loosely corroborate the impact of China’s cultural ideologies on court-led 
execution. 
 
6.6.2 Private collection agencies and lawyers 
PCACs are conventionally considered sticking to the interest-first principle, merely 
considering the amount of their service fees (30%-50% of the collectable amount).757 
Contrary to this common belief, this study found that the observed agency and the firm of 
Interviewee 29 appreciated three key doctrines. Staying inconspicuously and trouble-free 
stands as the primary credo for PCACs. During the participant observation, the author was 
constantly reminded to ensure the anonymity of the agency and the confidentiality of the 
collected data, so as to prevent dragging the agency into unwanted scrutiny by local 
authorities. Interviewee 9 and 29, who revealed their confidences in using local connections to 
accomplish their collection tasks, shared a strong disposition to avoid competition or 
confrontation with local authorities in their operations. The participation observation was also 
permitted by the observed agency for the purpose of assisting this agency in assessing the 
legitimacy of its operations and pinpointing potential problems. Additionally, through 
examining the documents and field operations of this agency, this study detected its attempts 
to, at least on the surface, legitimise its operations to a maximum. This endorses the remarks 
of Interviewee 9, claiming that he had quit from his previous violent practices, and staying 
trouble-free was his current top priority. Though Interviewee 9 gave no further explanation of 
his previous deeds, this study did learn from anecdotes given by his fellows that Interviewee 9 
used to apply violent approaches to accomplish his tasks and strengthen his local influence. 
But, this study did not observe Interviewee 9 or the studied agency engaging in illegal 
activities. Hence, this credo, which inherits the spirit of the De-related notions, could be the 
very reason motivating PCACs to seek proper causes to justify their operations in the absence 
                                                          
756 See Section 3.1.3 and 3.3.1. 
757 See Section 6.2.2. 
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of legal recognition. Secondly, ‘never rest until the work is done’ seems to be a credo 
followed by Interviewee 9 and 29 in their debt collection practice. To achieve pre-defined 
goals, Interviewee 9 would exhort his crews to deploy various strategies and take proactive 
actions at their discretions to maximise the chances of successful execution. Well-funded by 
creditors, the observed agency was also persistent in accomplishing its tasks. In the 
abovementioned debtor-tracking case758, the observed agency organised a 17-day off-turf 
operation for debt collection. During this process, its crews revealed remarkable patience in 
collecting data and hunting down the debtor. Moreover, although its operation had been 
deadlocked for ten days during the period, its crews managed to close the case, allegedly, 
through persistently imposing pressure on the debtor. Yet, such persistence of the PCACs is 
unaffordable for financially restricted courts or schedule-bound lawyers. Thirdly, PCACs are 
favourably disposed towards approaching targets with customised strategies, which mirrors 
the core proposition of the Biantong principle.759 Specifically, the observed agency would 
flexibly exhaust the available resources to hit out at the Achilles’ heel of debtors and persuade 
the latter to surrender. In a case of a somewhat immoral nature760, the observed agency 
detected that one of the involved parties was eager to solve the case without causing public 
attention, while the other essentially sought financial compensations. Having its fingers on the 
pulse of the parties’ attitudes, the agency used strategies to talk the conflicting parties into 
reaching a mutual agreement on dispute settlement. Furthermore, the observed agency was 
also found tactfully deploying its resources to preserve and further broaden its guanxi 
network, so as to promote its business and enhance its local influence. During the second-
round fieldwork of this study, China was undergoing its annual period for Gaokao761. The 
observe agency grasped the chance and offered free consulting services about university 
enrolment to its local contacts, whose families were Gaokao students. By using these 
approaches, the agency productively advertised its professional competence and strengthen its 
local guanxi-based network at a cheap cost. Hence, it can be tentatively concluded that, in 
their current unfavourable business environment, PCACs have achieved their survival by 
strategically utilising their resources and adjusting their operations to superficially 
accommodate the requirements of Chinese legislations. However, their operations are subject 
to heavy influence of customary protocols, which are essentially rooted in China’s cultural 
traditions, like reliance of guanxi.            
 
                                                          
758 Mentioned in 6.3.2. 
759 See n290. 
760 The first case mentioned in n741. 
761 This term refers to China’s National Examination for University Enrollment. 
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Lawyers adopt somehow a middle-ground approach in their practice. Specifically, the 
experiences of interviewees implied that lawyers would, on the one hand, vigilantly monitor 
their behaviours to avoid legal troubles, but they would reserve certain flexibility and act 
adaptably within the rule-bound borders, unlike what courts do.762 On the other hand, they are 
willing to take shortcuts and undertake affordable risks in exchange for hefty payments, but 
reject to cling on to prolonged pursuit of execution or use extreme measures for the realisation 
of short-term interests.763 These findings corroborate the popularity of the Biantong principle 
in China’s legal society.764 
 
In brief, courts assume a conservative stance in their operations, which prevents them from 
favouring aggressive execution actions and educate them to always be wary of negative public 
opinion. Comparatively, PCACs and lawyers appear to be adaptable agents willing to 
accomplish their missions at varied costs. Meanwhile, PCACs are, compared with other two 
agents, subject to heavier influence of China’s cultural ideologies in their operations. These 
findings indirectly establish the feasibility of using systematic legal education to offset the 
impact of negative tenets on modern Chinese society.  
     
6.7 Potential Perils 
The collected data enlightened this study on potential risks, which might emerge at any stage 
of an agent-led execution process. Because these risks are varied in accordance with the 
identity and field performance of the hired agent, the following section successively examines 
them in the light of the outcomes of interviews and the participant observation. 
 
6.7.1 Courts 
Interpreting from collected data, this study realised that reliance on courts-led execution does 
not utterly exempt creditors from being struck by three types of potential perils.  
  
i. Losses caused by slow execution 
Speaking from his lawyering experiences in Target 2, Interviewee 23 argued that courts’ slow 
execution operations could firstly grant defaulters general leeway to organise the concealment 
                                                          
762 Inferred from the comments of Interviewee 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23 and 27. 
763 ibid. 
764 See n290. 
 167 
 
of assets or conduct other anti-execution actions. He maintained that, in this information era, 
internet banking literally allowed debtors to hide their assets through complicated transactions 
within minutes. Additionally, it would take merely few hours for a prepared debtor to vanish 
without trace, jointly sponsored by China’s vast territory and well-developed transportation 
network. Therefore, the longer a court-led execution process lasts, the less likely a creditor 
could win a victory over the defaulting debtor. Meanwhile, a court’s slow movement might 
also make a creditor lose his/her legitimate rights to other creditors, who file their claims 
against the same debtor with other competent courts and obtain quicker execution. 
Interviewee 22 and 23 tasted such bitter failure in their previous practice.765 Hence, slow 
court-led proceeding could be a killer to successful execution. 
 
ii. Guanxi-based interference from other stakeholders 
Operating under China’s long-standing guanxi-centred culture, courts are subject to the 
interference from stakeholders who live in the same local communities, typically like senior 
or local administrative offices.766 Such interference normally appears without perceptible 
presence, and could exert considerable impact on the progression of execution, so implied by 
the judicial experiences of Interviewee 28. In view of China’s ongoing anti-corruption 
campaign and interviewee’s comments767, it is unlikely that courts could bear the risk at being 
accused of misconduct, and deny the EAA without proper justification, but purely on 
consideration of guanxi. Lawyering experiences of Interviewee 22 and 23 suggested that such 
interference could slow down the progression of execution and, at best, result to a court-
mediated compromise on execution results. The available countermeasure for such 
interference is filing complaints to the related court or higher authorities. However, for those 
well-connected creditors, a better option might be using their guanxi connections to counter 
such interference.768          
 
iii. Abuse of judicial power 
Four interviewees acknowledged the possible abusive utilisation of statutory powers by 
judges.769 The typical phenomena of this issue include sloppy performance, neglect of 
mandatory duties and misapplication of the law, so mirrored by the lawyering experiences of 
12, 22 and 23. In a case shared by Interviewee 22 and 23, judges used improper methods to 
                                                          
765 The case is mentioned in Section 5.4.1(ii). 
766 Reflected by the remakes of Interviewee 8, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 and 28. 
767 See Section 5.6.2. 
768 Inferred from the experiences of Interviewee 21 and 26, who claimed no experiences of such interference, possibly due to 
their social positions and connections. 
769 Interviewee 1, 10, 12 and 13. 
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force stakeholders to pay for the liabilities of a debtor. Interviewee 12 and 21 (lawyers 
respectively from Target 1 and 2) mentioned that it was highly unlikely that a judge would 
dare to raise blunt demands for bribery. However, Interviewee 22 and 23 defined a business 
dinner as an acceptable practice to treat judges. Interviewee 12 and 13 (lawyers from Target 1) 
held that the integrity of China’s judiciary would be further improved in the coming future, 
which would accordingly release creditors from a worry about pleasing judges with proper 
gifts. 
 
In short, due to the institutional characteristics of Chinese courts, court-led execution might be 
under threat from prolonged process, guanxi-based third-party interference and misuse of 
judicial powers. But, these perils are found being gradually eroded by China’s legal 
improvements and anti-corruption campaigns.  
 
6.7.2 Private collection agencies and lawyers 
The participant observation, together with the experiences of interviewee 9 and 29, suggested 
that PCACs collection operations might spawn the following four problems.  
 
i. Resistance from defiant debtors 
The participant observation and the experience-based comments of Interviewee 9 revealed 
that, in the absence of statutory authority, PCACs envisage a disadvantageous situation when 
confronting defiant debtors, which places the safety and well-being of their employees at 
excessive risk. During the participant observation, this study witnessed the injuries on the 
employees of the observed agency, which were allegedly caused by their physical 
confrontation with defiant debtors. In a recent case, the son of a defaulter injured three PCAs 
and killed one during a confrontation, for these collectors illegally imprisoned the debtor and 
utilised humiliating measures to harass the latter.770 The above events raise concern over 
PCA’s unsupervised operations and the protection of individual collectors’ personal safety.    
 
ii. Conflicts with other fellow competitors or local influential groups 
The discoveries of the participant observation spotlighted that, because debt collection is a 
well-rewarded business, PCACs have been facing fierce rivalry from each other. Meanwhile, 
this study also found that, partially owing to their aggressive approaches, PCACs could easily 
                                                          
770 Y Chen, 'Verdict in the Second Trial of The Yu Huan Case (in Chinese)' (qq.news, 23 June 
2017) <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2017-06-23/doc-ifyhmtek7670699.shtml>accessed 28 June 2017 
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be trapped in conflicts with local influential groups. In a case involving rescheduling of an 
overdue debt, the observed agency encountered interference from another collector, who 
requested the former to accept a rescheduled repayment time plus discounted interests 
(accounting for almost 25% of the original collectable interests). In another case, an employee 
of the observed agency was detained by a local influential group, when engaging in an off-turf 
execution case. Allegedly, such detention, which was unlawful in nature, was caused by 
disagreements of the local influential groups on the execution details. The observed agency 
claimed that it had experienced similar or even worst situations in its previous practice. 
Contrastingly, Interviewee 29 displayed little worry about competition from other rivals or 
conflicts with other influential groups, which might be attributed to his strong local 
connections and influence on his home turf.     
   
iii. Supervision from authorities 
Interviewee 9 and 29 expressed a concern that operations of PCACs, which have not been 
legally recognised, might be subject to unexpected inspection by local law enforcement 
authorities. This concern convinced Interviewee 9 and 29 to keenly observe the principle of 
staying trouble-free in their operations. Yet, this study did not collect any first-hand evidence 
to verify the impact of such inspections on the operations of the PCAC.      
  
iv. Possibility of dishonest operations  
The interviewed creditors771 and legal practitioners772 frequently questioned the integrity and 
diligence of PCAC, partially due to the complicated composition of their personnel and 
absence of effective third-party supervision. Inferred from interviewees’ remark773, 
embezzlement by PCACs stands as creditors’ worst nightmare. Speaking from an insider’s 
angle, Interviewee 9 and 29 confirmed that some dishonest agencies would feather their nest 
with clients’ funds or receivables. Chen also spotlighted the possibility of such incidents when 
studying the current status of the private debt collection business.774 The occurrence of such 
incidents seriously besmirches the credibility of PCACs, and keeps creditors anxious about 
the safety of their awarded interests.775 Moreover, compared with legally competent judges 
and lawyers, PCACs’ employees are more likely to engage in not-so-lawful or illegal 
operations to reap the desired rewards or interests776. In a case shared by Interviewee 8, the 
                                                          
771 Interviewee 8 and 25. 
772 Interviewee 1, 3, 5, 11, 21, 26, 27 and 28. 
773 Interviewee 9, 25, 27 and 29. 
774 XL Chen (n649). 
775 ibid. 
776 Discussed in Section 6.3.2. 
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hired agency disappeared, after being accused of illegally restricting the personal freedom of 
the debtor. The agency’s misconduct costed the creditor all his receivables and extra 
compensation for the debtor’s suffering. Therefore, employment of PCACs for the EAA 
would be a high-risk tactic, which could compel imprudent creditors to bear unnecessary 
financial and legal losses.   
  
Comparatively, lawyers envisage less interference from superior authorities or their fellows, 
whereas they might be the one suffering most from guanxi-sponsored intervention.777 
Interviewee 27 asserted that the width of a lawyer’s guanxi network determined his/her 
success in smaller cities. His claim was subtly endorsed by the achievements of Interviewee 
21 and 26, who enjoy well-connected guanxi network, thanks to their prominence in the legal 
field. Chewing over interviewees’ experiences, Chinese lawyers have to swim in labyrinthine 
guanxi networks and carefully balance interests of all stakeholders within the confines of the 
law and morality in their practice.778 Compared with courts, lawyers, who have no statutory 
powers, are more susceptible to the influence of local guanxi network. Accordingly, there is a 
possibility that lawyers’ execution performance might be compromised by guanxi-sponsored 
interference from local influential groups. Besides, considering the shared reluctance amongst 
lawyers to assume execution cases, creditors might risk receiving costly but less devoted 
execution services when entrusting lawyers with tight schedules to execute arbitral awards.779 
As to the concern over the dishonest conduct of lawyers, this study believes that, because 
legal service is a highly competitive industry in China, there is a remote chance that a lawyer 
would gamble with his career and reputation for limited immediate interests. Thus, guanxi-
based interference and sloppy performances of lawyers are two key perils associated with 
lawyer-involved execution cases.    
 
In brief, recruitment of different agents could force creditors to assume diverse potential risks. 
Essentially, all three concerned agents could fall prey to the impact of guanxi-grounded 
interference, but at varied levels. Specifically, court-led execution would envisage problems 
fuelled by institutional features of courts, like abusive usage of judicial power. Deployment of 
PCACs seems to be the most risky option for creditors, considering the four kinds of perils 
associated therewith. Superficially, lawyer involvement is a choice begetting fewer risks to 
creditors in the EAA.    
                                                          
777 Interviewee 1, 21, 26 and 27. 
778 Interviewee 1, 12, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 and 27. 
779 Interviewee 1, 11, 12, 13, 21, 24 and 27. 
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Conclusion  
The previous analysis comparatively depicts the execution operations of China’s judiciary and 
two private collection forces, which underscores the strengths and weaknesses of these agents, 
thereby bringing about a new understanding of China’s execution environment for arbitral 
awards. As analysed above, execution operations of courts, PCACs and lawyers demonstrate 
perceptible discrepancies in legal status, case admission, operating framework, methods of 
information collection, involvement of creditors, behavioural codes, and potential perils. 
These discrepancies fundamentally determine the operations and capacity of different 
collection agencies, while explaining why Chinese practitioners harboured dissimilar 
perceptions of these three collection agents. Hence, the foregoing comparative analysis of 
these collection agents’ performances enriches the picture of China’s current execution 
environment through spotlighting their individualised strengths and weaknesses, which might 
substantially finalise the fate of an execution case. Meanwhile, the foregoing analysis inspires 
this study to raise recommendations for improving China’s court-led execution operations and 
supervisory framework over PCAs in the following chapter.  
 
In sketchy terms, courts are legislatively nominated collection agents for the EAA, who are 
proud of their statutory authority and resources to pursue execution against defaulting debtors. 
Accordingly, the performance of courts generally appears to be formulaic and disciplined, but 
frequently rigid and sluggish. Due to their freelance status and lack of statutory authority, 
PCACs and lawyers seemingly operate in a more adjustable and efficient, but expensive, 
manner. In terms of case admission, courts are more accessible for award creditors than the 
other two cherry-pickers. Compared with the rule-bound judicial force, PCACs and lawyers 
are essentially disparate in their malleable operating styles, but consistent in an interest-
pursuing nature. Additionally, Chinese courts, who ostensibly play by the book, are 
comparatively ideal candidates to acquire public records from various institutions, thanks to 
their increasingly advanced approaches for tracking assets or debtors nationwide. Motivated 
by financial incentives and funded by relatively generous resources, PCACs are seemingly 
more ingenious at digging debtors’ personal details or hidden assets. Lawyers apparently 
possess the merits of the foregoing two groups in information collection. As to involvement of 
creditor in execution, lawyers are the collection force furnishing creditors with adequate 
information accessibility and greater leeway to exercise their decision-making power during 
the execution process, compared with the other two agents. Furthermore, the operations of all 
these agents bear testimony of the lingering influence of China’s cultural ideologies. 
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Accordingly, courts are found acting in a conservative and law-abiding manner when carrying 
out their legislative duties, whereas lawyers appear to be well-behaved agents with ready 
adaptability to case-specific demands. In contrast, PCACs are more aggressive collectors 
prepared to accomplishing their mission even at risks of breaking legal or moral rules, but 
adhering to Chinese customary rules. Besides, deployment of different agents could bring 
about diverse perils to the EAA. Typically, all these three agents would suffer from guanxi-
based interference, though at varied degrees. Other aforementioned risks are fundamentally 
attributed to legal status and characteristic operation style of individual agents, like the 
abusive usage of judicial power and rivalry between PCACs. Amongst all these agents, 
lawyers seemingly encounter fewer profession-specific troubles during their operations.  
 
Considering all the aforementioned discrepancies in the caseloads and operations of the three 
collection agents, superiority of a particular collection agent over others should not be 
superficially established on statistical reports or lopsided assessments. Also, it would be 
censorious to castigate an agent for its deficiencies, without simultaneously addressing its 
merits. Rather, it is rational to conclude that each of the abovementioned agents is competent 
to make considerable contributions to the success of execution, if being tactically deployed. 
Given the affordability and complexity of particular cases, joint deployment of these agents 
could significantly enhance the odds of productive execution. Furthermore, PCACs’ practices 
in personnel management, client-agent communication and utilisation of grassroots support 
could offer courts useful references in their future reforms. Meanwhile, the problems 
associated with PCACs’ operations justified the urgent requirement to regulate this collection 
force. The foregoing findings jointly suggest that the establishment of a multi-agent collection 
system, which allows both judicial and private collection forces to fully utilise their strengths 
under proper supervision, could be a solution to overcome China’s current unsatisfactory 
execution status and better facilitate the EAA. Besides, the previous analysis conveys a 
possibility to culturally transform Chinese society through conducting effective legal 
education. 
 
Upon the analyses in Chapter V and VI about the current execution environment in China’s 
ELDRs, the next chapter commences to unearth factors imperceptibly challenging the EAA in 
the concerned regions.  
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Chapter 7. Elements Responsible for the Lingering Existence of Obstacles 
to Execution  
As presented in the previous two chapters, the outcomes of this study depicted that the overall 
situation of execution in China’s economically less-developed regions (ELDRs) seemed to 
have attained a palpable improvement, compared with those depicted by the previous studies. 
Meanwhile, Chinese authorities have been constantly introducing execution-friendly 
regulations and measures, typically exemplified by the recent normative instructions of the 
SPC.780 However, this study spotlighted many potential obstacles to the execution of arbitral 
awards (EAA) in the concerned regions. Accordingly, the prospect of the China-grounded 
EAA, which generally involves large-sized monetary compensations, still remains debatable. 
Given China’ persistent inputs in legal reforms and legislative advancement, there then comes 
a question about what has been sustaining the persistent existence of those identified obstacles 
to execution. Answers to this question could raise awareness of demographically and culture-
conditioned issues, which have haunted China’s execution mechanism, amid domestic and 
overseas practitioners. Specifically, the following discussion aims to expose factors fuelling 
the problems in the real-life EAA in China’s ELDRs, particularly elaborating on the 
imperceptible impact of Chinese ideologies thereon. The outcomes of this chapter will then 
facilitate the production of propositions for future reforms of China’s execution framework in 
the next chapter.  
 
Upon contextualising the previous findings of this study in the literature and China’s socio-
cultural realties, four items, including China’s current social conditions, legal framework, 
institutional development of collection agents and the impact of cultural beliefs, are 
pinpointed as the deeply-embedded factors answerable for difficulty in execution. In the 
following, this chapter successively discusses these factors, to solicit academic attention to the 
underlying effects of these factors on China’s execution environment and spotlight the 
challenges to introduce corresponding execution-friendly changes.  
7.1 Imbalance between Developments of China’s Economy and Legal Mechanism 
Judging from a lawyer’s perspective, Interviewee 13 claimed that “The utmost problem faced 
by China now is that its soft infrastructures, like administrative and legal frameworks, cannot 
                                                          
780 See the 2017 Report, cited in n178. 
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keep up with its fast economic grows.”    
 
Fundamentally, the gap between China’s economic development and construction of legal 
infrastructure is attributed to two reasons. Initially, China adopted an economy-centred 
development stratagem, aiming to safeguard the country’s independence and cement its 
international influence through enhancing its economic strength.781 Thanks to the Chinese 
governments’ persistent investments in promoting economic transformation and commercial 
prosperity over the past several decades, “China’s GDP reached 67.7 trillion yuan in 2015, 
with an increase of 6.9%”.782 Nowadays, whenever talking about China, a country with 
rapidly growing economy and large population might be the first expression jumping into 
people’s mind.783 Stunned by the remarkable economic achievements that China has reaped 
over the past 68 years, people frequently overlook one hard truth that this country virtually 
commenced to reconstruct its societal and legal frameworks from scratch less than 40 years 
ago, due to the chaos of war and the Cultural Revolution.784 Considering the complexity of 
China’s social conditions and developmental surroundings, it is somehow impossible for the 
country to simultaneously reap significant accomplishments in economic growth and the 
construction of its legal framework over such a short period of time.785 This claim is 
corroborated by the perception of interviewees that China’s relatively immature legal 
framework has been suffering from many procedural and legislative loopholes.786 Secondly, 
China adopts a codified law system, which virtually precludes the country from swiftly 
modifying its legal framework to meet the requirements of economic development. Learning 
from official sources, it would normally take a period of at least five years for a new law to 
pass through China’s legislative procedures.787 Even worse, there is no fixed answer on how 
long the construction of supporting facilities for ensuring the implementation of a new law 
would take. Accordingly, it is no wonder that the contents of China’s statutes are seemingly 
always lagging behind the requirements raised by the business and legal communities. 
                                                          
781 KT Cao, 'Exploration and Development of China's 60-year Legal Construction (in Chinese)' (China Legal Science, 2009) 
<http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showNews.asp?id=29473> accessed 20 July 2017 
782 KQ Li, 'Report on the Work of the Government ' (Xinhua Net, 5 March 2016) 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-03/17/c_135198880.htm> accessed 13 May 2016   
783 World Bank, 'China's Economic Miracle' (BBC News, 24 October 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-
20069627> accessed 16 February 2017 
784 For detailed information of the Cultural Revolution, see T Phillips, 'The Cultural Revolution: all you need to know about 
China's political convulsion' (The Guardian, 11 May 2016) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-
revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion> accessed 13 May 2016 
785 H Yao, 'History of Developing Rule of Law by Communist Party of China and Reflections (in Chinese)' (cpcnews.cn, 3 
April 2015) <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0403/c40531-26797029-2.html> accessed 16 July 2017 
786 Discussed in Section 5.7. 
787 HZ Xia, 'Basic Legislative Procedure of the People's Republic of China' (Website of the National People's Congress of the 
People's Republic of China, 19 February 2013) <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/sjb/2013-02/19/content_1755104.htm> accessed 
16 May 2016 
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China’s 1995 Arbitration Law, which was criticised for its outdated provisions affecting the 
R&E of arbitral awards, could be a good example supporting this statement.788 Although the 
SPC strives to fill in the legal loopholes by promptly issuing directives or instructions, the 
efficiency of China’s whole legal infrastructure is still undermined by its flawed legislative 
framework and absence of supporting systems, so believed by the interviewees.789   
 
Based on the previous discussions, this study realises that China’s rapid economic growth is 
not matched by a concurrent expansion in its legal infrastructure, which consequently casts a 
gloom over the EAA and other legal instruments. Specifically, 8 interviewees790 spotlighted 
that China’s existing legal infrastructure was suffering from many weaknesses respectively in 
legislative and operational facets. Initially, three interviewed judges791 advocated that an 
independent statute with nationwide applicability should be introduced, to provide consistent 
judicial support for the EAA through promoting uniform execution practice and regulating the 
performances of all execution-concerned stakeholders. Remarks of Interviewee 10 also 
denoted that the existing legislations should be concurrently modified to accommodate the 
requirements of the EAA. Herein, the commitment of China’s SPC in refining China’s 
execution regime through publication of normative documents and guiding cases should be 
addressed for its contribution to improvement of China’s execution environment, so revealed 
in Chapter II and V. Nonetheless, this study upholds that the SPC’s efforts are substantially 
discounted by the relatively low statutory status of its publications. Secondly, complaints of 7 
interviewees792 implied that Chinese current legal infrastructure failed to operate productively, 
owing to the absence or insufficient performance of supporting facilities, particularly like a 
well-established asset-tracking platform and a conveniently accessible grievance regime for 
monitoring the execution behaviours of all stakeholders. In specific terms, judges are 
conventionally granted statutory authority for tracking debtors and their assets. However, a 
nationwide asset-tracking e-platform merely commenced its operation three years ago, and it 
is disputable that this immature system could vigorously facilitate judges’ execution 
operations. Even if this system does work productively, there is still no sound guarantee on 
the outcomes of court-led asset-tracking investigations, so exposed in Section 6.4.1 above. It 
is because such investigation requests access to records held by systems that are run by other 
institutions (e.g. the registration system of individual’s assets), which are administered locally 
                                                          
788 ZW Fei (n43). 
789 Discussed in Section 5.7. 
790 Interviewee 6, 10, 12, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 27. 
791 Interviewee 6, 10 and 19. 
792 Interviewee 1, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23 and 24. 
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and have not realised nationwide interconnection.793 Unless an overall improvement of all 
pertinent systems is achieved, the efficiency of court-led asset-tracking investigation would 
remain under a cloud. A similar situation happens to the implementation of regulations about 
restricting defaulting debtor’s luxury consumption. According to the Several Provisions of the 
Supreme People's Court on Restricting High Consumption of Judgment Debtors794, judges are 
entitled to disbar defaulters from enjoying luxury consumption or travelling. Yet, based on his 
field experiences as a senior execution judge, Interviewee 6 criticised that the current system 
for monitoring debtor’s consumption could not fulfil its mission, because it merely had access 
to debtors’ spending on transportation. Additionally, the development of a supervisory 
framework for monitoring Chinese citizens’ credits is at its immature stage. This gives 
defaulters generous leeway to continue leading a comfortable life, with little concerns of 
exposure. Noticeably, in 2016, the SPC and other 43 authorities took an initiative to compel 
defaulters voluntarily fulfil their obligations by inflicting various punishments.795 However, 
no nationwide platform is established under this initiative for judges to timely track and 
control debtors’ consumptions. Furthermore, China’s legislative framework spelt specific 
stipulations about how to supervise judges’ performance and punish badly behaved debtors. 
Nonetheless, lawyering experiences of Interviewee 22 and 23 reflected that, without the 
presence of a powerful grievance system to monitor judges’ field operations, these regulations 
would inevitably end up as idle talk. Besides, this study notices that there is no system 
available for judges or parties to raise complaints against other stakeholders in execution, like 
the media and record-holding institutions (e.g. banks). The absence of such a supervisory 
system over other stakeholders’ execution-related behaviours just explains why the media 
could be believed by interviewees796 as a conduit to influence judges’ execution operations. 
These findings resonate with those of Yu, proclaiming the importance of an enhanced 
supervisory mechanism to improvement of China’s execution status in civil cases.797 
 
In brief, China’s current unsatisfactory execution situation is partially caused by its 
insufficient legal infrastructure. There is little doubt that the absence of a well-structured legal 
mechanism could cripple China and stop its economic boom in the long run. Yet, it is possible 
to improve China’s legal infrastructure within a relatively short period, through updating the 
                                                          
793 No author, 'Records of Real Estate Property will Be Nationwide Interconnected by the End of This Year (in Chinese)' 
(China Daily, 7 April 2017) <http://caijing.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-04/07/content_28833588.htm> accessed 20 August 2017 
794 Fa Shi [2010] No.8, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8385&CGid= 
795 WJ Li (n581). 
796 Interviewee 12 and 23.  
797 JL Yu, 'Brief Discussion on Supervisory Mechanism for enforcement in Civil Cases (in Chinese)' (Website of Chuangchun 
Law Popularization Net, Unknown)<http://www.ccpf148.com/sjy/1181.htm> accessed 14 May 2017 
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existing legislations to form standardised execution proceeding and modifying the supportive 
systems to ensure the maximum implementation of the corresponding regulations. However, 
to increase inputs in improvement to the legal infrastructure means a shift of development 
focuses, which might affect China’s attempts to maintain its robust economic growth.    
 
7.2 Underdevelopment of Professional Collection Agents  
As presented previously798, underdevelopment of the private collection regime and the 
presence of a flawed judicial execution system jointly constitute a crucial reason responsible 
for the unfavourable execution status in China. Theoretically, creditors could entrust courts, 
lawyers and private collection agencies (PCACs), to enforce judicially approved arbitral 
awards as claimable debts on their behalf. Chapter VI expounds that these three collection 
agents suffer from dissimilar institutional shortcomings, which undermines the pertinent 
agencies’ efficiency to varied extents. In concise terms, courts stand as the only officially 
recognised force with statutory authority for coercive execution, but are crippled by their 
insufficient funds, rigid work procedure and flawed supervisory framework for regulating 
field operations of individual judges.799 Ten interviewed lawyers and 2 creditors800 nursed a 
common grievance against the execution performance of courts. Discussions in Chapter VI 
disclose that lawyers and PCACs both endure the dearth of secure, legitimate and accessible 
channels to track down enforceable assets or defaulters in their collection operations. 
Meanwhile, PCACs are further disadvantaged by their statutorily unrecognised identity and 
the absence of productive third-party inspection over their operations, so shown in Chapter 
VI. Consequently, although presenting a competitive performance in debt collection, PCACs 
were found failing to win recognition as reliable agents for the EAA or recovery of overdue 
debts amid 9 interviewed lawyers and 2 creditors801. Thus, China’s current judicial collection 
system, although recognised as capable of handling the EAA, is found possessing 
considerable flaws, whereas the private collection services in China are available in a rather 
chaotic state, due to the absence of legislation and official supervision.  
 
Nevertheless, lacking an effective private debt collection regime is not a problem exclusively 
                                                          
798 See Section 5.4. 
799 Chapter VI. 
800 Interviewee 1, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27. 
801 Interviewee 1, 5, 8, 11, 13, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27. 
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haunting China.802 Taking the UK as an example, debt collection services in this country have 
made observable developments with high-level standardisation, compared with that in 
China.803 Bailiffs, licensed PCACs and qualified solicitors jointly form the debt collection 
force in the UK, while standardised procedures and the grievance framework for regulating 
agencies’ performance are adopted nationwide.804 This would substantiate creditors’ 
confidence in the proper development and efficiency of debt collection agencies in the UK. 
The online resources also expounded that debt collection agencies exerted full authority as 
creditors in their operations, and it was possible for creditors to sell their debts to debt 
collection agencies.805 Documentary TV series about debt collection in Britain are broadcast 
by the major nationwide media, like Channel 4 and 5.806 From these programmes, viewers 
could savour visual demonstrations of debt collection in action and acknowledge the possible 
consequences of being wilful defaulters. Interpreting the operation guide of a collection 
agency807 and the concerned legislations of the UK, it seems that operations of the British 
collection agencies enshrine three key principles.808 Firstly, the agencies operate strictly upon 
plausible justifications. This means that it merely engages in the collection of legally 
sustained debts upon presentation of necessary documents, like valid contractual terms or 
court orders.809 Secondly, the agencies adopt their well-framed processes and offer tailored 
services for the collection of diverse legal instruments.810 Finally, they voluntarily surrender 
to the inspection of pertinent authorities, loosely proved by a news that the Office of Fair 
Trading suspended the license of a debt collection agency on suspicion of violating defaulting 
debtors’ consumer rights.811 Overall, the operations of collection agencies in the UK appeared 
to be well-organised, consistent and user-friendly. Yet, Stӑnescu pointed out that the private 
debt collection regime of the UK suffered from “lack of deterrent effect of the legislation” and 
inefficient administration.812 These two problems were deemed as the culprits directly leading 
                                                          
802 CG Stӑnescu, Self-Help, Private Debt Collection and the Concomitant Risks: A Comparative Law Analysis (Springer 2015) 
283-302 
803 No author, 'Bailiff Powers When They Visit Your Home' (GOV.UK, 4 December 2015) <https://www.gov.uk/your-rights-
bailiffs/what-you-can-do-when-a-bailiff-visits> accessed 13 May 2016; Simpson Milliar LLP, 'Guide to the Debt Recovery 
Process' (Simpsonmillar.biz, 2009).  <http://www.simpsonmillar.biz/downloads/guides/debtrecovery/guide-to-debt-recovery-
process.pdf> accessed 13 May 2016 
804 ibid. 
805 Simpson Milliar LLP (n803). 
806 The Programme, named The Repo Man, was presented by Channel 4 and accessible at 
<http://www.channel4.com/programmes/the-repo-man>. The TV series, titled Can’t Pay? We’ll Take It Anyway!, were 
produced by Channel 5 and accessible at <http://www.channel5.com/show/cant-pay-well-take-it-away>.   
807 Simpson Milliar LLP(n803). 
808 CG Stӑnescu (n802) 220-224. 
809 Simpson Milliar LLP(n803). 
810 ibid. 
811 E Simon, 'Channel 4's 'Repo Man' loses licence' (The Telegraph, 17 June 2013) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/borrowing/10125304/Channel-4s-Repo-Man-loses-licence.html> 
accessed 13 May 2016 
812 CG Stӑnescu (n802) 297-298 
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to increasing complaints about private collection services in the UK.813 Comparatively, 
Chinese PCACs are operating in a vacuum, due to their hitherto unapproved identity. 
Consequently, although also initiated upon the presence of superficially legitimate 
instruments, operations of Chinese PCACs appear to be localised and individually tailored to 
accommodate the needs of different agencies. Meanwhile, no state authority is delegated to 
supervise this prohibited industry, which raises concerns over the legitimacy of PCACs’ 
practice and the safety of their staff in their field operations.814 Hence, operations of Chinese 
PCACs were perceived as untrustworthy, abrupt and high-risk.815 
 
Deliberating over the previous analysis of PCACs in the UK and China, it is fair to announce 
that the development of collection agents in the latter is still immature, lacking legal 
recognition and authority, standardised working procedure and productive supervision. 
Considering the potentially important role of collection agents in the cross-boundary or non-
local EAA, the insufficient professionalism of Chinese collection agents could be held as 
answerable for the current dissatisfactory execution status in China. Solutions to the identified 
problems hampering the growth of Chinese collection agencies can be abstracted from the 
success experiences of other countries, while the implementation of these solutions can be 
achieved over a short period of time and, hypothetically, without occupying considerable 
resources. Predictably, the emergence of collection agencies with uplifted professionalism and 
standardised operations could bring about an immediate improvement in China’s execution 
environment.  
 
7.3 Complex Social Conditions 
When evaluating China’s execution environment, one fact unaffordable to be ignored is that 
the demographic composition of the Chinese population, together with issues accumulated 
during China’s rapid development over the past decades, compel contemporary China to 
wrestle with intricate social conditions, when striving to solve difficulty in execution.816 
Comprehensively interpreting the comments of all interviewees, this study observes that 
China is enduring complex social conditions, characterised by disproportionate population 
density, unbalanced regional economic development, co-existence of multiple ethnic tribes, 
policies available exclusively to protected groups, and issues triggered respectively by 
                                                          
813 ibid. 
814 Discussed in Section 6.7.2. 
815 ibid. 
816 Interviewee 6, 10 and 13. 
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China’s previous and ongoing economic transformation. Solely focusing on the EAA, China’s 
current complex social conditions are accountable for the existence of the following problems 
in execution.     
 
Initially, China’s large population and incomplete records of residence registration pose huge 
challenges for creditors and even authorities to verify and trace all citizen’s residence 
status.817 As a country with a history of over 5000 years, China accommodates 18.7% of the 
world population within its territory of roughly 9.6 million sq. km.818 Specifically, the 
available statistics revealed that mainland China hosted around 1.37 billion citizens on its 
official book, while at least 13 million people lived in an unregistered and, therefore, 
untraceable manner by 2010.819 The distribution of this huge population has historically 
remained uneven, due to China’s geographic conditions and unbalanced regional economic 
growth. The average population density in China was approximately 134 per sq.km by 2013, 
while the population density on its eastern coast was almost forty times that in its far western 
inland.820 Meanwhile, the population in China’s urban regions remained highly movable, 
thanks to China’s improved nationwide transportation network and gradually deregulated 
residence registration.821 It is reported that about one sixth of China’s population led a 
transient life by 2014.822 This is particularly true in China’s major cities, like Shanghai, where 
more opportunities, better regional welfare and other resources are accessible.823 Merely using 
income as an example, Shanghai’s per capita income was over twice as much as that in 
China’s far western urban areas (e.g. Tibet and Gansu), and was almost 7 times higher than in 
the rural regions of Gansu by 2014.824 Considering the huge gulf between the economic 
developments in China’s eastern and western regions, China’s population appears to maintain 
a constant lopsided flow into developed urban regions on its eastern coast.825 Admittedly, the 
flow of a large population contributed greatly to China’s economic achievements, but it also 
                                                          
817 Discussed in Section 5.2. 
818 Information from China.com.cn <http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/zhuanti/2007zgjk/node_7037323.htm> accessed 3 
May 2016 
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825 JF Bai (n821). 
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triggered some social problems, like tracking the movement of the migrant workforce826 and 
managing urban villages.827 The remarks of interviewees828 indicated that, due to their 
shoestring budgets and workloads, judges or other law enforcement forces cannot afford to 
conduct extensive or nationwide investigations in civil cases to hunt down a debtor. In the 
participant observation, this study witnessed how a defaulter managed to cover his tracks for 
several years and led a new life in a city that was just three hours’ drive from his original field 
of operation. Meanwhile, the large-scale population flow and disproportionate population 
distribution grants defaulters plenty of hideaways to fabricate their disappearance. 
Particularly, urban villages, which are tagged as wretched hives of suspicious people and 
villainy829, could allow debtors to cover their tracks and avoid their obligations on home turf.    
 
Secondly, the crowed co-existence of culturally and demographically differentiated tribes in 
the studied regions has spawned sophisticated interpersonal relationships within the local 
communities, which explains the long-term existence of guanxi-grounded obstacles to 
execution in China’s ELDRs. As presented in the previous chapters830, the participant 
observation and the remarks of interviewees831 disclosed that creditors and collection agents 
had to grapple with local close-knit groups when pursuing execution cases that were deemed 
as encroaching the common interests of the latter. It is little wonder that the interviewees832 
repeatedly addressed the benefits of guanxi-based connections to both self-reliant and court-
led execution.  
 
By virtue of China’s polices, the communities under special protection might become locally 
influential or untouchable groups, who could exert considerable impact on the execution 
environment of their home turfs.833 Talking about China’s population composition, the Han 
ethnic group accounts for about 91.5% of the total population, while the other 55 minority 
communities unevenly divide the rest.834 All these 56 ethnic groups boast their own languages 
                                                          
826 RJ Wu and MX Zeng, 'Impacts of Migration on Development of Urban and Rural Societies (in Chinese)' [2013] 11 
People's Tribune 10-12  
827 Urban villages refer to the residential areas of transient population in hosting cities. See YY Lan, 'Formation, Nature, 
Reform and Strategies of Urban Villages (in Chinese)' [2011] 24 People's Tribune 23- 26. 
828 Interviewee 6, 10 and 11. 
829 WW Huang and ZJ Yuan, 'Observations on Location, Local Characteristics and Social Culture of Urban Villages: Case 
Study of Lie De Village (in Chinese)' [2015] 3 Human Geography 42-49; YZ Hai, 'Phenomenon of Urban Village and Its 
Transformation in the Urbanisation Process (in Chinese)' (China Elections and Governance, 21 March 2008) 
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830 Chapter V and VI. 
831 Interviewee 8, 9, 28 and 29. 
832 Interviewee 8, 9, 25, 27 and 29. 
833 Learnt from Interviewee 9 and the participant observation. 
834 No author (n820). 
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and customs, while Mandarin is accepted as the official language nationwide.835 Although 
merely occupying a small portion of the total population, the minority groups take up 
permanent residence in about 64.3% of China’s indisputable territory, and their footprints are 
traceable around the country.836 Therefore, the co-existence of multiple ethnic groups is a 
ubiquitous phenomenon faced by China’s administrative provinces, regardless of their 
regional autonomy.837 Preferential policies were promulgated by Chinese governments to 
safeguard the rights of minority groups in all respects.838 Among the 55 minority 
communities, the Hui ethnic group seemingly possesses a more perceptible presence and 
greater local impact in China’s non-autonomous regions, due to their clustered residence and 
strong intra-group bonds.839 This study noticed the residential blocks of Hui ethnic groups, 
though of varied sizes, in all visited cities of Target 1 and 2. Apart from these ethnically 
divided communities, migrant workforce and physically challenged people are considered 
vulnerable groups under special protections.840 How to properly handle conflicts between 
ethnic communities and protection of vulnerable groups has remained a politically delicate 
task for Chinese government forces at all levels.841 As to the EAA, this study upholds that 
these communities could act as either accomplices of the defaulting debtors or helpers of the 
victimised creditors. For instance, Interviewee 9 was hesitated to confront ethnic minority 
groups and handicapped people in his debt collection operations, for fear of getting in trouble 
with these communities. Anecdotes842, which concern the hardship endured by the observed 
agency in negotiating with local groups for debt repayment or other matters, loosely 
corroborated the foregoing claim. In contrast, Interviewee 29, speaking as an experienced debt 
collection agent, preferred to invite these protected groups to join in his operations. The 
experiences of Interviewee 24 as a corporate counsellor also revealed that these protected 
groups could be hired to prey on reputation-sensitive corporations or institutions (e.g. 
hospital) for extortion. Therefore, China’s protective policies for specific groups could create 
unenviable problems to the EAA.     
 
Moreover, Interviewee 6 and 13 claimed that the acute transformation of China from its 
                                                          
835 ibid. 
836 ibid. 
837 ibid. 
838 See the 2001 Law on Regional National Autonomy, available at http://www.seac.gov.cn/gjmw/zcfg/2004-07-
10/1168742761851078.htm. 
839 Interviewee 9. 
840 Such protections are available respectively under Labour Law of the People's Republic of China (2009), Law of the 
People's Republic on Employment Contract (2007), and Law on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities (1990). 
841 The 2017 Government Work Report of China, available in Chinese at http://news.sina.com.cn/china/xlxw/2017-03-
05/doc-ifycaafp1903506.shtml. 
842 Collected during the participant observation. 
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previous planned economy to current socialist marketing one contributed to China’s economic 
boom and rapid growth, but also generated problems possibly hindering the EAA. This 
transformation has spawned a barrage of sensitive problems that have been demanding 
governmental attention at all levels, typically like redistribution of originally state-own 
properties, so reflected by the remarks of Interviewee 6. Hypothetically, these issues not only 
test the nerves of local administrative bodies who are conventionally encouraged to establish 
their political achievement upon properly maintaining regional social stability and 
maximising the interests of the local communities, but also pose weighty challenges to judges, 
who are expected to carry out their duties without upsetting the local social and economic 
order.843 
 
Finally, uneven distribution of social resources and wealth have provoked Chinese people to 
engage in money-oriented competition, which has substantially distorted the social values of 
contemporary Chinese society and diluted people’s awareness of their needs to fulfil 
obligations.844 Those newly emerging ideas will be elaborated in Section 7.4.3 below.  
 
To sum up, China’s current intricate social conditions could undesirably facilitate some 
obstacles to execution. However, this problem cannot be easily curbed by introducing isolated 
legislation or short-term solutions, since they are essentially rooted in China’s inherent 
conditions, population policies and development plans. Hence, a substantial improvement of 
China’s execution environment for arbitral awards requests thoughtful approaches 
accommodating China’s social realities.  
 
7.4 Impact of Distorted Cultural Beliefs  
As presented previously in Chapter III, this study advocates that traditional Chinese culture 
embraces both constructive and negative beliefs, which exert weighty impact on popular 
perceptions of legal issues and morality in contemporary China.  Meanwhile, interviewees845 
revealed that Chinese people are, in general, still suffering from low legal consciousness at 
large. Consequently, in the absence of strong legal consciousness and a well-structured legal 
mechanism, the execution behaviours of Chinese parties are subject to the profound influence 
of their cultural beliefs. This claim is underpinned by analyses in Chapter IV and V, 
                                                          
843 Based on discussions in Section 5.4.1 and 5.6.1. 
844 Discussion in Section 5.5.3. 
845 Interviewee 4, 26 and 28. 
 184 
 
generating evidence for the influence of China’s general and legal tenets on the current 
execution operations in China’s ELDRs. Pursuant to the collected data, the following details 
the impact of the perceived ideologies on China’s current execution practice under their 
cultural roots.   
 
7.4.1 Ideologies stemming from traditional culture 
Previous analyses in Chapter IV and V reveal the impact of some traditional Chinese notions, 
which revolve around Li, De, and He, on the formation of the interviewed Chinese 
community’s execution-related behavioural and thinking patterns. The section below 
examines these ideologies successively upon the collected data. 
 
i. Li-based ideologies 
Hereunder, two Li-based ideologies, namely, notions of social stratification and differentiation 
and reliance on guanxi, are addressed to expose their possible impact on China’s modern 
practices for the EAA.  
(a)  Notions of social stratification and differentiation 
As mentioned in Section 3.1.1 above, Confucianism essentially worked on forming and 
maintaining social stratification, which bracketed individuals in line with their social positions 
and gender, whilst managing the differentiated groups with strict rules.846 Wealth and 
occupation were nominated as two crucial criteria for assessing an individual’s social 
position.847 Scholarly opinions presumed notions of social stratification and differentiation to 
be the main ideological culprit for fostering the official-centred ideology, which contributes to 
condescension of Chinese authorities and low self-esteem of the grassroots class.848 It is a 
shared wisdom that, upon the establishment of the New Republic, China has superficially 
demolished the long-standing social strata and granted all citizens equal social status, 
regardless of their gender or social divisions. However, this study observes that the underlying 
notions of social stratification and differentiation are still surviving in contemporary Chinese 
society. The impact of these ideologies is manifested by judges’ condescending attitude 
towards lawyers and private parties, as well as interviewees’ rather negative perceptions of 
PCACs, who are deemed as engaging in low-level unlawful business, so revealed in Chapter 
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848 MY Gu (n236), 80-87 
 185 
 
V and VI. Additionally, though harbouring complaints about courts’ inefficient performance, 
the interviewed lawyers or individuals still bowed to the authority of local courts and 
generally displayed hesitation in pointing an accusing finger at particular courts.849 Being 
experienced private collection agents (PCA), Interviewee 9 and 29 shared a disposition to 
skirt around direct engagement or confrontations with local authorities, especially law 
enforcement departments. The experiences of Interviewee 8 and 25 suggested that individual 
creditors would swallow unfavourable treatment from local courts and use doable solutions to 
grease the wheels. Meanwhile, this study also noticed a condescending attitude of some 
judicial staff, upon analysing their on-the-job behaviours and speeches. The practices of 
Interviewee 8 and 25 also denoted their humble positions when seeking judicial assistances as 
private creditors. When justifying his favourable choice for dispute resolution, Interviewee 25 
declined to seek judicial helps and claimed that “It is more productive to undertake self-rescue 
than begging for others’ help.” Interviewee 8 also added that “It is difficult for the common 
people (who have no position or authority) to pursue execution cases. Possessing a favourable 
social position…. with authority can grease the wheels”. The foregoing remarks jointly prove 
the impact of the official-centred notion on Chinese people. Moreover, this study was 
impressed by the respect for scholars prevailing amongst Chinese people. Actually, this study 
could not have achieved its current outcomes, but for the author’s connection with local 
academia. Also, Interviewee 21 and 26 expressed little difficulty in their practice, thanks to 
their prestige in local academia. Besides, this study stumbled across issues in association with 
the notion of gender social divisions, which reportedly imposed considerable or even daunting 
obstacles to the growth of female legal professionals.850 Speaking as an arbitrator and legal 
scholar, Interviewee 4 indicated that carving a niche in China’ male-dominating legal field 
remained a demanding task for female legal scholars or practitioners. His remarks were 
endorsed by Interviewee 11, who mentioned that female lawyers endured greater hardship in 
constructing social network and daily life. Meanwhile, this study also sensed a discriminating 
attitude against female researchers, given the fact that this study was frequently greeted with 
scepticism about its value and the competence of the author as a female researcher from the 
interviewees. Even worse, a potential interviewee even misread the author’s invitation to 
interview as a request for unprofessional engagement. Predictably, such misconstruction is 
unlikely to happen in a male-led research project. Based on the foregoing analysis, this study 
is favourably disposed towards previous academic opinions, claiming that notions of social 
stratification and differentiation are still exerting considerable influence on China’s legal 
                                                          
849 Discussed in Section 5.4.1. 
850 Interviewee 4 and 11. 
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practice and the outcomes of execution cases.  
 
(b) Reliance on Guanxi 
The literature agreed that, as a core emblematic concept in Chinese culture, guanxi enjoyed 
ubiquitous presence in all Chinese social activities.851 Unsurprisingly, this study observed the 
presence of guanxi-centred notions in China’s execution practice, given the frequent 
occurrence of guanxi-related topics in the remarks of all interviewees. It is worth clarifying 
that guanxi embraces both interpersonal and cross-institutional relationships herein. 
Specifically, individual creditors, like Interviewee 8 and 25, accentuated the importance of 
guanxi in facilitating their business or materialisation of their petitions for lawful 
entitlements. Speaking as a lawyer from a less-developed city, Interviewee 27 argued that “A 
lawyer’s success is essentially determined by the width and profoundness of his/her guanxi 
network”. The experiences of other interviewed lawyers852 strongly endorsed his claim, which 
revealed their conscious or unconscious reliance on personal guanxi networks in practice. 
Moreover, the interviewed judges addressed the issues about obtaining assistances from other 
institutions or administrative organs.853 Deliberating over these complaints, this study 
perceived that it is crucial for local courts to maintain a healthy and reciprocal relationship 
with other local institutions, so as to create a friendly environment for their operations. 
Moreover, the popular application of the Biantong principles in Chinese legal practice helps 
guanxi obtain further attention from the common people as handy leverage to mitigate legal 
uncertainties and bargain for favourable treatment.854 Hence, this study tentatively 
substantiates the far-reaching impact of guanxi-related notions on execution-concerned 
behaviours of Chinese private parties and judicial force. Although reliance on guanxi could 
grant creditors extra assurance of legal protection for collecting legitimate expectations 
against defaulting debtors, this study up holds that the popularity of guanxi-sponsored 
operations has spoiled contemporary Chinese society, leading to the overdependence of 
guanxi and the rampancy of guanxi-facilitated corruption.    
 
ii. De-based notions 
As revealed in Chapter IV and V, De-related notions should be considered for the following 
reasons.  
 
                                                          
851 See Section 3.1.1.  
852 Interviewee 1, 5, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 26. 
853 Discussed in Section 5.1. 
854 Indicated by the experiences of Interviewee 8 and 25. 
 187 
 
Firstly, the gradual withering away of De-related notions could be a reason permitting the oft-
observed default and execution-avoidance behaviours of debtors in contemporary China, since 
those behaviours are basically clear breaches of De-related notions that promote a high degree 
of integrity in social practice.855 Secondly, under the influence of De-related notions, 
contemporary Chinese people have inherited an eagerness to maintain one’s social image and 
high sensitivity towards others’ opinions.856 This is evidenced by Chinese arbitrators’ 
sensitivity to public opinion, so observed by Interviewee 4 and 7 in their arbitration practice. 
Thirdly, the behavioural codes of Junzi, which appreciate self-discipline, forgiveness and 
conflict avoidance857, might misguide local Chinese communities to form a defaulter-friendly 
environment. This claim is supported by a discovery that the comments of interviewees subtly 
convey high-level tolerance towards default by debtors and problematic execution 
performance of Chinese courts, merely considering the tendency to blame creditors for failing 
to prevent default risks from happening.858 This tolerance reflects the spirit of De-related 
notions, but supports the popularity of defaulting behaviours in modern Chinese society, and 
increases the difficulty for both natives and out-of-towners to seek the EAA against local 
debtors.859 Fourthly, the ‘Play Smart and Stay Safe’ principle, bred by the De-based 
preference860 for moderate approaches and thriving on the wide application of the Biantong 
principle861, is found disadvantageous for the EAA, for two reasons: (1) it is responsible for 
Chinese judges’ reluctance to place penalties on defaulting debtors, possibly to avoid causing 
troubles to their own social connections or judicial careers862; (2) it provides a ready excuse 
for habitual defaulters to justify their liability-avoidance behaviours, and a ground to blame 
creditors for failing to conduct proper risk management.863 Finally, since De-related notions 
have traditionally taught the Chinese to evade conflict, contemporary Chinese people are 
frequently found circumventing the delivery of blunt expressions that might trigger others’ 
discomfort or antipathetic feelings.864 Accordingly, it would be a tough task for out-of-
towners, who are unfamiliar with the local culture, to detect the unspoken feeling of aversion 
held by the local community, especially when their execution attempts accidentally breach the 
local customs or etiquette.  
                                                          
855 Discussed in Section 3.1.2. 
856 ibid. 
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858 Discussed in Section 5.3. 
859 Inferred from the experiences of Interviewee 25. 
860 Discussed in 3.1.2. 
861 See n290. 
862 SS Hu & CS Wu, ‘Giving Consideration to Hearing and Enforcement Processes under the Current Hearing-enforcement 
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863 Discussed in Section 5.3. 
864 A similar opinion is presented by C Liu in 'Chinese, Why Don't You Show Your Anger?-A Comparative Study Between 
Chinese and Americans in Expressing Anger' [2014] 4(3) International Journal of Social Science and Humanity 206-209 
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Thus, De-related notions could influence China’s modern execution practice chiefly by 
swaying Chinese judges’ attitude towards compulsory execution and Chinese parties’ 
perceptions of fulfilling their liabilities.  
 
iii. He-concerted beliefs 
Previous research reveals that China’s long-standing He-centred notions, which advocate 
amicable dispute resolution and stress the importance of maintaining social stability, are the 
crucial factor nurturing the rapid advancement of arbitration practice in mainland China.865 
Echoing this statement, this study found that the majority of the interviewed lawyers and 
judges lent their endorsement to arbitration as a favourable ADR, despite the existing 
weaknesses and problems of China’s arbitration practice. Hence, it could be concluded that 
He-centred notions create a propitious developmental environment for arbitration in 
contemporary China. Nevertheless, these notions also trigger certain problems, particularly in 
terms of undue interferences in arbitral and judicial operations. Resorting to his experiences in 
arbitration and litigation, Interviewee 4 noticed that judges and arbitrators would decide their 
cases upon mainstream public opinion, to avoid provoking criticisms or even local 
disturbance. As a senior judge, Interviewee 10 also mentioned the challenge for courts to 
accomplish their task of simultaneously defending justice and social stability. Furthermore, 
Interviewee 22 and 23 also raised a case to verify that local government might interfere the 
progress of a case if “Collective interests of the local community or social stability are 
allegedly at stake”. This denotes a possibility that individual creditors’ entitlements might be 
sacrificed in exchange for local equilibrium, like in a case where the defaulting debtor might 
be pushed into bankruptcy if honouring the award and this incident could strike a serious 
blow at the local community. Besides, this study detects an interesting fact that PCACs and 
creditors seemingly also observe these He-centred principles. Commenting as a PCA, 
Interviewee 9 skewed towards dodging confrontations with various local groups and declined 
to use extreme approaches, in order to accomplish his tasks at minimal risks. Interviewee 29 
also stuck to a similar credo in his private collection practice, and his company even 
constructed a legal division to ensure the legitimacy of its operations. As individual creditors, 
Interviewee 8 and 25 were both prepared to accept various compromises in exchange for 
amicable or at least quick settlements. For instance, Interviewee 25 allowed debtors with poor 
solvency to repay their overdue debts with products or business promises. Therefore, the 
foregoing findings enable this study to claim that He-related notions could, to some extent, 
                                                          
865 Discussed in Section 3.1.3 and 3.3.2. 
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promote the EAA. Yet, this study also believes that, though promoting the development of 
Chinese arbitration practice, the He-centred notions should not be over-stressed, especially 
considering their negative impact on swaying the judgement of judges and arbitrators.   
 
7.4.2 Traditional legal customs 
The analyses in the previous three chapters suggest that the following three Chinese legal 
customs are imperceptibly shaping China’s contemporary execution practice.  
i. Notions of litigation avoidance  
As an oft-cited symbolic feature of Chinese legal culture in the literature, eagerness to avoid 
litigation is accredited with promoting the development of extra-judicial dispute resolutions, 
like arbitration and mediation, in China.866 The remarks of interviewees867 presented some 
evidence buttressing the foregoing claim. Firstly, Interviewee 8 and 25 voiced individual 
creditors’ reluctance for engaging in court-led operations, unless other alternatives were all 
exhausted. Such reluctance appears to be jointly fuelled by public concerns about the 
efficiency of judicial operations and the permeation of the ingrained litigation-avoidance 
notion. Additionally, Chinese courts apparently still cherish the traditional belief that the key 
mission of legal practice is to prevent litigation and disputes, with an ultimate aim to 
safeguard social stability.868 This belief effectively stops judges from taking risky approaches 
in execution and convince them to willingly accept compromises to cease further disputes or 
avoid a complete failure to execute.869 The inclination of Interviewee 10 (as a senior judge in 
Target 1) to facilitate the development of arbitration practice and reduce unnecessary litigation 
to lighten the burdens of overloaded courts, which won favour with other interviewed 
judges870, bears testimony to the aforementioned claims. Meanwhile, Chinese courts’ 
predisposition towards government interference in high-profile cases, which might affect local 
economic or political stability, also revealed their trouble-avoidance attitude.871 Hence, 
although China has been and is upgrading its judiciary to provide stronger protections for 
individuals’ legitimate interests, Chinese courts and the common public are still affected by 
the long-standing notions of litigation avoidance. Admittedly, this situation constitutes a 
favourable condition for commercial arbitration to sustainably expand in China. Nonetheless, 
                                                          
866 Discussed in Section 3.3.1. 
867 Interviewee 8, 10 and 25. 
868 Discussed in Section 6.2.1. 
869 Inferred from discussions in Section 5.4.1 and statistics in 4.3. 
870 Interviewee 14,15,16,17,18 and 19 
871 Inferred from the comments of Interviewee 21, 22, 23 and 24. 
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the litigation-avoidance attitude would undermine the superiority of China’s judiciary as the 
top option for Chinese population to seek proper protections or remedies.   
 
ii. Emphasis on formality and administrative supervision  
Based on field observations and the comments of interviewees872, this study detected that 
operations of Chinese courts and arbitration commissions are still under the spell of the 
traditional notions that advocate formality and hierarchical administrative management. 
Initially, Interviewee 10 revealed that court-led execution was subject to rigid procedures and 
requirements for documents. Meanwhile, this study witnessed the extensive internal 
paperwork to be completed by judges in execution cases, when rummaging around for 
execution-related statistics. Lawyers,873 respectively from Target 1 and 2, also disclosed the 
troublesome formalities for requesting access to wanted records in their asset tracking. 
Besides, Interviewee 6, a senior judge in Target 1, mentioned the tedious procedural and 
paperwork requirements for liquidating assets, which were imposed by national statutes or 
departmental regulations of third parties, like the Housing Bureau. Aside from the foregoing 
arguments about formality, this study also harvested evidence suggesting the presence of 
hierarchical administrative management in China’s legal realm. Commenting as an arbitrator, 
Interviewee 4 grumbled about the presiding internal administrative framework of local 
arbitration commissions for restricting the independence and authority of arbitrators. This 
argument was endorsed by the concern of Interviewee 7 and 26 over the same subject. 
Additionally, the remarks of Interviewee 10 and the outcomes of two group meetings revealed 
the tight internal administrative supervision on execution operations of judges. Hence, the 
findings of this study partially resonate with the claims of Huang, who blamed traditional 
Chinese culture for fostering the hierarchical nature of China’s arbitration practice.874 
Meanwhile, China’s emphasis on formality and administrative supervision is named as a key 
factor contributing to the low-efficient court-led execution and the official-centred ideology 
amid Chinese judicial staff. 
 
iii. Notion of Biantong (flexibility) 
Fan nominated Biantong as a crucial ideological notion in Chinese legal culture, which 
permitted Chinese courts to implement the inelastic written stipulations with tolerable 
flexibility to better accommodate the ever-evolving realities.875 Echoing Fan’s claims, this 
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study detected a shared inclination of judges to allow certain flexibility within the legitimate 
realm to satisfy the requirements of Li-base notions in their practice. For instance, Interviewee 
6 mentioned Chinese judges’ hesitation in pursuing execution against a debtor with a single 
asset, due to a solicitude for the debtor’s post-execution living conditions. Based upon his 
judicial practice, Interviewee 6 argued that it would be unreasonable to pursue an execution 
case if such attempt could make the debtor “become a homeless vagrant or unable to support 
his family”. These discoveries somewhat resonate with those of Fan, suggesting that 
“equitable principles” are voluntarily observed by the pertinent authorities in China’s 
arbitration practice.876 Furthermore, Interviewee 28, drawing upon his previous judicial 
experiences, unveiled Chinese judges’ inclination to use their discretion in performing 
statutory duties, but only within the domain permitted by the regulations.877 This statement 
was sustained by the interviewed lawyers.     
 
In addition, this study observed the application of the Biantong principle in operations of 
other three execution-concerned stakeholders, including creditors, PCACs and lawyers. 
Initially, Interviewee 8 and 25, both individual creditors, would adopt flexible strategies, like 
seeking assistance from influential third parties or accepting compromises, to extricate 
themselves from time-consuming and possibly fruitless chases for execution of judgments or 
collection of overdue debts. Additionally, Chapter VI spotlights that PCACs and lawyers 
would utilise circuitous tactics to compensate for their statutorily conditioned incapacity for 
free access to records about individuals’ living and financial status. Moreover, the participant 
observation informed this study about PCACs’ attempts to create contractual justifications for 
their collection operations in the absence of legislative permissions.  
 
Therefore, the previous findings jointly prove the influence of the Biantong notion on China’s 
contemporary legal activities and behaviours of individuals. This study upholds that the wide 
application of this notion could facilitate creditors’ execution pursuits under China’s current 
less-favourable execution environment, but it could increase uncertainties in the country’s 
legal practice and, thereby, enlarge difficulty in the EAA. Meanwhile, this notion offers a 
ready excuse for individuals to rationalise their illegitimate or contemptible strategies for 
achieving their hidden agendas. 
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7.4.3 Modern values 
As stated previously in Section 7.3, China’s contemporary society has undergone dramatic 
transformation, due to its rapid economic and social developments. The growing polarisation 
between rich and poor878, together with the success of some newly rich entrepreneurs, incites 
contemporary Chinese people, who are generally under great pressures from housing 
expenditures or other life burdens879, to pursue sudden wealth or a quick improvement in 
social status. Meanwhile, as a consequence of China’s intense urbanisation, a large amount of 
the rural population has flowed into the urban areas.880 Conflicts between rural and urban 
lifestyles demolished or reshaped these peoples’ value systems and life goals, which lured 
some of them to engage in profit-driven conduct or even wrongdoings.881 All these factors 
jointly enabled distorted values to abound throughout the country. Interviewee 26, acting 
simultaneously as a lawyer and professor, disclosed that “Some people even feel honourable 
for being a habitual defaulter and consider honest fulfilment of one’s promise to be foolish 
behaviour”. Interviewee 25 also reported the common occurrence of debt avoidance and 
failure to keep promises in his line of business.  
 
Examining the collected data, this study observes evidence proving that some currently 
popular notions, which are somewhat in opposition to China’s traditional De-related tenets, 
are utilised to justify execution-avoidance behaviours. Particularly, the money-worshipping 
ideology, which encourages people to eagerly pursue wealth, seems to win quite a high 
popularity among defaulting debtors, and encourages them to discard personal integrity and 
audaciously avoid fulfilling their obligations in exchange for monetary interests.882 The 
participant observation and the experiences of interviewees883 also uncovered that a claim 
advocating “A man of great ambition does not bother about trifles”884 was conveniently 
twisted by some Chinese people to justify their operations. For instance, Interviewee 29 
confessed the utilisation of some measures, morally or practically applicable but without 
legislative backup, to pursue collection of overdue debts. Examples given by Interviewee 29 
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include compelling relatives of a debtor to repay the debt, and hiring people with contagious 
disease or particular ethnic background to collect debts. Interviewee 9, a PCA from Target 1, 
also revealed a similar practice. Moreover, legal practice of Interviewee 26 and 28 indicated 
that a Chinese old phrase that “Laws fail if too many people disrespect them”885 granted 
defaulters a fallacious confidence in escaping their obligations without paying hefty costs. 
This loosely explains why interviewees886 observed the frequent occurrence of debt avoidance 
in their practice. These negative ideologies, which are essentially contrary to China’s 
traditional De-related tenets, force contemporary Chinese society witness a marked 
deterioration in morality and values, while fuelling the rampancy of dishonest and criminal 
conduct. Hence, the existence of these distorted values could be accused of ideologically 
perpetuating the current rampant spread of malicious execution-avoidance behaviours within 
Chinese society.  
 
In brief, the foregoing analysis verifies that some pernicious traditional and modern Chinese 
ideologies would, in a less perceptible manner, orchestrate Chinese people’s execution-related 
behaviours and fuel the oft-cited obstacles to the EAA. However, compared with the 
foregoing three factors, there is no quick solution to erase impact of distorted cultural beliefs, 
given the ingrained impact of traditional Chinese philosophies on all facets of Chinese 
people’s life.     
 
Conclusion 
Reviewing the previous discussion, this chapter enriches the understanding of China’s 
execution practice for arbitral awards by underlining four factors that are answerable for 
difficulty in execution faced by China’s ELDRs now. These factors include imbalance 
between the development of China’s economy and legal mechanism, immature development 
of professional collection agents, China’s complicated social conditions, and the impact of 
distorted cultural beliefs. Specifically, China’s current legal framework is found unable to 
keep up with the needs of its execution practice, chiefly due to the absence of execution-
exclusive legislations and supporting systems for implementing the enacted legislations. This 
shortage disadvantages creditors’ execution attempts and restricts the execution capacity of 
Chinese courts. Additionally, compared with their British counterparts, Chinese courts are 
precluded by their inherent shortcomings from efficiently completing their execution tasks, 
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whereas Chinese PCACs, whose existence has not been legislatively authorised under China’s 
current legal framework, have little chance to legitimately expand their operations, and are 
thereby unable to offering Chinese courts strong assistances in the EAA.  
 
Then, China’s complicated social conditions, together with leftover problems caused by 
China’s previous economic transformation, could lead to difficulty in tracking defaulting 
debtors, heavy reliance on guanxi-based connections, the existence of untouchable local 
communities, and the distortion of social values. Moreover, China’s traditional tenets 
(respectively about Li, De and He) are found working along with its legal traditions (litigation 
avoidance, emphasis on formality and administrative supervision, and Biantong) in 
simultaneously imposing beneficial and harmful impacts on the EAA. Meanwhile, this study 
discovers the impacts of some distorted modern values, like ‘worshipping money’, on 
inducing contemporary Chinese society to tolerate execution avoidance and not-so-lawful 
collection operations by PCACs.  
 
Considering their causes and effects, these factors need to be comprehensively addressed to 
produce workable countermeasures for substantially improving China’s execution 
environment for arbitral awards and other legitimate instruments. Comparatively speaking, 
issues originating from China’s complicated social conditions and the impact of cultural 
beliefs are unlikely to be removed overnight with quick solutions. Rather, the accomplishment 
of this mission demands adjustments in China’s national policies and the improvement of 
Chinese people’s legal awareness, which can only be realised through long-term efforts and 
hefty investments. However, it is possible for China to harvest relatively immediate 
improvement in improving its execution practice, through advancing its legal infrastructure 
and uplifting the professionalism of its collection agents, both judicial and private.  
 
Relying on the analyses of the EAA in China’s ELDRs and factors fuelling obstacles to 
execution, the final chapter is devoted to proposing some execution-friendly suggestions for 
future reforms of China’s execution environment. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion and Suggestions for the Future China-grounded 
Execution of Arbitral Awards  
Thus far, this thesis has successively expounded on the discernible issues and factors that 
possibly perpetuate problems in the China-grounded execution of awards. The previous 
discussions lead this thesis to espouse the view of Interviewee 6, claiming that execution is “a 
complicated task involving a host of legal and practical considerations”.     
 
Based on the collected data, this thesis concludes that, although China’ current arbitration 
mechanism is still suffering from discernible weaknesses in legislative, procedural, 
institutional and practical aspects, commercial arbitration has already obtained great 
development in China’s economically less-developed regions (ELDRs), while the execution 
status of arbitral awards in these regions is demanding, but still achievable, merely 
considering the figures of voluntary and coercive execution (40% and 60% respectively) 
within a six-month period in Target 1. This thesis spotlights that the development of 
commercial arbitration in China envisages two major challenges, namely, competition 
between arbitration commissions and the preference for litigation within Chinese legal 
society. Meanwhile, though revealing an expectation for further growth of commercial 
arbitration, Chinese legal society is seemingly possessed by a scepticism towards the 
enforceability of arbitral awards, due to concerns over the qualifications and impartiality of 
arbitrators, attachment of arbitration commissions to local governments and the absence of a 
sound regulatory framework for supervising arbitrators’ performance. This data denotes that 
China’s current socio-cultural realties are suitable for modern commercial arbitration to 
expand, but the execution of arbitral awards (EAA) envisages a perceivable gap between 
legislative stipulations and real-life practices.  
 
This thesis identifies 7 execution-unfriendly issues, including difficulty in asset tracking, 
inefficiency of judges, defaults of debtors, heavy burdens of creditors, the influence of 
cultural factors, the flawed legislative framework, and poor quality of arbitral awards. This 
thesis also discovers that China’s constant legal reform and anti-corruption campaign have 
been gradually weakening the impact of corruption, the professionalism of Chinese judges 
and local protectionism on the EAA. Hence, in line with the previous research, this thesis 
upholds that, despite the unique conditions in individual cases, the EAA in China’s ELDRs 
could be generally depicted as a bumpy ride conditioned by the efforts of creditors, debtors, 
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collection agents and other stakeholders to various levels, while being exposed to many 
obstacles and perils. For Chinese creditors, their secret of success apparently rests on active 
participation in execution and careful selection of execution strategies. This thesis in 
particular detects the important role of the private collection agencies (PCACs) and the impact 
of China’s traditional culture on its modern execution practice.  
 
Afterwards, chiefly relying on the comments of two private collectors and the outcomes of the 
participant observation, this thesis critically analyses the execution performances of Chinese 
courts, PCACs and lawyers from seven aspects, and reaches a conclusion that each of these 
agents possesses their own fortes and drawbacks in their field operations, which are 
essentially determined by their dissimilar statutory status, objectives, key values and 
operational modes. In concise terms, courts are comparatively easy-to-access, but low-
efficient and poorly-funded collection agents, who are also criticised for their complicated 
operating procedure and superior attitude. Despite these criticism, the collected statistics 
confirmed the competence of Chinese courts to accomplish their execution tasks within six 
months in the majority of cases. Compared with lawyers who are competent but reluctant to 
undertake execution cases, PCACs are found active in assuming execution cases, but might 
bring about high risks and uncertainties to the EAA, due to their hitherto unrecognised 
identity. Consequently, these three agents are literally incapacitated by their individual 
shortcomings from defeating wilful defaulters and improve China’s current execution 
environment on their own. Based on the foregoing findings, this thesis leans towards 
advocating the establishment of a multi-agent collection system to unify judicial and private 
collection forces to improve China’s execution status and, thereby, ensure the EAA.  
 
Moreover, this thesis detects four less perceptible factors accountable for difficulty in the 
EAA, namely, imbalance between the development of China’s economy and legal 
mechanism, the underdevelopment of professional collection agents, China’s complicated 
social conditions, and the impact of cultural beliefs. Particularly, this thesis unearths how 
Chinese cultural and legal doctrines skew Chinese parties’ collective execution behaviours 
towards a manner that emphasises formality, superiority of authorities, moderate dispute 
resolution, tolerance of misconducts, flexibility in handling issues, litigation avoidance, and 
guanxi-based relationship. Modern values, which fundamentally revolve around pursuing 
personal interests, are also found exerting impact on the rampancy of liability avoidance and 
other unlawful conducts within contemporary China. These findings resonate with those of 
Fan, suggesting that studies about China’ legal practice should be contextualised in China’s 
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culture and social realities, which could bring about a deeper understanding of Chinese legal 
phenomena. Given the origins and possible impact of the identified four factors, this thesis 
proposes that they need to be handled with differentiated resolutions, which might require an 
ideological transformation of contemporary Chinese society, the adjustment of China’s 
national protective policies for specific groups, further reform of China’s legal mechanism 
and introduction of a multiple-agent collection system.  
 
Overall, the previous findings enable this thesis to portray the problematic, yet improving, 
status of the EAA in China’s ELDRs, highlighting the gaps between the pro-arbitration 
attitude of China’s high-level authorities and scepticism toward arbitration amongst Chinese 
frontline practitioners. This thesis also updates the list of obstacles to the EAA upon 
practitioners’ experiences, which reflect recent changes in China’s socio-cultural conditions 
and the impact of Chinese culture on execution. Through comparing the operations of three 
mainstream Chinese collection agents, this thesis reveals the strengths and attention-arresting 
problems of PCACs’ operations, which constitute evidence endorsing the introduction of a 
multi-agent execution framework in China. Furthermore, this thesis unveils China’s social 
realities and cultural foundations, which have jointly supported hindrances to the EAA and, 
therefore, should be addressed in future reforms of China’s execution practice.  
 
Sifting through the previous findings and the published scholarly opinions, this thesis 
perceives that stronger execution reassurance has being called upon to pacify worrying 
creditors or spectators. Even importantly, the sustainable economic development and political 
stability of China cannot afford the continuous absence of a sophisticated and well-
conditioned legal fabric. To dispel clouds hanging over China’s legal practice and socio-
economic actualities, systematic approaches should be implemented to safeguard the 
execution of legal instruments and awarded remedies. Consequently, the current execution 
situation in China’s ELDRs, which entails considerable uncertainties and obstacles, 
necessitates productive collaboration of various stakeholders, in order to further improve 
China’s rather fraught execution environment. Among all the stakeholders, Chinese courts and 
pertinent authorities are expected to seize the leading roles and contribute concerted efforts to 
ensure the EAA. Pursuant to collected data and personal observations, this study would like to 
propose the following suggestions respectively for the consideration of Chinese authorities 
and judicial force, with an aim to improve the whole execution environment in China.  
 
 198 
 
8.1 Suggestions for Authorities  
Considering the significance of a benign legal environment for sustainable growth of any 
country, China should further extend its legal reforms and improve its legal operations, 
notwithstanding that economic developments and political stability would remain at the top of 
its political agenda in the coming decades. Particularly, Chinese authorities should proactively 
adopt various approaches to promote an execution-friendly atmosphere to comfort the 
business community with a stronger guarantee for safe materialisation of their arbitral awards. 
Therein, long-term schemes, which might consume sizeable resources and make slow 
progress, could be introduced synchronously with some fast-track solutions, which might 
demand fewer inputs and bring about comparatively immediate effects, to accomplish the 
foregoing task. The following section tentatively proposes three suggestions for further 
consideration of Chinese authorities, especially the high-ranking legislative and judicial 
forces. Essentially, these suggestions intend to improve China’s execution environment 
through conducting comprehensive reforms, raise Chinese people’s awareness of voluntarily 
honouring their liabilities through systematic legal education, increase the efficiency of 
China’s execution mechanism by adopting a series of problem-targeted measures and 
welcoming the involvement of legal scholars, and strengthen China’s legitimate execution 
force by introducing a multi-agent framework.  
 
i. Adjust China’s macro-governance polices to comprehensively support initiatives for legal 
advancement 
The previous discussions reveal that, aside from imposing serious punishments on obstinate 
defaulters, Chinese authorities should levy weighty attention to other issues that might affect 
the EAA, like those respectively relating to China’s economy, ideological infrastructure and 
institutional issues.887 Guan Zhong (管仲) declared that the morality and social awareness of 
the common people could only be improved if their basic living needs were sufficiently 
satisfied.888 Echoing this ancient wisdom, China’s execution status and legal environment 
could be improved, if people’s living standards and the corresponding social framework are 
productively heightened. Hence, further developing the country’s economy and upgrading the 
overall financial status of Chinese population is a critical approach to transmute China’s legal 
environment and the prospect of the EAA. Furthermore, Chinese authorities are advised to 
                                                          
887 Discussed in Chapter VII. 
888 This remark stands for “仓廪实而知礼节，衣食足而知荣辱” in Chinese, taking from a chapter of Guanzi (管子) titled 
Mumin (牧民). Guan Zhong(管仲) was an ancient Chinese politician and philosopher, serving the Qi Dynasty during the 
Spring and Autumn Period in the Chinese history. 
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reconsider the implementation of certain national polices, which might subtly generate 
vexatious obstacles to the EAA.889 For instance, they should remain wary of their fervour to 
lessen ethnic strife and achieve peaceful co-existence of multiple ethnic groups, in case the 
implemented protective policies are manipulated into an umbrella for ill-intentioned 
operations of interest-driven local groups or manipulators.890 Ideally, authorities should lend 
strong supports to raid or crackdown campaigns of local law enforcement forces against 
illegitimate activities in residential areas of ethnic minority groups, if solid evidence 
justifying such operations is presented. The same concern is also applicable to protective 
treatments exclusively for other groups currently under special protection.891 
 
ii. Deploy multiple media to enhance the nationwide legal education and revive beneficial 
Chinese traditions to establish a social environment respecting the authority of law  
Though traditional ideologies are likely to cast a lingering spell on Chinese society in the near 
future892, contemporary China could be converted into a law-abiding society untrammelled by 
reprehensible conventions or values. Admittedly, it is a formidable task to expel the 
detrimental ideologies that have been tainting contemporary Chinese society and supporting 
the frequent emergence of miscellaneous dishonourable behaviours. But, this is certainly not a 
problem defying resolution. The traditional legal education channel893 could be inherited to 
strengthen legal education in China, to inject a stronger law awareness into contemporary 
Chinese society. Specifically, Chinese authorities could muster the private forces to help 
authorities diffuse the approved legal messages amongst Chinese people at all convenient 
occasions, whilst families and schools would be tagged as two crucial platforms for 
nationwide legal edification. Meanwhile, mass media and academia should be granted more 
access to field operations and archives of law enforcement departments, while multimedia 
case reporting should be expediently encouraged, so as to provide diverse reliable sources of 
information for the outside world to learn about China’s legal practicalities. Nevertheless, 
reports that deliberately twist the facts and blacken the reputation of law enforcement forces 
should not be tolerated. Also, mass media should be heartened to extol the deeds of people 
who overcome severe hardship with fortitude to fulfil their liabilities or honour their debts. 
Such publication could establish iconic role models for individuals on which to model their 
own behaviours. Ideally, this approach could boost public awareness of decent social 
                                                          
889 Discussed in Section 7.3. 
890 ibid. 
891 Ibid. 
892 Discussed in Chapter III. 
893 See n225. 
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behaviours, while enabling the idea that voluntary fulfilment of liabilities is the basic 
obligation of a law-abiding person to substantially permeate through contemporary Chinese 
society. Meanwhile, beneficial contents in traditional Chinese culture, especially De-related 
notions, could be revitalised to persuade people to lead their lives with higher-level self-
regulation and integrity.  Application of these notions could have far-reaching impacts, but 
without huge inputs and confrontation. It is believed that intense well-organised edification 
about legal knowledge and educative reports of cases against defaulters, together with a 
revival of traditional Chinese behavioural codes, could jointly warn modern Chinese 
population of the severe consequences for straying from the path of righteousness, thereby 
depressing their inclination for liability avoidance and precluding the likely emergence of 
misconduct.     
 
iii. Correct deficiencies in China’s current execution framework to release its full potentials 
in curbing obligation avoidance 
The previous chapters894 identified two major deficiencies of China’s current execution 
framework, namely, soft punitive measures and the absence of well-structured supporting 
systems. Those deficiencies literally crippled this framework’s ability to stop defaulters from 
undertaking dishonourable conducts. Initially, the current execution framework should be 
modified to enhance its deterrent effects and facilitate court-led execution. According to the 
2017 Reports895 of the SPC, local courts are inclined to inflict warnings or disciplinary 
detentions on defaulters. However, it is really disputable to what extent such methods could 
impel defaulters and their brethren to honour their obligations or staunch their backsliding, 
given the general involvement of hefty monetary or commercial interests in execution cases. 
Severe punitive methods with far-reaching consequences and accompanying social reproach 
might be more effective to suppress avarice for illegitimate interests and galvanise defaulters 
to honour their obligations. Meantime, to eliminate the possible impact of third parties’ undue 
interference, strict penalties should be imposed upon parties, who become involved in the 
execution process due to their occupational duties, but illegitimately forewarn debtors or 
impede the progress of execution. Bank managers, who tip off debtors about the ongoing 
judicial operations or present sluggish responses to courts’ inquiries, are typical of the 
foregoing parties. Therefore, it is necessary to modify the current punitive framework to 
ensure that the standing punishments for execution avoidance or slackness in assisting court-
led inquiries could touch the deep interests of individuals or institutions (like their public 
                                                          
894 Chapter V and Vii. 
895 See n178. 
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images). Nonetheless, differentiated treatments respectively for one-time and chronic 
offenders should be legislatively clarified to offer accidental defaulters a chance to make up 
their faults.  
 
Additionally, Chinese authorities should continuously work on perfecting the already 
established systems, while introducing other wanted frameworks. As stated in the previous 
chapters896, China has hitherto initially constructed some crucial supporting systems for 
execution, like a credibility tracking system of individuals and cross-institutional asset-
tracking channels over the past decade. But, since these systems are still in their rudimentary 
stages, it would take quite a long period and considerable resources to nurture these systems 
into mature default-preventing arsenals.  Persistent assistance from the competent authorities 
would be a critical element for achieving this mission. Meanwhile, this study noticed a 
prevailing complaint about the absence of a reliable channel for issuing grievance against 
judicial or private collectors. Presumably, a third-party-run grievance system, which could 
offer both private parties and judges a safe channel to unburden their pent-up complaints and 
worries, would be warmly welcomed. Moreover, a social welfare system could be introduced 
to specially address the single-asset holders’ post-execution living needs and, thereby, hearten 
the latter to voluntarily fulfil their obligations.897 
 
Aside from modifying various execution-related frameworks, Chinese authorities could also 
consider inviting legal scholars and practitioners to participate in periodic or random 
supervision of court-led execution. This approach could allow the concerned authorities to 
gain extra sources for monitoring the all-round performance of courts and obtaining credible 
intellectual support to direct China’s legal reforms.  
 
iv. Introduce a pristine multi-agent execution framework to augment China’s collection 
forces  
An unpleasant yet undeniable truth is that judges have been, are being and will possibly be 
outnumbered by offenders who inadvertently overlook or, more frequently, deliberately 
repudiate their liabilities. Exclusively relying on courts to fight a lone battle against the 
defaulters would be indubitably unfeasible and resource-demanding. Therefore, it is necessary 
to strengthen China’s collection forces to offer creditors more alternative options. This task 
could be initiated by legitimatising the operations of private collection forces. The 
                                                          
896 Section 5.1 and 7.2. 
897 Discussed in Section 5.4.1. 
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comparative analysis in Chapter VI reveals that three Chinese execution agencies, namely, 
local courts, lawyers and PCACs, display discrepant strengths and features in their operations. 
It is highlighted that PCACs are apparently pundits in locating artificially disappeared 
individuals and hidden assets.898 Nevertheless, the hitherto extant denial of the legitimate 
existence of PCACs has virtually enticed them to operate in a beyond-law manner and, 
therefore, led to concerns over illegal operations and unnecessary risks for creditors. 
Considering the merits and potential perils involved in the current operations of PCACs, this 
seemingly highly-sufficient group should no longer be ostracised from China’s execution 
mechanism. Inviting PCACs to work in tandem with courts under proper supervision could 
enhance China’s execution forces to offer creditors extra options to safely pursue their 
legitimate entitlements and, to some extent, unyoke Chinese courts from their increasingly 
heavier workload. To establish a multi-agent execution mechanism, an accommodating 
environment that allows private collection and investigation forces to thrive and reach their 
full potentials under the keen eyes of competent authorities is needful. Herein, Chinese 
authorities are counselled to follow the well-trodden path of constructing a multi-agent 
collection framework in legally advanced countries, like the UK and the USA. Putting it 
simply, PCACs could be transformed into a well-behaved and law-abiding collection force, if 
their operations are legally recognised and become subject to the supervisory management of 
specifically delegated authorities. Yet, licensure by examination might not win favour of 
PCACs, given their employees’ generally thin qualification. This claim is subtly proved by the 
fact that the majority of PCACs are operating without a state-issued license for commercial 
debt collector.899  
 
8.2 Suggestions for China’s Courts 
Referring back to discussions in Chapter V and VI, the present court-led execution operation 
indeed suffered from some drawbacks, chiefly owing to their insufficient financial budgets, 
understaffing, and flawed operating procedures. Those drawbacks, together with legislative 
and procedural restrictions, circumscribed the execution competence of Chinese courts. 
Though acknowledging courts’ execution competence and achievements, this study proposes 
the following four approaches to further improve court-led execution.  
 
i. Heighten public confidence in courts through modifying the present procedural 
                                                          
898 Discussed in Section 6.4.2. 
899 Mentioned in Section 5.4.2. 
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framework of judicial operations, and enriching training programmes for judges     
To address applicants’ doubts about the commitment of judges, Chinese courts could further 
specify its internal regulations and framework to eliminate opacity in its current operation. 
Meanwhile, Chinese courts could consider reducing superfluous, often time-consuming, 
formalities and paperwork, though extensively utilising paperless solutions and easy-to-access 
media. This could not only unify the nationwide judicial performance and heighten the 
transparency of judicial operations in China, but could also demolish the hotbed of bribery 
and negligence, thereby increasing the efficiency of local courts and improving public 
confidence in Chinese judiciary. Meanwhile, severe punishments should be inflicted on 
inaction or misconduct of judges to warn others and appease the pertinent parties. For 
instance, judges who are deaf to entreaties of applicants or react slowly without proper 
justifications should be subject to internal investigation or punishment. It is of great 
importance that the outcomes of these internal disciplinary processes are promptly conveyed 
to the pertinent parties, which could positively affect public perceptions towards the 
efficiency and credibility of court-led operations. Besides, other supervisory organs, like 
Discipline Inspection Commissions at varied administrative levels, should exercise their 
authority over local courts’ operations with due discretion and, ideally, clarified restrictions. 
Tentatively, their supervision could be confined merely to misdeeds of judges, whilst placing 
judicatory activities entirely in hands of local courts.  
 
Additionally, training programmes with diversified themes, particularly about the basics of 
financial operations and negotiations, should be arranged to turn judges into overachieving 
multitaskers. Scholars or practitioners with credible frontline experiences in the execution-
related topics could be consulted about the future arrangements of these practice-oriented 
coaching events. Furthermore, previous studies of He spotlighted the plight of courts in 
China’s ELDRs, which was chiefly caused by their financial restrictions and local 
practicalities. Bearing this problem in mind, Chinese higher judicial authorities could consider 
continuously offering courts in the current legally-disadvantaged regions preferential 
treatments in all dimensions, including but not limited to economic supports, resource 
allocation, staff benefits and training.900       
 
ii. Engage in proactive cooperation with China’s legal academia and private practitioners  
Nowadays, Chinese legal academics have already been granted participation in China’s 
                                                          
900 The 2017 Report, cited n178. 
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judicial operations, largely in terms of trialling and policy making.901 Allegedly, such 
cooperation between the Chinese judicial force and academia could benefit the former in 
intellectual support and training resources, while could allow the latter to taste the frontline 
judicial operations and the evolving environment, thereby saving them from producing 
unworldly pedantic judgements or propositions about China’ legal practice and future 
reforms.902 Nevertheless, such permission to participate is apparently open merely to two 
groups, namely, prestigious scholars for high-ranking judicial positions and new graduates for 
internships or lower-level positions.903 Thus far, little information has been found indicting 
the intimate involvement of Chinese legal scholars in the execution sector, whilst this study 
experienced the hesitancy of Chinese courts when dealing with academic research projects.          
 
Furthermore, the previous discussions identified a shared complaint among practitioners 
about the scarcity of detailed execution-centred information or case reports. This situation 
compels researchers and practitioners to generate their knowledge of China’s execution and 
legal operations merely upon anecdotes or antiquated evidence. Hence, the foregoing scarcity 
of information nurtures less accurate or even fallacious interpretations of Chinese legal 
practice. Also, it undesirably provides ammunition against the effectiveness of China’s 
judiciary and fuels the outsiders’ mistrust about the final enforceability of arbitral awards. 
Accordingly, a well-structured official information-releasing channel should be constructed to 
keep the outsiders updated about execution-related regulations, statistics and educative cases 
in China. This practice could not only verify forthcomingness of the pertinent Chinese 
authorities, but, more importantly, rescue the outside world from the baffling puzzles or 
misconceptions about China’s legal environment in reality. Actually, the SPC’s website could 
be further updated to offer an e-platform supporting direct creditor-judges interactions. The 
SPC could also consider exploiting its internal reporting system to garner more detailed 
performance-related statistics and cases to produce official resources that could promptly brief 
practitioners on the latest legal status and developments in China. It would be highly 
appreciated that the annual work reports of the SPC could, instead of delivering sweeping 
statements in a formulaic official tone, convey comprehensive statistics elaborating real-life 
judicial treatment for cases of different natures. The 2017 Report, with graphic appendices, is 
                                                          
901 DB Yuan and WQ Guo, 'The Supreme People's Court Will Invite Legal Scholars to Take Middle-Layer Positions in 
Trialling (in Chinese)' (Finance Huanqiu, 13 August 2012) <http://finance.huanqiu.com/data/2012-08/3020583.html> 
accessed 1 August 2016; SJ Song and others, 'Participation of Scholars in the Supreme People's Court Will be Beneficial for 
Reducing Divergence Between the Academic and Practical Communities (in Chinese)' (The Beijing News, 16 January 2013) 
<http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013-01/16/content_403954.htm?div=0> accessed 1 August 2016 
902 ibid 
903 ibid 
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a nice starter.904 But it would be more ideal, if the published data could expound on the 
prospective and exact execution outcomes of various legal instruments. Besides, the Chinese 
academia should be heartened to, instead of churning out empty accusations or commentaries, 
amass authoritative data from empirical studies and produce down-to-earth solutions, to assist 
China’s judicial force in tackling problems in its field operations and shed appreciable light 
on China’s legal transformation.  
 
iii. Enhance prestige of courts by exhausting their statutory authorities in judicial activities 
and fulfilling their promises 
The collected remarks of interviewees subtly hinted at the weak social influence and a 
disappointingly inferior status of Chinese courts in interactions with other Chinese institutions 
or even individuals.905 Essentially, this could be partially attributed to the influence of China’s 
long-standing legal traditions that discourage people to seek judicial remedies for their 
disputes or suffering. Yet, Chinese courts should not be exonerated from causing this 
situation, for their conventional soft approach in case handling and execution. It is rather 
disappointing to learn from the SPC’s work reports that people daring to challenge the 
authority of Chinese courts were merely subject to mild punishments (e.g. fines) with no 
severe consequences.906 As the pillar of China’s legal fabric, Chinese courts should really 
adopt a tough attitude in defending the sanctity of law and proclaiming their foremost position 
in safeguarding people’s legitimate rights. Imposing tougher punishments on wilful defaulters 
or offenders in civil cases could be a good starting point to alert the common people to 
Chinese courts’ sheer determination to reform China’s legal atmosphere and traditions.    
 
iv. Adopt novel but legitimate resource-raising approaches to free courts from their 
financial embarrassment  
This study discovered that mustering of sufficient resources to support costly field operations 
remained a key challenge for Chinese courts, merely considering their humble fiscal budget 
and relatively low service fees. However, this discouraging fact does not suggest that Chinese 
courts should just swallow this tough situation and carry on their operations unsatisfactorily 
within a manageable realm. Rather, Chinese courts could constructively exploit their internal 
potentials and available resources to legitimately self-fund their operations. For instance, 
since the legal profession is a widely appreciated occupation in China, Chinese courts could 
                                                          
904 See n178. 
905 Discussed in Section 5.4.1. 
906 See the 2015, 2016 and 2017 Report of the SPC, n56, 180, and 178. 
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take full advantage of their intimacy with China’s legal operations to offer training on various 
topics, like those about China’s national examination for judges and other legally sensitive 
business subjects, at modest prices. Additionally, Chinese courts also hold other resources that 
could be prudently commercialised without extensive investments or labour. For example, 
Chinese courts could offer modestly charged services for credibility check and asset tracking 
upon private requests. Courts could also offer judicial counselling programmes for the 
preparation of instruments with varied legal significance and management of legal risks or 
dispute avoidance.     
 
Besides, extra resources should be saved by rationally streamlining superfluous administrative 
personnel and downgrading the office facilities of Chinese courts. Chinese courts could 
consider replacing some permanent administrative positions with temporary internships, 
which would save their labour expenditures and simultaneously enlarge their reserve of 
competent talents. Meanwhile, this study observed that Chinese courts in the target regions 
generally enjoyed spacious premises and high-tech facilities to a somewhat excessive degree. 
Chinese courts could modestly compress their current generous and well-facilitated office 
spaces to create spare rooms for accommodating the foregoing resource-raising activities or 
other commercial utilisation, like leasing out to other parties. 
 
All in all, this thesis presents a portrayal of the real-life EAA in China’s ELDRs from an 
insider’s perspective upon the experiences of Chinese practitioners, unveils issues possibly 
imposing challenges to the EAA at varied levels, and raises several proposals for improving 
China’s overall execution environment upon the understanding of the current execution status 
in the target regions. Most importantly, this thesis reveals Chinese parties’ secrets of success 
under China’s current unfavourable execution circumstance,  and underscores the possibility 
of constructing a multi-agent execution framework upon the recognition of the important role 
played by the hitherto under-addressed PCAs in China’s current execution practice. This 
thesis also demonstrates the impact of China’s general and legal ideologies on shaping 
contemporary Chinese parties’ execution-related behaviours, which then highlights the 
necessity to address Chinese culture and social conditions in future China-related studies. Yet, 
considering that this thesis merely presents the execution experiences of a small group of 
Chinese practitioners in China’s ELDRs, studies with an extensive coverage into the overall 
execution environment in China could be arranged to further enrich understanding of China’s 
modern execution practice and facilitate the development of China’s commercial arbitration 
practice through ensuring the materialisation of arbitral awards.   
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Appendix A. Methodology 
1.1 Research Approaches  
This study chose to adopt the inductive approach, instead of the deductive one, to answer the 
predefined research questions about the execution of arbitral awards (EAA) from a Chinese 
perspective. According to Worster, the inductive approach refers to a theory-forming process 
striving for establishment of generalisable philosophies about the underlined research themes, 
through carefully analysing a relatively small group of specific phenomena.907 He further 
explained that the key merit of the inductive approach rest on its capacity for encouraging 
researchers to shake off the restrictions of pre-settled assumptions and carry out their research 
projects with an open mind to produce new information about their particular topics.908 In 
comparison, deduction is a “truth-preserving” process, which works on generating concrete 
conclusions through testing hypotheses that are proposed upon pre-established theories.909 
Bearing the above theories in mind, this study determined to follow the inductive approach to 
explore the current execution status of arbitral awards in China, since this approach permits 
this study to abstract theories about the foregoing topic and expose the underlying causes of 
obstacles to execution, through observing the execution experiences of a small group of 
interviewees in two chosen target provinces with little interferences of presumptions. This 
research also uses qualitative methods to collect wanted data.  Compared with quantitative 
methods that are versed in the production of impersonal statistical descriptions about the 
research theme, qualitative approaches could allow this study to conduct an in-depth 
investigation into the perceptions of individual practitioners about the execution environment 
and practice in China, with a focus to generate experience-based answers about the real status 
of the EAA in China and spotlight potential factors that could support the obstacles to 
execution from an insider’s perspective.910  
 
Overall, this study utilised six data-gathering approaches, namely, a review of secondary 
materials, collection of statistical data from courts and arbitration commissions, survey by 
questionnaire, semi-structured interview, group interview and participant observation.  
 
                                                          
907 WT Worster, 'The Inductive and Deductive Methods in Customary International Law Analysis: Traditional and Modern 
Approaches' [2014] 45(2) Georgetown Journal of International Law 445-521 
908 ibid, 456-459 
909 ibid, 448 
910 A Bryman, Social Research Methods (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 375-378 
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1.2 Target Regions  
Due to the restricted research resources, this study determined to conduct a comparative case 
study to explore the determined theme. According to case study theories of Gerring, a case 
study can only produce valid results if a representative sample is involved.911 Theoretically, a 
representative sample refers to one that embraces some symbolic properties shared by “a 
larger population” and, thereby, serves as a feasible target for researchers to explore and infer 
generalisable theories.912 Generally speaking, administrative provinces in mainland China, 
apart from the tier-1 regions913, can be roughly categorised into two groups, merely 
considering the composition of the local population, economic status, and the bureaucratic 
atmosphere. Hence, when determining these two representative provinces, this study utilised 
the typical-case approach and set four criteria for case selection, namely, the composition of 
the local population, economic status, the bureaucratic atmosphere, and the accessibility of 
data. Upon selection, two provinces of China were selected to be the research targets. To 
protect sources of information, these two provinces are referred to as Target 1 and 2 in this 
thesis. 
 
Specifically, Target 1 is a province with huge population, rich cultural heritages, relatively 
developed legal practice, but unbalanced economic developments at municipal level and a 
complicated social situation within its jurisdiction. Noticeably, although merely constituting 
roughly 1% of the whole long-staying population, the ethnic minority community in Target 1 
embraces individuals from all ethnic backgrounds in China, largely due to its geographic 
location. Such diversity in the composition of the local population inevitably compels local 
authorities to pay extra heed to settlement of the conflicts between the major and minor ethnic 
groups. This province is now considered possessing remarkable investment potential because 
of its well-connected geographic location, the smaller presence of foreign investment and 
large local corporations, and business-friendly policies. However, owing to its strategically-
important geographic location and political history, this province is seemingly governed by a 
comparatively conservative bureaucratic atmosphere. In comparison, Target 2 is an ethnic 
minority province boasting the time-honoured coexistence of multiple ethnic minority groups. 
Geographic conditions, rich ethnic cultures and less population shape the social environment 
of Target 2 in a manner, which reveals contrasting discrepancies with that of Target 1. More 
noticeably, Target 2 is statutorily granted with autonomy to handle regional ethnic issues and, 
                                                          
911 J Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge University Press 2007) 86-150, 86 
912 ibid, 145. 
913 See n12. 
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thereby, management of ethnic-related issues is a crucial, but less demanding, task for 
authorities in Target 2, compared with the situation in Target 1. This area also used to suffer 
from a fairly backward economy and complex social conditions, but is now and will be 
enjoying, privileged policies for attracting both inland and overseas investments to promote 
regional economic development, particularly over the next decade. Learning from previous 
experiences and observations of this study, this province seems to uphold a prudent, but less 
conservative, bureaucratic culture, loosely proved by the comparatively frequent interaction 
between the local judicial and academic communities. This might be attributed to the 
gradually rising economic position and politic impacts of Target 2 in its neighbourhood, 
which requests a more legally-advanced and commerce-friendly regional environment. For 
both of the provinces, this study managed to locate local contacts, who were willing to offer 
substantial assistance in access to data and potential informants. Therefore, through 
comprehensively considering the foregoing considerations, Target 1 and 2 were chosen by 
this study as representatives respectively for the foregoing two groups of China’s 
economically less-developed regions (ELDRs). A comparative study of these two chosen 
provinces could allow this study to create a rough picture of the legal environment and the 
EAA in places outside China’s tier-1 regions, which might arouse interests of the academia to 
further explore the legal development in these regions.     
 
1.3 Process of Research 
1.3.1 Utilisation of statistical data   
Commencing with a review of the existing literature, this study preyed on accessible 
execution-related data, both textual and statistic, from three sources of information, namely, a 
university-facilitated library database, legitimate online resources and the assistances of four 
institutions. This study particularly went after statistics about court-led execution cases, the 
development of Chinese courts, and the workload of arbitration commissions, as well as 
reports of courts’ decisions about the R&E of arbitral awards. Through triangulating these 
multi-sourced data, this study planned to statistically depict the latest execution environment 
and development of Chinese arbitration practice, whilst presenting a comparison between the 
findings of this study and the execution status reported by the literature. Besides, these data 
could be analysed against those released by Chinese authorities or institutions (e.g. the SPC) 
to verify the reliability of the latter. 
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Two kinds of statistical data, namely, publically assessable statistics and unpublished 
institution-held records, were used in this study. Initially, this study abstracted statistics from 
the published academic work and public media. Scholarly publications, official reports and 
statistics, news, and execution-related online comments all fell into the scope of appreciated 
data in this study. Comparatively speaking, this study discovered many useful materials from 
official websites of the SPC and CIETAC, as well as online platforms, like Kluwer 
Arbitration, Lawinfochina and Legal Blog (in Chinese). This study precisely citied the sources 
of secondary materials and quotes from other scholarly contributes or official documents, with 
a keen aim to avoid plagiarism. Additionally, this study obtained unpublished execution-
related statistics from four institutions, thanks to the generous supports of the corresponding 
authorities and contacts. It should be emphasised that the foregoing data sharing stayed within 
the legally permitted authority of the concerned institutions, and was strictly restricted to the 
lawfully disclosable contents that did not embrace privacy-sensitive information, like contact 
methods and names of the parties to arbitration. Meanwhile, this data was presented to the 
author through unofficial-but-lawful sources, with a full disclosure of research purpose and 
the utilisation of data to the concerned institutions and contacts in advance.  
 
1.3.2 Survey by questionnaire  
Essentially, the questionnaire was designated as an instrument for this study to gather 
opinions from judges or lawyers, who held valuable information about the research theme, but 
were unavailable to attend interview.914  
 
i. Design of questionnaire 
To fulfil the foregoing purpose, this study adopted the combination of close and open-ended 
questions to form this questionnaire. This is because close-ended questions could help this 
study with detecting the respondents’ attitude towards a particular issue, while open-ended 
questions could require respondents to justify their attitudes in their own terms, thereby 
allowing this study to decipher reasons behind their answers.915 
 
In total, two versions were prepared for judges, while one version served lawyers and other 
individuals. Structurally, these three versions of the questionnaire shared the same framework, 
                                                          
914 NM Bradburn and others, Asking Questions: The Definitive Guide to Questionnaire Design -- For Market Research, 
Political Polls, and Social and Health Questionnaires (Revised edn, John Wiley & Sons 2004) 151-155 
915 ibid. 
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containing an introductory statement and three key sections. In specific terms, the 
questionnaire started with a statement, which explained the background information of this 
study, highlighting the identity of the researcher, contact methods, issue of confidentiality and 
instructions for completion. The first section of the questionnaire worked on collecting 
personal details of the respondents, including gender, age, position, length of practice, and 
academic qualification. Then, the questionnaire moved on to explore the respondents’ 
opinions on function, practicability and the development perspective of commercial 
arbitration, as well as their willingness to use arbitration for dispute settlement, in a 
successive manner. Finally, the third part of the questionnaire saw slight adjustments of the 
contents, which distinguished the foregoing versions of questionnaire from each other.  
 
Nonetheless, these three versions of the questionnaire embraced the following slight 
discrepancies. Compared with the first version of the questionnaire for judges (distributed 
around the July of 2014), the updated second version raised a question (Q16) about the 
average percentage of actual materialisation of awarded values in individual cases.  It is worth 
mentioning that these two versions of the questionnaire for judges were caused by a 
modification that was made upon the enlightenment of Interviewee 1, and the latter version 
was only presented to judges after the September of 2014. Consequently, Q16 in the second 
version of the questionnaire for judges was processed individually, whereas the rest unrevised 
questions were assessed together with those in the first version during the process of data 
analysis. Besides, for lawyers and other parties, they received a questionnaire, which left out 
two questions about training received by judges, and offered different answer options under 
Q19. These differences were determined by two considerations: (1) lawyers and other parties 
were unlikely to have precise knowledge about training arrangement of judges, so it would be 
of little value to ask them about judges’ training status; and (2) the inefficient performance of 
judges might be considered an obstacle to execution from the perspectives of lawyers and 
other parties, but this view might not be an acceptable option for judges and, thus, this study 
decided to offer judges different options about reasons causing difficulty in execution.  
 
ii. Sampling strategy 
Guided by the underscored research theme, this study marked judges, lawyers, arbitrators, and 
other parties with knowledge of the China-grounded execution as its target groups. This 
choice was purposefully decided upon the ground that these informants’ familiarity with 
China’s execution mechanism could provide this study with frontline experiences and a fresh 
interpretation of China’s execution environment. This study used the snowball sampling 
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strategy to recruit respondents, upon approval from the supervisory team. The sampling 
process worked in the following steps: (1) the author first reached out to a contact and 
discussed the possibility of a survey by questionnaire; (2) the contact worked out a list of 
institutions hosting potential respondents who might be available for the survey; (3) the 
respondents were approached by the contact or the author to obtain their approval to 
participate. By using this method, this study could ensure its access to informants, especially 
lawyers and judges, who held useful information about the research theme and, more 
importantly, were available for the survey or other forms of participation.916  
 
iii. Distribution of questionnaire 
Prior to the recruitment of participants, experiences of Peerenboom917 and advice from 
contacts exposed the strong likelihood for this study to encounter hardship in distributing and 
collecting questionnaires, because the thin academic reputation of the author and the tight 
research schedule of this study would make this questionnaire survey a time-consuming, 
possibly fruitless, chase.  Hence, this study decided to conduct the survey under the condition 
that the distributing process of questionnaires could be supervised by the author or an 
entrusted contact, so as to ensure turnout and quality of completion. Specifically, the 
questionnaires were either presented to the respondents by the author in person or by a contact 
through his/her network. In the latter case, a questionnaire was first distributed to a contact, 
with the clear instruction that the questionnaire should be completed only by judges in the 
Judicial Execution Bureau of an intermediate court or lawyers with experiences in execution. 
The process of completion was then self-administered by respondents. Finally, the completed 
questionnaires were collected and sent back to the author. 
 
1.3.3 Semi-structured interview  
Comparatively speaking, interview was a more-heavily-reliant data-gathering technique for 
this study than questionnaire, since interview was proved by the previous research to be a 
productive method to approach Chinese informants and, more importantly, it could empower 
this study to harvest detailed and personalised materials in a flexible manner.918 This study 
decided to use semi-structured interviews to collect wanted data from potential informants, 
because this method permitted the author to consult with interviewees about the determined 
                                                          
916 A Rubin and ER Babbie, Research Methods for Social Work (7 edn, Cengage Learning 2010) 358 
917 Peerenboom(n11) 258-262 
918 I Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences 
(Teachers College Press 2013) 7-9 
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topics, but simultaneously left interviewees acceptable leeway to elaborate on matters that 
were significant from their point of view, thereby diversifying and enriching the collected 
qualitative data.919 
 
i. Drafting of questions  
Pursuant to the determined research questions, this study prepared an interview guide 
stipulating the procedural arrangement of the interview and the scope of the inquiry.  In total, 
this study listed 12 topics to be covered in an interview. Five topics relating to China’s current 
execution status constituted the main thread of interview, while other seven topics 
respectively addressed issues concerning the execution-related regulatory framework, 
stakeholders in the execution process and performance of Chinese courts.  Meanwhile, this 
study permitted the author to spontaneously adjust the contents of interview in accordance 
with the responses of interviewees and length of interview. 
 
ii. Sampling approach 
This study also employed the snowball sampling technique to locate potential candidates for 
interview. The sampling process for interview embraced two steps.  Firstly, the author 
informed a contact about the specifications of wanted information, and the contact then 
referred the author to the potential candidates that matched the descriptions and sat within his 
reach. Afterwards, once a willingness to participate was confirmed, the author would 
communicate with the marked informants directly to deliberate over details of their 
participation.   
 
Thanks to the ungrudging endorsement of several contacts, the author finally obtained 
opportunities to interview 29 informants. Among them, 17 participants resided in Target 1 
and 10 from Target 2. Demographically speaking, the informant group from Target 1 
comprised 4 judges920, 10 lawyers, 1 senior official from a local arbitration commission, and 2 
individuals with experiences in execution of judgments or debt collection. This study 
approached 7 judges and 3 lawyers in Target 2. It also interviewed one individual, who owned 
a business premises outside the targets, but was familiar with the business atmosphere and 
practice in the target provinces and other regions in China, thanks to his nationwide business 
operation. Learning from this individual, this study obtained informative insights into China’s 
                                                          
919 SN Hesse-Biber and P Leavy, The Practice of Qualitative Research (SAGE 2011), 102 
920 Interviewee 3 had experiences of serving in a grassroots court outside the targets, but was off duty at the point of 
interview. Interviewee 28 was honourably retired.  
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current business environment and experiences of a creditor in self-reliant debt collection. 
Besides, an informant from a private collection agency (PCAC), headquartered in China’s 
tier-1 region, was consulted to explore operation experiences of the agency, with an aim to 
produce a comparison against performances of its counterparts in China’s economically less-
developed regions (ELDRs).  
 
iii. Delivery of interview 
An interview normally took on a one-to-one basis and lasted about 30 minutes. Aside from 
the one with Interview 29, all interviews were recorded by hand-written notes, while a few 
had audio records, but only used for information correction and gap filling. Upon his request 
for identity protection, Interviewee 29 was approached through a series of communications 
via a mutual contact, and the interview notes were recorded electronically. 
 
1.3.4 Group interview 
Learning from the outcomes of semi-structured interview with judges and lawyers in Target 1, 
this study found that some informants seemingly felt uncomfortable about the one-to-one 
interview, and the data collection process was considerably prolonged because the interview 
arrangements had to be justified to accommodate the varied timetables of individuals. Hence, 
this study adopted group interviews with judges and lawyers in Target 2, to encourage these 
informants to share their experiences in a less confrontational environment and save the 
research resources.921 This study conducted two group interviews with seven judges and one 
with two lawyers. Two group interviews with judges lasted for over 1 hour, each embracing a 
pre-interview talk for almost 20 minutes and a group discussion section for 40 to 60 minutes. 
The group interview with two lawyers lasted for about 40 minutes. Note-taking was used to 
record the outcomes of these group interviews. Group interviews apparently worked well 
amid judges, proved by their contributions and active participation. This is possibly because 
the group interview was organised like a routine staff meeting, which created a friendly 
environment for judges to break their reticence and draw inspirations from others’ opinions to 
enrich their comments.  In contrast, lawyers seemingly preferred meeting on a one-to-one 
basis, possibly due to a feeling of assured confidentiality. Overall, group interviews reaped 
productive outcomes and new insights into obstacles to the EAA from informants.  
 
                                                          
921 NK Denzin and YS Lincoln, The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (SAGE 2005) 704; RK Merton, Focused 
Interview (Simon and Schuster 2008) 135-147 
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1.3.5 Pilot trial 
Upon completion of questionnaire and interview guidance, this study firstly sought academic 
approval from the supervisory team, based on which the contents of these documents were 
further modified to accentuate the research focuses. Then, the prepared Chinese-version 
questionnaires, together with other background documents, were reviewed by the contacts of 
the author. Two of these contacts are chosen for their professional backgrounds in legal 
practices and academic research, whereas the third contact was invited to benefit from her rich 
experiences in project supervision and paper-drafting skills. Three contacts kindly offered 
their feedback respectively about the design of the questionnaires and experience of 
completion, based on which the contents of questionnaires were slightly modified and 
methods for distributing questionnaires were determined. To assess the feasibility of interview 
guidance, the author invited two Chinese students with business backgrounds and knowledge 
about the concerned themes to join in a mock interview. Their feedback reminded the author 
of the necessity to flexibly adjust the contents of interview and conduct efficient time 
management, so as to ensure productivity and informativeness of interviews. 
 
1.3.6 Participant observation 
This study conducted a brief participant observation of a PCAC’s operation, because this 
method could allow this study to engage in daily operations of this agency, to obtain 
knowledge of how this agency managed to complete debt collection in the absence of 
statutorily recognised identity and authority.922 This participant observation was subject to 
mutually agreed conditions between the agency and the author. Through this participant 
observation, this study acquired a superficial understanding of the internal management, field 
debt collection operation, and organisational culture of this agency. Particularly, it obtained 
first-hand knowledge of the agency’s business environment, operational style and efficiency 
in task completion. Based on the outcomes of the participant observation, this study was able 
to comparatively analyse the performances of China’s three major collection agents, namely, 
courts, lawyers and PCACs. This comparative analysis not only exposed the strengths and 
weaknesses of different collection agencies, but also furnished informative data for this study 
to propose suggestions for future reforms of China’s execution framework. 
 
                                                          
922 KM Dewalt and BR Dewalt, Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers (Rowman Altamira 2011) 1-16 
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1.3.7 Data collection  
The whole data collection process of this study was divided into two phases. The first phase 
ran from 28 August to 28 November 2014, and the second one from 7 April to 22 July 2015. 
 
During the first three-month fieldwork, a questionnaire survey and semi-structured interview 
were employed flexibly according to the specific situations. Two versions of questionnaires 
for judges were distributed via contacts respectively around the July and September of 2014, 
while the questionnaires for lawyers were presented in person by the author. In total, this 
study merely accepted 31 valid questionnaires from five courts923 and 2 from lawyers. It 
should be mentioned that most respondents either gave brief answers to open questions or 
simply escaped them. Yet, the results of questionnaire yielded useful statistics for this study to 
compare with the outcomes of the previous research, to describe the execution environment 
and development of commercial arbitration from the perspectives of Chinese legal 
practitioners. This study also obtained some ideas about reasons underpinning the theme-
related perceptions of Chinese legal practitioners. Besides, the first round of fieldwork 
witnessed this study interviewing 24 informants, obtaining the execution statistics of three 
institutions, and arranging a later delivery of statistics by another institution. Afterwards, this 
study completed a roughly three-month participant observation924 on the operations of a 
PCAC, interviewed four informants, revisited two interviewees for further detailed 
information, and initiated contacts with Interviewee 29 during the second round of fieldwork.    
 
1.3.8 Data analysis 
As for data analysis, this research adopted the data-centred approach and diverse methods to 
process information from multiple sources, to build a coherent justification for the final 
conclusions of this research. However, due to the small quantity of data involved, this study 
did not resort to computer-based software, like SPSS or NVivo, but completed the data 
analysis manually.  
 
Initially, results of the questionnaire survey were recorded in an Excel file, and descriptive 
statistics read therefrom were presented925 to generate up-to-date comments on the 
                                                          
923 Five copies from a court in Target 1, eighteen from three courts in Target 2, and eight from another court in the 
neighbourhood of Target 2. 
924 This observation ran from 13 April to 3 July 2015. 
925 In Chapters IV to VII. 
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corresponding themes. Despite the small size of samples, this questionnaire survey yielded 
some informative data reflecting perceptions of practitioners on four topics, namely, the 
development status and perception of Chinese commercial arbitration, the general situation of 
court-led execution, and potential obstacles to execution. This data was then analysed against 
the findings of previous studies to present a statistical description of the execution situation 
for arbitral awards in China’ ELDRs.   
 
For information derived from semi-structured interviews and participant observation, this 
study used the thematic analysis to categorise and triangulate them in accordance with main 
themes.926 Procedurally, the notes of interview and observation, which appeared in textual 
form, were firstly perused and judiciously interpreted in a context-driven manner, without 
guidance of pre-defined suppositions. Then, this study identified and pigeonholed themes 
with repeated occurrence in the foregoing notes, pursuant to the defined research focus. 
Afterwards, a coding scheme was constructed, based on which the whole data set was coded 
and critically assessed to detect the interrelations amid the identified themes. Specifically, all 
the qualitative data was firstly categorised under four headings, namely, development of 
arbitration, general comments about the execution status, problems, and evidence for the 
influence of cultural factors. Then, data associated with problems was divided into eight 
groups, respectively about asset tracking, creditor, debtor, collection agents, China’s 
legislative framework, arbitral awards, cultural factors, corruption and local protectionism. 
Afterwards, according to the identity of the related interviewee, this data was further 
subdivided in accordance with five types of informants, namely, judges, lawyers, arbitrators, 
creditors and private collection agents.   
 
Finally, the findings of the previous data analysis were cross-checked against those stemming 
from the literature and jurisdictional data to yield consistent results and minimise bias. 
Benefiting from the foregoing process, this study was enabled to generate a concise picture 
portraying the EAA in the two targets and explore the underlying reasons triggering obstacles 
to execution, while producing preliminary theoretical answers to the research questions. Yet, 
it should be highlighted that the outcomes of data analysis were reported in gender-neutral 
languages, because gender was not set as a crucial factor to be addressed in this study. 
 
                                                          
926 D Ezzy, Qualitative Analysis (Routledge 2013) 80-88 
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1.4 Ethical Considerations 
Initially, pursuant to the university’s research regulations, this study adopted the following 
approaches to manage data protection and confidentiality. All participants were promptly 
advised on the essential background information of this research, highlighting the identity of 
the author, the purpose of this study and methods for data protection. Also, each participant 
was presented with a consent form and a participant debriefing sheet, and was asked to leave a 
signature before engaging in the research process. However, this requirement of written 
consent caused spreading anxiety about identity protection among the chosen informants of 
this study, especially those who engaged in the debt collection business that has not been 
legally recognised in China yet. Seven participants willingly accomplished interviews or 
questionnaires, but rejected to sign the consent form in the first-round of fieldwork. This left 
this study in an awkward position, with scant evidence to justify the sources of information in 
accordance with the school’s requirements. Additionally, concern about confidentiality 
dragged several other informants away from this study, after being asked to sign a consent 
form. For example, shortly after the completion of his interview, Interviewee 9 claimed that 
he would withdrew his statements unless the signed consent form was destroyed in his 
presence. This request was motivated by an anxiety that there was a good chance that his 
signature might be accidentally released to third parties and, then, could enable others to 
easily track him down. Meanwhile, three interviewees927 contributed their remarks after 
attaining an assurance that the author would not directly quote their remarks or reveal their 
personal identities (apart from their occupation and work experiences) in the final publication. 
All these foregoing observations jointly verified Chinese practitioners’ high susceptibilities to 
issues of confidentiality. In view of this shared anxiety about confidentiality, this study was 
forced to adjust the original choice of consent procedure, which merely accepted written 
consents. Specifically, this study allowed the informants to give a verbal or written consent at 
their discretion, and used the notes of an interview or a completed questionnaire as a proof of 
their voluntary participation. This study also promised that participants could withdraw their 
consent at any time, and their data would be subsequently destroyed upon a notified 
withdrawal.  
 
Besides, an assurance of anonymity and confidentiality was provided to prevent participants’ 
private details from accidental or deliberate leakage. Firstly, for those participants who 
voluntarily disclosed their names and contact details, their personal information were 
                                                          
927 Interview 4, 7 and 28. 
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removed from questionnaires, electronic notes of interviews or other data collection forms, 
and replaced with identification codes solely serving this study. A separate identification file 
linking codes to names of participants was created to permit latter references or correction of 
information. This file was properly sealed and only accessed by the author. This is a standard 
practice in research on commercial arbitration and such arrangements have been exploited in a 
number of published pieces of research.928 Secondly, any information that would lead to 
exposure of informants’ identities was deleted from or recoded in the context of this 
dissertation. For instance, the two chosen provinces were addressed as Target 1 and 2 to 
protect sources of information. It is also worth highlighting that, to protect the anonymity of 
the related stakeholders and of the places where were the subjects of the study, this study 
transformed statistics to exclude detailed information that could lead to de-anonymization, or 
to the disclosure of personally identifiable data. This involves, for example, conversion of the 
key figures into the corresponding percentages without distortions. This arrangement 
inevitably precluded this dissertation from presenting all collected data. Thirdly, utilisation of 
the collected data was strictly subject to the conditions of anonymity mutually agreed between 
the author and the corresponding participants. No third party was permitted to access the 
original documents. Finally, all collected materials, especially the hand-written notes of 
interview and participant observation, will be properly destroyed upon the completion of this 
research, pursuant to the university’s regulations. 
 
1.5 Limitations 
Reviewing the whole research process, this study suffered from some discernible limitations.  
1.5.1 Geographically narrow focus of research   
Due to the restriction of research resources, this study chose practitioners from two provinces 
to conduct data collection. Meanwhile, the procedural regulations of the corresponding four 
institutions and timetable of this study jointly restricted this study to only dip into execution-
related data of the years prior to the time of data collection, which was before the November 
of 2014. Consequently, this study only presented an incomplete statistical description of the 
latest execution situation in the two regions. Nonetheless, the qualitative data utilised in this 
study was contributed by participants familiar with legal practice and execution environment 
                                                          
928 For instance, Y Dezalay and BG Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of 
a Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press 1998) 
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in the concerned provinces. Hence, these comments are informative for deciphering the 
practical situation of the EAA in these two provinces. More importantly, the problems 
repeatedly addressed by these practitioners, typically like difficulty in asset tracking and 
shortcomings of China’s legislative framework, can be projected on to other regions in 
mainland China. For statistical data directly derived from judicial and arbitration institutions, 
their authenticity was verified by the sources of information, which constituted their key merit. 
Thus, through heedfully analysing the collected data and the secondary materials, this study is 
able to present a broad picture of the EAA in China’s ELDRs. 
 
1.5.2 Reliance on qualitative data from a small group of practitioners 
This study merely collected opinions from a small group of Chinese judges, lawyers and 
individuals with previous execution-related experiences in the two chosen provinces, while 
escaping opinions from foreign practitioners and Chinese parties from other regions. 
Meanwhile, this study did not collect the opinions of creditors with direct experiences in the 
EAA, because it was denied access to contact information of these parties by the related 
authorities for confidentiality considerations.  
 
Despite these restrictions, the interviewed practitioners, who enjoyed a rich knowledge or 
experiences about execution of legal instruments in the target provinces, furnished this study 
with illuminating insights into the execution status and particularities in China. Additionally, 
two individuals, who were consulted for their experiences in self-reliant collection of overdue 
judgments or debts, revealed problems that could equally affect the EAA, from a creditor’s 
perspective. Furthermore, perceptions of two informants, who had years of experiences in the 
private collection business, enlightened this study on the operations of PCACs in the absence 
of lawful identity and statutory authority. Their comments, together with the outcomes of the 
participant observation, afforded this study valuable materials for comparatively assessing the 
execution performance of Chinese collection agents and proposing suggestions for future 
reforms of China’s execution framework. Based on the foregoing data, this study managed to 
produce its claims about the existing obstacle to execution in China’s ELDRs and the 
underlying causes of these obstacles. 
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1.5.3 Issues associated with China’s research environment  
During the field data collection, this study encountered the following three issues associated 
with China’s current research environment. At first glance, the environment for conducting 
legal research in China is apparently not very friendly. However, interviewees remarked that 
Chinese judiciary would love to cooperate with academic researchers, so as to seek intelligent 
support and recognition from the latter.929 The key reason precluding them from actively 
participating in research projects is a deep-rooted worry that their contributions might be 
misinterpreted by researchers, who are affected either by their little understanding of real-life 
legal operations or by their prejudiced attitude towards China’s judicial system, and then lead 
to deceptive conclusions.930 Such fear substantially blocked the path for this study to peruse 
classified official records. For instance, the author was permitted to read the original case 
registration record of an intermediate court, but with certain data deliberately left out. 
Specifically, the author learned some case-specific information, like names of judges and 
amounts of money to be enforced in particular cases, but was politely denied access to the 
contact methods of the applicants and judges, together with briefings of the execution process 
and the final outcomes in these cases, upon the ground that this information was only 
accessible for internal review. But, this situation does not declare the unfeasibility of 
empirical legal research projects in China. Rather, it highlights the significance of 
researchers’ sound reputation and impartial attitude for winning approval from China’s 
judiciary and legal community. As mentioned previously, this study achieved its current 
outcomes with firm endorsement from the author’s close acquaintances, who held crucial 
positions in their corresponding fields. An interviewee stated that, without the endorsement of 
the related contact, he would simply use official excuses to reject meeting the author in the 
first place, let alone disclose any statistics that this study hankered after.931 This indirectly 
explains why Chinese authorities are reluctant to participate in research projects carried out by 
foreigners, especially those that cannot provide reliable referees to back up their research. 
Therefore, it is fair to say that China is not hostile to all socio-legal research projects, but 
merely to those with low credibility or weak endorsement. 
 
Additionally, the experiences of this study detected the awkward situation of female-led 
research projects in China. Being a female-led research project, this study firstly tasted 
difficulty in convincing informants to accept its seriousness and credibility, and then endured 
                                                          
929 Interviewee 10 and 14. 
930 Causally expressed by Interviewee 14,15,16,17 and 21. 
931 Interviewee 2. 
 222 
 
persistent scepticism in later data collection, notwithstanding the endorsement of contacts. 
However, the author’s identity helped this study win the ticket of the participant observation, 
since female figures were considered less threatening to the currently male-controlled debt 
collection business. But, the author was refused by the agency, upon the ground of safety 
consideration, to attend some events, like night field operations. Hence, future research 
projects are advised to take into consideration the potential impact of researcher’s identity on 
data collection. 
 
Besides, the research schedule of this study failed to properly accommodate some ‘special 
Chinese events’.  When organising the first round of fieldwork, this study overlooked the 
arrangement of China’s national holiday, and the determined fieldwork plan was also attacked 
by the agenda of political meetings. These two factors negatively affected the progression of 
this round of fieldwork to a noticeable extent. Such setbacks persuaded this study to carefully 
plan the following fieldwork to mitigate conflicts between the fieldwork schedule and China’s 
special events.  
 
Despite suffering from the foregoing problems, this study acquired participation of 29 
interviewees, 33 valid questionnaires and other execution-related data from its fieldwork. This 
data empowered this study to portray a broad picture of the EAA in China’s ELDRs and the 
problems to be solved.   
 
1.5.4 Issues about language utilisation 
Language utilisation also constitutes a factor challenging this study. Conducting the research 
in Chinese but later publishing outcomes in English makes cross-language translation an 
unavoidable task to be addressed. Because the chosen informants were all Chinese and only 
very few of them could read English, the documents utilised in the fieldwork had to be firstly 
translated into Chinese. Meanwhile, the outcomes derived from the fieldwork and data 
contributed by the concerned institutions were all presented in Chinese. Considering that the 
final outcomes would be reported in English, this study has endured persistent worry about 
the accuracy of cross-language translation and interpretation of controversial terms during the 
whole research process. Additionally, this study noticed the frequent emergence of regional 
dialects and profession-specific jargons during data collection. Though Mandarin is 
popularised as China’s official language, the experiences of this study confirm that each 
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province in China honours their unique dialects, which embrace discrepancies even between 
two adjacent cities.  Meanwhile, this study notices that, due to diversity of regional cultures, 
different parts of China might interpret a particular event with dissimilar colloquial phrases. 
This study fortunately tasted little difficulty in understanding dialects, but failed to catch 
unfamiliar colloquial phrases that occasionally emerged during the meetings with informants 
from Target 2. Moreover, the author was stunned by jargons sporadically appearing in the 
conversions between employees of the observed PCAC during the participant observation. 
The foregoing issues, to some extent, limited the ability for this study to extract more 
information from informants and the participant observation.  
 
Yet, though facing these language barriers, this study succeeded in productively 
communicating with interviewees and obtaining meaningful information therefrom, thanks to 
the nationwide utilisation of Mandarin and the assistance of contacts, who kindly translated 
unfamiliar local dialects from time to time. Additionally, this study exerted extra attention to 
translate and present the collected Chinese data in this thesis. During the cross-translation 
process, the original meanings of the collected data were preserved to the best of the author’s 
ability. 
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Appendix B. Questionnaire on Enforcement of Commercial Arbitral 
Awards in China 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
I, a PhD student in Law of Newcastle University, is undertaking a research project to 
decipher the situation of enforcing commercial arbitral awards in China. To help me achieve 
this aim, please kindly complete the following questionnaire as accurately as you can. 
Although your response is of the utmost importance to me, your participation in this survey is 
entirely voluntary. All information provided by you hereafter will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and reported in coded format. Under no circumstance, you will be traced through 
your responses. Please kindly return the completed questionnaire back to me via email at 
m.qu@ncl.ac.uk before 30 September 2014. Should you have any queries or comments 
regarding this survey, you are welcome to contact me at m.qu@ncl.ac.uk.  
 
Please answer the following questions by ticking the block where appropriate, or write down 
your answer in the space provided. Besides, please pay attention to instructions specified 
after several exceptional questions.  
 
Section A  Background information  
(This section refers to background or biographical information. Your responses will remain 
anonymous.) 
1. Gender:  □Male    □Female  
2. Age: ____________ 
3. Position:____________ 
4. Years of service or practice:____________ 
5. Current academic qualification:___________ 
 
Section B  
This section explores your perceptions regarding commercial arbitration 
6. Are you familiar with commercial arbitration practice?  □Yes   □No 
7. Do you think that commercial arbitration should be adopted as an alternative means, other 
than litigation, for solving commercial disputes in China?   □Yes    □No 
 225 
 
7.1 What make you think so? (Please briefly specify your answer) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. What do you think of the effectiveness of commercial arbitral awards? 
□ Do not have any binding effect, unless being honoured by parties. 
□ Carry limited binding effect upon recognition of parties. 
□ Only become binding after approved by competent authorise. 
□ Automatically enjoy the same binding effect as judgments, if without irregularities. 
9. In your opinion, what is the prospect for the development of commercial arbitration in 
China?  
□ Have no room for further development and will wither gradually along with the 
perfection of China’s litigation practice. 
□ Have limited room for development, since it follows the latest trend in international 
legal practice, but does not fit in with Chinese legal tradition. 
□ Have more room for development, because of requirements for alterative disputes 
resolution raised by China’s business society. 
□ Unsure, because there is lack of statistics proving the effectiveness and development 
of commercial arbitration in China. 
10. In your opinion, what would be the better option for resolving commercial disputes, 
especially those foreign-related ones, provided that resolution through friendly negotiation 
between parties involved is unlikely?  
□ Litigation      □ Arbitration         □ Mediation    
□ Others (Please specify your answers)                             
10.1  What make you think so? (Please briefly specify your answer) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section C 
This section explores your perceptions regarding the enforcement framework and 
corresponding practice in China.  
11. How many execution cases would you assume annually?                             
12. Have you ever handled applications for executing arbitral awards? □Yes   □No 
12.1 Have you ever handled applications for executing foreign arbitral awards? □Yes   □No 
12.2 If yes, what was the outcome of the related cases? □Succeeded  □Failed  □In progress 
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If your case was failed, please brief on the reasons causing such failure. 
 
 
13. Among your previous execution cases, what is the most common type of dispute 
involved? □Commercial dispute □Labour dispute □Debt dispute □Other civil dispute 
14. What was the success rate of your previous cases?                                     
15. How long would the execution period last in your previous cases? Shortest            m to 
Longest            m. 
16. During the execution process, what institution would you turn to for assistance? (more 
than one option are available)  
□Local government     □Industrial and Commercial Bureau & Inland Revenue Bureau   
□Bank & Securities Regulatory Commissions (other financial institutions)  
□Housing Department & City Construction Department     □Public Security 
□Mass media     □Others                           (Please specify your answer) 
 
17. Among the execution measures proffered by China’s Civil Procedure Law, which 
measure in your opinion is the most effective?                             
18. In your previous execution practice, what kind of problems have you ever encountered? 
□Disappearance of or Asset-hiding by debtors  
□Insolvency of debtors, thereby having no sufficient assets to meet the execution 
□Resistance or passive delay from financial institutions (like Bank & Securities Regulatory 
Commissions) 
□Resistance or passive delay from Housing Department & City Construction Department     
□Other problems                                 (Please specify your answer) 
 
19. Do you think that the foregoing problems could be solved by reforms over a short period?  
□Yes   □No 
19.1  If yes, please specify which problems could be solved by reforms over a short period. 
 
19.2  What make you think so? (Please briefly state your reasons)  
 
19.3  What measures, do you think, could help with solving difficulty in execution under 
the current circumstance?  
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20. In your opinion, what kind of professional qualification should an execution judge 
possess? (more than one option are available)  
□Legal knowledge   □Financial knowledge □Negotiation skills  □Business knowledge □Other 
knowledge                                 (Please specify your answer) 
 
21. Do you think that the current on-the-job training for judges has addressed the cultivation 
of the foregoing qualifications? □Yes   □No 
21.1 If no, what knowledge, do you think, should be added into the current training for 
judges? 
 
 
22. Do you have chance to attend on-the-job training each year? □Yes   □No 
23. Do you think that the on-the-job training you have attended could benefit your 
performance?  
□Yes   □No 
24. Based on your experiences, what measure would you recommend creditors to take to 
ensure the outcomes of their execution cases to maximum? (Please briefly state your 
suggestions) 
 
Thank you for your co-operation in completing the questionnaire.  
 228 
 
Appendix C. Questionnaire on Enforcement of Commercial Arbitral 
Awards in China 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
I, a PhD student in Law of Newcastle University, is undertaking a research project to 
decipher the situation of enforcing commercial arbitral awards in China. To help me achieve 
this aim, please kindly complete the following questionnaire as accurately as you can. 
Although your response is of the utmost importance to me, your participation in this survey is 
entirely voluntary. All information provided by you hereafter will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and reported in coded format. Under no circumstance, you will be traced through 
your responses. Please kindly return the completed questionnaire back to me via email at 
m.qu@ncl.ac.uk before 30 September 2014. Should you have any queries or comments 
regarding this survey, you are welcome to contact me at m.qu@ncl.ac.uk.  
 
Please answer the following questions by ticking the block where appropriate, or write down 
your answer in the space provided. Besides, please pay attention to instructions specified 
after several exceptional questions.  
 
Section A  Background information  
(This section refers to background or biographical information. Your responses will remain 
anonymous.) 
1. Gender:  □Male    □Female  
2. Age: ____________ 
3. Position:____________ 
4. Years of service or practice:____________ 
5. Current academic qualification:___________ 
 
Section B  
This section explores your perceptions regarding commercial arbitration 
6. Are you familiar with commercial arbitration practice?  □Yes   □No 
7. Do you think that commercial arbitration should be adopted as an alternative means, other 
than litigation, for solving commercial disputes in China?   □Yes    □No 
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7.1 What make you think so? (Please briefly specify your answer) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. What do you think of the effectiveness of commercial arbitral awards? 
□ Do not have any binding effect, unless being honoured by parties. 
□ Carry limited binding effect upon recognition of parties. 
□ Only become binding after approved by competent authorise. 
□ Automatically enjoy the same binding effect as judgments, if without irregularities. 
9. In your opinion, what is the prospect for the development of commercial arbitration in 
China?  
□ Have no room for further development and will wither gradually along with the 
perfection of China’s litigation practice. 
□ Have limited room for development, since it follows the latest trend in international 
legal practice, but does not fit in with Chinese legal tradition. 
□ Have more room for development, because of requirements for alterative disputes 
resolution raised by China’s business society. 
□ Unsure, because there is lack of statistics proving the effectiveness and development 
of commercial arbitration in China. 
10. In your opinion, what would be the better option for resolving commercial disputes, 
especially   those foreign-related ones, provided that resolution through friendly negotiation 
between parties involved is unlikely?  
□ Litigation      □ Arbitration         □ Mediation    
□ Others (Please specify your answers)                             
10.1  What make you think so? (Please briefly specify your answer) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section C 
This section explores your perceptions regarding the enforcement framework and 
corresponding practice in China.  
11. How many execution cases would you assume annually?                             
12. Have you ever handled applications for executing arbitral awards? □Yes   □No 
12.1 Have you ever handled applications for executing foreign arbitral awards? □Yes   □No 
12.2 If yes, what was the outcome of the related cases? □Succeeded  □Failed  □In progress 
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If your case was failed, please brief on the reasons causing such failure. 
 
 
13. Among your previous execution cases, what is the most common type of dispute 
involved?    
     □Commercial dispute □Labour dispute □Debt dispute □Other civil dispute 
14. What was the success rate of your previous cases?                                     
15. How long would the execution period last in your previous cases? Shortest            m  to 
Longest            m. 
16. What was the rate of materialisation in your previous cases? (percentage against the total 
amount to be collected) 
□100% □76-99% □51-75% □26-50% □Less than 25% □Unsure 
17. During the execution process, what institution would you turn to for assistance? (more 
than one option are available)  
□Local government     □Industrial and Commercial Bureau & Inland Revenue Bureau   
□Bank & Securities Regulatory Commissions (other financial institutions)  
□Housing Department & City Construction Department     □Public Security 
□Mass media     □Others                           (Please specify your answer) 
 
18. Among the execution measures proffered by China’s Civil Procedure Law, which 
measure in your opinion is the most effective?                             
19. In your previous execution practice, what kind of problems have you ever encountered? 
□Disappearance of or Asset-hiding by debtors  
□Insolvency of debtors, thereby having no sufficient assets to meet the execution 
□Resistance or passive delay from financial institutions (like Bank & Securities Regulatory 
Commissions) 
□Resistance or passive delay from Housing Department & City Construction Department     
□Other problems                                 (Please specify your answer) 
 
19.1 Comparatively speaking, which problem have you encountered most frequently? (Please 
specify your answer) 
19.2 In your opinion, which problem is the most difficult one to be handled? (Please specify 
your answer) 
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20. Do you think that the foregoing problems could be solved by reforms over a short period? 
□Yes   □No 
20.1  If yes, please specify which problems could be solved by reforms over a short period. 
 
20.2  What measures, do you think, could help with solving difficulty in execution under 
the current circumstance?  
 
21. In your opinion, what kind of professional qualification should an execution judge 
possess? (more than one option are available)  
□Legal knowledge   □Financial knowledge □Negotiation skills  □Business knowledge □Other 
knowledge                                 (Please specify your answer) 
 
22. Do you think that the current on-the-job training for judges has addressed the cultivation 
of the foregoing qualifications? □Yes   □No 
22.1 If no, what knowledge, do you think, should be added into the current training for 
judges? 
 
23. Do you have chance to attend on-the-job training each year? □Yes   □No 
24. Do you think that the on-the-job training you have attended could benefit your 
performance?  
     □Yes   □No 
25. Based on your experiences, what measure would you recommend creditors to take to 
ensure the outcomes of their execution cases to maximum? (Please briefly state your 
suggestions) 
 
Thank you for your co-operation in completing the questionnaire. 
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Appendix D. Questionnaire on Enforcement of Commercial Arbitral 
Awards in China 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
I, a PhD student in Law of Newcastle University, is undertaking a research project to 
decipher the situation of enforcing commercial arbitral awards in China. To help me achieve 
this aim, please kindly complete the following questionnaire as accurately as you can. 
Although your response is of the utmost importance to me, your participation in this survey is 
entirely voluntary. All information provided by you hereafter will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and reported in coded format. Under no circumstance, you will be traced through 
your responses. Please kindly return the completed questionnaire back to me via email at 
m.qu@ncl.ac.uk before 30 September 2014. Should you have any queries or comments 
regarding this survey, you are welcome to contact me at m.qu@ncl.ac.uk.  
 
Please answer the following questions by ticking the block where appropriate, or write down 
your answer in the space provided. Besides, please pay attention to instructions specified 
after several exceptional questions.  
 
Section A  Background information  
(This section refers to background or biographical information. Your responses will remain 
anonymous.) 
1. Gender:  □Male    □Female  
2. Age: ____________ 
3. Position:____________ 
4. Years of service or practice:____________ 
5. Current academic qualification:___________ 
 
Section B  
This section explores your perceptions regarding commercial arbitration 
6. Are you familiar with commercial arbitration practice?  □Yes   □No 
7. Do you think that commercial arbitration should be adopted as an alternative means, other 
than litigation, for solving commercial disputes in China?   □Yes    □No 
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7.1 What make you think so? (Please briefly specify your answer) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. What do you think of the effectiveness of commercial arbitral awards? 
□ Do not have any binding effect, unless being honoured by parties. 
□ Carry limited binding effect upon recognition of parties. 
□ Only become binding after approved by competent authorise. 
□ Automatically enjoy the same binding effect as judgments, if without irregularities. 
9. In your opinion, what is the prospect for the development of commercial arbitration in 
China?  
□ Have no room for further development and will wither gradually along with the 
perfection of China’s litigation practice. 
□ Have limited room for development, since it follows the latest trend in international 
legal practice, but does not fit in with Chinese legal tradition. 
□ Have more room for development, because of requirements for alterative disputes 
resolution raised by China’s business society. 
□ Unsure, because there is lack of statistics proving the effectiveness and development 
of commercial arbitration in China. 
10. In your opinion, what would be the better option for resolving commercial disputes, 
especially those foreign-related ones, provided that resolution through friendly negotiation 
between parties involved is unlikely?  
□ Litigation      □ Arbitration         □ Mediation    
□ Others (Please specify your answers)                             
10.1  What make you think so? (Please briefly specify your answer) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section C 
This section explores your perceptions regarding the enforcement framework and 
corresponding practice in China.  
11. How many execution cases would you assume annually?                             
12. Have you ever handled applications for executing arbitral awards? □Yes   □No 
12.1 Have you ever handled applications for executing foreign arbitral awards? □Yes   □No 
12.2 If yes, what was the outcome of the related cases? □Succeeded  □Failed  □In progress 
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If your case was failed, please brief on the reasons causing such failure. 
 
13. Among your previous execution cases, what is the most common type of dispute 
involved?  
      □Commercial dispute □Labour dispute □Debt dispute □Other civil dispute 
14. What was the success rate of your previous cases?                                     
15. How long would the execution period last in your previous cases? Shortest            m  to 
Longest            m. 
16. What was the rate of materialisation in your previous cases? (percentage against the total 
amount to be collected) 
□100% □76-99% □51-75% □26-50% □Less than 25% □Unsure 
17. During the execution process, what institution would you turn to for assistance? (more 
than one option are available)  
□Local government     □Industrial and Commercial Bureau & Inland Revenue Bureau   
□Bank & Securities Regulatory Commissions (other financial institutions)  
□Housing Department & City Construction Department     □Public Security 
□Mass media     □Others                           (Please specify your answer) 
 
18. Among the execution measures proffered by China’s Civil Procedure Law, which 
measure in your opinion is the most effective?                             
19. In your previous execution practice, what kind of problems have you ever encountered? 
□Disappearance of or Asset-hiding by debtors  
□Insolvency of debtors, thereby having no sufficient assets to meet the execution 
□Long execution period □High expenses involved in execution practice 
□Discrepancies in the execution procedures and practice amongst different local courts  
□Interference or passive resistance from execution judges or other judicial staff  
□Interference or passive resistance from local administrative organs where the target assets 
are located  
□Other problems                                 (Please specify your answer) 
 
19.1 Comparatively speaking, which problem have you encountered most frequently? (Please 
specify your answer) 
19.2 In your opinion, which problem is the most difficult one to be handled? (Please specify 
your answer) 
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20. Do you think that the foregoing problems could be solved by reforms over a short period?  
□Yes   □No 
20.1 If yes, please specify which problems could be solved by reforms over a short period. 
 
20.2 What measures, do you think, could help with solving difficulty in execution under the 
current circumstance?  
 
21. In your opinion, what kind of professional qualification should an execution judge 
possess? (more than one option are available)  
□Legal knowledge   □Financial knowledge □Negotiation skills  □Business knowledge □Other 
knowledge                                 (Please specify your answer) 
 
22. Do you think that the current on-the-job training for judges has addressed the cultivation 
of the foregoing qualifications? □Yes   □No 
22.1 If no, what knowledge, do you think, should be added into the current training for 
judges? 
 
23. Based on your experiences, what measure would you recommend creditors to take to 
ensure the outcomes of their execution cases to maximum? (Please briefly state your 
suggestions) 
 
Thank you for your co-operation in completing the questionnaire. 
 236 
 
Appendix E. Interview Guide 
1. Notify participants about the background information of the interview and request  the 
interviewees to sign the informed consent form 
2. Collect demographic data of the interviewee, including: age, position, educational 
background, year of service or practice, party membership (optional). 
3. Cover the following topics in the interview (for 30 minutes or longer): 
(1) Enforcement 
▪ Opinion about China’s current enforcement situation  
▪ Problems having ever been envisaged or identified (cases or examples)  
▪ Approaches(official,  personalised, or off-book) deployed to mitigate those problems  
▪ Underlying reasons causing those problems 
▪ Possibility of eradicating or transcend obstacles causing difficulty in enforcement 
 
 (2) Regulatory frameworks 
▪ Related governing relations and legal assistance derived wherefrom 
▪ Problems existing and needs for further reform 
 
(3) Stakeholders 
▪ Possible participants in enforcement and their roles 
▪ Influences imposed by individual participants and to what extent  
 
(4) Judicial System  
▪ Developments of China’s judicial system 
▪ Problems still existing and corresponding reasons (cases or examples) 
▪ Suggested orientation for future reform 
         Notes: Questions concerning the enforcement serve as the key targets for interviews and 
will be addressed in each interview, whereas interviewees will be flexibly consulted about 
their opinions on other questions, according to their occupation and time arrangement for 
interview.  
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